REASON AND THE UNITY OF EXPERIENCE: NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE
OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF TOTALITY

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1976
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I wish to thank all those who have aided me in the production of this dissertation. In particular, I wish to thank the members of my committee Dr. Thomas Auxter, Dr. Ellen Haring, Dr. Jay Zeman and Dr. Raymond Cay-Crosier. I am further grateful to Dr. Henry Allison, former member of the University of Florida Department of Philosophy, and Dr. George Tunstall, former member of the University of Florida Department of German and Slavic Languages, for what I consider to be invaluable assistance rendered through our many and lengthy discussions on this and related topics.
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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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December, 1976

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This dissertation is concerned to understand Nietzsche's philosophy within the rational philosophic tradition. The point of view adopted is not Nietzsche's and is almost certainly not one he would have approved but is an attempt to make sense of his general approach to the tradition. There are two basic motivations for this project: (1) the need for an account of Nietzsche's fundamental concerns in terms of the deepest characterizations of the tradition of reason, and (2) the need to do this in a way which remains within traditional philosophic language and does not require an understanding of the particular ideas and language of the person commenting on Nietzsche's philosophy, as is the case with Heidegger's and Jasper's commentaries.

To accomplish this aim, I approach the tradition according to what I believe is its most basic aspect. I treat the tradition as an extended attempt to give a unified rational account of human experience as a whole. This point of view is maintained throughout with the object of
insuring that the understanding of Nietzsche obtained will proceed on a level commensurate with the basic concern of the rational tradition.

Within the general theme of the unity of experience, the following basic subthemes become pertinent: (1) the movement of reason toward unity, (2) the principle of sufficient reason, (3) the drive to establish an unconditioned principle in philosophy, (4) Nietzsche's concepts of nihilism and the will to power. By means of these fundamental themes, I attempt to show the failure of the tradition of reason to give an explication of the unity of experience, and in terms of this, I try to gain an understanding of Nietzsche's position on nihilism and the will to power. This approach has the added virtue of demonstrating the intimate connection between nihilism and the will to power, a point not generally noticed in the commentaries on Nietzsche.

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter one establishes the theme of unity in the modern philosophic tradition and represents Kant's philosophy as the culmination of this tradition. Kant's idea of reason as seeking unity is taken as definitive of reason's role in philosophy. Kant's main concern with reason is taken as the concern of the rational tradition generally, namely the attempt to give a discursive account of the unity of experience. The second chapter is meant to carry further an already established connection between the principle of sufficient reason and the problem of unity. This leads to a consideration of Schopenhauer's philosophy in chapter three by way of transition to Nietzsche's philosophy proper. Schopenhauer is considered strictly in terms of what Nietzsche regards as Schopenhauer's failure, viz., his inability to give a unified view of experience, or his failure to reconcile Kant's Ding an Sich and the phenomenal world. The
consideration of Schopenhauer's defects leads to a discussion of nihilism, the will to power and Nietzsche's value philosophy. This in turn leads to a discussion of Nietzsche's view of unity with respect to nihilism in chapter five. In the final chapter, the general adequacy of Nietzsche's position with respect to the problem of the unity of experience in the tradition is discussed. Certain methodological problems of Nietzsche's philosophy are raised without, however, leading to a discussion in detail. These considerations invite the conclusion, similar to that of Heidegger, that although Nietzsche's philosophy lies within the traditional philosophic understanding of reason, it does not achieve unity in the form desired by this tradition.
INTRODUCTION

The present thesis is an attempt to understand the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche with respect to the Western philosophic tradition. To facilitate this project, I approach the tradition in what I believe is its basic aspect, the attempt to give a unified rational account of human experience as a whole. The attempt to give such an account fundamentally characterizes the activity of reason in the tradition. The thesis will therefore concern itself with Nietzsche's understanding of reason in the tradition. More particularly, the leading principle of reason, the principle of sufficient reason, is emphasized throughout the presentation. At all times, it is intended that the closest connection be made between the following three points of view: the activity of reason in general, the problem of the unity of experience and the principle of sufficient reason. Furthermore, as will be argued in the first chapter dealing with Kant, the drive to establish an "unconditioned" in philosophy in whatever form cannot be divorced from these three points of view and becomes important for Nietzsche's particular way of viewing the tradition. We therefore have four primary viewpoints on the movement of the rational philosophic tradition: the activity of reason in general, the attempt to give a unified account of experience as a whole, the principle of sufficient reason, and the attempt to posit an "unconditioned."

Nietzsche had much to say about the rational philosophic tradition
and furthermore had a primitive leading principle which (for him) functioned at a level as basic as any in the tradition. Since the Western rational tradition as a whole becomes an explicit theme in Nietzsche's philosophy, Nietzsche may be legitimately regarded as a philosopher of philosophy. This being the case, it seems appropriate to deal with Nietzsche's philosophy at a level coincident with the deepest possible characterization of the tradition in general. I consider this level to be a properly metaphysical or ontological one and consequently regard the most complete understanding of Nietzsche's position as possible only at this level. I will not specifically argue for this position.

Nietzsche's status as a metaphysician is controversial. The standpoint of the present thesis is simply that any philosopher who makes a problem of the activity of reason in the philosophic tradition cannot avoid philosophizing at a properly metaphysical level. A certain effort has therefore been made to place Nietzsche's philosophy within the language of the tradition. Poetic or strongly metaphorical language which one might easily fall into while discussing Nietzsche is, as far as possible, consciously kept to a minimum. On the other hand, Nietzsche's philosophy cannot be forced into the mold of a dry epistemology and there has been no attempt to do so here. There are, however, concerns which enter the philosophic tradition for the first time with Nietzsche and therefore do not completely lend themselves to explication in traditional terms. The most outstanding example of this is the theme of nihilism, Nietzsche's most basic concern. Since the project is to understand Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of the tradition and vice versa, I have tried to present this most basic concern in traditional philosophic categories. This, as I believe, can never be totally
successful but must be attempted for an adequate understanding of Nietzsche's place in philosophy.

Where does the present thesis stand with respect to the Nietzsche literature? Anyone who reads extensively in this literature will discover that it falls into two basic categories. First there is that literature which is basically expository, takes over Nietzsche's remarks on the tradition without much analysis, does not try to see the unity of his thought (in fact could not since it never goes deep enough) and, in general, leaves the reader with a lot of information on what Nietzsche said but very little knowledge of his significance philosophically. With this type of presentation, Nietzsche's philosophy emerges as just another position in the tradition to be placed alongside every other. Into this first category can be placed at least ninety percent of everything written on the subject. In the second place, we have that literature typified by the extensive Heideggerian analysis which while going deeply into a metaphysical critique of Nietzsche's philosophy, depends for its understanding upon a quite thorough acquaintance with the author's own language and philosophical position. The following thesis tries to steer a middle course between these two approaches. It strives to grasp the primary sense of Nietzsche's philosophy at a nonsuperficial level yet does not do so in terms of nontraditional language or modes of classification. Consequently, it only focuses on the most general significant features of the tradition arising out of the traditional conception of reason.

Beginning with the first chapter, Immanuel Kant's philosophy will come under discussion. There are at least three main and intimately related reasons for this. First, with Kant reason as it was understood
by the tradition comes under an explicit critique. Whether Kant's view of his own project as reason coming under its own gaze is valid or not, the fact remains that the tradition comes to a culmination in Kant's philosophy when the place of reason becomes an explicit theme.

Second, this thesis takes the position that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is primarily an essay on the principle of sufficient reason. This might be guessed simply from the fact that the Critique is an investigation of the place of reason and the principle of sufficient reason has been represented as the highest principle of reason. Viewing the Critique in this way has the advantage of allowing a more obvious connection to be made with the idea of the unity of experience or the world. Third, with Kant's phenomena/noumena distinction, we have the culmination of the perennial philosophic idea, the real/apparent world dichotomy. This separation and the question of its legitimacy became one of Nietzsche's chief interests in his consideration of the rational tradition.

The reader will search Nietzsche's writings in vain for a characterization of his philosophy as given here in terms of the unity of experience. Nietzsche did not present his views in any "system" of philosophy. What is presented here is not an attempt to make Nietzsche systematic, but an attempt to see his most basic concerns as a consistent development of one line of thought. As a prime example, this thesis tries to intimately relate nihilism as Nietzsche understands it with his concept of the will to power. Only Martin Heidegger's Nietzsche addresses itself in any thoughtful way to this connection. Yet there could hardly be a more basic connection to be made in Nietzsche's philosophy; a commentary which fails to consider this
cannot possibly claim to be dealing with Nietzsche's philosophy at its deepest level. The standpoint of unity employed in this thesis has been extracted from an extensive reading of Nietzsche's original philosophy and the commentaries on it. This standpoint has also been adopted as the result of a sustained attempt to view everyday experience in Nietzschean terms. Finally the present approach arises from the need to grasp the tradition in a convenient yet nonsuperficial form so as to make it manageable as a theme of Nietzsche's philosophy. Hopefully generalizations of the tradition used in this thesis will not be thought too artificial.

Because of the level at which Nietzsche's philosophy is treated here, there has not been much concern to use supportive material from any particular period of his development. Although changes in method, emphasis and mode of expression do occur, these do not affect Nietzsche's most basic concerns as dealt with here. At the deepest level Nietzsche's concerns remain the same. A good deal of material has been taken from the collection of notes never published by Nietzsche but first issued by his sister under the title The Will to Power (Der Wille zur Macht). The reason for this is simply that by far most of Nietzsche's explicit metaphysical remarks, remarks about the rational tradition and specific references to the will to power appear in these notes. There has been a continuing controversy for many years about the importance of Nietzsche's unpublished notes as opposed to his published writings. In my opinion, this controversy is completely pointless, because without a direct statement by Nietzsche (unlikely at this late date), there are simply no criteria by which the issue could be settled. The controversy derives its force from the initial premise that Nietzsche's
writings show basic inconsistencies, however this is a premise which has by no means been established. The most anyone need do in any case is to read Nietzsche as a whole and attempt to see his thought as a unity. My own position is that there is no inherent incompatibility at all between the published and unpublished writings and that anyone who lives with Nietzsche's thought long enough and enters into its spirit will come to the same conclusion.

The following thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter establishes the theme of unity in the rational tradition and the sense in which it culminates in Kant's philosophy. Throughout the overriding concern is with Kant's view of reason and its drive toward unity. The thesis takes Kant's main concern as the problem of the unity of experience or the constitution of a world. The second chapter is meant to carry further the connection of the principle of sufficient reason (introduced in the first chapter) with the problem of unity. This is all by way of a consideration of Schopenhauer's philosophy in chapter three which strongly emphasizes the place of the principle of sufficient reason. Schopenhauer is considered strictly in light of his failure to give a unified view of experience; his failure to reconcile Kant's Ding an sich (Schopenhauer's Will) with the phenomenal world. But Schopenhauer's failure is instructive. It leads to the conclusion that the traditional view of knowledge and quest for unity in terms of the principle of sufficient reason is not viable. This in turn leads to Nietzsche's value philosophy based upon the will to power which abjures all absolutes or unconditionals according to which the world is to be ultimately explicated. In addition, the advent of nihilism as an explicit philosophic theme is to be connected with the problem of unity.
At this point, the designation of Nietzsche as a philosopher of philosophy should make more sense since his basic concern with nihilism will have been connected with the basic problem of traditional philosophy. The last chapter concerns itself chiefly with two questions. To what extent does Nietzsche overcome the traditional problem of unity and the related question, does Nietzsche's critique of the tradition apply to his own philosophy? A discussion of these questions leads to a conclusion similar to that reached by Heidegger. That is, Nietzsche's position of perspectivism is viewed as the last one possible within the traditional view of reason. Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power is to be viewed as the last available means of expression for the activity of life (which includes the activity of the philosopher) in general. Its peculiar status lies in its self-reflexive character. Its unconditional force stems not from its mere assertion, but from the fact that it inherently excludes alternatives. Insofar, however, as the will to power is autonomous, it must be vulnerable to the weaknesses of all causa sui principles. Consequently the will to power does not fulfill the demand of the tradition for a discursive account of the unity of experience, and nihilism as outline with respect to the attempt to achieve this unity remains intact.
CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE MODERN PHILOSOPHIC TRADITION WITH RESPECT TO THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF EXPERIENCE AND THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

In order to acquire an adequate understanding of Nietzsche's view of the rational philosophic tradition and his place in it, this chapter will attempt to characterize the tradition in terms of the activity of reason. This activity is fundamentally one of a quest for unity. This activity first comes to explicit consciousness with Kant's philosophy, thus the Kantian philosophy may be regarded as a culmination of the Western philosophic tradition insofar as this tradition is viewed as rational. The present historical survey will, therefore, lead up to a discussion of Kant's philosophy with specific reference to his characterization of the activity of reason. Throughout, the emphasis will be on reason and its activity as the attempt to give an account of the unity of human experience. Having understood the course of the modern rational tradition in terms of its fundamental activity, the foundation will be laid for an understanding of Nietzsche's position with respect to this tradition.

As indicated, when we speak of unity, by this is meant the unity of experience. This unity is recognized as the basis for notions like the "universe," "world" and ultimately, the notion of "thing" in general. In philosophy, this recognition of unity has been the basis for the postulation of substance, that which underlies the properties of an object and allows us to speak of a totality or a unity in
opposition to a mere aggregate. In addition, the notion of permanence has been connected with the idea of substance. The postulation of substance is quite understandable if we take a certain common view of the tradition. This view as expressed by Lucien Goldmann is as follows:

All genuinely philosophical thought sets out from the premiss that there is in human existence something eternal and immutable, the search for which constitutes the principal task of philosophy; this point of departure thus assumes the existence of objective truth.¹

This is a view with which Nietzsche would certainly agree. The notions of permanence and unity persist throughout the tradition and their power as fundamental motivating factors can be clearly seen. This is no less true with respect to Kant's Inaugural Dissertation (Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World) where we meet the question of unity in the form of the totality vs the aggregate. In Hume's problems with causality, the problem of unity is further perceptible with the felt need for but lack of a necessary connection between events. Concerning the assumption of objective truth as Goldmann characterizes the tradition, we are principally interested here in this as it developed from the time that ens is essentially no longer ens creatum but becomes ens certum, indubitatum, vere cogitatum. Truth is now no longer decided by the method of authority but becomes dependent on the nature of thinking.

In Descartes' example of the changing characteristics of wax, we get the explicit move toward truth as certainty based upon the thinking substance. The thinghood of the wax leads to the unity of the thinking substance, as its basis; "... with how much more [evidence] and distinctness must it be said that I now know myself, since all the reasons
which contribute to the knowledge of wax, or any other body whatever, are yet better proofs of the nature of my mind."2 The external world serves as one gigantic piece of evidence for the existence of the cogito and the cogito then subsequently becomes the basis for the truth of perception through the criteria of clarity and distinctness "and I have already fully demonstrated that all that I know clearly is true."3 "... what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true."4 What truth is Descartes assumes we already know. He is mainly interested in a criterion whereby we can determine what is true. The criteria, of course, are clarity and distinctness. To perceive something clearly and distinctly is to be able to isolate it from everything else, to individuate the perception from others. The criteria of clarity and distinctness as criteria for determining truth can be correlated with Nietzsche's view, to be discussed in more detail later, of the activity of philosophy as imposing "upon becoming the character of being."5 But this further involves a static conception of truth, that is, a conception of truth as characterized above by Goldmann. It is with the beginning of the modern period that this static conception of truth becomes explicitly formulated in terms of clarity and distinctness. The notion of truth as certainty emerges with criteria for determining certainty.

In Principle 10 of the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes says,

And when I stated that this proposition I think, therefore I am is the first and most certain which presents itself to those who philosophise in orderly fashion, I did not for all that deny that we must first of all know what is knowledge, what is existence, and what is certainty, and that in order to think we must be, and such like; but because these are notions of the simplest possible kind, which of themselves give us no knowledge of anything that exists, I did not think them worthy of being put on record.6
That which can be determined as certain is true. We already presumably know what certainty is, but we are in need of a set of criteria for discovering what can be taken as certain. These criteria Descartes finds in clarity and distinctness based upon the model of mathematics. Descartes upholds the traditional notion of man as the rational animal with an already presupposed connection made between rationality, thinking and certainty. Yet, it is this presupposed nature of and emphasis upon reason as primary which conditions the attempts after Descartes to humanly grasp (rationalize) experience as a whole.

The example of the wax which is meant to lead to the indubitability of the cogito shows that already an idea of what will count as certain is already operative in Descartes' thinking. There is nothing certain in sense impressions because they are in flux, are mutable. The idea of certainty and truth as concomitant with immutability is, of course, an old theme. With Descartes, however, man as a thinking being becomes capable of certainty without waiting for revelation. True, God still waits in the background to guarantee the validity of the application of a criterion of clarity and distinctness, however man reaches this conclusion through his reason. Immutability, as it did traditionally, becomes a sign for that which is most true; it becomes a basis for knowing anything. The light of nature tells us that "no qualities or properties pertain to nothing; and that where some are perceived there must necessarily be some thing or substance on which they depend. And the same light shows us that we know a thing or substance so much the better the more properties we observe in it." We know substance as that which supports the properties and while properties may come and go, the substance persists and we are allowed to speak of the "same"
object. Here there is nothing at all different from the scholastic doctrines.

Descartes' philosophy is significant because it defines the nature of thinking which persists throughout modern philosophy; it defines the notion of reason and its operation. Furthermore the role of reason in man's attempt to deal with his world is emphasized. Besides the notion of clarity and distinctness as criteria of truth, we get the notion that thinking is always conscious thinking, a notion which is later criticized by Leibniz. More importantly, what comes to consciousness is most significant for Descartes; what I consciously perceive clearly and distinctly is true. Substance itself is not perceived, but Descartes implies it is the result of an immediate inference from a group of properties and the "notion that nothing is possessed of no attributes, properties, or qualities." But it could be objected that this is circular reasoning because the notion of property implies its being a property of something, therefore, properties could not be apprehended as such. At any rate, it is significant that the mutability of properties of the "same thing" force us to push on to something less mutable and hence, more "real." Reality thus becomes a function of mutability.

Of the things we consider as real, the most general are substance, duration, order, number, and possibly such other similar matters as range through all the classes of real things. I do not observe, however, more than two ultimate classes of real things -- the one is intellectual things, or those of the intelligence, that is, pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance, the other is material things, or that pertaining to extended substances, i.e., to body.

Thinking substance and extended substance are both substances but still only with a qualification, namely, that they have both been
created by God. Descartes says, "By substance, we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist. And, in fact, only one single substance can be understood which clearly needs nothing else, namely, God." Yet the notion that both extension and thinking come under the common designation substance, does not help us in understanding the interaction between them. Furthermore, the principium individuationis and its connection with substance is left unknown. According to Descartes variety was presumably produced through an original motion caused by God in extension. There is a sort of Deus ex machina in the action of God producing variety in the world. The relation of properties of things to the things themselves (things taken as substances) presents a problem of unity which is never made clear.

When we come to the philosophy of Spinoza, we have several changes, the most important of which is that there is only one substance of which extension and thought are attributes. These two attributes may be conceived as absolutely distinct from one another but are to be regarded as expressions of one substance. The important point is that the dichotomy of two substances is recognized by Spinoza as untenable. Spinoza is concerned to avoid any kind of emanationism, therefore God must be represented as being extended. The motion in matter is an activity of extension as an attribute of the one substance. The Deus ex machina involved in a distinct separation of natura naturans and natura naturata is supposedly avoided in Spinoza, but is it really? The Deus ex machina actually lies in Spinoza's claim that finite modes appear out of the one substance but we don't know how this happens. Spinoza must, as must every philosopher, face the problem of those who
favor the theory of emanationists, namely how does the finite proceed from the infinite or multiplicity from unity. This problem does not seem to be overcome by Spinoza. He is forced to make some attempt to solve it by postulating an infinite series of efficient causes but this hardly solves the problem of unity.

Descartes postulated distinct substances which obviously did not permit an understandable unity; Spinoza made the next logical move by developing a monism in which everything was said to be the expression of one substance. Both of these thinkers recognized, at least implicitly, the problem they were faced with; "the truth about being as such in totality" had not been realized. In both cases a unity of experience was recognized and multiplicity was to be accounted for. Furthermore, certain distinctions must be taken as given absolutely. Descartes has two absolutes in the form of the res cogitans and the res extensa which must produce a unity. Spinoza has an absolute causa sui substance and must account for multiplicity, that is to say: finitude. From his initial monistic position, Spinoza must account for the emergence of particulars while still maintaining their identity with the whole. The philosophy of Leibniz may be looked at as an attempt to overcome Spinoza's problems of diversity in unity. The main point of this discussion is that Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz represent the three logical alternatives for accounting for multiplicity out of unity within a certain given framework, yet because of the way the problem is set up in terms of an already given idea of reason and its role, a Deus ex machina must always be introduced.

In the Leibnizian philosophy, totality is represented by the totality of perspectives of the monads which are infinite and differ
from one another by no specifiable degree, however small. This is the analogue of the principle of least difference. But this is not merely a successive infinite like Spinoza's infinite chain of efficient causes. Because each monad is a perspective on the whole universe, it contains the universe in its own way while maintaining its distinctness. Furthermore, the monads are unextended, simple substances which are not subject to external action, because strictly speaking there is no external. Descartes had the problem of the atomists while Spinoza had the problem of the monists. Leibniz's solution is really ingenious in that he affirms a multiplicity of substances while maintaining that each substance reflects all the others.

Leibniz himself seems to have seen his position as the only alternative to the shortcomings of the Cartesian and Spinozistic philosophies. Each monad of the Leibnizian system is a self-contained, self-active center of force which is constantly developing new perspectives. This is what Leibniz calls appetition. Extension and matter are not primary for Leibniz as for Descartes since extension implies divisibility and therefore no simplicity, and matter is by no means simple. Leibniz is fully aware that matter alone was incapable of offering any ultimate explanation. Yet a substance has to be postulated and in an absolute sense. In the New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Leibniz says we postulate substance "from that which demands a kind of knowledge of which the object does not admit."

Ingenious as Leibniz's solution of the problems of Descartes and Spinoza is, the necessity of postulating absolute, causa sui, unconditional shows its effects in his philosophy. In the first place, the exact place of God as the highest monad seems impossible to clarify
within his system. We are led to God for the ultimate explanation of things. Furthermore, God has created the infinity of monads which as substances are ultimately distinct from one another. Each of these monads, since they reflect the whole, must contain God although in an obscure way. But God has a perfectly adequate, clear and distinct perception of the whole, so the necessity for creating an infinity of monads never becomes clear. Because Leibniz is not clear about the position of God, he seems constantly to equivocate between God as separate from his creation and identified with it. Indeed it seems impossible to understand what creation could mean in this case. In the Discourse on Metaphysics, it is said "each substance is a world by itself, independent of everything else excepting God." But in what the dependence on God consists is difficult to say. We always come back to the same problem, either God is his creation or he is distinct from it. Furthermore, in several places in Leibniz's writings we meet the traditional notion that everything is "emanating" from God in a continuous act of creation and is thereby held in existence. In one place God is referred to as the "extramundane reason of things." But the notion of "emanation" and the "reason of things" do not make the unity of the world as we experience it any more comprehensible although they are presumably used to express a recognized unity.

Secondly, and as an illustration of problems of unity, the perennial dichotomy of contingency and necessity is preserved in Leibniz in the form of the inability to unify the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of contradiction. The problem becomes one of accounting for contingent truths in a necessary universe. Although contingent truths may be said to be certain, they cannot be said to be
necessary. Leibniz attempts his famous resolution of the problem of contingency and necessity in his distinction between moral perfection and metaphysical perfection, yet, as far as I know, no one has made adequate sense of this distinction.\textsuperscript{18}

Thirdly, the postulating of absolute unconditionals implies that Leibniz holds an absolute theory of truth. That is, there is a truth to be attained although for the human mind the acquisition of adequate knowledge of "external" objects would require an infinite analysis. In a letter, Leibniz makes another kind of distinction which is more Kantian.

\textbf{Being itself and truth are not known wholly through the senses; for it would not be impossible for a creature to have long and orderly dreams, resembling our life, of such a sort that everything which it thought it perceived through the senses would be but mere appearance. There must therefore be something beyond the senses, which distinguishes the true from the apparent.}\textsuperscript{19}

Positing a multiplicity of absolute unconditionals causes further problems in that Leibniz finds it necessary to postulate a preestablished harmony because his monads are absolutely distinct from one another even though their perspectives can never be entirely distinguished. Leibniz does not see occasionalism as a viable alternative. But the nature of each monad consists only in perception and appetition and its perception is a perception of the universe which includes the other monads. Given all of this, what does it mean to say that the monads are absolutely distinct? The problem is one of the incompatibility of Leibniz's principle of continuity, and his doctrine of discrete substances. Of course this is just another statement of the unity-multiplicity problem, and, although we can make sense of this in
mathematics, on the level of matters of fact, where metaphysics is ultimately concerned to understand it, the problem seems insoluble. The principle of continuity follows from the principle of sufficient reason, but how do we know that this does not apply just in the order of knowledge and not in the order of nature? Leibniz's answer would of course be that there is no ultimate distinction between mind and matter but this conclusion must itself be based upon the principle of continuity.

There is no intention to go into Leibniz's philosophy in greater detail, but what has been said of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz should suffice to show that they all move within a certain framework of thinking. They represent the three possible basic alternatives within this framework. Put in its crudest form, these alternatives are atomism, monism or both at once. From this point of view, we recognize Liebniz as one end point in the history of Philosophy. Either all philosophy is condemned to follow these three basic forms, although perhaps with a greatly diversified content, or a change in the point of view of what philosophy is to do is necessary. Yet the task of metaphysics remains the same; to make comprehensible the unity of experience as a whole.

While the position of the Christian God was intact, it is easy to see that the Deus ex machina could always be employed without suspicion, and this makes it understandable that a position like occasionalism could and did develop early in the history of modern philosophy. With the occasionalists the "unreasonable" nature of this device did not appear as an objection as it might today. With the move to the cogito and the move toward man as the center, the comprehensibility of all
being becomes necessary because man must take over explanations previously referred to God. This is simply a characteristic of the move out of the middle ages. This comprehension, as mentioned, is characterized by a certain framework of thinking. What is this framework? The discussions above meant to aim at the idea that the framework of thinking beginning with Descartes is characterized by a certain assumption as to the priority and nature of "objective" thinking. The dominant mode of thinking has as its banner the notion of "clear and distinct ideas." From this position the notion that thinking is to take place in terms of well defined categories follows immediately.

As a further indication that this position is correct, the following situation should be noted from the position of Leibniz in 1684. Leibniz notes that there has been abuse of the criteria of clarity and distinctness on the ground that something may appear as clear and distinct "and turns out to be really obscure and indistinct." Leibniz then says, "This axiom is therefore useless so long as we have not drawn up the criteria of the clear and distinct, such as we have given." But what "criteria" are given or can be given? Leibniz gave the following: "... knowledge is clear when it is sufficient to enable me to recognize the things represented ...." Knowledge "is indistinct as soon as I am not able to enumerate separately the characteristics required to distinguish [note the circularity in the use of this word] the thing from others ...." Furthermore "a distinct idea ... is like the one the goldsmiths have of gold ... one based on distinctive [?] characters and results of assayers' tests which suffice to distinguish [?] gold from all other similar bodies." At another place Leibniz says, "... it already becomes clear that in order to
have distinct knowledge, we need intuitive awareness of its content. "

It seems then that we decide if our knowledge is clear and distinct by seeing whether it is clear and distinct, and the appeal to intuitive knowledge seems very "irrational." So we see that clarity and distinctness function as an ultimate ground of truth and objective knowledge.

In the New Essays, Philalethes says, "When words are so joined in propositions that they express exactly the agreement or disagreement as it really is, it is a certainty of truth ...." Theophilus, the exponent of Leibniz's views then says that this "kind of certainty appears to be nothing else than the truth itself." However, the determination of the agreement or disagreement depends upon our ability to discriminate a situation that really is.

In summation, the foregoing treatment of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz was meant to indicate the plausibility of their metaphysical positions once given a certain way or regarding truth and being. It was emphasized here and was emphasized by Nietzsche that this conception has been a traditionally static and categorial one. That the framework for deciding questions of truth was given as static follows from Descartes' adoption of the criteria of clarity and distinctness. These criteria only make explicit an already long-established criterion for truth, namely, immutability. That which is mutable, that which changes into something else is that which is confusing. It is essential that a thing remain identical with itself and endure. That which is absolutely true must be absolutely immutable. This points to an unconditioned; something which is unconditionally true, something in itself. But the notion of an unconditioned truth is by definition irrational according to the principle of sufficient reason, because
reason depends upon the ways in which parts of our experience are not radically distinct from others. Yet the elimination of confusion depends upon the ability to clearly and distinctly discriminate areas of our experience. Leibniz saw both the principle of noncontradiction and the principle of sufficient reason as necessary but their connection is not too clear.

As a clue to the way truth was regarded in the tradition being considered, consider the following quotation from Leibniz and also employed by Heidegger in On the Essence of Ground (Vom Wesen des Grundes):

Thus a predicate, or consequent, is always present in a subject, or antecedent; and in this fact consists the universal nature of truth ... This connection and inclusion of the predicate in the subject is explicit in relations of identity. In all other relations it is implicit and is revealed through an analysis of notions, upon which a priori demonstration is based.

From these things, which have not been adequately considered due to their great simplicity, there follow many other things of great importance. Indeed, from them there at once arises the familiar axiom: "Nothing is without reason," or "there is no effect without a cause." If the axiom did not hold, there might be a truth which could not be proved a priori, i.e., which could not be resolved into relations of identity; and this is contrary to the nature of truth, which is always identical, whether explicitly or implicitly.25

The statement shows the principle of sufficient reason as dependent upon a notion of truth as identity. It would go against the nature of reason for there to be any beings without a reason. This conclusion follows upon the supposition of a complete metaphysical unity wherein a break or hiatus would be contrary to reason. Experience forms a continuum as Leibniz thought, and if this were not the case, human understanding of experience would be defeated from the start. For Leibniz, this fact is expressed in the proposition with its subject-predicate form. Every subject can ultimately be exhausted in its
predicate. Leibniz is quite correct when he views what it would mean to possess the "truth" as understanding experience as a whole. It must be noted, however, that a categorical way of thinking seems to be self-defeating with respect to the project of understanding experience as a unity. In the end, we would be under the obligation to break out of our categories in order to achieve the desired unity. Each category would have to be shown in its essential connection with every other and thus lose its status of a well-defined category; the very status which was thought to be the source of its power.

In the philosophic positions discussed we recognize a "need" to maintain at least three conflicting notions which provide the framework in which these metaphysical positions become the viable alternatives. These conflicting notions are experience as a unified whole, an unconditional "substance" and the criteria of clarity and distinctness for deciding truth. The philosophy of Leibniz is the last alternative within this framework and in this light, at least, it is understandable that L.W. Beck in his Early German Philosophy says, "with the exception of Lessing, German philosophers who lived between Leibniz and Kant are now forgotten." Moreover, the foregoing makes plausible Nietzsche's characterization of the philosopher's attempt "to impose upon becoming the character of being ...." Again Nietzsche's statement that the "will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable ..." exhibits considerable force when we understand these alternatives of the tradition.

The drive to the "thinkability of all being," as Nietzsche describes traditional philosophy, implies that the philosopher must represent human experience somehow as a totality (unity). This is
implied by those philosophers who see the principle of sufficient reason as fundamental for any rational endeavor. The requirement for a unified view, however, has further required that some "unconditioned" be postulated and this "unconditioned" has been traditionally represented as substance.

Now it is simply not philosophically adequate to postulate an unconditioned immutable substance and then assert that the particulars of experience emerge from this or exhibit this substance while at the same time remaining identical with it. What philosophy demands is an understanding of this permanence-in-change situation but without being condemned to proceed strictly from one side of the permanence-flux dichotomy or the other. To satisfy this situation would be to achieve a philosophic unity in its most radical form.

The permanence-flux dichotomy may show up in a purely abstract way as in considerations of change in general or it may take the form of a split between the abstract realm as a whole and the concrete. The split is sometimes seen under the rubric Geisteswissenschaft/Naturwissenschaft. It is this latter characterization and the attempt to gain a unified experience in terms of it which most interested Nietzsche and Kant. Nietzsche's many remarks concerning the scholar and his remarks on the will-to-truth as anti-life are meant to reflect the one-sided nature of the traditional way of seeking unity. It has been the contention of the presentation of this part so far to indicate that a certain pregiven way of regarding truth in an absolute sense, in a static, categorial, unconditioned sense, biased the search for a unified human experience from the start. The notion of truth and what it means to understand which reigns in the modern tradition as an abstract notion
is unsuccessful in bringing about even an adequate abstract unity much less one which takes into account the "irrational" side of human experience.  

In the remaining pages of this Chapter, the discussion will revolve around Kant's attempts to deal with the problem of the disunity of experience. It will be seen that Kant retains the fundamental notions of the tradition such that the fundamental problem of disunity remains. Yet Kant represents an extreme solution to the problem which seems plausible if it is granted that Leibniz represents a last alternative within a certain given approach to the problem. As is well known, Kant's expedient is to radically separate two aspects of experience, the theoretical and practical. It is the contention of this discussion that Kant's expedient is dictated by a recognition that the traditional approach will not work and that although the notion of an unconditioned cannot be given up, knowledge of it must be radically limited. Kant's notion of what thinking involves, however, by no means differs from the tradition. 

In Kant's famous letter to Marcus Herz of 1772, Kant gives an informal review of alternatives to account for the unity of experience somewhat after the manner of Leibniz's review of his predecessors' attempts. Kant, like Leibniz, is seen to reject any Deus ex machina position as "the most absurd argument one could choose." Then in The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant mentions a "middle course" between experience making concepts possible or concepts making experience possible.

A middle course may be proposed between the two ... [that is] subjective dispositions of thought, implanted in us from the first moment of our existence, and so ordered by our Creator that their employment is in
complete harmony with the laws of nature in accordance with which experience proceeds -- a kind of preformation-system of pure reason.31

But Kant goes on to write:

... there is this decisive objection against the suggested middle course, that the necessity of the categories, which belongs to their very conception, would then have to be sacrificed. The concept of cause, for instance, which expresses the necessity of an event under presupposed condition would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, of connecting certain empirical representations according to the rule of causal relation.32

In these lines is expressed the fundamental proposition without which The Critique of Pure Reason would not exist and which dictates Kant's procedure throughout, namely that there is an absolutely necessary aspect of experience which must be accounted for. It is ultimately the failure of all previous positions to account for this which condemns them. But we ask, "Where does this supposition come from?" What is being recognized with this claim of necessity? If we read the Critique in terms of this concern with necessity, it is easy to miss Kant's fundamental viewpoint. The necessity that Kant has in mind is that which goes to make up one unified human experience. The emphasis upon necessity as Kant presents it means that all parts of experience are in thoroughgoing interconnection and constitute a totality or unity. Kant's viewpoint on this will be presented in the following in his Analogies.

Certainly we cannot treat necessity in a Humean sense or in terms of a "necessary" causal connection of the billiard ball variety. If this is done, Kant's Second and Third Analogy concerning the reciprocity and simultaneity of cause and effect becomes hopelessly confused or even nonsense.33
As a last remark on this issue of necessity, it should be noted that Kant's objection above with regard to the "middle course" has no force at all if he is concerned with the "necessity" of particular events in causal connection in a Humean sense. This is so because a theory of preestablished harmony would not at all sacrifice "the necessity of the categories." That is, it would not sacrifice their necessity in so far as all experience would be seen to be in conformity with them. What Kant really intends to convey here is that a theory of preestablished harmony is not "reasonable;" does not allow itself to be ultimately understood, and therefore defeats from the start any attempt to attain a unified view.

We see what primarily concerns Kant when we look at his Inaugural Dissertation and find that it starts off immediately with the problem of the possibility of the recognition of a world in general. In this, we have explicitly presented the problem of unity in multiplicity. Kant says of the problem, "This absolute totality may bear on the face of it the appearance of an everyday concept and one that is easily met with, especially when it is stated negatively as happens in a definition. Yet when we reflect upon it more deeply it is seen to constitute a crux for the philosopher." The problem of the possibility of a "world" is the philosophic problem par excellence. So we see once again that Kant is essentially concerned with the basic metaphysical issue whose last possibility of formulation was given above as articulated in the position of Leibniz. This emphasis upon the problem of unity as Kant's main concern is, of course, not new and may be found discussed in a work entitled Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant by Radoslav Tsanoff. It is moreover the position taken by Lucien Goldmann in his work,
Immanuel Kant. Note the following quotation which is representative of the present thesis:

... it is with Kant that philosophy first attains knowledge of one of the most important dialectical oppositions -- between empiricism and totality, between form and content -- ... Kant was the first to set out this opposition in all its starkness and to place it at the center of his philosophical system.36

Note also the following:

Kant seems to me to be the first modern thinker to recognize anew the importance of the totality as a fundamental category of existence, or at least to recognize its problematic character.37

It must be noted at the outset that from the pre-critical period onwards the category of totality occupies a most important place. Indeed, it provides the key to the development of Kant's thought, a point which most of the neo-Kantians failed to grasp.38

Before going into Kant's attempt to deal with the problem of the unity of experience, a comment is necessary in terms of the possible objection that the empiricist approach is left out of account in this presentation. In effect, this is quite true, yet, on the other hand, the rationalists mentioned have not been considered simply because they are rationalists. They have been considered because it is more obvious in their case that their prime concern has been to represent experience as a unity or a whole. This treatment is not meant in any way as an attempt to defend the rationalists against traditional objections to their program. It is well known that Kant was critical of both the so-called rational and empirical approaches, and he is sometimes represented as attempting their reconciliation. It must be pointed out, however, that this is once again a confirmation that Kant's ultimate concern is that of the problem of unity. In other words, the traditional
division of method according to rationalism and empiricism both turn out (from a Kantian point of view) to be inadequate for dealing with a complete explanation of experience or, as characterized here, the representation of experience as a unity. Both the rationalists and empiricists may be represented as having the same ultimate goal yet differing in the means of achieving it.

If we ask ourselves why so much attention was given by Kant and others to Hume's encounter with the principle of causality, the ultimate answer to this must come in the form of a concern to understand experience as a unity. Answers to the question in the forms: "Science depends upon the principle," or "the work of science is put in jeopardy by Humean skepticism," are really quite superficial from a philosophic point of view. This is shown by the fact that the concern to "save" science in this sense is a concern to save a way of unifying a large part of my experience and a concern to save the hope that a sure method of continuing the process of unification has been found. At any rate, in the interest of completeness and to help point up its inadequacy, a few words concerning the naturalistic-realistic approach are given below. There will then follow a more specific treatment of Kant. The problem of the unity of experience before Kant had more and more taken on a psychological tendency where attention is given to the coordination of the senses and the relation of the senses to the intellect.

In speaking of this trend in English and French psychology of the first half of the eighteenth century, Cassirer in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment says, "Both these psychologies want to get rid of the last remnants of dualism which had remained in Locke's psychological principles; they want to do away with the distinction between internal
and external experience and reduce all human knowledge to a single source." In fact, Cassirer sees as the "common center" of epistemological and psychological considerations at this time the problem which Molyneux first formulated in his *Optica*.

Is the experience derived from one field of sense perception a sufficient basis on which to construct another field of perception that is of qualitatively different content and of specifically different structure? Is there an inner connection [allowing us to make a transition from one sense to another]. Will a person born blind -- who has acquired an exact knowledge of certain corporeal forms by means of experience [have the same power of discrimination without the sense of touch if he regains his sight].

Progress beyond Leibniz takes the form of a clear separation of the sensible from the intellectual and then attempts to get them together. This is not exactly how the problem of unity was posed for Leibniz, but there seems to have been general dissatisfaction with Leibniz's adjudication of mind and matter according to clear and confused perception. Also, however, Leibniz's objections to Locke did not become generally known until 1765 in the *New Essays*.

At any rate, because of the preoccupation with the unity of experience in the way described by Cassirer, experiments like the famous Cheseldon case of 1728, in which a boy born blind was given sight, generated tremendous interest. From this point on, until the time of Kant's reformulation, confusion reigns supreme with all kinds of sensationalistic interpretations which get nowhere with the problem of unity because of their realistic-psychological orientation.

It is in the form of the relation of the understanding to objects of sense that Kant takes up the problem of the unity of experience. But it is to be noted that Kant's perspective on the problem is deeper than his predecessor's and in this respect he harks back to Leibniz.
For Leibniz there was a primary interest in the question of the most basic principles of reality and of man's place in the universe. His concerns in this sense may be properly termed metaphysical. With the emphasis upon psychological and physiological concerns which antedate Kant, the question of the possibility of a metaphysics, in so far as we can characterize it as a concern with a unified experience, never gets posed. Kant would claim that this is always the case with a naturalistic-realistic approach. This is why Kant may be interpreted as the only logical successor to Leibniz as was earlier indicated with reference to L.W. Beck. Both Kant and Leibniz were concerned to delineate those features of experience within which my experience of a world becomes possible at all (although this was not Leibniz's way of putting it). In terms of this situation, what do we see Hume doing when he fails to find a necessary connection between events in terms of the principle of causality? In essence, Hume gives up by appealing to custom. Yet, he has no choice given the already established realistic standpoint from which he philosophizes.

Immediately before Kant, thinkers were occupied with wondering about the status of non-logical necessity principally in the form of Hume's problem. Here was a necessity not determinable by the principle of contradiction. Yet here again we are back to Leibniz and his postulation of two first principles of reasoning; the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. Indeed it seems that the only way to make sense out of Kant's Second and Third Analogies is to regard his problem there as one concerning the principle of sufficient reason and not as one of causal connection in the billiard ball sense. The principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz and Kant was a realization
of the unity of experience. Consequently, as mentioned earlier, the necessity Kant is concerned with in The Critique of Pure Reason is that of the necessary unity recognized in experience and just as this unity is simply recognized and cannot be argued for, likewise, to speak with Schopenhauer, "to seek a proof for the principle of sufficient reason, is, ... an especially flagrant absurdity." We see the same opinion expressed by Leibniz in his correspondence with Clarke, and in this respect Leibniz's insight was ahead of many of those who followed him, namely, that the principle of contradiction alone could not be regarded as the highest principle of reason. Yet even Leibniz did not grasp fully the insight at the basis of the postulation of the principle of sufficient reason, for he says that it applies to contingency while the principle of contradiction applies to necessity. Necessity is taken in the sense of logical necessity. The principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz gets tied up with possible worlds in notions of the "best" and expressions like the following:

All contingent propositions have reason for being as they are rather than otherwise or (what is the same thing) they have a priori proofs of their truth, which render them certain, and show that the connection of subject and predicate in these propositions has its foundation in the nature of the one and the other; but they do not have demonstrations of necessity, since these reasons are only founded on the principle of contingency or the existence of things, i.e., on what is or appears the best among several equally possible things .... But too much gets sneaked in here with "the connection of subject and predicate in these propositions has its foundation in the nature of the one and the other ...." It is precisely this connection as constituting a unity which is the most interesting thing. The principle of sufficient reason simply says that there must be a chain of events leading up to any particular event we might choose such as Caesar crossing the
Rubicon and determined by the ultimate reason; that God freely chose this world. But the real unity of this connection of events, we never learn. The highest approach to unity is achieved by the postulation of individual substances each of which reflects the whole universe. But when we specifically examine the connection between subject and predicate, we postulate that all relations reduce to the relation of identity. For Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason plays less of a role in describing what is recognized when we recognize a world, than in the question "why this world at all?"

The principle of sufficient reason after Leibniz takes on the more explicit sense of referring to the unity of experience, and controversy centers around whether its status is logical or ontological. However, it is not realized that at the level of the true insight regarding the unity of experience, that is, the true meaning of the principle of sufficient reason, the logical/ontological distinction really doesn't hold up. We still get the old distinction of matter and form at this level in the discussions at the time of Kant warning not to confuse reasons with causes. Reasons belong to thought, causes concern the material world. While this may be a legitimate distinction, we cannot stop with it if our task is to make the unity of experience understandable. But we have seen that this was indeed Kant's problem as he expressed it in his Inaugural Dissertation and later as the unity of the various fields of human endeavor under metaphysics. The task is to find the highest principle of unity in experience and of course, we mean experience as a whole.

Note the following from "The Discipline of Pure Reason" in the Critique.
The semblance of conviction which rests upon subjective causes of association [as opposed to a proof which shows the necessary conditions for any objective experience], and which is regarded as insight into a natural affinity, cannot balance the misgivings to which so hazardous a course must rightly give rise. On this account, all attempts to prove the principle of sufficient reason have, by the universal admission of those concerned, been fruitless; and prior to our own transcendental criticism, it was considered better, since that principle could not be surrendered, boldly to appeal to the common sense of mankind — an expedient which always is a sign that the cause of reason is in desperate straits — rather than to attempt new dogmatic proofs.

It is perfectly clear from this that Kant cannot be satisfied with any philosophical investigation which stops short of a complete explication of experience. This passage is also confirmation of the thesis that, in spite of only a few explicit references to it, Kant was quite concerned with the principle of sufficient reason and what it represents as an ultimate principle, namely, an expression of the recognition of the ultimate unity of experience. As a further confirmation of Kant's concern, the "Second Analogy" should be noted in which the only other mention of the principle of sufficient reason occurs in connection with the unity of time; "The principle of sufficient reason is thus the ground of possible experience, that is, of objective knowledge of appearances in respect of their relation in the order of time."

Furthermore, in the section entitled "Transcendental Logic" where general logic is contrasted with transcendental logic, the principle of contradiction is given as the highest appeal in general logic, but no principle for transcendental logic is given. From the previous history of philosophy we might guess that this would be the principle of sufficient reason — and indeed, it turns out to be Kant's form of this principle. Kant, however, no doubt to divorce himself from the
previous confusions and Leibniz generally avoids its use.

There will be no attempt here to discuss in detail Kant's "theory of knowledge." We are interested mainly in how his doctrine relates to the previous discussion concerning the unity of experience and what we have called a certain way of thinking characteristic of the tradition. It is well known that Kant distinguished between the phenomenal world with which our knowledge is concerned and the noumenal world of which we cannot have any knowledge. Furthermore, the unity of experience, the content of experience consisting of appearances only, is to be accounted for by the unity of consciousness. So, "the transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object." This is the basis of all our "objective" knowledge and what makes a unified experience possible. The detailed derivation of this is given in the "Transcendental Deduction."

It is furthermore well known that Kant wanted to avoid both transcendental realism and subjective idealism. To achieve this, it was necessary to posit the subject as the source of objective knowledge while still maintaining the subject/object distinction in a real sense. The unity which Kant was ostensibly concerned to comprehend was that concerning the question of how concepts could apply to objects; the familiar problem of unity as we saw it formulated in the period between Kant and Leibniz. As Kant says, "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects." The problem of unity presents itself in a number of basic ways. On the one hand, we may confront the problem at the level of the unity of appearances, that is, in terms of a world which appears to a subject.
On the other hand, we may confront the problem in terms of the unity of the perceiving subject with the world that appears. Kant was, of course, concerned to show that these are by no means isolated problems. Ultimately, however, when no longer concerned primarily with reason in its theoretical employment, Kant is forced to preserve a disunity in terms of the phenomenal/noumenal distinction. With regard to the world as appearance and the problem of multiplicity in unity at this level, what we require is a principium individuationis under which unity is maintained. Kant attempts to ground the connection of multiplicity in unity through time. This is made explicit in the analogies of experience where Kant's fundamental use of time is equated with the fundamental character of the principle of sufficient reason. In this respect, it makes sense that the Analogies are the last stage of the Critique before the treatment of the phenomena/noumena division. In other words, once we reach the level of the principle of sufficient reason, at the level of appearances there is nowhere else to go.

With regard to Kant's inability to overcome all disunity, we notice that Kant is quite unequivocal about the fact that a "manifold of sense" is given and furthermore given as a manifold. In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" Kant says, "Objects are given to us by means of sensibility," very loosely speaking, of course, since as such an "object" cannot be given. The object is given "insofar as the mind is affected in a certain way." The subject is in this sense "receptive." "Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations ...." Through the union of the
sensible given and concepts, knowledge arises.

Although this is the way human knowledge is constituted, Kant postulates another way of knowing which eliminates the receptive aspect of knowledge. The distinction is between an *intuitus derivativus* and an *intuitus originarius*. In the former case, the understanding must wait on the manifold of sense before there can be knowledge; the concepts only represent the possibility of an object. In the latter case, a direct knowledge of the object is postulated apart from sensibility. This knowledge would be knowledge of the thing-in-itself. For us mortals, the understanding stands in the service of sensible intuition. But this means that human knowledge depends upon "something" independent of itself. The postulation of the thing-in-itself is at least partially the result of the receptivity associated with our human finite knowing. Kant must account for the givenness of a manifold of sense without conceding a complete objective idealism?

In order to grasp in more detail what Kant's treatment of unity involves at the theoretical level, and thus to confirm that Kant's discussion in the Analogies is basically a concern with the principle of sufficient reason, the Analogies will be discussed with reference to A.O. Lovejoy's article "On Kant's Reply to Hume." 52

Firstly, Lovejoy seems to be in basic agreement with the thesis of the discussion so far that Leibniz is really the last figure of great significance when we consider Kant's basic concern in the *Critique*. Secondly, as a result of this, Lovejoy sees the central importance of the Second Analogy in the *Critique*. Thirdly, Lovejoy correctly sees that Leibniz did not take the principle of sufficient reason in a more extended sense "as Kant believed that he had." The
more extended sense was meant by Kant to provide an apodictic justification for synthetic judgments. Fourthly, Lovejoy's conclusion is that Kant did not solve Hume's problem according to the exposition of the Second Analogy, and as Kant presents it, we can only agree. But it must be said that Lovejoy does not attempt to extend the concept of the principle of sufficient reason or attempt to see what Kant is really up to. Lovejoy himself does not totally grasp the insight expressed in the principle of sufficient reason, but regards it according to a Humean model and, therefore, as noted earlier, the argumentation of Kant becomes nonsense and nonsense is relatively easy to criticize. It will be necessary to return to this point and ask whether in light of the previous discussion there might be necessary reasons for the mode of Kant's presentation and therefore the resulting misunderstanding of the Analogies.

Kant's concern, as has been insisted all along, was that of the unity of experience, the fact that experience is everywhere interconnected. This interconnectedness is a characteristic which cannot be accounted for as simply a logical unity "for although our knowledge may be in complete accordance with logical demands, that is, may not contradict itself, it is still possible that it may be in contradiction [used in strange sense here] with its object." The logical connections are a sine qua non yet not sufficient. At this point in the present discussion, I venture a more explicit attempt to say what the insight behind the principle of sufficient reason has been. In general this is only open to a negative mode of expression and here the help of Schopenhauer is enlisted. In the fourth book of the first volume of The World As Will and Representation (Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung) we see:

... the concept of nothing is essentially relative, and always refers to a definite something that it negates ... considered more closely, an absolute nothing, a really proper nihil negativum, is not even conceivable, but everything of this kind, considered from a higher standpoint or subsumed under a wider concept, is always only a nihil privatum. Every nothing is thought of as such only in relation to something else; it presupposes this relation, and thus that other thing also.

Thus every nihil negativum or absolute nothing, if subordinated to a higher concept, will appear as a mere nihil privatum or relative nothing, which can always change signs with what it negates, so that that would then be thought of as negation, but itself as affirmation.

This should be compared with Leibniz's notion that nature makes no "leaps," and consequently is a continuum since it is precisely the denial of a nihil negativum which demands the postulation of a continuum. In other words, no differences in nature, however small, can be represented as absolute differences.

The formulation above is noteworthy in connection with the present discussion on two accounts. Firstly, we notice that Schopenhauer's point is only capable of negative expression. This corresponds to the procedure of Kant in his "Deductions" where the inconceivability of the absence of something is appealed to; namely, the absence of the categories. This is a feature of any transcendental deduction in that we must prove our point by showing that unless it is admitted, experience as we know it is not possible. Secondly, the concern here is with a conceptual or theoretical nothing at the level of appearances, and an existentialist might object that this is far from what he means by the term 'nothing.' We might note in addition that for Kant as for Leibniz, unity is of the very essence of reason. Says Kant, "The law of reason
which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth."55 From this it follows, that the notion of a nihil negativum is unreasonable, i.e., goes against the very nature of reason which is to seek a unity. Furthermore, the impossibility of a proof for the principle of sufficient reason claimed by many philosophers is more comprehensible in terms of this nihil negativum. The very nature of a proof depends upon the ability to make smooth (comprehensible) transitions from one aspect of experience to another or experience regarded one way to experience regarded in another. But this is ruled out from the start if the possibility of an absolute break (nihil negativum) is admitted.

Yet in the Second Analogy, Kant does attempt a "proof" for the principle of sufficient reason. This amounts, for Kant, to showing the indispensibility of a thoroughly interconnected experience. A.O. Lovejoy's article is a good example of how commentators completely miss the point of Kant's Analogies by considering them as a specific refutation of Hume. 56 There are many misunderstandings in this article, not the least of which is that Lovejoy thinks the force of Kant's presentation lies at a point where it does not exist at all. For this presentation, the significance of Lovejoy's article lies in its criticism of Kant on the basis that Kant's express purpose was to refute Hume's specific formulation. In fact, we need not claim this at all but merely understand that Hume's problem with causality gave rise in Kant to the more general problem of the necessary unity (inter-connectedness) of experience as a whole. For example, Lovejoy states:
Yet if the thesis of the Second Analogy — that "every event follows upon an antecedent event according to a rule" — is meant to have any relevancy to Hume's problem, it should mean that every event has some determinate antecedent and that it can be certainly known a priori that the same kind of antecedent will in all instance, be followed by the same kind of consequent.57

But this goes much too far because the principle of sufficient reason as Kant was trying to establish it, is by no means the principle of causality which concerned Hume. As mentioned above in the brief discussion of Kant's understanding of necessity, the Humean conception of causality will not work. Consequently, to accuse Kant of not refuting Hume is simply a misunderstanding of Kant's whole concern in terms of the thoroughgoing unity of experience. It is unfortunate that Kant so often has recourse to the language of physical causality in his discussion of the Analogies. However, taken in the context of Kant's philosophy as a whole and his concern with the unity of experience, we ought not to be misled by his language. Lovejoy says, "To Kant himself, his arguments about causality seemed the very core of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft ..."58 This would be absurd, however, if Kant's concern were taken in a less basic sense than that of the principle of sufficient reason. Indeed, if Kant's treatment of the unity of experience is at the level of the principle of sufficient reason, then a complete refutation of Lovejoy's position would entail showing that Hume's problem could not even arise unless the unity of experience at the level of Kant's treatment were presupposed.

A full discussion of A.O. Lovejoy's article is neither intended nor necessary. The concern has been to point to Kant's preoccupation with the unity of experience and to further indicate that this concern is not to be taken in any superficial sense. With the Analogies, we
reach the highest expression of unity possible at the level of the understanding: "The general principle of the three analogies ... rests on the synthetic unity of all appearances as regards their relation in time." 59

The "unity of knowledge" or unity at the level of the understanding does not overcome the problem of unity. After treating the understanding, Kant points out that a basic disunity still exists in terms of a manifold of sense which must be "given" to a receptive subject and the pure forms of thought. This leads Kant into a discussion of the thing in itself which must now be considered.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant emphatically states that human knowledge depends upon the receptivity of a given manifold of sense which the understanding then structures. It is in terms of the need for this receptive aspect of human knowledge that Kant gives one of his characterizations of the thing in itself as opposed to the object of appearance. Kant says that there might be an intuitive intellect which does not have to depend upon the given manifold of sense but could, as it were, "perceive" objects immediately. However, ...

... we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition. 60

This way of putting the matter makes explicit the finite character of human knowledge which is dependent upon a given sensible manifold. In this respect, the thing in itself may be represented as a limiting concept.

What our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumenon, is a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits
sensibility by applying the term *noumena* to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). This way of expressing the situation is obviously not meant to tell us something about another type of nonhuman knowledge, but is designed to characterize human knowledge. Part of the point of the Analogies was to show how one aspect of experience can only be known in terms of some other aspect. No one aspect can be known, so to speak, "in itself" but only in relation to other appearances. The series of appearances with respect to any one object can never be exhausted since, for Kant, this would be to arrive at an appearance which was not itself conditioned by other appearances. But an unconditioned appearance can never be a part of my experience as Kant was concerned to show in the Analogies and the "Antinomy of Pure Reason." From this point of view, we might interpret the thing in itself as the object regarded as completely determined. As Kant says in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and Lucien Goldmann emphasizes, "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance." From this Goldmann concludes, "It follows, reversing the assertion, that the completely determined object of a non-empirical intuition is the thing in itself." Of course, no object is ever completely determined in this sense. Goldmann further supports this interpretation with a quotation from the "Ideal of Pure Reason."

If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determination of things a transcendent substrate ... this substrate cannot be anything else than the idea of an *omnia* *ut* *realitat* *i* ... But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a thing in itself as completely determined.

Furthermore, as Kant emphasizes in the "Antinomy of Pure Reason" and the "Ideal of Pure Reason," the notion of a completed series of
appearances is coincident with the notion of an unconditioned something of which the understanding can know nothing. The interpretation of the thing in itself which Goldmann adopts seems quite plausible and in its briefest form says, "in the knowledge of the thing in itself, we are dealing with the category of totality which according to Kant, is lacking in human knowledge ...." There is, however, as mentioned above, the other interpretation of Kant's thing in itself in terms of the receptivity of the subject. As indicated above, Kant's discussion of the divine intellect which does not have to depend upon a sensible given, indicates an actual "something" apart from the subject which supplies the sensible manifold.

We have then two ways of indicating the limitation of human knowledge and expressing the thing in itself: first, in terms of an unachievable totality and second, in terms of a dependence upon a sensible manifold which must be given to a receptive subject. Both of these interpretations can be partially reconciled by saying that, as Goldmann indicates, the understanding always remains with an undetermined object in terms of appearances which if allowed to reach totality would represent the thing in itself. When Kant discusses the thing in itself in terms of the receptivity of the subject, he does so from the point of view of the understanding. When, however, Kant discusses the thing in itself in terms of a totality, he is concerned with reason per se. Insofar as the understanding seeks unity, it must do so in terms of appearances which are all merely conditions of further appearances. The "understanding does not admit among appearances any condition which can itself be empirically unconditioned."
... in the empirical regress we can have no experience of an absolute limit, that is, no experience of any condition as being one that empirically is absolutely unconditioned. The reason is this: such an experience would have to contain a limitation of appearances by nothing, or by the void, and in the continued regress we should have to be able to encounter this limitation in a perception -- which is impossible. 67

We here have expressed explicitly the denial of the nihil negativum as mentioned above in the discussion of the Analogies. Every appearance must be conditioned by another appearance. Although it is permissible to speak of unity with regard to the function of the understanding, this is not a unity in its most radical sense, namely a totality. It is only permissible to postulate a totality with respect to reason, but of course apart from the possibility of an intuition.

The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from such unity, which is that of the understanding. That everything which happens has a cause, is not a principle known and proscribed by reason. That principle makes the unity of experience possible, and borrows nothing from reason, which apart from this relation to possible experience, could never, from mere concepts, have imposed any such synthetic unity. 68

The highest form of unity attributable to the understanding is the highest form of unity attributable to the series of appearances. According to the above interpretation of the Analogies, this unity turns out to be the principle of sufficient reason. This form of unity, however, does not suffice for the realization of an ultimate unity in the form of a totality. The understanding merely involves itself in an infinite regress when it attempts to seek the totality.

The quest for the totality can ultimately only lead to an unconditioned, that is, to an end of the series of appearances. This is why an unconditioned beginning for the series of appearances can never
be found. Therefore, if an unconditioned is to be found, it must lie outside the series of appearances.

That everything which happens has a cause is a universal law, conditioning the very possibility of all experience. Hence the causality of the cause, which itself happens or comes to be, must itself in turn have a cause; and thus the entire field of experience, however far it may extend, is transformed into a sum-total of the merely natural. But since in this way no absolute totality of conditions determining causal relation can be obtained, reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause ....

My purpose has only been to point out that since the thoroughgoing connection of all appearances, in a context of nature, is an inexorable law, the in- evitable consequence of obstinately insisting upon the reality of appearances is to destroy all freedom. Those who thus follow the common view have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom.

But Kant's "reconciliation" amounts to creating a radical breach between the world of appearance and the world of freedom; the phenomenal and noumenal world. The attempt to gain the unconditioned or totality in the realm of appearance is given up, but it is sacrificed at the cost of the unity of our world. Was there not, however, a disunified world present from the beginning with respect to the sensible given? We never knew where the sensible manifold came from, and the notion of an inside/outside distinction with regard to the knowing subject was presupposed as basic from the beginning of the Critique. In "The Antinomy of Pure Reason" Kant finally gets around to indicating that the unconditioned which lies outside of the series of appearances may be postulated as the "cause" of the appearances.

The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a receptivity, a capacity of being affected in a certain manner with representations .... The non-sensible cause of these representations is completely unknown to us, and cannot therefore be intuited by us as object.
We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have something corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity. 71

The question of the totality of appearances along with the receptivity of the subject are both connected in terms of the unconditioned postulated outside the realms of appearance. On the basis of the unconditioned we can bring together the two interpretations of the thing in itself. The question as to the ultimate origin of the given manifold of sense and the question of the ultimate unity of the world in terms of a totality are both referred to the unconditioned as thing in itself.

Thus the world presents itself as an ultimate disunity from my human standpoint. The world of appearance can never satisfy the demand of my reason, which always seeks the unconditioned. The apparent world as opposed to the real world (if we may so characterize it) it now asserted to be an irreparable part of (definitive of) human knowing. We may attempt to overcome the real/apparent dichotomy by saying that it is actually the thing in itself which comes to appearance as the world we know, but these would be totally empty words without some knowledge of the thing in itself outside the realm of appearance.

In terms of the traditional problems with disunity, where does Kant stand. When we read Kant's discussions of his predecessors, it is obvious that his criticisms revolve around their failure to draw a radical distinction between the world as appearance and the world in itself. All problems stemming from the conflict of necessity and freedom are the result of this failure. Besides ethical problems, however, it is clear that Kant views his predecessors as attempting
to overcome problems of multiplicity in unity by seeking the solution in the world as it appears. Thus, Kant's message to his predecessors is basically this: the ultimate unity of the world which appears, is not itself a piece of knowledge (in the realm of appearance). Therefore, all previous attempts to understand the world in terms of an overriding principle of multiplicity in unity were bound to fail, because their authors unknowingly took appearance for the thing in itself.

If we characterize Kant's project as the understanding of human experience as a whole or in terms of the Inaugural Dissertation, as the constitution of a world, we must ultimately conclude that he fails. But Kant's project is different from all previous attempts because it presumes to show why it must fail. To this extent a thoroughgoing attempt to understand the constitution of the world must simultaneously be a critique of reason. This is so because of the place occupied by reason: "For reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of a priori knowledge," and "metaphysics consists, at least in intention, entirely of a priori synthetic propositions." Kant says furthermore that "the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" Therefore the proper critique of metaphysics amounts to a critique of pure reason.

In terms of the concern of this chapter with the problem of unity, we must conclude that for Kant, the overriding concern of traditional metaphysics has been the problem of how a world is constituted as a unity. Kant states in the "Architectonic of Pure Reason,"

The philosophy of pure reason is either a propaedeutic (preparation) which investigates the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure a priori knowledge, and is
entitled criticism, or secondly, it is the system of pure reason, that is, the science which exhibits in systematic connection the whole body (true as well as illusory) of philosophical knowledge arising out of pure reason, and which is entitled metaphysics. The title 'metaphysics' may also, however, be given to the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the investigation of all that can ever be known a priori as well as the exposition of that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this type -- in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from all mathematical employment of reason.  

However,

Mathematics, natural science, even our empirical knowledge, have a high value as means, for the most part, to contingent ends, but also, in the ultimate outcome, to ends that are necessary and essential to humanity. This latter service, however, they can discharge only as they are aided by a knowledge through reason from pure concepts, which, however we may choose to entitle it, is really nothing but metaphysics.  

All pure a priori knowledge, owing to the special faculty of knowledge in which alone it can originate, has in itself a peculiar unity; and metaphysics is the philosophy which has as its task the statement of that knowledge in this systematic unity.  

The disunity expressed in experience as a whole and ultimately necessitated by the inability of the realm of appearances to produce a totality is reflected in the division of metaphysics into speculative and practical; a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. In both cases we have a metaphysics, because we are concerned with "the demand of reason for a complete systematic unity." The "demand" for unity lies at the basis of the creation of all metaphysical systems, because reason is at the basis of all metaphysical systems. Moreover insofar as we regard metaphysics as philosophy in its most basic form, this demand lies at the basis of all philosophy. "Metaphysics ... alone properly constitutes what may be entitled philosophy in the strict sense of the term."
The demand of reason has been behind the previous attempts to attain a unified world view in terms of a philosophy. The tradition, however, maintained a radical distinction between man as a thinking being and man as a sensing being. This division is clearly set forth in Descartes philosophy in terms of the two substances of thought and extention. Man is set down in a world as a thinking being and then proceeds to discover this world as it is given to him through the senses. The project of philosophy in terms of the problem of unity is then to get these two "substances" together to constitute a world. The problem of the constitution of a unified experience given over to Kant does not differ from that of the tradition. Kant, however, makes the failure of the previous attempts at unity the basic problem of his philosophy. Kant's predecessors failed to attain a unified account of experience because they failed to carry out a critique of reason itself and ascertain the limits of objective knowledge. Having carried out the critique, what is Kant's answer as to the possibility of comprehending experience as a unified whole? We must conclude that Kant denies the possibility of such comprehension. In the end, I am left as a subject in a world which is given to me I know not how. The traditional problem of the unity of human experience is only pushed back one step. Regarding the world as appearance opposed to a world in itself still maintains the old opposition between a thinking subject and a given world of which he must make sense. Put in other terms, the realms of thinking and acting remain distinct. This is a common theme of Goldmann.

For Kant, however, knowledge and action, theory and practice, were almost totally separate; the impossibility of uniting them constituted indeed, as I have often repeated, the upper limit of his philosophy.80
Through thought man gets at the truth of things insofar as he can know it. Man is first and foremost a reasonable being: man = the rational animal. Kant does not question the traditional equation in terms of which reason is given the highest place; man is defined in terms of reason. That a critique of the metaphysical tradition could be written as a critique of pure reason, testifies to the primacy of reason in the tradition. More than this, however, metaphysics,

... can be brought to completion and fixity as to be in need of no further change or be subject to any augmentation by new discoveries; because here reason has the sources of its knowledge in itself, not in objects and their observation, by which its stock of knowledge could be further increased.81

Is this then where a critique of pure reason ultimately ends? Is reason simply this faculty of man which presses on to an unconditioned of which it can never have objective knowledge? Is the end of philosophy proper to be reason's knowledge of itself? That a higher standpoint is possible, is indicated by Kant himself in the Prolegomena.

That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether. There will, therefore, always be metaphysics in the world; nay, everyone, especially every reflective man, will have it and, for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto been called metaphysics cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it entirely is impossible; therefore a Critique of Pure Reason itself must now be attempted or, if one exists, investigated and brought to the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge.82

Kant realises that what is involved is "something more than a mere thirst for knowledge" or as some might say, "curiosity," yet he does not pursue the issue to a higher standpoint. To make this "metaphysical need" a problem would be to jeopardize the primacy of reason or the
primacy of thought in the tradition. Kant does not make the "need" for metaphysics a problem; his highest appeal is to the "nature of reason." The drive toward totality and the unconditioned in experience is attributed to the "nature of reason" and thus remains inexplicable. The question then arises whether reason may be regarded from the higher perspective which would then, like Kant's critique of pure reason, make the metaphysical tradition a problem but in a more radical and comprehensive way.
ABBREVIATIONS FOR
NOTES

The following reference scheme will be used throughout the notes of the dissertation. All references to Karl Schlechta's three volume edition of Nietzsche's writings, Werke in drei Bänden, will be made as in the following example: Schlechta, Vol. II, p. 100. This will then be followed by a reference in parentheses to a translation (if available) of the particular work cited in Schlechta's edition. The citation for the translation will consist of the translator's name followed by an abbreviation of the particular work of Nietzsche translated with appropriate page number. Thus a complete reference might be: Schlecta, Vol. II, p. 100. (Kaufmann, GM, p. 50).

The abbreviations for the individual works of Nietzsche cited will be as follows:


NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Lucien Goldmann, Immanuel Kant, Translated by Robert Black (London, 1971), p. 31. The basic line of thinking in this chapter is very close to the view of Goldmann to whom I will refer throughout. My presentation, however, is not, like Goldmann's, concerned with sociological or economic factors as conditions for a particular metaphysical point of view. It is concerned, like Goldmann's presentation, with the problem of the individual/community unit but only in a very derivative way, namely, as one small part of the unity problem. My presentation is, however, in complete agreement with Goldmann's characterization of the tradition as quoted. It is furthermore in complete agreement with the emphasis put on Kant's pre-critical writing.

4. Ibid., p. 184.
7. Ibid., p. 223.
8. Ibid., p. 240.
9. Ibid., p. 238.
10. Ibid., p. 239.
11. Benedict de Spinoza, The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, Translated by R.H.M. Elwes (New York, 1955), Vol. II, pp. 50-51. Spinoza says here, "And as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition; and from its definition ... we cannot infer the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one substance." Spinoza is concerned to show that if substance had a cause outside itself, this would necessitate two absolutely distinct entities whose reason would lie in a third thing.
15. Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz, Selections, Edited by Philip P. Wiener (New York, 1951), p. 309. Leibniz says here, "... created substances depend upon God who preserves them and can produce them continually by a kind of emanation ...." It is presumably this "kind of emanation" which Spinoza was concerned to avoid. With regard to Spinoza and the problem of emanation see Harry Austryn Wolfson The Philosophy of Spinoza (New York, 1969), pp. 306-308.
16. Ibid., p. 309.
17. Ibid., p. 345.
18. For a similar opinion on this issue see Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 170-175.
19. Leibniz, Selections, p. 359. Leibniz is here denying the possibility of a radical phenomenalism. He seems to be arguing on the basis of the principle of sufficient reason. Since we do in fact make the real/apparent distinction there must be a reason for it which itself does not lie in the realm of appearance.
20. Ibid., p. 288.
21. Ibid., p. 284.
22. Ibid., p. 286.
24. Ibid., p. 454.
27. WP, no. 585.
28. WP, no. 552.
29. It will be objected that if this "irrational" side of experience was made comprehensible, this would once again be an abstraction. What is ultimately desired is to understand the "irrational" as irrational. It is difficult to see what could be involved here since there seems to be a contradiction in this notion. What the discussion is moving toward is a way to "understand" this disunity or "irrational" in experience.
32. Ibid., p. 175.
33. This is a mistake made by Schopenhauer in his discussion of the Kantian philosophy. For an account of this see Radoslav Tsanoff, Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant (New York, 1911), p. 36.
34. Kant, Selected Pre-critical Writings, p. 53.
35. Tsanoff, Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant, p. 9 and p. 36.
37. Ibid., p. 36.
38. Ibid., p. 58.
41. In this connection see G.W.F. Hegel, The History of Philosophy, Translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New York, 1974), Vol. III, pp. 428-429. Hegel criticizes Kant for being as dogmatic as his predecessors but in the form of a "subjective" instead of "objective dogmatism." He is also critical of Kant for leaving the concept of necessity unexamined.
43. Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Edited by H.G. Alexander (Manchester, 1956), p. 95 and p. 119. Liebniz criticizes Clarke for demanding a proof of the principle of sufficient reason. "Is this a principle, that wants to be proved?"
At certain points, however, Leibniz does not seem too sure about the status of the principle; he implies that it is an inductive generalization. "It is certain, there is an infinite number of instances, wherein it succeeds [or rather it succeeds] in all the known cases in which it has been made use of. From whence one may reasonably conclude, that it will succeed also in unknown cases ...."
44. Leibniz, Selections, pp. 94-95.
45. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 621-622.
46. Ibid., p. 226.
47. Ibid., p. 157.
48. Ibid., p. 22.
49. It will be objected that the Analogies are not the last stage before the treatment of the phenomena/noumena distinction. But, of course, they are last with respect to the constitution of the object. The Postulates of Empirical Thought have to do with modalities of already constituted objects. As Kant states on page 239 of the Critique, "No additional determinations are thereby thought in the object itself ...."
51. Ibid., p. 92.
52. Arthur O. Lovejoy, "On Kant's Reply to Hume," Kant: Disputed Questions, Edited by Moltoke S. Gram (Chicago, 1967), pp. 284-308. There is no intention of entering upon an exposition of the literature on Kant's Second Analogy. The interpretation of this Analogy is one of the most controversial points in Kant scholarship. Lovejoy's article has been selected because it is an especially good example of the type of position I am interested in denying. I am not interested in this article per se but only as representative of a type of common misunderstanding.
53. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 98.
55. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 538. Kant's statement here that "... without it [reason's drive toward unity] we should have no reason at all ...." I take to be an explicit recognition on his part of the intimate connection between the unity of experience and the principle of sufficient reason.
56. The Analogies can undoubtedly be regarded as a refutation of Hume but the issue is actually much larger. I take Kant's concern to be at the level of the principle of sufficient reason and the unity of experience generally. Hume's function was to focus Kant's attention at the most fundamental level of unity. Kant's mention of the principle of sufficient reason at the very end of the Analogies of Experience confirms my interpretation of Kant's position.

58. Ibid., p. 303.
60. Ibid., pp. 272-273.
61. Ibid., p. 273.
62. Ibid., p. 65.
64. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 490.
67. Ibid., p. 455.
68. Ibid., p. 306.
69. Ibid., p. 465.
70. Ibid., p. 467.
71. Ibid., p. 441. Notice that this idea of the transcendental object seems to contradict Kant's view elsewhere (p. 271).
72. Ibid., p. 58.
73. Ibid., p. 55.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., p. 665.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 661.
78. Ibid., p. 658.
79. Ibid., p. 663.
80. Ibid., p. 155.
81. Ibid., p. 61.
CHAPTER II
UNITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

The general point of view taken in the previous discussion of Kant was that of the unity of experience. It is important to again emphasize the importance of this point of view and why it was adopted. If we understand Nietzsche as a philosopher of philosophy, then an understanding of his philosophy is only properly grasped when it is related to the most basic ways of characterizing the philosophic tradition as a whole. The position of this thesis is that most basically the problem of the unity of experience characterizes the ground movement of philosophy. It is in fact a further assumption of this thesis that a complete "proof" of this position would literally constitute a recapitulation of the history of philosophy.

Because the question of the unity of experience becomes essential, it was most expedient to focus on the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of sufficient reason is taken as most essentially a statement which says, among other things, that my experience insofar as it is to be open to a rational critique or indeed understood at all must be an interconnected whole. It must, because this at least is involved in what we mean by understanding anything, be possible to move from one part of my experience to any other. Put alternatively, to the extent to which I cannot make this move or transition in experience, to this extent any particular area of my experience I care to choose must be said to be irrational. It is then noteworthy that the problem of
the unity of experience becomes simply the problem of the limits of reason in general. Kant saw this more clearly than anyone before him. The previous discussion of Kant arises out of the conviction that the Critique of Pure Reason may be taken most consistently as a treatise on the principle of sufficient reason. Although this point may not be immediately apparent, when we regard the principle of sufficient reason and the Critique within the perspective of a concern with the unity of experience, the connection becomes quite obvious.

At the most basic level of pure epistemology, of course, and as Kant treats the subject in the Critique, the principle of sufficient reason may merely be taken as a recognition that if "anything" is to be part of my possible experience then there must be features of this possible experience which it has in common with my experience as a whole. This then becomes an admission that if I have experience at all, this experience must be in principle demonstrably unified. Therefore a consideration of the problem of the unity of experience is at least as basic as a consideration of the possibility of experience in general. Kant expresses this conclusion himself in the Critique where the entire "Transcendental Deduction" hinges on the notion of the synthetic unity of consciousness. Kant states, "The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me." It is highly significant that in a work which for the first time makes reason an explicit philosophic theme, Kant should find it necessary to assert the importance of the notion of unity. It is to be expected, therefore, that the most basic
understanding of Nietzsche's position with respect to Kant and the
philosophic tradition ought to occur at the level of the unity of
experience. It is this consideration which has motivated the discussion
of this thesis so far and assures that the understanding of Nietzsche's
position will not proceed at some superficial level.

Because of the perspective of unity adopted here, the forms of
disunity recognized by the philosophic tradition become of interest.
In the historically oriented discussion of the last chapter, the con-
cern was to show the movement of the rational tradition as a progressive
attempt to overcome these disunities. To the extent that a philosophy
may be said to fail, the failure may be localized at that point where
a leap in thinking is required. At this point the position in question
may be characterized as irrational. Kierkegaard's position falls into
this category, and of course, Kierkegaard himself insisted that the
rational tradition could not accomplish its goal of unity; his entire
discussion of truth as subjectivity reflects this distinction.

In the tradition as based upon the primacy of reason, why is a
leap in thinking seen as objectionable? It is objectionable, because
we already have an a priori recognition that our experience is "one"
and feel that an account of this experience ought to reflect this
recognized unity. All this simply says that we cannot operate other
than at the level of the principle of sufficient reason. This is why
we might expect that with the inception of modern philosophy with
Descartes and the beginning of epistemology as it has come to be
understood there could be no other outcome than Absolute Idealism.

This was expressed by Leszek Kolakowski in the following way:

The development of post-Cartesian philosophy was
to a large degree a spate of imitations of the same
procedure; philosophers accepted Descartes' question
completely, and with it half his answer, and stubborn attempts to modify the cogito formula dragged on into this century.

Once the consciousness of the thought process is the ultimate datum of cognition, all of reality becomes incapable of going outside the thought process.\(^2\)

The tradition may be characterized as an attempt to overcome all oppositions in philosophic accounts of experience. Hegel of course realized this in his periodization of the history of philosophy making Descartes the beginning of the modern period.\(^3\)

The forms the disunity of experience has taken were indicated in the cursory review of the previous chapter. Within the last 150 years, with the emergence of an existentialist way of thinking, this disunity has more and more come to be an explicit theme. In fact it has gained a certain respectability and found a philosophic home of its own. The emerging preoccupation with the fundamental problems connected with the disunities in experience comes to explicitness with the concept of the Nothing. It is an interesting question whether the existentialist realization of its Nothing is not ultimately the same Nothing which reveals itself in the many dichotomies of the rational philosophic tradition beginning with Descartes and the subject/object distinction. In Kant's philosophy, the Nothing reaches a hitherto unknown explicitness in the form of the phenomena/noumena distinction, and it is in terms of this that Kant may be viewed as a culmination of the rationalist tradition and may conversely (as is not usually done) be viewed as the beginning of the modern existentialist tradition. The Nothing of concern here is of course the nihil negativum.

Where do we meet this nothingness in the existentialist tradition? Between Kierkegaard's objective and subjective lies the Nothing.
Between the individual and mankind lies the Nothing. Between the infinite and the finite lies the Nothing. The traditional recognition in the phrase "the finitude of man" is the recognition of the "gap" supposedly existing between man and a wholistic viewpoint of whose existence he can have some awareness but cannot attain. In fact this might be said to be the basis of the so-called "tragic world view" which the Greeks clearly recognized. The "tragic world view" is distinguished by the recognition that man is not capable of comprehending the totality of his experience. The tragic hero, whether he deceives himself about it or not, is in the position of acting on inadequate knowledge. It is usually understood that this lack of knowledge is not simply an accidental deficiency, but an inevitable result of the human condition. The point at which man falls short of the necessary insight into existence represents the point at which a recognition of the nihil negativum enters. Existentialism as it has developed in the modern tradition has explicitly recognized this nihil negativum and made it an explicit philosophic theme. Man's striving (specifically man's striving for rational comprehension) may be regarded as an attempt to overcome this recognition of the nothing. Kierkegaard has asserted this, and as will be seen, Nietzsche described much of the activity of modernity as an attempt to escape this recognition.

Nietzsche's use of the phrase (not unique with him) "God is dead" labels the abyss which modern man finds opening before him and which he desperately tries to fill. Part of Nietzsche's distinction as a philosopher stems from taking seriously the idea that the philosophic tradition might be one attempt to fill the abyss. This is an important point and helps make clearer why Nietzsche put so much stress on value
considerations in his discussion of the tradition rather than preoccupying himself with traditional metaphysical and epistemological categories. This point will be considered further in what follows.

The rational view of the world involves an explicable, systematic whole which can be laid before us in a discursive manner. For the most part, existentialist philosophies are interested in denying that this program can be carried out. They usually posit in one form or another an opaque, irreducible aspect of experience which can only be known to exist but never described. This for example is the position of Karl Jaspers. With respect to the concerns of the present thesis, the point to be noticed is that the existentialist assertion of an opaque aspect of experience is at the same time an assertion of the Nothing. The principle of sufficient reason as it has grounded reason in the tradition is now asserted to no longer apply. In this sense, it is correct to view existentialism as a reaction to the rational tradition. It is furthermore noteworthy that the concept of necessity is strikingly absent in existentialist thought. This is obviously due to the intimate connection between reason and necessity in the tradition. As already mentioned, the concept of necessity is fundamental to Kant's position and cannot be further grounded; it can no more be grounded than the principle of sufficient reason itself can be grounded. In contrast to the emphasis upon necessity in the tradition, existentialism is concerned to assert the importance of possibility and human freedom. In a tradition based upon the primacy of reason, this would signal the breakdown of the principle of sufficient reason. Note that Schopenhauer, whose philosophy more than any other in the tradition emphasizes the principle of sufficient reason, consistently denies the
existence of real possibility.  
Let us look at how reason is understood in terms of necessity with Kant and two philosophers of the rationalist tradition after him; Fichte and Hegel. In the last chapter, a close connection was made between Kant's notion of the \textit{a priori} and necessary knowledge. A \textit{a priori} knowledge is the proper business of metaphysics thus metaphysics studies the necessary features of experience. Furthermore, "reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of \textit{a priori} knowledge."\textsuperscript{7} It sounds almost trivial when a point is made of the connection between reason and necessity, because the job of reason is to show that the world is \textit{this} way and no other and this is equivalent to showing how any particular feature of experience we care to choose is \textit{necessarily} connected with the rest of experience. According to Fichte, "Philosophy anticipates the entirety of experience and \textit{thinks} it only as necessary, and to that extent it is \ldots \textit{a priori}."\textsuperscript{8} In fact both Fichte and Hegel explicitly criticized Kant for not showing the necessity in the development of his philosophy at every turn, such that their advance over Kant may be taken as finally demonstrating that necessity. In the \textit{Lesser Logic}, Hegel states, "But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes evident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the \textit{necessity} of its facts \ldots."\textsuperscript{9} Hegel's and Fichte's philosophies are represented as absolute idealisms precisely because they are concerned to push the idea of necessity in knowledge to its limit; no fact may be left undemonstrated in its necessity. With regard to this specific theme of necessity in the rationalist tradition Hegel is to be taken as the end of the Western rationalist tradition. It is the \textit{premium} put upon necessity in the
rationalist tradition which accounts for the emphasis upon reason. Reason is nothing without necessity. 10

While maintaining that what has been said of the traditional notion of reason is the case and further maintaining the existentialist position on the bankruptcy of this view of reason, this by no means destroys the deeper sense of the reasonable in terms of the unity of experience. What is at stake is whether this unity need be taken in the discursive sense of a thoroughgoing series of interconnections forming a system. Furthermore, the question arises at this point in the investigation and historically after the philosophy of Hegel whether philosophy as it has been practiced traditionally may not stand in the service of life in general. This Nietzschean question could have made no sense whatever to Hegel since philosophy by definition could have nothing outside itself. Thus we are presumably at an impasse with the traditional understanding of reason and necessity. To move further will require no less than a new perspective on the world; a perspective in which the place of reason is redefined. It will be further required that reason give up attempting to ground itself. If we believe that Hegel left any part of life unaccounted for, then we tacitly admit that Absolute Idealism was not achieved. Let us accept that Hegel made the fullest possible attempt to achieve a self-grounding of knowledge. If we are then dissatisfied with his effort, it can only be because we feel that something has been left out of account. For Hegel, of course, it would be absurd to maintain that some phenomenon could become part of my experience and yet remain incomprehended by philosophy. Yet this very fact allows one to know what form any denial of the complete dominance of reason in the
tradition must take. Any objector to Hegel must finally assert that
the ultimately irrational, the irrational in principle, is a possible
component of experience. This could take the form of either (1) showing
that the rational as Hegel understands it cannot encompass experi-
ence as a whole; there is a real which is not rational or (2) showing
that in general no view of reason could be self-justifying. This,
of course, was precisely the line taken by Kierkegaard with his dis-
tinction between the radically subjective individual and the objective
world. As long, however, as one maintains the existence of a breach
in experience as a whole, the traditional rationalist will claim that
reason has more work to do, i.e., as asserted before, nothing short of
an Absolute Idealism will do. 11

As mentioned above, the so-called bankruptcy of reason by no means
destroyes the deeper sense of the reasonable in terms of the unity of
experience. Certainly idealism after Kant was more intent than ever
to assert the criterion of unity as a measure of the rational together
with the concept of necessity which was to remain unavoidably vague.
Furthermore, as stated above, even with the advent of a philosophy
asserting ultimate irrationalities in experience, the concept of the
rational remains unchanged. Thus, looked at from the standpoint of the
unity of experience per se, the concern of philosophy remains the same
with respect to the constitution of the reasonable. Indeed, the task
of reason in terms of seeking unity remains unchanged from Kant onward.
What does historically change is the form the unity of experience is
to take. The notion of reason in its basic form remains as given by
Kant.

... what is peculiarly distinctive of reason in its
attitude to this body of knowledge is that it prescribes
and seeks to achieve its systemization, that is, to exhibit the connection of its parts in conformity with a single principle. This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of knowledge -- a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts and which contains the conditions that determine a priori for every part its position and relation to the other parts. This idea accordingly postulates a complete unity in the knowledge obtained by the understanding, by which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system connected according to necessary laws.  

Kant is at this point a few pages away from an oblique statement of the principle of sufficient reason (A651, B679). Kant puts it this way: "The law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason no coherent employment of the understanding ...." Further formulations follow in A659, B687 but stated in the form of the principle of continuity; a necessary corollary of the principle of sufficient reason. In his formulations, however, Kant makes a typical vacillation as illustrated by the following remark: "Such anticipations [that is, the various formulations of unity], when confirmed, yield strong evidence in support of the view that the hypothetically conceived unity is well-grounded ...." "Well-grounded" at this point refers to the idea that "nature" may be actually the way reason has postulated it. But, of course, the postulation of an independent reality or "nature" in this sense has no place in the whole Kantian project and indeed could have no definite meaning attached to it. Kant seems to be aware of this but unable to think consistently in terms of his avowed project, consequently he follows his assertion with the traditional qualification that "this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no congruent object can be discovered in experience."
is appropriate to point out here that reason \textit{per se} has nothing to do with truth or falsity which is the business of the understanding or the categories. Because of this, Kant cannot legitimately talk about a "nature" which may or may not correspond to ideas of reason. The understanding must \textit{follow} the principles of reason, but reason is not concerned with the constitution of objects which is the work of the understanding.

The upshot of Kant's conception of reason is this: "Unconditioned necessity, which we so indispensible require as the last bearer of all things, is for human reason the veritable abyss."\textsuperscript{16} This has been the condition of reason in the Western tradition for the past two millenia. The force of the drive toward unity as it was characterized in the last chapter may be extended to the history of philosophy as a whole as was done by Arthur Lovejoy in his work \textit{The Great Chain of Being}. The present discussion has focused on the modern period of philosophy, because it is in this period that the ground motivation of philosophy in terms of the principle of sufficient reason comes to explicit philosophical consciousness. As long as this principle remained the highest operative principle of reason, there could be no other satisfactory outcome for philosophy than a complete and unified description of experience. This unity, however, which must be viewed as the hoped for outcome of all the activity of the philosophic tradition has not been achieved. Furthermore the suspicion grows as to whether, at least on the traditional view of reason, the goal is achieveable at all.

The situation has recently been characterized as "epistemological nihilism." "Men ... find that there is no truth, and that they should continue to seek it. The will to truth drives men even further into
the void, and that they may now recognize it as void is no help."\textsuperscript{17}

In the following chapter, a short discussion of Schopenhauer is used to lead into a discussion of nihilism. Schopenhauer's philosophy was of considerable influence on Nietzsche's entrance into philosophy but more importantly for our purposes, it represents a significantly different attempt within the tradition to grasp the unity of experience. Many problems with the traditional attempts are brought to their highest degree of explicitness in Schopenhauer's philosophy. The most obvious example of this is Schopenhauer's explicit emphasis and extended discussions of the principle of sufficient reason.\textsuperscript{18} Because this principle plays such an explicitly dominant role in Schopenhauer's philosophy, it becomes abundantly clear that the ground motivation of this philosophy is to comprehend experience as a unity. This makes its failure particularly instructive.
NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York, 1929), p. 156.
6. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Translated by E.F.J. Payne (New York, 1966), Vol I, p. 463f. Schopenhauer therefore collapses the distinction between the actual and the possible. His basic line of thinking is that if a given event were possible it must have occurred. The fact that it does not occur proves that, in fact, it was not possible. For a fuller development of this position, see Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Freedom of the Will, Translated by Konstantin Kolenda (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960).
10. For a discussion of the primacy of necessity in Kant's Critiques, see Heinz Röttges, Nietzsche und die Dialektik des Aufklärung (Berlin, 1972), p. 177ff. Here it is stated (p. 182), "... durch das Erheben des spezifisch Kantischen Notwendigkeitsbegriffs zum Kriterium für Wissenschaft und Ethik Kant eine bestimmte spekulative Voraussetzung, die selbst nicht begründet werden kann ..."
11. There is no intention of entering into an extended discussion of Hegel's philosophy. Any full treatment of Nietzsche's confrontation with the tradition will eventually have to face the difficulties involved in a confrontation between Nietzsche and Hegel. To my knowledge this has not been done in any complete way. The requisite knowledge of Hegel's philosophy alone would be an obstacle to this kind of investigation. I believe that Nietzsche's position with respect to the tradition will not be sufficiently comprehended until Hegel's philosophy is understood. This is because Hegel represents the Absolute Idealist position toward which reason in the philosophic tradition has been tending. Hegel may be considered a culmination of the tradition but in
a sense different from that of Kant. Kant's philosophy may be
legitimately regarded as a culmination, because it asserts the limits of
reason through the use of reason. By thus making a definite assertion
about the limits of reason as understood by the tradition, Kant pro-
vided a clear statement and foundation from which the later Idealists
could assert the incompleteness of his position and attempt to go beyond.

In the sense that a move to a dialectical position was found
necessary by Fichte and a dialectical-historical by Hegel, the con-
ception of reason after Kant was new. Yet, from the deepest point of
view, I would want to maintain that Hegel's position still remains within
the tradition of reason; which has its ultimate culmination in Nietzsche's
philosophy. Here I can only acknowledge the importance of a
Nietzsche-Hegel dialogue.

13. Ibid., p. 538.
14. Ibid., p. 544. Throughout his discussion of reason, it seems
to me that Kant desperately wants to assert a nature which is the way
reason expresses it but quite independent of reason itself. Such an
assertion would, of course, destroy the very foundations of the Critique.
See, for example, pp. 537-538.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 513.
17. Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of
Transfiguration (Berkeley, 1975), p. 77.
18. Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation was entitled The Fourfold
Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
CHAPTER III

A TRANSITION BY WAY OF SCHOPENHAUER

It is well-known that Schopenhauer maintained Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself in the form of his doctrine of the will. In The World As Will and Representation it is stated that our willing "is the one thing known to us immediately, and not given to us merely in the representation, as all else is."\(^1\) The will "is the point where the thing-in-itself enters the phenomenon most immediately."\(^2\) Moreover, it is Schopenhauer's contention that modern philosophy since Descartes has operated with the division of "knowledge" into will and representation and been motivated by the problem of getting them together. Schopenhauer represents the primary problem of philosophy as "the deep gulf between the ideal and the real."\(^3\)

... once first demonstrated by Descartes, it has ever since given philosophers no rest. But after Kant had at last shown most thoroughly the complete diversity of the ideal and the real, it was an attempt as bold as it was absurd ... to try to assert the \underline{absolute identity} of the two by dogmatic utterances referring to a so-called \underline{intellectual intuition}.\(^4\)

Schopenhauer is the interesting case of a philosopher who categorically rejects all idealist philosophy between Kant and himself. He viewed his philosophy as the legitimate successor and correction of Kant's philosophy. Yet it must be said that his general philosophic project is quite close to that of the idealists. A comparison on this point will be useful in terms of an understanding of Kant. The situation may be put concisely and rather sketchily as follows.
Both Schopenhauer and the idealists may be viewed as reacting to Kant's philosophy. The reactions took the form of attempts to complete the Kantian position by overcoming the dichotomies inherent in that position. Schopenhauer and Fichte both explicitly call themselves Kantians. Fichte sees himself as simply drawing out the consequences of Kant's conclusions. Schopenhauer's philosophy is a constant dialogue with Kant although this is often only very implicit. Both Fichte and Hegel characterize their projects at various points as an attempt to eliminate the radical breaks in Kant's philosophy which he himself took as unavoidable for finite human reason. With Schopenhauer's main work, we have his attempt to overcome the phenomena/noumena distinction. The title of the work, The World As Will and Representation, betrays what Schopenhauer's problem is. There is the recognition of one thing, a world, which we must attempt to make sense of in terms of will and representation. But this necessarily entails identifying the two in some sense. Therein lies the problem. The reader sees time and again how every discussion leads up to this connection and how Schopenhauer fails to make it understandable. The World As Will and Representation may without exaggeration be viewed as a long series of attempts to see will and representation (thinking) as a unity called the world. Both Schopenhauer and the idealists then are concerned to understand the unity we recognize as the world. This is the way this thesis has characterized the goal of philosophy in general. Schopenhauer's vehement objections to the idealists are mainly at the level of method and not of aim. 5 It must be added, however, that even this is not too clear. For example, Schopenhauer rejects the idealist notion of intellectual intuition yet asserts that we do have immediate knowledge,
e.g. the subjective/objective distinction is given immediately thus cannot be further grounded.

The outcome of Schopenhauer's attempts to go beyond Kant really amounts to vacillating between two assertions which, when all is said and done, remain at the level of mere assertion. First, the thing-in-itself (will) is toto genere different from phenomena (representation). Second, the phenomenal world must be seen as the world as will coming to consciousness in representation. The root of Schopenhauer's difficulties is easy to see; he cannot make will phenomenal, because it cannot then be seen simultaneously as will. He wants to say, "See how the phenomena reveal the inner nature of the world as will?" But when he attempts to display this, he finds himself pointing only to phenomena. Schopenhauer clearly realizes his problem, but since he has one notion of what thinking consists of, he finds no way out of his troubles.

Schopenhauer sees his own significance as a philosopher in the following way:

... all philosophers before me, from the first to the last, place the true and real inner nature or kernal of man in the knowing consciousness. Accordingly, they have conceived and explained the I, or in the case of many of them its transcendent hypostasis called soul, as primarily and essentially knowing, in fact thinking, and only in consequence of this, secondarily and derivatively, as willing. This extremely old, universal, and fundamental error ... must first of all be set aside, and instead of it the true state of the case must be brought to perfectly distinct consciousness. However, as this is done for the first time here after thousands of years of philosophizing, some detailed account will not be out of place. The remarkable phenomenon that in this fundamental and essential point all philosophers have erred ... might be partly explained ... from the fact that all of them aimed at presenting man as differing as widely as possible from the animals.6

That Schopenhauer's philosophy does not overcome the age-old problems involved is illustrated by the vagaries to which he is reduced in
his description of the connection between consciousness and the will.

My philosophy alone ... puts man's real inner nature not in consciousness, but in the will. This will is not essentially united with consciousness, but is related to consciousness, in other words to knowledge, as substance to accident, as something illuminated to light, as the string to the sounding-board ... 7

In general terms, how does Schopenhauer's philosophy differ from the tradition up to and including Kant? He basically preserves the traditional division of willing and thinking but attempts to give a "correct and universal understanding of experience" (the main task of philosophy for Schopenhauer) from the standpoint of the primacy of the will. By reversing the traditional emphasis in the division, Schopenhauer believes he can achieve the goal of philosophy. The connection, however, which was the traditional problem, remains a problem. But says Schopenhauer,

... even if the root cannot be directly brought to light, it must yet be possible to lay hold of some data for explaining the connexion between the world of phenomena and the being-in-itself of things. Here, therefore, lies the path on which I have gone beyond Kant and the limit he set. But in doing this, I have stood on the ground of reflection, consequently of honesty and hence without the vain pretension of intellectual intuition or absolute thought that characterizes the period of pseudo-philosophy between Kant and myself. 8

Anyone who reads through Schopenhauer's chief work will clearly see that the connection is never shown. At the crucial points where one would expect to find the connection explicitly presented, Schopenhauer is reduced to metaphor, analogy or the mere assertion that the will is presenting itself in such and such a phenomenal way. It might be expected that if the primacy of thinking in the tradition could not satisfactorily bring about the comprehension of experience as a unity then reversing the emphasis of the thinking/willing dichotomy would be
equally useless. The fact is that Schopenhauer takes over, in its essentials, the traditional way of regarding the two sides of the division. Note what he says about knowledge. "It is above all else and essentially representation. What is representation? A very complicated physiological occurrence in an animal's brain, whose result is the consciousness of a picture or image at that very spot." Schopenhauer explicitly states the traditional view of thinking as representational thinking. This is precisely the way we later find Heidegger characterizing traditional western metaphysical thinking.

Because Schopenhauer maintains this notion of thinking and yet holds out the possibility of a unified view of experience, he is beset with insoluble difficulties. The unity sought, as Kant clearly showed, cannot be gained in a discursive way by externally related representations. To overcome his problems, Schopenhauer introduces his doctrine of Ideas, and here a brief account of Schopenhauer's doctrine of Ideas is in order.

The one will becomes dispersed as phenomena which constitute the world as it is thinkable for us, i.e., the world as representation or the world as it is subject to the principle of sufficient reason and the principles of individuation, space and time. But the unity of the one will cannot be faithfully given by the world as we know it, that is, as a world of particulars. With the doctrine of the Idea, Schopenhauer posits a phenomenal way of knowing which he asserts is not dictated by the principle of sufficient reason. "... the Idea does not enter into that principle; hence neither plurality nor change belongs to it." Here, by the way, Schopenhauer must start equivocating because although he must assert the Ideas to be phenomenal, up to this
point the phenomenal world has been virtually defined as that world which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason.

With respect to the Idea, Schopenhauer says, "... it alone is the most adequate objectivity possible of the will or of the thing-in-itself; indeed it is even the whole thing-in-itself, only under the form of the representation." Furthermore:

When the Idea appears, subject and object can no longer be distinguished in it, because the Idea, the adequate objectivity of the will, the real world as representation, arises only when subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely.

In art, Schopenhauer tells us, we are presented with the Idea as instantiated in some particular. We are then privy to the essentials of a world which is normally a dispersion of particulars.

... only the essential in ... the will's objectification constitutes the Idea; on the other hand, its unfolding or development [Schopenhauer means in the form of particular objects like crystals, plants, etc.], because drawn apart in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason into a multiplicity of many-sided phenomena, is inessential to the Idea ...

What is the Idea? "We can define it accurately as the way of considering things independently of the principle of sufficient reason, in contrast to the ... way of science and experience."

... science ... is with every end it attains again and again directed farther, and can never find an ultimate goal or complete satisfaction, any more than by running we can reach the point where the clouds touch the horizon; art, on the contrary, is everywhere at its goal.

The connection of the particular object with the Idea instantiated in it, however, is never made clear. The "how" of the instantiation is never presented yet this is precisely what we wish to comprehend. We have here, of course, the classic problem of the instantiation of the universal in the particular, but with Schopenhauer's philosophy, we are
no nearer a solution. At the end of volume two of *The World As Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer presents a lengthy discussion of mysticism and attempts to confirm his own position by pointing to the common features of previous well-known mystical experiences. These common features, he argues, are due to the fact that "the inner essence of all things is at bottom identical." But Schopenhauer can do no more than assert the validity of mystical experience as a confirmation of an underlying unity. In fact, mystical experience proper, which betrays for Schopenhauer the basic unity of the world, is not a legitimate topic for philosophy. He says with reference to philosophy in general and his own in particular,

... it must remain cosmology, and cannot become theology. Its theme must restrict itself to the world; to express from every aspect what this world is, what it may be in its innermost nature, is all that it can honestly achieve. Now it is in keeping with this that, when my teaching reaches its highest point, it assumes a negative character, and so ends with a negation. Thus it can speak here only of what is denied or given up; but what is gained in place of this, what is laid hold of, it is forced ... to describe as nothing; and it can add only the consolation that it may be merely a relative, not an absolute, nothing. For, if something is no one of all the things that we know, then certainly it is for us in general nothing. Yet it still does not follow from this that it is nothing absolutely, namely that is must be nothing from every possible point of view and in every possible sense, but only that we are restricted to a wholly negative knowledge of it; and this may very well lie in the limitation of our point of view.17

But ultimately all of this makes no sense. The above paragraph contains internal inconsistencies and is furthermore inconsistent with what Schopenhauer has said earlier in his presentation. As an example, it is perfectly obvious that we cannot be dealing with a relative nothing at this point because this is a concept of nothing based upon an already unified experience and is completely bound to a view of the
world according to the *principium individuationis* as Schopenhauer asserts many times. A relative nothing would imply that in principle all mystical experiences could be reduced to experiences under the principle of sufficient reason which is precisely what Schopenhauer is interested in denying at this point in his presentation. There is no need to detail Schopenhauer's inconsistencies; there are many of them throughout his philosophy. What is most instructive, however, is what these inconsistencies reveal concerning Schopenhauer's attempt to disclose experience as a coherent unity. In the end he must simply assert this unity. How the unity or underlying will of things is instantiated in the particular phenomena or different "points of view" remains incomprehensible. The unity cannot be directly stated, but this is what the philosopher ultimately feels compelled to state.

Schopenhauer's problem, of course, stems from the fact that he begins with two apparently basic aspects of experience and must make understandable how one unified experience can contain both. This unfortunately usually degenerates into the attempt to reduce one to the other and thereby seems to result in the denial of the reality of one aspect. With respect to this problem, Stanley Rosen has said in reference to Kant, "The Kantian philosophy attempted to avoid the silence of monism by preserving the distinct identities of nature and Geist."\(^\text{18}\) It must be said that Schopenhauer attempted to capture the distinction while proclaiming a monism by making nature a manifestation of the spirit (will). As stated already however, how this actually can occur remains incomprehensible. When the outcome is a form of monism, it cannot be adequately stated in terms of the particulars of experience. This is one of Rosen's main points with respect to the problem of
monistic philosophies. Schopenhauer continually wavers with respect to how much he can positively assert. He is constantly taking back with the left hand what he has just given with the right. This is the situation one might expect from a philosophy which attempts to unify two apparently mutually exclusive parts of experience. The problem of the instantiation of the universal in the particular of which the problem of the unity of experience is a form cannot be understood from a reductionist point of view, because the integrity of each side of the dichotomy must be maintained.

During the last few years of his life, Schopenhauer's philosophy began to get the recognition he had originally hoped for it. It might be conjectured that the attempt to develop certain lines of the Hegelian philosophy during the intervening years had begun to wane and thus the time was ripe for something new -- even an antihegelian position. It is well-known that interest in philosophy in Germany reached its lowest point around the middle of the nineteenth century just before the development of Neo-Kantianism, thus Schopenhauer seems to have filled the space between a waning Hegelianism and a waxing Neo-Kantianism. At any rate, Schopenhauer falls outside the mainstream of nineteenth century philosophy, yet, as has been urged in this thesis, not in his most basic aim but only in the way he attempts to realize this aim. The project of philosophy still remains to understand and express the unity of experience. The lasting contribution of the Hegelian philosophy was "in his theory that the nature of every phenomenon of life is to be understood historically." This is a point which was virtually ignored by Schopenhauer but which exerted a great influence upon Nietzsche. And although Schopenhauer strongly affected Nietzsche's
philosophy, many of Nietzsche's views on Kantianism betray the influence of Neo-Kantian doctrines prevalent during his development; in particular those of Gustav Teichmüller, Afrikan Spir and F.A. Lange.  

The exhaustion which becomes explicit in the philosophy of Schopenhauer stands as a sign from the philosophic point of view of nihilism. The express recognition of nihilism arises with the final unsuccessful attempts in the tradition to give a philosophical account of the unity of human experience. Nietzsche is the first philosopher to philosophize on the basis of the knowledge that the previous activity of the tradition has been nihilistic. The tradition can be historically characterized as nihilistic, hence Nietzsche accepts the view that a general movement in history can be perceived; that patterns of development can be recognized. He rejects the view, however, that we can know whether or not this development has a point, a goal, a final outcome. In light of this, he further rejects the notion that man as an individual might view his life as meaningful in terms of a historical whole.

The problem of nihilism is often equated with the problem of meaning. It is also equated with a crisis of values or the problem of the ultimate justification of man's existence. These are acceptable descriptions of nihilism but for this thesis it is most important to insist on the connection of nihilism with the problem of the unity of experience and with the conception of reason particularly as Kant presents it. The explicit recognition of nihilism coincides with the last attempts to carry out the presentation of human experience as a unity. With this in mind, we focused upon the failure of Schopenhauer's philosophy. This was doubly appropriate since Nietzsche entered philosophy proper through Schopenhauer's philosophy. The stage is now
set for a philosophy which makes the phenomenon of nihilism its most basic theme.

The following discussion of Nietzsche's conception of nihilism proceeds from a characterization of the philosophic tradition as the attempt to state clearly the unity of experience. In addition, the discussion proceeds from the understanding that only within the "whole" can the question of meaningfulness be ultimately answered. Furthermore it should be kept in mind that the drive toward unity virtually becomes a defining characteristic of reason for Kant. In view of this, problems involved in our discussion of the unity of experience may be taken literally as problems of reason in general. These considerations in the discussion of nihilism will then allow a further understanding of Nietzsche's position in the tradition vis a vis his doctrine of the will to power. The progress of this thesis may then be crudely schematized as follows:

1) The progress of reason as the drive toward unity (Kant)
2) The drive toward unity in terms of meaning and value (Nietzsche)
3) The failure of the drive toward unity as a characterization of nihilism
4) Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power with respect to nihilism and therefore reason in the tradition.
NOTES

CHAPTER III

2. Ibid., p. 197.
3. Ibid., p. 192.
4. Ibid.
5. This gives a clear indication of one way in which Kant may be regarded as the culmination of the tradition. Namely, the Idealists and their followers along with Schopenhauer all philosophize from the same problematic ground established by Kant. With the later Neo-Kantians, of course, the connection is explicit.
7. Ibid., p. 199.
8. Ibid., p. 289.
9. Ibid., p. 191.
10. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 169. Schopenhauer believed he had the correct understanding of Plato's Ideas. He says here, "Further, I hope that, after what has been said, there will be no hesitation in recognizing again in the definite grades of the objectification of that will, which forms the in-itself of the world, what Plato called the eternal Ideas ...."
11. Ibid., p. 175.
13. Ibid., p. 182.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., pp. 611-612.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF NIHILISM

Stanley Rosen in his work on nihilism has said "The modern project to master nature begins in Cartesian pride and ends in the pessimism of Schopenhauer and the nihilism of Nietzsche."¹ Rosen's view of nihilism is compatible with what this thesis has presented so far; his emphasis and line of attack are, however, different. In the following development of the concept of nihilism, there will be occasion to emphasize Rosen's approach when it is pertinent to the presentation.

We see above that Rosen's view of Schopenhauer's position coincides with our previous discussion. Rosen, however, uses the idea of mastering nature as the ground motivation of philosophy. This, according to the context of the remark, is to make explicit the connection with Nietzsche's will to power. Of course, it is only a short move from the notion of mastering nature to nihilism as a crisis of reason when we consider the influence that the idea of "knowledge as power" has played in the tradition. Rosen, in fact, does see nihilism as a crisis of reason. He states, "Reason has been conceived as a human project or the instrument of a human project, but in either case it emerges from the pre-rational stratum of desire, basically the desire to master nature."² He further states "Contemporary man desperately needs a rational interpretation of reason. Instead, he has been furnished with epistemologies, or technical discussions of how reason works."³ Because
reason cannot be grounded in some "reasonable" way, nihilism arises. This might be put in terms of the present thesis as follows: Because the unity of experience cannot be explicated philosophically (in terms of a reasonable account), philosophy ends in nihilism. Rosen believes that "the problem of modern philosophy up to Kant was not dualism, but rather its intrinsic inclination toward monistic nihilism." This confirms that Rosen basically shares Nietzsche's view of at least the modern tradition. The phrase "monistic nihilism" does, however, betray a difference. It is the fact of monism and its inability to come to complete expression which reveals the nihilistic element for Rosen. The problem of monistic positions in terms of nihilism will be treated in the sequel.

At this point, let us proceed with an account of Nietzsche's concept of nihilism. In his unpublished writings, Nietzsche gave a by now famous formulation of nihilism. "What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; 'why' finds no answer." This appears to be a very mysterious answer to the question. The answer is framed in the form of values and furthermore apparently makes these values autonomous or self-acting. Commentators on the definition of nihilism have usually emphasized the devaluation of values but not its autonomous character which, as I hope will be shown, is a very important aspect of the concept of nihilism, particularly in connection with the will to power.

For Nietzsche, nihilism is a historical phenomenon but not in the sense of an event within history; history is itself nihilistic. Nihilism describes the movement of history itself. In this respect, Nietzsche regards it as a necessary event. It makes no sense to
realistically entertain the idea of alternatives as if the progress of nihilism thus far were an accident. History as nihilistic is a product of the basic condition of man. The development of history is the development and progressive working-out of nihilism. In true Hegelian fashion, there comes a time when man becomes self-conscious enough to realize this. Nietzsche's philosophy represents this form of self-consciousness.

That the "highest values devaluate themselves" is a necessary process. How is this to be understood? There are two senses in which this might be understood one of which is more basic than the other and relies on the doctrine of the will to power. We must be clear that the process Nietzsche is describing is an autonomous one. There is one process in which the establishment of values is one side and the devaluation the opposite side. Furthermore, Nietzsche believes that in order for a given value to be established it is necessary for there to be a simultaneous devaluation. Ultimately the process manifested in this valuing and devaluing is the process of the will to power itself. This will be discussed later in a chapter on the will to power.

In Nietzsche's philosophy, the terms 'meaning' and 'value' may be used synonymously. If we want to consider meaning apart from value, this must be at some level less basic than the one with which Nietzsche is generally concerned. Nietzsche speaks of value in many instances where others might speak of meaning. This is a point agreed upon by virtually all commentators, and Nietzsche's writings are filled with examples in which the two terms might be interchanged.

With the loss of the highest values (meaning) we are sunk in nihilism, yet the idea of nihilism does not correspond strictly with
the loss of meaning per se. An important distinction must be made here between two ideas of nihilism concerning which Nietzsche himself seems sometimes ambiguous. As noted above, nihilism may refer to the complete process of valuation and devaluation and indeed this is his deepest understanding of nihilism.

The meaning could have been: the fulfillment of some highest ethical canon in all events, the moral world order; or the growth of love and harmony in the intercourse of beings; or the gradual approximation of a state of universal happiness -- any goal at least constitutes some meaning.⁶

According to the strict understanding of nihilism the nihilist is not one who believes in the ultimate meaninglessness of existence, but one who recognizes the futility of fixing any ultimate meaning on existence because "the highest values devaluate themselves." Nietzsche believed, in fact, that the ultimate meaninglessness of existence could not be asserted, because the standpoint from which such a judgment must presume to be made, could never be assumed. Nietzsche often speaks of nihilism in the sense of simply a loss of meaning thereby using the term in its more common form. He says, for example, "The faith in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism."⁷ Here nihilism is regarded as an event which can be "caused." In this context, nihilism could simply mean a loss of value. From his more precise and comprehensive standpoint, however, Nietzsche could just as readily assert that nihilism is the cause of the faith in the categories of reason. The setting up of meaning-value is just as much a part of the total phenomenon, nihilism, as the devaluation.

The implicit presence of nihilism as a condition is what, for Nietzsche, allows us to grasp the ground movement of Western metaphysics. Western philosophy as a whole presents itself as a problem for Nietzsche
under the name of nihilism. In this regard, the explicit doctrines of the various past philosophies are to be looked at as particulars and as symptoms of the condition, nihilism. Every explicit philosophy is conditioned by its predecessors but regarded in this way, we do not grasp the movement of the tradition as a whole. For this the tradition as a series of historical facts must be transcended. The philosophies of the tradition as explicitly put forth were therefore a surface phenomenon which must be interpreted as signs of something deeper. It may be possible, for example, to show how a given philosophy emerges as a reaction to its immediate predecessor, yet this would remain a self-contained analysis by leaving the preconditions of the given type of philosophizing unexamined. This is in fact the way most histories of philosophy proceed. One may find a good example of Nietzsche's quite different mode of procedure in the first part of *Beyond Good and Evil*.

One of the results of the implicit nihilistic character of the tradition, is that, in a rather dialectical fashion, attempts to cure the symptoms only bring about the opposite of what was desired. What is meant here is not difficult to understand. At the surface level, at the symptomatic level, certain "facts" are placed opposite each other, let us say, as a crude example, pleasure and pain. These "opposites" are then each made the cure for an excess of the other without anyone's realizing that they are equally necessary from a higher perspective. Nietzsche would speak here, however, of the replacement of one supreme value with another. "Believing one chooses remedies, one chooses in fact that which hastens exhaustion; Christianity is an example; progress is another instance."8

In the dialectic of "the devaluation of values," one believes that
to avoid the loss of meaning, to avoid the devaluation of values one
must set up other values. Or to eliminate one situation which arose
from "wrong" values we seek to work according to counter values. This
is a "common sense" reactive point of view which, according to
Nietzsche, never questions the process of valuing itself. "Common
sense" never entertains the possibility that the very action it takes
to eliminate its discontent is that which, in the end, promotes it.
"Are not all 'values' lures that draw out the comedy without bringing
it closer to a solution?"\textsuperscript{9}

As mentioned earlier, there comes a point when the process of
valuation/devaluation may be grasped as what it is in fact. The philoso-
pher may be the individual who explicitly articulates the realization
but it will reveal itself across the whole spectrum of human concerns.
"The entire idealism of mankind hitherto is on the point of changing
suddenly into nihilism -- into the belief in absolute worthlessness,
i.e., meaningfulness."\textsuperscript{10} Here Nietzsche uses the term 'nihilism' in
its more restricted common form. However, the whole process by which
ideals are created and destroyed may, according to the foregoing account,
also be viewed as nihilism. Idealism acquires a peculiar meaning which
applies to virtually every philosophy which attempts to make absolute
pronouncements on the character of existence. Basically all philosophy
since Plato represents idealism as Nietzsche understands it. According
to Nietzsche's famous formulation of the activity of philosophy, the
tradition has tried "to impose upon becoming the character of being."\textsuperscript{11}
Idealism means imposing "upon becoming the character of being." It
indicates that for mankind existence is meaningful, that is, man lives
in terms of an expressed or unexpressed interpretation of existence.
That "the entire idealism of mankind hitherto is on the point of changing suddenly into nihilism," once again represents the dialectical movement whereby one state of things gives rise to its opposite. The idealism which Nietzsche sees as representative of Western metaphysics is about to collapse. But into what?

Extreme positions are not succeeded by moderate ones but by extreme positions of the opposite kind. Thus the belief in the absolute immorality of nature, in aim -- and meaninglessness, is the psychologically necessary affect once the belief in God and an essentially moral order become untenable. Nihilism appears at that point, not that the displeasure at existence has become greater than before but because one has come to mistrust any "meaning" in suffering, indeed in existence. One interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain.12

In order to move further into Nietzsche's characterization of nihilism and his critique of philosophy generally, it is necessary now to introduce his fundamental metaphysical conception, the will to power. This most basic principle of Nietzsche's philosophy is difficult to understand and the reader may feel that he never comes to an adequate grasp of the concept. In the final chapter of this thesis, I will discuss this problem more thoroughly and suggest there are necessary reasons for the difficulty. For the present, however, I would like to make the connection between Nietzsche's concept of nihilism as presented in its most basic form above and the will to power. As far as I am aware, this connection has been treated adequately only by Heidegger, yet it is absolutely imperative to understand this connection if Nietzsche's philosophy is to be comprehended as a unity.

The will to power is an autonomous principle whose autonomy is revealed in the process of valuation/devaluation discussed above. It
is definitive for all life; in fact, life is the will to power for Nietzsche. He has Zarathustra say, "wherever I found life, I found the will to power." The will to power exhibits a dialectical process of the Hegelian type in that it represents a self-contained principle which operates through a simultaneous process of creation and destruction. This is in fact the basis of Nietzsche's many statements asserting that all creating whether artistic or otherwise involves a necessary destroying. Every increase in power involves a simultaneous decrease. One might translate this as "you can't get something for nothing" or creation ex nihilo is not permitted. Nietzsche attempts to make this point over and over again.

Displeasure, as an obstacle to its [an organism's] will to power is therefore a normal fact, the normal ingredient of every organic event; man does not avoid it, he is rather in continual need of it; every victory, every feeling of pleasure, every event, presupposes a resistance overcome.

Overall insight. -- Actually, every major growth is accompanied by a tremendous crumbling and passing away: suffering, the symptoms of decline belong in the times of tremendous advances; every fruitful and powerful movement of humanity has also created at the same time a nihilistic movement. It could be the sign of a crucial and most essential growth, of the transition to new conditions of existence, that the most extreme form of pessimism, genuine nihilism, would come into the world. This I have comprehended.

Above we saw Nietzsche characterize philosophy as imposing "upon becoming the character of being." If this quotation is completed we get "To impose upon becoming the character of being -- that is the supreme will to power." The philosopher, then, exercises the "supreme will to power." He attempts to characterize existence as a whole; he attempts to say that things are thus and not otherwise. Of course other people besides philosophers need to impose a stable set of
interpretations or values on their world, but the philosopher is the peculiar type whose job it is to make all of this explicit. For others, the basic ways in which they characterize experience remain at a subterranean level.

Nietzsche's concept of power is, of course, basic to his position. It will therefore be useful to clarify this concept. To do this I would like to develop the concept in basically the way Heidegger does in his commentary on Nietzsche. Heidegger describes the situation as follows:

Every power is only power insofar as and so long as it is more power, that is, power increasing. Power can hold itself in its essence only as it climbs over and reaches beyond an already achieved stage of power, we say: overpowers. As soon as power remains at one stage of power, it is already without power. (Jede Macht ist nur Macht, sofern sie und solange sie Mehr-Macht d.h. Machtsteigerung ist. Macht kann sich nur in sich selbst, d.h. in ihrem Wesen halten, indem sie die erreichte Machtstufe, also je sich selbst übersteigt und überholt, wir sagen: Übermächtigt.)

Power is not an entity in itself but is only recognized insofar as it is active or has concrete effects. The point here parallels the kind of arguments designed to eliminate the old notion of "force" in physics as some kind of entity or substance with a status apart from some perceivable change. Analogously, something is said to possess power only insofar as there is an overcoming of a resistance or a movement from one power stage to another. For Nietzsche, life as will to power meant that, as living, an organism was in a constant state of overcoming -- generation and degeneration. From this point of view, to speak of a power which could not manifest itself would be to speak nonsense. When the process of constant overcoming or growth ceases, this is equivalent to death. It is important to see in this description that, consistent with a dialectical position, there is no question of a one-sided
interpretation of life. This theory makes life and death complements, indeed, necessary counterparts. There is simply the process with its two sides of overpowering and being overpowered. The following unpublished selection may be enlightening,

My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it.17

Once the dialectical character of Nietzsche's fundamental conception is understood, it becomes more understandable why "the entire idealism of mankind hitherto is on the point of changing suddenly into nihilism ...." If as Nietzsche asserts, the erection of ideals is a consequence of life which is the will to power, then man's idealizing function must participate in the dialectic manifested in the will to power; "the highest values" must "devalue themselves." We have reached here an explicit connection between the will to power and nihilism. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with nihilism and the will to power in connection with man's idealizing function, the positing of "values" and "truths" and the attempt to give a meaning or interpretation to existence.

Nietzsche usually makes no explicit distinction between ideals, values and truths. In general, however, we can say that "value" is used in a more primary sense; closer to the word 'interpretation'. At times Nietzsche uses the words 'ideals', 'values' and 'truths' in a more common way. When reading Nietzsche, one must be careful not to confuse the senses of these words. In On the Genealogy of Morals (Zur Genealogie der Moral), for example, we read, "... the value of these
values themselves must first be called in question." 18 The second use of the word 'value' refers to traditional moral interpretations while the first refers to the condition of man as part of life or will to power. Furthermore there are numerous instances of the following type: "The question of values is more fundamental than the question of certainty: the latter becomes serious only by presupposing that the value question has already been answered." 19 In addition, "... we know, too, that reverence for truth is already the consequence of an illusion -- and that one should value more than truth the force that forms, simplifies, shapes, invents." 20

In light of the possible confusion regarding ideals, truths and values as Nietzsche presents them, it is important to be careful in determining exactly where Nietzsche is directing his criticism of the tradition. It is sometimes simplistically thought, for instance, that Nietzsche condemns all valuing, idealizing and "holding for true." He is often dismissed as a nihilist who believes in nothing, claims there is no truth and therefore holds that "everything is permitted."

The criticism Nietzsche directs against the tradition, when viewed correctly, is always based upon whether values or truths represent a denial or affirmation of the will to power which means life. His criticism cannot be directed against the establishing of truths as such, because this would ignore value or truth-setting as a necessary process of the will to power as described above. In this respect, Nietzsche's criticisms are primarily directed against truths as an attempt to "fix becoming" as "external truths." In an important section of Thus Spake Zarathustra (Also Sprach Zarathustra) entitled "On Self-Overcoming" Zarathustra says,
"Will to truth," you who are wisest call that which impels you and fills you with lust? A will to the thinkability of all beings: this I call your will. You want to make all being thinkable, for you doubt with well-founded suspicion that it is already thinkable. 
You still want to create the world before which you can kneel: that is your ultimate hope and intoxication. Your will and your valuations you have placed on the river of becoming; and what the people believe to be good and evil, that betrays to me an ancient will to power.
Now the river carries your bark farther; it has to carry it. Not the river is your danger and the end of your good and evil, you who are wisest, but that will itself, the will to power -- the unexhausted procreative will to life. And life itself confided this secret to me: "Behold," it said, "I am that which must always overcome itself."
Indeed, you call it a will to procreate or a drive to an end, to something higher, farther, more manifold; but all this is one and one secret.
"Indeed, the truth was not hit by him who shot at it with the word of the 'will to existence': that will does not exist. For, what does not exist cannot will; but what is in existence, how could that still want existence? Only where there is life is there also will: not will to life but -- thus I teach you -- will to power."
And whoever must be a creator in good and evil, verily he must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the highest goodness: but this is creative.21

Here we have in the most condensed form possible a statement of the will to power and its relationship to the establishing of truths. The will to power is self-overcoming. "Holding for true" is a function of life or the will to power. This is one of Nietzsche's most fundamental themes.

So Nietzsche's criticism is directed against those who would lay their "eternal truths" across existence with the belief that they are just that. The quest for certainty in this sense has been the dominant theme of the modern philosophic tradition ever since it was announced by Descartes as a criterion of truth. Moreover, man has tried to obtain certainty in areas where, even accepting certainty as a criterion
of truth in itself, truth was not possible. Judgements on existence as a whole are of this kind. Questions of whether or not mankind is "progressing," whether things on the whole are getting better, are always questions which ask for the impossible standpoint of the beyond. These presumptuous judgements to the "beyond" Nietzsche sees as a remnant of the Christian value scheme, and he asks "to what extent Christian presuppositions and interpretations still live on under the formulas 'nature', 'progress', perfectability', 'Darwinism', under the superstitious belief in a certain relationship between happiness and virtue, unhappiness and guilt." Like Christianity, we here have judgements on the whole which Nietzsche condemns as denials of the basic character of life. At this point I wish to anticipate the possible objection that Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power might come under his condemnation of "eternal truths." This objection will be discussed in the last chapter.

It should be noted that with the belief in "progress" and "perfectability" we have another possible example of how, according to Nietzsche, philosophers perpetuate nihilism; nihilism here regarded as simply the collapse of value. They set up so-called stable truths "in which one can believe," but in order to gain these stable truths, the philosopher must deny life as the will to power, thus:

... it is a self-deception of philosophers as moralists to imagine that they escape decadence by opposing it. That is beyond their will; and, however little they acknowledge it, one later discovers that they were among the most powerful promoters of decadence.

Furthermore, "Believing one chooses remedies, one chooses in fact that which hastens exhaustion; Christianity is an example (to name the greatest example of such an aberration of the instincts); 'progress'
is another instance." Consequently the very act of establishing values can be nihilistic insofar as it does not recognize the necessities of life. Nietzsche calls Christianity, for example, the nihilistic religion par excellence.

I consider life itself instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline. My assertion is that this will is lacking in all the supreme values of mankind -- that values of decline, nihilistic values hold sway under the holiest names. In conjunction with the above, it is well to point out the following.

"Nihilism. It is ambiguous: A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism. B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism." All life is a manifestation of the will to power, but within this, two possible interpretations of life-phenomena are possible. That is, all phenomena of life are ambiguous. In actuality what we have is "one kind of life in struggle with another." Of decisive importance here is whether there is an affirming or denying of life, an affirming or denying of the will to power.

With respect to his critique of the philosophic tradition, it is precisely Nietzsche's realization of the character of the will to power which places him at the end of the metaphysical tradition and gives his critique its force. Nietzsche does not simply dismiss the tradition or oppose it through a simple negation; this would be to make the mistake of positing opposite values, and from the point of view of the tradition as a whole, would be merely a perpetuation of the thinking of the tradition itself. What Nietzsche does is point to the underlying condition of the whole movement. The will to power, once recognized, allows the break with the tradition simply because with this principle
the tradition is grasped as a whole; the tradition, particularly if we follow the interpretation of Heidegger, reaches its culmination with the will to power and is therefore in a position to be comprehended in its unity. More on this in the final chapter.

As noted, Nietzsche chose to adopt the language of values when speaking of the "truths" promulgated by the metaphysical tradition. Even the most abstract, sterile epistemologies engage his attention only as signs of a particular type of valuation related to the affirmation or denial of life. Certainly it would have been unwise of Nietzsche to speak in terms of the traditional categories of epistemology when these categories, particularly the traditional notion of truth, were being called into question. The traditional notion of truth as certainty or truth "in itself" "as if values were inherent in things and all one had to do was grasp them" is a falsification possible only on the basis of a valuing antithetical to life. Nietzsche claims that all being is being interpreted and behind this is a value-setting based upon the essence of life as the will to power. As Eugen Fink puts it in his commentary on Nietzsche, "Behind all value worlds stands 'life' as the great player."29

There is perhaps a further reason for Nietzsche's language of values. Traditionally we have seen the equation truth = goodness prevailing: 
summum ens = summum bonum = aeterna veritas. In the past men have valued the truth highly, the truth has been desirable, there have been martyrs to the truth, to tell untruths is immoral. But why?

"Why not rather untruth?" asks Nietzsche. Questions of truth have been inextricably entangled with value questions. This was of course the case during the church-dominated period of philosophy but was this
left behind at the inception of the modern period with Descartes?

Nietzsche doubts it. The older tradition and even Descartes was more honest in allowing theological considerations to bear on considerations of truth. What Nietzsche deplores is the modern preoccupation with an "objectivity" which masks moral concerns or values.

Even Descartes had a notion of the fact that in a fundamentally Christian-moral mode of thought, which believes in a good God as the creator of things, only God's veracity guarantees to us the judgements of our senses. Apart from a religious sanction and guarantee of our senses and rationality -- where should we derive a right to trust in existence! That thinking is a measure of actuality -- that what cannot be thought is not -- is a rude non plus ultra of a moralistic trustfulness (in an essential truth principle at the bottom of things), in itself a mad assumption, which experience contradicts every moment. We are altogether unable to think anything at all just as it is.30

The "truths" of our experience are the way we must assimilate that experience.

Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. 'Truth' is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered -- but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end -- introducing truth, as a processus in infinitum, an active determining -- not a becoming-conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the "will to power."31

This should be compared with Nietzsche's statement that to "impose upon becoming the character of being ... is the supreme will to power."

From an unpublished note of 1885-1886 we read:

That the value of the world lies in our interpretation ...; that previous interpretations have been perspective valuations by virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, for the growth of power; that every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and increase of power opens up new perspectives and means believing in new horizons -- this idea permeates my writings.32
The term 'perspectivism', it must be emphasized, is not meant to introduce a relativism in the anything-is-permitted sense of the word. It is Nietzsche's term to indicate a position which sees truth as nothing absolute but as a condition of life. Life is evaluating and truths are evaluations. Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole is sometimes called perspectivism, so a clarification of this term depends upon a comprehensive understanding of his essential position. More will be said in the final chapter concerning this designation. The best explicit discussion of Nietzsche's notion of perspective can be found in Karl Jasper's *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity.*

With the advent of nihilism in its modern manifestation, sometimes known as the "death of God," man begins to lose his center of gravity. What follows is a period of frantic activity whose duration Nietzsche estimated at a few more hundred years and within which we now stand. The activity of this period is characterized by the attempt to avoid what he called the great "in vain."

One tries to hold on even to the "beyond" -- even if only as some antilogical "x" -- but one immediately interprets it in such a way that some sort of old-fashioned metaphysical comfort can be derived from it.

One tries to find in events an old-fashioned divine governance -- an order of things that rewards, punishes, educates and betters.34

... to get over it by intoxication: intoxication as music; intoxication as cruelty in the tragic enjoyment of the destruction of the noblest; intoxication as blind enthusiasm for single human beings or ages .... Attempt to work blindly as an instrument of science: opening one's eyes to the many small enjoyments; mysticism, the voluptuous enjoyment of eternal emptiness; art "for its own sake" ... and "pure knowledge" as narcotic states of oneself ... some little stupid fanaticism ....35

The reader should compare this with the similar comments of Heidegger on page 31 of the English translation of *Einführung in die Metaphysik.*
From a higher perspective, how might the attempt to avoid the "in vain" of nihilism be interpreted? The autonomous character of the process of valuation/devaluation or the more basic sense of nihilism as outlined above provides the clue to a deeper interpretation. It is an interpretation put forward by Heidegger in his essay entitled *Nietzsche's Word "God is Dead"* (Nietzsche's Wort, "Gott ist tot"). Heidegger calls nihilism "the fundamental event of western history" and states that "Nietzsche thinks nihilism as the 'inner logic' of western history." Furthermore "the sphere for the essence and event of nihilism is metaphysics itself." With the death of God, says Heidegger, the place which he occupied still remains and "even demands to be possessed anew and to have the vanished God replaced by others." In other words, the value-place remains to be filled and what content fills it is not particularly crucial. What is crucial is that it be filled. This scheme of Heidegger's in terms of value-places to be filled provides a good method of describing the mechanism involved in Nietzsche's concept of nihilism. That there must be a valuing has ontological priority here. Since value is "the standpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement for complex forms of relative life duration within the flux of becoming," this valuing must proceed as a condition of life regardless of its object. In connection with this, note Nietzsche's statement at the beginning and end of *The Genealogy of Morals* that "man would rather will nothingness than not will." What is to be avoided at all costs is the loss of a content which would be to experience nothing or the great "in vain." In this sense, to speak with Eugen Fink, "God was the mask of the nothing." Put another way, God provided the ultimate reason for man's existence which
otherwise might be seen as in vain.

Gradually, man has become a fanciful ["phantastischen" -- two English translations use visionary and fantastic. Both seem wrong to me.] animal that has to fulfill one more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race cannot flourish without a periodic trust in life -- without faith in reason in life.42

God functions here in the sense of Kant's "unconditioned"; the reason which has its reason in itself. The need for this unconditioned is ever present, just as Kant believed that the need for metaphysics would be ever present, regardless of how its content is conceived.

In the following chapter, the problem of nihilism will be discussed in the context of the problem of the unity of experience and specifically Nietzsche's recognition of this problem. Quite simply, I wish to equate the inability to give a unified philosophical account of experience with the problem of nihilism. This could already be guessed from the discussion of Schopenhauer's failure to give the account. We saw there that Schopenhauer was left to face "nothing"; he himself spoke of this "nothingness" in describing his dilemma. He became, as Nietzsche says, a pessimist. Pessimism represents a form of bad nihilism or a form of declining spirit as mentioned above. Schopenhauer's philosophy ends in a mysticism which for Nietzsche is one more attempt to avoid the "in vain." Even though Schopenhauer does not accept the Christian form of transcendence, he still has his "will-less beyond" whose main function is to deny the "becoming" of this world. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is important to understand that Schopenhauer's failure to encapsulate experience within the confines of the principle of sufficient reason (and traditionally what more basic way could this be done in philosophy) leads
him to a life denying position. One should read in this regard the chapter "On the Vanity and Suffering of Life" in the second volume of Schopenhauer's chief work.

It is now necessary to give some direct evidence of Nietzsche's recognition of the problem of the unity of experience.
NOTES

CHAPTER IV

2. Ibid., p. 56. With regard to the mastery of nature, Rosen continues, "We are unable to explain to ourselves in a rational way the point to our success ...."
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 66.
5. WP, no. 2.
6. WP, no. 12A.
7. WP, no. 12B.
8. WP, no. 44.
9. WP, no. 55.
10. WP, no. 617. The discussion of the first chapter concerning the role of certainty as the mark of truth is relevant here.
11. WP, no. 617.
12. WP, no. 55.
14. WP, no. 702.
15. WP, no. 112.
17. WP, no. 636.
18. Schlechta, Vol. II, p. 768. (Kaufmann, CM, p. 20) This concisely expresses Nietzsche's radical scepticism. There are simply no values not open to question. Under the heading "value" Nietzsche also includes such supposedly nonevaluative assertions as those of the pure epistemologist.
19. WP, no. 588. With respect to this and the preceding quotation, consider Nietzsche's remark in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "... it is high time to replace the Kantian question, 'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' by another question, 'Why is belief in such judgments necessary?' -- and to comprehend that such judgments must be believed to be true ...." (Kaufmann, BGE, p. 19)
20. WP, no. 602.
22. WP, no. 243.
23. WP, no. 435. This note is in the context of a discussion of Plato.
24. WP, no. 44.
26. WP, no. 22.
27. WP, no. 592. Nietzsche's meaning is clearer in context. "The antagonism between the 'true world' as revealed by pessimism, and a world possible for life -- here one must test the rights of truth. It is necessary to measure the meaning of all these 'ideal drives' against life to grasp what this antagonism really is: the struggle of sickly, despairing life that cleaves to a beyond, with healthier, more stupid and mendacious, richer, less degenerate life. Therefore it is not 'truth' in struggle with life but one kind of life in struggle with another."

28. WP, no. 422.


30. WP, no. 436. This quotation reveals Nietzsche's phenomenalism. In Nietzsche by R.J. Hollingdale we find: "Nietzsche wanted to be a phenomenalist and you fail to appreciate a whole dimension of his greatness unless you see that his philosophy is at heart a phenomenalism." See R.J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche (London, 1973), p. 134.

31. WP, no. 552.

32. WP, no. 616.


34. WP, no. 30.

35. WP, no. 29.


37. Ibid., p. 204.

38. Ibid., p. 208.

39. WP, no. 715.

40. Fink, Nietzsches Philosophie, p. 92

41. Schlechta, Vol. II, p. 35. (Kaufmann, GM, p. 163) This remark opens and closes Nietzsche's critique of ascetic ideals. In conclusion, Nietzsche says, "We can no longer conceal from ourselves what is expressed by all that willing which has taken its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself -- all this means -- let us dare to grasp it -- a will to nothingness ...."

42. WP, no. 517.
CHAPTER V

NIHILISM AND NIETZSCHE'S AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM OF UNITY

If the problem of nihilism is the all-pervasive phenomenon it has been represented to be and if the problem of the unity of experience is intimately connected with this phenomenon, the various specific discussions within Nietzsche's philosophy ought to manifest his concern with disunity. I intend to illustrate this concern by concentrating chiefly on two works; On the Use and Abuse of History for Life (Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben) which is the second part of Untimely Meditations (Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen) and The Birth of Tragedy (Die Geburt der Tragödie). The chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of the role of reason in the tradition with respect to the problem of unity.

The two works I have chosen to discuss, I believe most easily bring out the theme of unity (or disunity) as a concern of Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy is especially significant in that it connects most clearly Schopenhauer's philosophy with that of Nietzsche and furthermore sets the stage for the main lines taken by Nietzsche's later philosophy.

In section 18 of The Birth of Tragedy we read:

The extraordinary courage and wisdom of Kant and Schopenhauer have succeeded in gaining the most difficult victory, the victory over the optimism concealed in the essence of logic -- an optimism that is the basis of our culture. While this optimism, resting on apparently unobjectionable aeternae veritates, had believed that
all the riddles of the universe could be known and fathomed, and had treated space, time and causality as entirely unconditional laws of the most universal validity, Kant showed that these really served only to elevate the mere phenomenon, the work of Maya, to the position of the sole and highest reality, as if it were the innermost and true essence of things, thus making impossible any knowledge of this essence, or in Schopenhauer’s words, lulling the dreamer still more soundly asleep.

With this insight a culture is inaugurated that I venture to call a tragic culture.¹

It is Nietzsche’s opinion that Schopenhauer revealed the poverty of a purely theoretical approach to reality by working out the implications of the principle of sufficient reason in connection with the principle of sufficient reason in connection with the principium individuationis of space and time. Moreover, Kant’s merit lies in his delimitation of the phenomenal world while admitting a human reality beyond the phenomenal. It should be remembered that Schopenhauer saw his philosophy as merely an extension of the Kantian and believed the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique to have been Kant’s crowning achievement. Schopenhauer says with emphasis, "Kant’s greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself ...."²

The Birth of Tragedy is a cultural critique as are the Untimely Meditations. Beyond this they are critiques of modernity as nihilistic although Nietzsche is not using the term "nihilism" at this point. Nietzsche calls modern culture a Socratic culture; a culture which worships the man of theory.

Our whole modern world is entangled in the net of Alexandrian culture. It proposes as its ideal the theoretical man equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge, and laboring in the service of science, whose archetype and progenitor is Socrates.³

When Goethe on one occasion said to Eckermann with reference to Napoleon: "Yes, my good friend, there is also a productiveness of deeds," he reminded us in a charmingly naive manner that the nontheorist is something incredible and astounding to modern man ....⁴
As Nietzsche said many years later in reflecting on *The Birth of Tragedy*, the topic of that essay had everything to do with what the modern emergence of science and the modern theoretical man signified from a higher perspective.

And science itself, our science -- indeed, what is the significance of all science, viewed as a symptom of life? For what -- worse yet, whence -- all science? How now? Is the resolve to be so scientific about everything perhaps a kind of fear of, an escape from, pessimism? A subtle last resort against -- truth? And, morally speaking, a sort of cowardice and falseness? Amorally speaking, a ruse?5

The problem of the book was that of science, but "presented in the context of art -- for the problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of science ...."6

It is not fully possible to understand Nietzsche's critique of modernity unless one understands his conception of Socrates in relation to the traditional view of reason. This will be considered in the last part of this chapter. Suffice it to say here that a "Socratic culture" is one which is divided against itself in that it has lost touch with its basic instincts and no longer grasps life as a whole. For Nietzsche, neither optimism nor pessimism represent a viable attitude toward life as a whole because both fail to realize that creation and destruction, pleasure as well as pain are necessary complements of life. To fix on either aspect of life represents a form of degeneration. This view foreshadows Nietzsche's later view regarding denial or affirmation of the will to power as a sign of degeneracy.

Could it be possible that, in spite of all "modern ideas" and the prejudices of a democratic taste, the triumph of optimism, the gradual prevalence of rationality, practical and theoretical utilitarianism, no less than democracy itself which developed at the same time, might all have been symptoms of decline of strength, of impending old age, and of physiological weariness?7
The theoretical man insofar as he promotes the interpretation of the world as phenomena is described by Nietzsche in the words of Schopenhauer: "Just as in a stormy sea that, unbounded in all directions, raises and drops mountainous waves, howling, a sailor sits in a boat and trusts in his frail bark: so in the midst of a world of torments the individual human being sits quietly, supported by and trusting in the principium individuationis." In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche took Apollo as representative of the veil of illusion for the Greeks; the veil behind which lurks the cruel Dionysian aspect of life. "... we might call Apollo himself the glorious divine image of the principium individuationis, through whose gestures and eyes all the joy and wisdom of 'illusion', together with its beauty, speak to us." Behind the imagery of Apollo lies the Dionysian frenzy where the principle of sufficient reason no longer applies. "... at this collapse of the principium individuationis, we steal a glimpse into the nature of the Dionysian ...." With this collapse "the Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence. That he might endure this terror, he had to interpose between himself and life the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians." The world of art, here the creation of the Olympians, was developed out of the terror of a naked existence. But both of these aspects belong to life and it is this realization which, for Nietzsche, gives the ancient Greeks the advantage over modern man.

With the tendency toward dialectics in the form of Socratic reasoning, we have the end of tragedy and thereby the appreciation of the necessary unity of the Apollonian and Dionysian. Tragedy, in which this necessity was expressed, began to appear accidental, i.e., unintelligible. With the emphasis on dialectics, comprehensibility
becomes of primary concern. But the forces which gave rise to Greek tragedy could not be extinguished; and, although Plato had to tear up his poems in order to become a disciple of Socrates, Nietzsche says,

he was nevertheless constrained by sheer artistic necessity to create an art form that was related to those forms of art which he repudiated ... and so we find Plato endeavoring to transcend reality and to represent the idea which underlies this pseudo-reality. Thus, Plato, the thinker, arrived by a detour where he had always been at home as a poet ....

... to Socrates it seemed that tragic art did not even "tell the truth"; moreover, it addressed itself to "those who are not very bright," not to the philosopher: a twofold reason for shunning it. Like Plato, he reckoned it among the flattering arts which portray only the agreeable, not the useful ....

As a consequence of the emphasis upon rationality, "The Platonic dialogue was, as it were, the barge on which the shipwrecked ancient poetry saved herself with all her children: crowded into a narrow space and timidly submitting to the single pilot, Socrates, they now sailed into a new world, which never tired of looking at the fantastic spectacle of this procession." But now Nietzsche suspects that Schopenhauer and Kant may be steering a different course for the first time. This could only happen when reason undertook, as Kant says, "the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims ... This tribunal is no other than The Critique of Pure Reason."

But what does Nietzsche mean by "the optimism concealed in the essence of logic -- an optimism that is the basis of our culture?" Put simply, there is optimism because there is now the hope that things can be "figured out." In terms of the leading theme of the present thesis, the hope that the unity of experience as a whole can reach a theoretic
expression in terms of a transparent logic. Perhaps the questionable character of existence which gave rise to Greek tragedy may now no longer be questionable.

... for who could mistake the optimistic element in the nature of dialectic, which celebrates a triumph with every conclusion and can breath only in cool clarity and consciousness -- the optimistic element which, having once penetrated tragedy must gradually overgrow its Dionysian regions and impel it necessarily to self-destruction -- to the death-leap into the bourgeois drama. Consider the consequences of the Socratic maxims: "Virtue is knowledge; man sins only from ignorance; he who is virtuous is happy." In these three basic forms of optimism lies the death of tragedy.16

Even under this very early interpretation, Nietzsche sees the motivation of The Critique of Pure Reason in an area outside its main concern. Kant is credited with overcoming optimism precisely by showing its basis and its poverty. If all our objective knowledge is limited to the phenomenal realm under set laws, there is either the possibility of comprehending everything or being involved in an indefinite course of investigation under the same forms. No matter which alternative occurs, man can never be satisfied. In the first alternative, we know everything once we know the forms in which things must appear such that there is really no radically new experience possible. In the second alternative, we are always awaiting an end product which will justify all the activity leading up to it. Thus, Nietzsche says of Lessing and his famous statement on striving for truth, "Therefore Lessing, the most honest theoretical man, dared to announce that he cared more for the search after truth than for truth itself -- and thus revealed the fundamental secret of science, to the astonishment, and indeed the anger, of the scientific community."17

Science and the theoretical man are, according to Nietzsche, the
victims of a "sublime metaphysical illusion." "... the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of logic, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it."\textsuperscript{18} But this illusion constantly leads science to its limits where it "must turn into art -- which, with this mechanism, is actually its object (auf welche es eigentlich, bei diesem Mechanismus, abgesehen ist)."\textsuperscript{19}

The optimism of the theoretical man, of course, does not only consist in the hope of complete comprehension, but, most importantly for Nietzsche and the present thesis, the hope that the terrible side, the irrational side, the Nothing may be avoided. In the previous chapter concerning the characterization of nihilism, we noted Nietzsche's references to the attempt to avoid the "in vain"; particularly the "attempt to work blindly as an instrument of science ...."\textsuperscript{20} What becomes important is that science presents itself as something in which one can believe. Actually any curiosity in which one could lose oneself would do. The attempt to avoid what Nietzsche calls the "tragic insight" leads to diverse frantic activity with no unifying principle. The growing awareness of this in the nineteenth century has been described by Karl Löwith in his essay "The Historical Background of European Nihilism." The general point of view expressed by the intellectuals Löwith mentions is that of a directionless Europe which yet persists in an almost totally unreflective frantic activity. Says Löwith, "In the midst of frantic progress, of domination and exploitation of the world my means of the new technical inventions, a feeling of aimlessness and a spiritual pessimism casts its shadow upon Europe's finer spirits."\textsuperscript{21} Because of this situation, these "finer spirits"
feared the emergence of an incredibly militaristic form of government which would be imposed by someone able to capitalize on the disunity of the time. Goethe, Jacob Burckhardt and Nietzsche were only three of the most prominent.

The constitution of culture was an overriding concern of Nietzsche's throughout his productive period. In his essay on David Strauss in the *Untimely Meditations*, he describes a culture as "the unity of artistic style in every expression of a people's life." The modern theoretical man is not capable of a culture. Nietzsche had nothing but scorn for those who spoke, for example, of modern German culture. Following his definition of culture Nietzsche says, "Much knowledge and learnedness is, however, neither a necessary means of culture nor a sign of it ...." This is a basic theme in the cultural critique of the *Untimely Meditations*. In the fourth meditation, *Schopenhauer als Erzieher*, Nietzsche says, "That educating philosopher, of which I dream, would not only find the central force but know how to keep it from destroying the other powers: his task would be to form the whole man into a living, moving solar system and learn the law of its higher mechanism." Kant, Nietzsche has decided by the time of the *Meditations*, is the opposite of this ideal. Furthermore, with reference to Kant, Nietzsche says sarcastically, truth "is an easygoing and cheerful creature, which assures all the established powers again and again, that no one should fear any trouble from her; one who is only 'pure reason'. Thus: I want to say, that philosophy in Germany must unlearn 'pure reason' ...." Schopenhauer, for Nietzsche, represents the macrocosm in microcosm. The genius, as he understands him, is a self-contained entity,
hence his inevitable isolation. The genius is fragile, because he represents a unity of delicately balanced instincts and forces which is constantly in danger of being upset. The man of disinterested learning is not in a position to appreciate what the genius represents nor can he feel philosophy as vitally touching his life.

So the first danger in whose shadow Schopenhauer lived was isolation. The second was -- doubting the truth. This danger accompanies every thinker who sets out from the philosophy of Kant, assuming he be a strong and complete man in his sorrows and his desires, and not a mere clanking thought or calculating machine.

... it appears to me that only the very fewest men have been vitally grasped and had their blood and sap changed by Kant.

For I see unclearly that men themselves need to be revolutionized before any realm [of thought] can be revolutionized. As soon as Kant begins to exercise a popular effect, we find this in the form of a dangerous corroding and crumbling scepticism and relativism; and only with the most active and noble spirits, who have never rested in doubt, could that shattering and despairing of all truth enter in its place, as was experienced, for example, by Heinrich von Kleist.26

At this point, Nietzsche quotes Kleist's account of his experience in which after reading Kant he concluded that we cannot decide if what is called truth is really such. Kleist laments the fact that there may be no such thing as a purely objective truth and that what we have called truth may die with us. He then says, "If the point of this thought does not strike your heart, don't laugh over one who feels him wounded in his most spiritual inner self. My single, highest goal is gone and I have no more."27 To this Nietzsche replies, "... when again will men feel like Kleist, when will they learn to measure a philosophy according to their 'Holy of Holies'."28

No matter what we think of Kleist's Kant interpretation, Nietzsche's point is well taken in its attack on disinterested learning. The
scholarly type was the object of his attack throughout Nietzsche's entire productive period. It is difficult, however, to be sure whether the Kleist incident is meant to indicate something significant about Kant's philosophy or not. One would think that some tribute is being paid to Kant here as well as the complete spirits who are profoundly affected by him. There seems to be the implication in terms of Nietzsche's critique of German culture that the Germans simply do not measure up to Kant's true worth but must take him in a sterile form. It is known that Nietzsche had moved away from Kant and Schopenhauer at the time of the Untimely Meditations, but because of the way Nietzsche uses the man he is discussing, it is difficult to distinguish exactly what he is praising in the individual. Kant and Schopenhauer are generally taken as types (often as representatives of Nietzsche himself) in Nietzsche's attempt to describe a supra-historical image of the philosopher.

In his work Kant in the Judgement of Nietzsche (Kant im Urteil Nietzsches), Otto Ackermann thinks that Nietzsche views Kant as a necessary precursor of Schopenhauer and sees Schopenhauer as an advance on Kant. Kant is often representative of the theoretical man and contrasted with Schopenhauer to the advantage of the latter. Schopenhauer represents the true philosopher who is a complete man, the unified man as opposed to the fragmented one-sided scholarly type.

A scholar can never become a philosopher: for Kant was not capable of it himself, but remained to the end, in spite of the force of his native genius, in a chrysalis stage. Whoever believes that I do Kant an injustice with these words, does not know what a philosopher is, namely not only a great thinker, but a real man; and since when could a real man come from a scholar ... a philosopher ... must take most of his teaching from himself and he himself serves as the image and abbreviation of the entire world.
The only critique of a philosophy, which is possible and proves anything, namely to try and see if one can live by it, has never been taught by the universities, but only a critique of words about words. 31

In the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche begins more and more to tie up his notion of culture and the complete individual with an idea of life as a whole. Nietzsche's use of the term 'life' remains vague throughout his philosophy, but we can at least see that in every instance of its use, he is intent to convey the idea of unity. Nihilism, interpreted as the loss of the basic directing values of life, leads to an emphasis on the particular to the detriment of the universal. This manifests itself in the form of fetishisms which abstract from life as a whole. Nietzsche regards the emphasis on knowledge as the pure accumulation of information as an abstraction from life. In The Use and Abuse of History we read,

Must life dominate knowledge, or knowledge life? Which of the two is the higher and decisive power? There is no room for doubt: life is the higher and the dominating power, for the knowledge that annihilated life would be itself annihilated too. Knowledge presupposes life and has the same interest in maintaining it that every creature has in its own preservation. 32

The culture of a people as against this barbarism can be, I think described with justice as the "unity of artistic style in every outward expression of a people's life." This must not be misunderstood as if it were merely a question of the opposition between barbarism and "fine style." The people that can be called cultured, must be in a real sense a living unity, and not be split apart into form and substance. If one wish to promote a people's culture, let him try to promote this higher unity first .... 33

The modern man carries inside him a huge heap of indigestible knowledge-stones that occasionally rattle together in his body .... This rattling reveals the most unique characteristic of the modern man: the noteworthy opposition of an inner to which no outer corresponds and an outer to which no inner corresponds; an opposition of which ancient peoples knew nothing. 34
It becomes obvious through these and innumerable other of Nietzsche's expressions what the unity of experience must have meant for him. His question in the essay on history is, "how can history serve life?" The constant emphasis put on "life" throughout foreshadows the later concept of the will to power which functions as Nietzsche's primary unifying concept. Concerning himself with respect to his critique, Nietzsche says, "I have at all times written with my whole body and my whole life. I do not know what purely intellectual problems are." The modern theoretical man knows problems as one knows a train is passing by feeling the vibrations. Says Nietzsche, "... your thought is not your experience but the reverberation of the experience of others; as your room trembles when a car passes. I am sitting in that car, and often I am the car."36

While concentrating on the general characteristics of the true culture, Nietzsche, as was seen in the example of Schopenhauer, emphasized the individuals who embodied these characteristics. Erich Heller has said of Goethe that "emancipating reason from the totality of the human person appeared to Goethe as the denial of his vision of man .... He sincerely believed that this way lay catastrophe."37 Nietzsche seems to agree.

What he [Goethe] wanted was totality; he fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling and will (preached with the most abhorrent scholasticism by Kant, the antipode of Goethe); he disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself.38

Kant is the antipode of Goethe. "I have set up the most difficult ideal of the philosopher. Learning is not enough! The scholar is the herd animal in the realm of knowledge -- who inquires because he is ordered to and because others have done so before him. Let us confess
how utterly our modern world lacks the whole type 

Kant's and Schopenhauer's philosophies maintain their merit in that they come up against the problem of the unity of experience in an explicit way. They fail, however, to reach a satisfactory understanding of the constitution of this unity. Kant's failure is made quite explicit in his phenomena/noumena distinction. Human freedom, for example, must remain beyond any possible rational explication. It exists as a brute fact whose consequences can be seen and reasoned about, but freedom an sich is unintelligible. Schopenhauer tried to overcome this problem but as was seen in chapter three, he failed. Schopenhauer expressed his frustration with the problem of unity in the following way:

... the philosophical investigator must always feel in regard to the complete etiology of the whole of nature like a man who, without knowing how, is brought into a company quite unknown to him, each member of which in turn presents to him another as his friend and cousin, and thus makes them sufficiently acquainted. The man, himself, however, while assuring each person introduced of his pleasure at meeting him, always has on his lips the question: "But how the deuce do I stand to the whole company?"40

In 1867, Nietzsche wrote in a note that Schopenhauer complained "in his old age that the most difficult problem of philosophy was also not solved by his philosophy. He meant the question of the boundaries (Grenzen) of individuation."41 But this problem is precisely the problem of the unity of experience since this explicitly concerns how the individual stands to the whole.

The problem of the unity of experience as Nietzsche presents it is at the same time the problem of reason as it has developed within the Western philosophic tradition. The disunity which Nietzsche outlines from a cultural point of view in *Untimely Meditations* represents the
end result of the faith in reason. What has not been comprehended is
that the status of reason rested squarely on the faith in it. It is
well to recall Nietzsche's claim that "The faith in the categories of
reason is the cause of nihilism." In the first chapter, Kant was
represented as the culmination of the tradition in the sense that
reason is explicitly presented to be critiqued. It should be noted,
however, with respect to Nietzsche's remarks that Kant's philosophy
therefore also represents the point at which a decision concerning the
"faith" in reason becomes necessary. The idealisms which followed Kant
were prompted by the need to reach a decision on the status of reason.
From this point of view, Hegel or any later philosopher does not
legitimately represent the culmination of the rational tradition but
the attempt to come to terms with Kant's realization. In the fourth
chapter, Nietzsche's statement about "the faith in the categories of
reason" was discussed in the context of the loss of value and the
autonomy of the will to power. It was indicated at that place, however,
that there were at least two ways Nietzsche's statement could be under-
stood. The second way may be stated as follows: when an interpretation
of reality (existence, the world) is insisted upon long and hard
enough, it eventually becomes untenable. That is, the respect in
which it falls short of reality (which for Nietzsche is in a constant
state of becoming) will eventually show itself. This is precisely how
Nietzsche describes the death of God; the Christian "truths" must
ultimately become untenable.

Even though Kant represents a culmination of the tradition in the
sense indicated, what Kant attempted was a "piece of naivete; knowledge
of knowledge. The legitimacy of belief in knowledge is always
presupposed ...." But belief in knowledge, for Kant, means the belief in universality and necessity. For Nietzsche, it is crucial that we are dealing with a belief; he consequently suggests that necessity is not necessary at all in the way Kant thought. And although on the traditional view of reason, necessity and universality cannot be abandoned (a point Nietzsche would admit), this traditional view ought not to be presupposed in a critique of reason itself.

How does Nietzsche understand the emergence of the emphasis upon reason in the tradition which found its culmination in Kant? The question relates to the significance of dialectics in the life of the ancient Greeks. By the term 'dialectics', Nietzsche presumably meant no more than the critical give and take of the Dialogues whereby common statements and beliefs (particularly moral ones) are considered in order to arrive at set definitions. Nietzsche thought the need for this sort of disputation represented a form of decline. "Dialectics can only be an emergency measure. One must experience an emergency, one must be obliged to exhort one's rights: otherwise one makes no use of dialectics." The same thought is expanded and deepened in the section of Twilight of the Idols (Götzendammerung) entitled "The Problem of Socrates." In this section Nietzsche asks, "What really happened ..." with Socrates. "Above all, a noble taste is thus vanquished; with dialectics the plebs come to the top. Before Socrates, dialectic manners were repudiated in good society: they were considered bad manners, they were compromising." Socrates was a peculiarity who fascinated the Greeks with his agonistic instinct. The move toward dialectics was a stop gap measure. If those who condemned Socrates to death did not appreciate him, what precisely did they not appreciate in
him? For Nietzsche it was the fact that Socrates offered an alternative to a declining life during the break-up of the polis. As H.D.F. Kitto notes, "The Peloponnesian War virtually saw the end of the city-state as a creative force fashioning and fulfilling the lives of all its members. During the fourth century, Greece steadily moves towards new ways of thought and a new way of life."46

Socrates was a decadent who was forced to choose dialectics. "One chooses dialectic only when one has no other means."47 The move toward dialectics was "self-defense." Socrates, according to Nietzsche, should not be regarded as a cause but as an effect. He comprehended that he was only the extreme symptom of a general malady of declining instincts.

When the spirit is rich and independent, it most resists any preoccupation with morality. How came it that Socrates was a monomaniac in regard to morality? In emergencies, 'practical' philosophy steps at once to the fore. Morality and religion as chief interests are signs of an emergency.48

The fanaticism with which all Greek reflection throws itself upon rationality betrays a desperate situation; there was danger, there was but one choice: either to perish or to be absurdly rational.49

Here we are at the decisive point which, for Nietzsche, determines the drift of western philosophy up to the present. It is at this point that the main division between being and becoming was determined. From now on philosophy has as its fateful underlying presupposition, the division of the true and apparent world. The "real" is to be apprehended by means of concepts which "fix" becoming and make it thinkable; the world of the senses is changeable and deceptive and cannot give us truth. It is this division between the two worlds which becomes one of the fundamental forms of disunity in the Western metaphysical tradition; a form of disunity prompted by a decline in the hitherto sure reliance
upon the instincts. With a decreasing vitality, "The impulses want to play the tyrant; one must invent a counter-tyrant who is stronger ... the instincts turned against each other."\(^{50}\) In the case of Socrates, "rationality was then hit upon as the savior." Reason then tyrannizes over the instincts. But for Nietzsche, "To have to fight the instincts -- that is the formula of decadence: as long as life is ascending, happiness equals instinct."\(^{51}\) Under Nietzsche's interpretation, Socrates became a curiosity only because he was the first to explicitly perceive the degeneration which "was quietly developing everywhere."

"Old Athens was coming to an end. And Socrates understood that all the world needed him -- his means, his cure, his personal artifice of self-preservation."\(^{52}\)

Perhaps consistent with Nietzsche's interpretation, Christianity may be looked at as a reasonable means of escape. Nietzsche's preoccupation with Christianity is certainly understandable when we consider how the division of the true and apparent world becomes intensified. Interestingly enough, we see an increasing flood of rational argumentation as the Christian God becomes less and less believable.\(^{53}\) Was this also an emergency measure? Perhaps the voluminous argumentation of the scholastics was a reaction to an emergency situation. It seems difficult to reconcile the amount of effort expended on apologetics and a firm faith no matter how much one hears about the value of "constantly risking one's faith." Continuing this line of thinking, perhaps science itself predominates because it represents a reaction to an emergency situation. In chapter four, Nietzsche's position was presented in this way.

In the Genealogy of Morals, which again picks up the problem of
science discussed in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche says,

Oh, what does science not conceal today! how much, at any rate, is it meant to conceal! The proficiency of our finest scholars, their heedless industry, their heads smoking day and night, their very craftsmanship -- how often the real meaning of all this lies in the desire to keep something hidden from oneself! Science as a means of self-narcosis: do you have experience of that?54

Behind science stands a belief, a faith, a value, "It first requires in every respect an ideal of value, a value-creating power, in the service of which it could believe in itself ...."55 The question of value is primary here. For Nietzsche, it is by no means coincidental that the increasing emphasis upon science and the theoretical man in the modern age is contemporaneous with the death of God. The value-place left by the departing God must be filled; science and the illusion of progress it promotes furnish this content.

The presupposition of scientific work: belief in the unity and perpetuity of scientific work, so the individual may work at any part, however small, confident that his work will not be in vain. There is one great paralysis: to work in vain, to struggle in vain.56

In the modern tradition, the development of science as a consequence of the emphasis on reason and the "quest for certainty" becomes an explicit object of concern in a way it need not have been while the Christian God was alive and well. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Descartes, who characterizes the movement toward an avowed primacy of reason, involves himself in a circular argument over God's existence. This is because he wants to let man as a reasoning being and God have a say in the decision about truth. And although the religious values are becoming untenable, this does not mean that the rise of science is anti-religious. "Modern philosophy, being an
epistemological skepticism, i.e., covertly or overtly, anti-Christian — although, to say this for the benefit of more refined ears, by no means anti-religious.'

Reason becomes an authority in which one can believe. With the elevation of reason, the stage is set for the slow destruction of reason's authority. For Nietzsche, an explicit scepticism is the logical outcome of the emphasis on reason as Descartes developed it. Eventually it seems as though reason can no longer believe in itself. With the disunity evident in an extreme epistemological skepticism reason seems at an impasse. Hume apparently reconciled himself to this situation and took up backgammon. Nietzsche describes what happened as follows:

The aberration of philosophy is that, instead of seeing in logic and the categories of reason means toward the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends ... one believed one possessed in them the criterion of truth and reality.

The naivete was to take an anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure of things, as the rule for determining "real" and "unreal": in short to make absolute something conditioned.

This is the greatest error that has ever been committed, the essential fatality of error on earth: one believed one possessed a criterion of reality in the forms of reason -- while in fact one possessed them in order to become master of reality ... The result of insisting on the primacy of reason leads to the blatant separation of the real and apparent worlds. In chapter one, Hume's and Kant's problems with causality were discussed in terms of the possibility of a rational account of the unity of experience. The principle of causality, however, was simply the form in which the crisis of reason made itself explicit. It was suggested that the more general problem concerned the principle of sufficient reason and thereby
the unity of experience. L.W. Beck indicates in his history of German philosophy that the Germans as a whole up to Kant failed to "understand the radical character of Hume's discovery."^59

Kant was aware, as he expresses it in the preface to the Critique, that man will not surrender his drive toward metaphysical knowledge in its unlimited, unconditional sense. Metaphysics "... would survive even if all the rest [of the other sciences] were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism ...."^60 From a Nietzschean point of view, Kant's statement would signal that a search was necessary for a principle which would include this "need for metaphysics." At the very end of the first chapter, mention was made of Kant's appeals to the "nature of reason" when confronted with this "need for metaphysics." For Kant there is simply no further way of understanding the activity of reason; this "need" represents the limit of the Kantian philosophy.

The Kantian philosophy represents the point in the history of philosophy where philosophy first attempts to acquire its own subject matter and really show itself as the "queen of the sciences"; concerning itself with the possibility of objective knowledge in general. This attempt was absolutely necessary if philosophy was to move beyond Humean scepticism. Yet Kant still stands firmly within the long-established conception of reason in the tradition with his emphasis upon universality and necessity. As Hegel states in his History of Philosophy,

... while Hume attacks the universality and necessity of the categories ... Kant merely argues against their objectivity in so far as they are present in external things themselves, while maintaining them to be objective in the sense of holding good as universal and necessary, as they do, for instance, in mathematics and natural science.^61
In order to preserve the necessity supposed in the knowledge of experience, Kant had to make experience merely phenomenal. The phenomenality of all knowledge under necessary laws, however, forced Kant to pay the traditional price of enclosing himself in a necessitated phenomenal world from which by his own principles there was no escape. But at this point, the "in vain" mentioned earlier appears on the horizon, and Nietzsche apparently agrees with Schopenhauer that "about those phenomena known by us only as our representations, etiology can never give us the desired information that leads us beyond them." As Nietzsche says,

> The development of science [which of course proceeds etiologically] resolves the "familiar" more and more into the unfamiliar: it desires, however, the reverse, and proceeds from the instinct to trace the unfamiliar back to the familiar.

> In summa, science is preparing a sovereign ignorance, a feeling that there is no such thing as "knowing." 

In Kantian terms, the understanding is frustrated in its attempt to reach an "unconditioned" in the series of appearances, which is what it ultimately desires. Moreover, it desires this goal, because it stands in the service of reason in general whose raison d'être lies in the goal of unity. The hope was that once the laws of appearance were worked out, we would enter "upon the secure path of a science" and all would be well. But, Nietzsche claims, all is not well, because in this way we have only succeeded in becoming explicitly aware of our ignorance. Nietzsche implies, however, that this is precisely what Kant desired,

> ... in order to create room for his 'moral kingdom', he found it necessary to add an unknowable world, a logical 'beyond' -- that is why he found his Critique of Pure Reason necessary.

Perhaps Nietzsche had in mind Kant's own statement: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith."
Nietzsche seems to emphasize the role of Kant's moral concerns, because he wants to show that behind the philosophizing of the tradition in general stands a "need" to assert that human existence "makes sense." Even the most abstruse and abstract epistemologies are merely ancillary with respect to this "need." Nietzsche is not ultimately critical of moral positions per se, but only insofar as they represent a position which is intentionally unreflective and therefore intellectually dishonest.

For Nietzsche, Kant's moral position was specifically designed to be invulnerable to a rational attack. This is an interesting position to say the least since Kant felt that his position followed from the acceptance of man as a rational being. At any rate, as one commentator has pointed out, "Kant solved the problem of the vulnerability of the questionable base of knowledge simply by concocting a basis which was, by definition, unquestioned, since men could never know anything directly about it. Nietzsche will not abide, though, with what he perceives as willful ignorance."66

It is well here to understand Nietzsche's use of the term 'moral' in its most general form. It will be seen that his use is actually quite close to Kant's. Jaspers very neatly gives the essence of Nietzsche's use as follows: "Whenever we value something unconditionally our experience is moral, and, contrariwise, whenever our experience is moral in nature, we are dealing with something unconditional."67 A thorough reading of Nietzsche will reveal that this opinion is basically correct. Nietzsche's use of the term 'moral' shows why he can bring what seem to be properly epistemological questions under a moral critique. All that is necessary is that the position put forth absolute
claims about the character of existence. Interestingly enough the
notion of the unconditional is crucial to Kant's understanding of the
moral. In the Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur
Metaphysik der Sitten) we find, "What else, then, can freedom of the
will be but autonomy, i.e., the property of the will to be a law to
itself?" But, of course, this means that the will is absolutely un-
conditioned as free. Then Kant says, "Thus if freedom of the will is
presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it by
the mere analysis of its concept." "... a free will and a will under
moral laws are identical." What we cannot assert in the case of Kant,
however, is that everywhere we find an unconditional we also have a
moral phenomena. Kant starts with moral phenomena as a fact and dis-
covers their essential ground in the unconditioned; namely unconditional
freedom. For Nietzsche, the unconditioned as a fact does not exist,
therefore morality as Kant presents it cannot exist.

Metaphysics is characterized by Nietzsche in terms of the uncon-
ditioned. "Senselessness of all metaphysics as the derivation of the
conditioned from the unconditioned. It is in the nature of thinking
that it thinks of and invents the unconditioned as an adjunct to the
conditioned (zu dem Bedingten das Unbedingte hinzudenkt, hinzufindet)."
From this we can conclude that metaphysics is to be discussed under the
heading of morals and this is indeed the case as even a superficial
reading will show. When Nietzsche considers metaphysics and the un-
conditioned as a moral question, he is not at all concerned to investi-
gate whether a certain piece of metaphysical or epistemological doctrine
is correct or not; he is always concerned with what attitude toward
life (existence) in general is betrayed by the "metaphysical need"
which the position shows in postulating its unconditioned.

As a final indication of Nietzsche's sense of the moral, I give Heidegger's description:

By morals, Nietzsche understands in general the system of value setting in which a supersensible world is established as decisive and desirable. Nietzsche always grasps "morals" "metaphysically" that is, with respect to that in it which is determining for the whole of being (totality of beings). (Unter Moral versteht Nietzsche meist das System solcher Wertschätzungen, in denen eine übersinnliche Welt als massgebend und wünschbar gesetzt wird. Nietzsche begreift die "Moral" stets "metaphysisch," d.h. im Hinblick darauf, dass in ihr über das Ganze des Seienden entschieden wird.)

Heidegger then gives Nietzsche's own statement of his position. "I understand by "morals" a system of evaluations which coincide with the conditions of a creature's life." Commenting upon this, Heidegger continues:

Nietzsche indeed also understands morals here "metaphysically" in relation to being as a whole and the possibility of life in general and not "ethically" with regard to a "manner of living." He does not consider "morals" anymore in the sense which conditions Platonism. (Hier versteht Nietzsche die Moral zwar auch "metaphysisch" in bezug auf das Seiende im Ganzen und die Möglichkeit des Lebens überhaupt und nicht "ethisch" hinsichtlich der "Lebensfuhrung," aber er denkt nicht mehr an die "Moral," die den Platonismus bedingt.)

Metaphysics is then put in terms of life which, as mentioned in chapter four, is essentially will to power. Evaluation, value setting is the result of life as will to power, and metaphysical positions insofar as they attempt to assert the character of existence, judge existence as a whole, are manifestations of the will to power. The philosopher and moralist, however, have not been aware of this. In Heidegger's words, he "suspects nothing of the origin of the values to which, as unconditioned ideals, he subordinates himself (nichts ahnt vom dem Ursprung der Werte, denen er sich als unbedingten Idealen unterstellt)." But
here again we have the autonomous character of the will to power as presented in the fourth chapter. Valuing itself is for Nietzsche the will to power as life. The will to power is not something distinct which from time to time interprets the world, the process of interpreting and valuing (which in Nietzsche's use are equivalent) is the will to power itself. Consequently, for Nietzsche there can be no position outside the will to power; there can be no position which is not a valuation -- interpretation.

And do you know what "the world" is to me? ... a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself ... a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income; enclosed by "nothingness" as by a boundary ... a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying ... my "beyond good and evil," without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal: ... do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? This world is the will to power -- and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power -- and nothing besides! 

But does this mean then that Nietzsche has achieved what this thesis has asserted was sought all along by philosophy; a description of human experience in its unity? Certainly this description must involve some sort of autonomous principle on the order of the will to power. But is a totally autonomous principle ultimately "comprehensible" in any ordinary sense of the word? Furthermore, is not the principle of the will to power itself one of the unconditionals which Nietzsche denies can be legitimately asserted? In other words, is not the postulation of the will to power nihilistic? Is the traditional disunity of appearance and reality which has been presented as reaching its
culmination in Kant's philosophy overcome in Nietzsche's philosophy?
In the sixth and final chapter these questions will be discussed if not entirely answered.
NOTES

CHAPTER V

4. Ibid., p. 100. (Ibid., p. 111)
5. Ibid., p. 10. (Ibid., p. 18)
7. Ibid., p. 13. (Ibid., pp. 21-22)
8. Ibid., p. 23. (Ibid., pp. 35-36)
9. Ibid., pp. 23-24. (Ibid., p. 36)
10. Ibid., p. 24. (Ibid.)
11. Ibid., p. 30. (Ibid., p. 42)
12. Ibid., p. 79. (Ibid., p. 90)
13. Ibid. (Ibid.)
14. Ibid., p. 80. (Ibid., pp. 90-91)
17. Ibid., p. 84. (Ibid., p. 95)
18. Ibid. (Ibid.)
19. Ibid., p. 85. (Ibid., pp. 95-96)
20. WP, no. 29. Compare this with Nietzsche's statement at the end of the Genealogy of Morals: "... any meaning is better than none at all ... the tremendous void seemed to have been filled; the door was closed to any kind of suicidal nihilism ...." See Schlechta, Vol. II, p. 899. (Kaufmann, GM, p. 162).
23. Ibid. (Ibid.)
24. Ibid., p. 292. (Collins, SE, p. 110)
25. Ibid., p. 299. (Ibid., p. 119)
27. Ibid., p. 303. (Ibid., p. 124)
28. Ibid. (Ibid., pp. 124-125)
29. Otto Ackermann, Kant im Urteil Nietzsches, Dissertation (Tübingen, 1939), p. 62. This dissertation on the whole is fairly superficial in that it offers very little critical analysis. It is mainly an enumeration of Nietzsche's remarks on Kant.
31. Ibid., p. 356. (Ibid., p. 190)
32. Ibid., p. 282. (Collins, UAH, p. 96)
33. Ibid., p. 232. (Ibid., p. 34)
34. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
39. WP, no. 421.
42. WP, no. 12B.
43. WP, no. 530.
44. WP, no. 431.
47. Schlechta, Vol. II, p. 953. (Hollingdale, TI, p. 31)
48. WP, no. 435.
50. Ibid., p. 954. (Ibid.)
51. Ibid., p. 955. (Ibid.)
52. Ibid., p. 954. (Ibid.)
53. The increasing attempts to rationally overcome the difficulties presented by the Christian concept of God is well-presented by Arthur Lovejoy in The Great Chain of Being. See especially chapters three through six. Lovejoy's presentation emphasizes the problem of unity.
55. Ibid., p. 891. (Ibid., p. 153)
56. WP, no. 579.
58. WP, no. 584.
60. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 21.
63. WP, no. 608.
65. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 29.
66. Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley, 1975), p. 43.
69. Ibid.
70. WP, no. 574.
72. WP, no. 256.
74. Ibid., p. 120.
75. WP, no. 1067.
Nietzsche considered traditional philosophy under the aspect of value. Interpretations or valuations are not either true or false in any objective sense; as if there were a state of things "in itself" which we could grasp as observers in the world. From the viewpoint of the will to power, traditional philosophic interpretations become means of control; they become means of "imposing upon becoming the character of being." Let us connect more closely the notion of value with that of power.

A brief description of the concept of power was given in Chapter IV. There the crucial idea was that there is only a recognition of power (in any form) insofar as a new stage of "power" is being attained. Put otherwise, there is only a recognition of power insofar as a resistance is being overcome (overpowered). "The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it ...."1 Hence power is overpowering. The difficulty of giving a non-circular definition becomes quite clear. This is no doubt due to the simplicity and fundamental nature of the conception.

When a value is posited, this represents an increase of power and at the same time a power stage from which a new increase can be initiated. Furthermore, the attempt to maintain a given power stage (interpretation) requires the constant exercise of power of the
The continual presence of a resistance. If this were not the case, we could be accused of postulating a power stage "in itself" or apart from the exercise of power; this would be a complete absurdity since it would contradict the very concept of power.

What are our evaluations and moral tables really worth? What is the outcome of their rule? For whom? in relation to what? Answer: for life. But what is life? Here we need a new, more definite formulation of the concept of "life." My formula for it is: Life is will to power.  

Value is the highest quantum of power a man is able to incorporate.  

The standpoint of "value" is the standpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement of complex forms of relative life-duration within the flux of becoming.  

As applied to the philosopher we have:  

The inventive force that invented categories labored in the service of our needs, namely of our need for security, for quick understanding on the basis of signs and sounds, for means of abbreviation: "substance," "subject," "object," "being," "becoming" have nothing to do with metaphysical truths. It is the powerful who made the names of things into law, and among the powerful it is the greatest artists in abstraction who created the categories.  

If the traditional truths of philosophy are the result "of our need for security" is this not a cessation of the process of overpowering? Yes and no. Yes in the sense that these truths represent power stages or points of view from which existence is interpreted, but no in the sense that they are actively in force and actively put forth by philosophers at a given period in history. What fails to be realized is that if a particular set of categories were not in force, another set would be necessary. Recall here Kant's remark concerning the possibility that man will ever give up his penchant for metaphysics. The will to interpret, the will to truth, the will to value are all really
aspects of the one will to power. That this has not been realized before is because "one has taken the value of these 'values' as given, as factual, as beyond all question ...."\(^6\) Nietzsche will not entertain the objection that the sceptic in philosophy is an exception here. "The typical philosopher is here an absolute dogmatist; if he has need of scepticism, it is so as to be able to speak dogmatically about his main interest."\(^7\)

Obviously Nietzsche cannot criticize the "will to truth" as the postulation of unconditioned truths in philosophy if these are the result of the necessary process of valuing in terms of the will to power. Such a criticism would be a criticism of the will to power itself; a manifest absurdity from a Nietzschean point of view. It would in fact be the attempt to characterize existence as a whole; the very attempt which brings Nietzsche's condemnation of traditional philosophy.

Nietzsche's criticism, as has been emphasized, is consistently directed against the unconditioned aspect of traditional philosophies. Furthermore, it is precisely this unconditioned aspect of traditional interpretations which brings on the devaluation which is the hallmark of nihilism and, in terms of the leading theme of the present thesis, brings on the disunities of the rational tradition in philosophy. It must be emphasized that nihilism as thus conceived refers to the devaluation of the value of existence as a whole. We are not concerned here with the devaluation of this or that particular value. Consequently, Nietzsche's critique usually concerns itself with perspectives such as the Christian value system in toto, or the place of the value of reason in the tradition generally. The phenomenon of nihilism concerns only
the most complete crises of value.

At the very end of chapter four, it was suggested that "the inability to give a unified philosophical account of experience" could be equated with the problem of nihilism. Perhaps now this can be shown.

The attempt to give a unified philosophical account of experience, which means a rational account, is, if we take Nietzsche at his word, itself a manifestation of what life is, namely the will to power. What the rational tradition as a whole has desired is to show that the human world is thus and not otherwise. If this cannot be discovered, then the project of reason is indeed in vain. Even if we characterize the activity of the tradition in terms of, say, the mastery of nature, this leads to the same conclusion. The mastery of nature would only be complete on the assumption that it was comprehended in totality.

But if the attempt to characterize existence in its totality in any categorical form is pursued to its limits, the very process of interpreting which this manifests will give rise to disunity. As Nietzsche asserts with respect to the Christian value scheme in a crucial passage of the Genealogy of Morals,

All great things, we might say all unconditioned interpretations of existence, bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming: thus the law of life will have it, the law of the necessity of "self-overcoming" in the nature of life -- the law-giver himself eventually receives the call: "pater legem, quam ipse tulisti." In this way Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now perish, too: we stand on the threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself; this will happen, however, when it poses the question "what is the meaning of all will to truth?"8

Here we have in its most pregnant form the mechanism of the demise of
all unconditional positing. Note that Nietzsche emphasizes the words "as a dogma." This means as unconditional.  

The illusion created by the emergence of disunity is that a previous evaluation has been shown to be "incorrect" in comparison with a "correct" appraisal. But there is no given standard in terms of which the character of existence can be measured. The condition of nihilism as loss of value presents itself when "one interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain." But where precisely is the disunity revealed by the collapse located? As just noted, it cannot be between a "correct" interpretation and an "incorrect" interpretation which falls short. The main issue, therefore, is not one of replacing one interpretation with another. The answer can only be that the feeling of powerlessness, the disunity between "our" interpretation and the "real" world is ultimately traceable to the gulf between a given unconditional interpretation and the implicit recognition of the will to power; the recognition that no unconditional value will maintain itself. I suggest that it is this realization which is at the source of the nihil negativum, the Nichtheit of Heidegger, the "absurd" of the existentialist tradition and every other characterization of the absolute Nothing. The world appears absurd, because the will to power leads exactly nowhere. There is no goal to "becoming"; there is no "aim" which could give sense to everything that leads up to it. The myth of Sisyphus is undoubtedly the most apt symbol of this situation; an action which can never cease yet leads nowhere.

The movement of the rational tradition is only meaningful as a
goal-oriented activity; the goal has been unity, as Kant understood. But the will to power says that the rational tradition is condemned to a perpetual disunity, i.e., a perpetual nihilism. This is first comprehended by Nietzsche. Thus as Camus notes, "With him nihilism becomes conscious for the first time."\(^{11}\) "He recognized nihilism for what it was and explained it like a clinical fact."\(^{12}\) Here nihilism is to be taken as the total process of valuation/devaluation. When the reaction to this realization becomes a "fleeing into a beyond," this is also called nihilism but is also termed "pessimism" or a "pessimism of weakness." It is this pessimism which, for Nietzsche, describes the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer. There is also, however, a "pessimism of strength" whereby one resolves to live in terms of the "in vain" character of existence. One is, of course, forced to the conclusion that the attempt to flee the "in vain" must itself be a consequence of the will to power, and this is exactly the basis of Nietzsche's commentary on ascetic ideals in the Genealogy of Morals. The attempt to avoid the "in vain" leads one to posit even more strenuously something as unconditioned; something in which one might lose oneself. As was seen earlier, science may function in this way.

The problem of the unity of experience has now been connected with the phenomenon of nihilism. The rational tradition since Plato has been nihilistic because it has established itself on the basic disunity of the true (real) world over against the apparent world. Considered in this way, of course, the Christian influence in philosophy was only an intensification of the basic dichotomy. The activity of the tradition from Plato to Nietzsche represents the attempt to maintain the real/apparent interpretation of existence. In this respect we can
agree with the Heideggerian interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy as the logical conclusion of the metaphysical tradition. At the end of this tradition the foremost concern of the tradition becomes the tradition itself. The most fundamental value which man has laid across existence collapses. As Heidegger puts it, "What does the 'end of metaphysics' mean? Answer: the historical moment in which the essential possibilities of metaphysics are exhausted. (Was meint aber dann 'Ende der Metaphysik'? Antwort: den geschichtlichen Augenblick, in dem die Wesensmöglichekeiten der Metaphysik erschöpft sind.)"¹³

Heidegger's own characterization of what has happened in terms of his own categories is quite different, but the outcome in terms of the historical place of Nietzsche's philosophy is the same. Nietzsche's pronouncement of the death of God symbolizes that the last possibility for a flight into a "beyond" is gone. Nietzsche is concerned to eliminate every last vestige of transcendence and to use a favorite saying of Karl Löwith, "to retranslate man back into the world of nature (um aber den Menschen in die Welt der Natur zurückzubesetzen)."¹⁴

With the collapse of the traditional two-world view neither category, true world nor apparent world, is applicable anymore. In his capsule summary of the history of this separation in Twilight of the Idols, the last step reads, "The true world we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one."¹⁵ What does this mean in terms of the practice of philosophy? What are the practical results of living in terms of a "pessimism of strength?" Nietzsche is not too informative at this point. We can form some general conception of the attitude of amor fati, but it is difficult to derive any specific
prescription for action in a \textit{positive} sense from this. This is a perennial complaint of commentators who wonder why Nietzsche said so little concerning the specific characteristics of the \textit{Übermensch}.\textsuperscript{16} 

There will be no attempt here to resolve these problems which point to the consequences of overcoming nihilism as it has been manifested in the tradition. It is possible to suggest, however, several lines that could be adopted with respect to these problems. First we could adopt Heidegger's position toward his own philosophy and conclude that fundamental ontology has absolutely nothing prescriptive to say. This position, of course, depends upon viewing Nietzsche primarily as a metaphysician or fundamental ontologist. The present thesis is in sympathy with this view, however many commentators, notably Jaspers, would disagree. For Heidegger, philosophy must remain at the level of phenomenology, the only way that fundamental ontology can be done. It therefore remains purely descriptive. Nietzsche's philosophy certainly contains a great many remarks which must be construed as prescriptive, however with the following qualification. The main concern of Nietzsche's remarks is almost always merely designed to open up the broadest perspective on an issue which we may or may not use as a basis for action. The perspective of the will to power was in fact the broadest possible perspective on history for Nietzsche, consequently he seems to say we "ought" to live in terms of it.

A second position which could be adopted with respect to a post-Nietzschean world is that absolutely nothing will be different than it would otherwise be. Nietzsche himself sometimes seems to be favoring this position. The process of the overcoming of nihilism must work itself out in a historically necessitated way and as products of history
we are in no position to change its course. There are many statements, however, which are difficult to reconcile with this historical determinist view. The main difference between this and the first position is that the former will not go this far, that is, it will not make any prescriptive statements whatsoever. This second position is, as I believe, that of Camus.

As a third possible approach, we have the "everything is permitted attitude" and the "might makes right" attitude. This is probably the most superficial of all interpretations of Nietzsche and therefore the most easily refuted. It must be said, however, that the "everything is permitted" attitude could be interpreted as simply meaning (although it usually does not) the future cannot be predicted.

It might be objected, and rightly, that since all of these alternatives are presented as possible interpretations, this really amounts to saying that anything follows from Nietzsche's position which in turn says that nothing follows from it. This difficulty, however, is a result of Nietzsche's position which completely eliminates any extra-human aspect of the world. Man is given total freedom which, as existentialism is fond of pointing out, means total responsibility. But from a position of total freedom nothing follows. At this point, man's activity must quite literally be viewed as creation ex nihilo. The self-contained autonomy of the will to power reflects this radical human freedom. There is no longer any realm of transcendence, in whatever surreptitious form, which could take over responsibility for any action. This is reminiscent of Nietzsche's comment that "Any distinction between a 'true' and an 'apparent' world -- whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant (in the end, an underhanded Christian) --
is only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of life.\textsuperscript{18}

Any transcendent realm must be only a human product; it must be the result of the autonomous will to power. The final decision as to what a post-Nietzschean future might be like would also have to come to terms with the problem of reconciling human freedom with historical necessity which this thesis is not about to do. As a related issue and with regard to the previous discussion of Nietzsche's critique of the philosophic tradition, I would like to conclude this presentation with some remarks about the implications of the autonomous nature of the will to power.

Walter Kaufmann, in his commentary, calls Nietzsche a "dialectical monist."\textsuperscript{19} This monism follows from the autonomous nature of the will to power. We can only conclude that Nietzsche's principle of the will to power functions to unify experience. Certainly Nietzsche attempts to show the operation of the principle in many diverse areas of life. But if the will to power is Nietzsche's principle of unity, has he not done precisely what the will to power denies can be done and what Nietzsche himself condemns the rational tradition for doing? Furthermore is not a monism ultimately irrational and therefore unintelligible from the standpoint of the traditional notion of reason?

In his commentary on Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers states that "Nietzsche's interpretation is actually an interpretation of interpreting, and for that reason different from those of all earlier, comparatively naive interpretations which were undertaken without awareness of their own interpretive character."\textsuperscript{20} It seems that some answer of this type is the only one possible. We might say instead that Nietzsche's perspective of the will to power is the broadest one attained thus far.
It is a perspective from which all other perspectives as perspectives are seen in their origin. Does this broadest perspective thus account for itself? The answer is no. But let us suppose that there was a standpoint which "accounted" for this broadest perspective. This standpoint would be just another perspective and we would still be left with simply a perspectivism. There is no way out of a position like this, because it already implicitly includes any judgment on it. Getting beyond this perspectivism would apparently mean assuming a nonperspectival or absolute position, but there could never be any characteristic of such a position which would allow us to distinguish it from any other perspective. In fact no meaning can be attached to such an absolute perspective since it seems to involve a *contradictio in adjecto*. But the question arises, is not the fact that we cannot get beyond such a position the sign that it is the "absolute" perspective? This must be admitted but with the following qualification. It would make no sense to ask for the "why" of such a perspectival position, because it is not conceivable what kind of answer would count as answering the question. Therefore the will to power or the perspective of perspectives acquires its unique position by default so to speak. In terms of a "why" which is based on the principle of sufficient reason, such a position is completely unreasonable. The upshot of this whole line of argumentation is then that no rational account of reason can be given if the activity of reason hitherto is presented in terms of the will to power; the will to power itself must remain unreasonable.

Having come to this conclusion, I would like to repeat the words of Stanley Rosen quoted at the beginning of chapter four. "Contemporary man desperately needs a rational interpretation of reason."21 This
need can never be fulfilled on the traditional view of reason. Either a new idea of reason must be adopted or the explanation of the traditional idea of reason must itself be accepted as unreasonable. There are simply no other alternatives if we want to maintain any idea of reason at all. Rosen believes that nihilism results when reason can no longer justify itself and is silenced in the attempt. Monism, for Rosen, is a form of silence. One consequence of this silence is that we must be silent about the direction history will take based upon our monism. From the standpoint of a particular history, monism says nothing simply because it allows every possibility. It is pure possibility and as Rosen points out, "pure possibility is nothingness." 22 "The nihilist's future is a creation ex nihilo ...." 23

Many of Rosen's conclusions are in general agreement with those of Nietzsche, although his exposition of the nihilistic character of philosophy differs greatly. As an important confirmation of the approach of the present thesis we may note part of Rosen's conclusion. "As is especially evident in our own age, the fundamental feature of nihilism is discontinuity, and particularly so in the efforts to replace speech by immediate ecstasy or symbolic abstraction." 24 For Rosen, the main source of this discontinuity occurs between man and the world of things which confront him. Through speech, man attempts to bridge the gap. "Men speak because they are partially detached from things and try to overcome this disjunction with a bridge of language. Since words, however remarkable, are not things, the disjunction between the two can never be entirely overcome." 25 Rosen has in mind "rational speech"; this is what the present thesis has understood most basically as the attempt to express the unity of experience in the rational
philosophic tradition. But what is most fundamentally characteristic about rational discourse and expressed by the principle of sufficient reason? Furthermore, how does this question reflect upon a monistic position?

I will enlist the help of Rosen's discussion in considering these questions. It seems I can say "Y because X" and thereby assert that "X is a reason for Y." Yet the ability to say this does not help me much in understanding what counts in allowing one "thing" to be the reason for another. That is, the relation of reasonableness remains opaque. To use Rosen's example in Nihilism, "If 'because' is onological, whereas Y and X are not, then 'because' has no internal structure; I mean that its sense cannot be reproduced discursively, or replaced by statements having the form Y or X." What we seek to understand is the reasonableness of our reason and although it can be asserted that the principle of sufficient reason is the highest source of appeal in the unity of our experience, this principle itself cannot be said to be reasonable. Rosen states that "because" in "Y because X" can have no internal structure since, as ontological, it stands for the unity recognized as existing between the things X and Y; the connection which presumably allows us to say X is a reason for Y. If "because" itself had a structure we would be forced to a further unifying principle and so on thus generating a regressus in infinitum.

What all of this provisionally indicates is that when one asserts "Y because X," the sanction for this already preexists in one's experience as unified. Very early in chapter two this thesis stated that the unity of our experience is always implicitly recognized. This conclusion must still be maintained. From the point of view of the
history of philosophy, there has never been a question of constructing experience as a unity; rather the project has always been to demonstrate in a discursive way an already recognized unity. That the former point of view sometimes seems to be the case is simply an illusion. But this unity cannot be stated in a rational discourse, and this has prompted some writers to adopt Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of the Lebensform. 27

In his work On Certainty, Wittgenstein says, "You must bear in mind that the language game is so to speak something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It stands there -- like our life." 28 Nietzsche would certainly agree that it would be absurd to speak of life as either reasonable or unreasonable. In addition, since Nietzsche equates life and the will to power, it would be likewise absurd to designate the will to power as reasonable or unreasonable. Is the will to power then what Wittgenstein terms a Lebensform? It would seem not since the will to power is a stated principle in terms of which we can give a definite description of phenomena. This could never be the case with a "form of life" as Wittgenstein presents it and for the very reasons given in the discussion above on rational discourse. But because we can form the concept of power with respect to the activity of particular phenomena, the will to power does not assume the aspect of a completely nondescript background as in the case of Wittgenstein's "form of life." In this respect, Nietzsche's position cannot be represented as a pure monism. If Nietzsche's position were one of radical monism as I take Wittgenstein's ultimate position to be, he would have been able to say nothing whatever about the will to power. The will to power, however, is a fact. It is the last fact we arrive at in the analysis of any life
phenomenon, but it is still a fact. This means that it can be regarded as an object in some sense which, I believe, would be difficult to state.

Nietzsche's position, however, must still be regarded as a monism, but one which does not reduce us to silence. The position maintained earlier in this chapter with regard to the irrationality of the will to power still stands. The process of interpreting itself cannot be grounded, and this is a feature of the will to power as a monistic principle. As autonomous and self-creating it must remain irrational since such descriptions ultimately reduce to the assertion of a creation ex nihilo and thereby leave the principle of sufficient reason out of account altogether. We are in fact reduced to silence if the ground of the will to power is demanded; the will to power must be its own ground. That the will to power must be regarded as its own ground, means further that Nietzsche's assertion of this principle as the last possible perspective must itself be only a perspective. This is a conclusion of which Nietzsche himself was aware. In the highly significant first section of Beyond Good and Evil entitled "Prejudices of Philosophers," Nietzsche states,

... and somebody might come along who, with opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of the same "nature" and with regard to the same phenomena, rather the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of claims of power -- an interpreter who would picture the unexceptional and unconditional aspects of all "will to power" ... but he might, nevertheless, end by asserting the same about the world as you do, namely, that it has a "necessary" and "calculable" course, not because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment. Supposing that this also is only interpretation -- and you will be eager enough to make this objection? -- well, so much the better.29
With the doctrine of the will to power, we arrive at a principle which, to be accounted for in any sense at all, must account for itself. Does this achieve the unity which has been represented as the Holy Grail of the philosophic tradition? Perhaps Jaspers is closer to the truth when he states,

He [Nietzsche] rejects every determinate species of entity that as such is supposed to express the nature of being. Nevertheless, his world-exegesis appears in fact to revive just the sort of specification that he rejects.

Nietzsche arrives at something determinate as did old-fashioned metaphysics.30

Jaspers feels that Nietzsche did not achieve his goal which was not in fact to remain fixed at "something determinate" but to understand unity as unity. The will to power appears as the last interpretation possible within a position which chooses a determinate concept to represent the unity of experience in general. The concept of power, as a familiar although perhaps not completely transparent concept, is a part of ordinary experience. Jaspers believes that Nietzsche takes over and expands this familiar part of our experience to stand for something more. The something more, however, never gets stated. The problem which arises is that no part of experience can function as the unity of experience without losing its status as a piece of knowledge. This status depends upon the fact that as a part of experience, it can be related to other aspects of experience according to the principle of sufficient reason. The unity of experience, however, can itself never be regarded as an object within experience, yet we still demand that it be made a piece of knowledge.

This basic criticism is remarkably similar in the case of Jaspers' and Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation. Traditionally these two
interpretations have been opposed. Heidegger, as was seen earlier, represents Nietzsche as the end of the Western metaphysical tradition. Without going into a detailed discussion of Heidegger's position, we simply state that he represents Nietzsche's philosophy as the last possible attempt to understand Being (Sein) in terms of a being (ein Seiendes). Being (Sein) is the only true representative of unity for Heidegger; it is unity. A being (ein Seiendes) is always determinate and therefore partial, a part of experience as a whole. Nietzsche's will to power represents, for Heidegger, the most extreme position one can adopt while still remaining within the realm of beings (die Seienden). According to Heidegger, the problem of unity will be solved and nihilism overcome only when man is no longer preoccupied with beings (die Seienden) but allows Being (Sein) to emerge. In this respect not only does Nietzsche not overcome nihilism, his position represents the most intense form of nihilism possible. But because this is the case, Nietzsche is precisely the philosopher in the tradition with the best opportunity to recognize the phenomenon of nihilism. The problem of overcoming nihilism still remains, but once again, we are at a loss as to how to proceed. Nietzsche gives us no clues (and not because he thought he had solved the problem as some commentators imagine) nor does Heidegger. Perhaps Mikel Dufrenne is correct when he says in The Notion of the A Priori (La Notion d'a priori),

Yet can philosophy agree to remain at this point? Can it accept the Kantian verdict that, even if the need for metaphysics is irrepressible and even if metaphysical experience is felt, metaphysics is impossible? If philosophy wants to advance further, and if it wants to communicate the experience of a background that would also be a radical ground [in the sense of the unity of experience as this thesis has presented it], it must become poetry.
The present thesis will not pursue this "perhaps." In terms of Nietzsche's position regarding the philosophic tradition as nihilistic, this thesis is at an end. The concern has been to understand Nietzsche's philosophy vis-à-vis the rational philosophic tradition. This has been done by emphasizing those aspects of the tradition, in the form of specific philosophies and general themes (such as the unity of experience), which most fundamentally characterize it.
CHAPTER VI

1. WP, no. 656.
2. WP, no. 254.
3. WP, no. 713.
4. WP, no. 715.
5. WP, no. 513. Compare this with "Philosophy is the tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 'creation of the world', to the causa prima." See Schlechta, Vol. II, p. 573. (Kaufmann, BGE, p. 16).
7. WP, no. 447.
9. It is well to bear in mind here the discussion of the unconditioned in chapter one. It was argued there with respect to Kant's position that the concept of unity cannot be separated from the concept of the unconditioned. Thus two unconditioned principles in a philosophy would be an absurdity.
10. WP, no. 55.
12. Ibid., p. 66.
22. Ibid., p. 109.
23. Ibid., p. 141.
25. Ibid., p. 212.
26. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
27. As an example see Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 79-86.
31. All of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation is concerned to demonstrate this position. See especially Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. II, pp. 31ff.
32. For an opposite opinion see Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche and Nihilism," Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. XI, no. 1 (1973), pp. 65-90. Schacht comes to the conclusion that Nietzsche was not a nihilist in his philosophy. This, in my opinion is an erroneous conclusion and is due to an initially mistaken view of what nihilism is.
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