MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES.
"SOCRATES introduced Ethics, and taught duties; and then finally PLATO asserted, or reasserted, the idea of a GOD, the maker of the world. The measure of Human Philosophy was thus full, when Christianity came to add what before was wanting —assurance."

S. T. COLERIDGE, Sept. 24, 1830.
BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

I HAVE often wondered by what arguments the accusers of Socrates could possibly have succeeded in convincing the Athenians that he deserved death at the hands of the state, for the indictment against him ran somewhat thus:—"Socrates violates the laws, inasmuch as he acknowledges not as gods those whom the state acknowledges, but has introduced other and new divinities. He also violates the laws by corrupting the youth."

Now as to the first count, that "he did not acknowledge as gods those whom the state acknowledges," what kind of evidence did they adduce? For he was frequently seen sacrificing without concealment, both at his own house and on the public altars of the
city; and he openly used divination, for it was commonly bruited about how that "Socrates affirmed that the divinity forewarned him." And on this assertion it was that they seem to me chiefly to have founded the charge of his "introducing new divinities."

But in reality he introduced nothing more novel than others do who employ divination, and have faith in birds, and voices, and signs, and sacrifices; for such do not suppose that the birds or the people who encounter them know what is best for those who seek their counsel, but only that the gods signify thus much by the instrumentality of such things; and this was also his opinion.

Whereas, however, most people profess that they are diverted from an object, or incited to it, both by birds and by the people they meet, Socrates asserted that which he himself felt; for he declared that it was the divinity who was his forewarner. Accordingly he encouraged many of his disciples to some actions, and dissuaded them from others; and those who followed his advice were benefited, while those who did not, repented of not having done so. Yet is there any one who would not admit that he disliked being regarded either as a fool or a braggart by his friends? both of which Socrates certainly would have been considered, if, after affirming that revelations had been vouchsafed to him by a god, he had then proved a deceiver. It is manifest, therefore, that unless he had believed his predictions true, he would not have uttered them. Who,
however, in such matters, would trust in any one rather than in a god? And if Socrates trusted in the gods, how could he think that there were no gods?

Moreover, he acted on similar principles where his friends were concerned, for he counselled them, in matters in which results follow as of necessity, to proceed in such a way as he thought most conducive to their interests; while in those of which the issue was uncertain, he referred them to divination to determine whether they should act or not. He said, too, that those who would found families or cities on a sure footing stood in need of divination; for architecture, or metallurgy, or husbandry, or the governing of men, or the power of criticizing or reasoning upon such subjects, all these he regarded as matters of science, and as fit objects for man's selection according to his individual judgment. But the gods, he affirmed, reserved to themselves that which was most important in all such matters, of which nothing was revealed to mortals. Thus, he who had cropped his land abundantly was by no means sure who should reap the fruits, neither was he who had built a fine house certain who should inhabit it. Nor, again, was it clear to the accomplished general whether it would be to his advantage to undertake the command of the army; or to the politician whether he had better become prime minister; or to him who had married a beautiful woman in the hope of happiness whether she might not prove a bane to him; or to him
who had powerful political connections whether by their means he might not be sent into banishment. And he asserted that those who were of opinion that the divinity took no cognisance of such issues, but that they were all matters demanding merely human judgment, must be out of their minds. Those also he declared to be bereft of their senses who had recourse to divination with a view to solving questions upon which the gods had given the power to men to decide for themselves. For instance, as if any one should inquire whether it were better to engage as a charioteer a man who could drive, or one who could not; or as a pilot a man who could steer, or a man who could not; or in matters which can be estimated by arithmetic, or mensuration, or ponderation. Those who consulted the gods upon questions of this kind he deemed guilty of impiety, and said that whatever the gods had given a man the power of informing himself upon, that he should learn; but in matters which were inscrutable to him the gods should be inquired of through divination, for that they vouchsafed revelations to those whom they regarded favourably.

Moreover, with regard to his own conduct, he always acted without any attempt at concealment, since he was wont early in the morning to attend the public promenades and the gymnasia, and was constantly to be seen in the Forum at the time of high market; while for the rest of the day he went where he was likely to meet the most people, and discoursed as much as possible, so that
all those who chose to listen to him could do so. Neither did any one ever see or hear of Socrates acting impiously either by deed or word; for he did not argue, as most philosophers do, concerning the nature of all things, speculating upon that which is termed by the Sophists "the universe," and by what laws each of the heavenly bodies exists; but he maintained that those who devoted their attention to such subjects were fools. And, first, he would ask them whether it was because they considered themselves sufficiently well instructed in all branches of human knowledge that they proceeded to the contemplation of such matters, or whether they thought it became them to ignore humanity in order to speculate upon divinity? He marvelled also that they could not perceive that it was impossible for mortals to penetrate these mysteries, since even those who are the best informed with regard to such topics do not, when discussing them, agree in their opinions, but are affected one towards another as mad people are. For that as with madmen, some are not terrified at things that really are terrible, while others are frightened at that which is by no means frightful; and as some hold it not unseemly to say or do anything before a crowd of people, while others think it wrong even to go into company at all; as some, again, reverence nothing that is sacred, either altar or anything that is consecrated to religion, but worship stones, or chance logs, or wild beasts; so of those who busy themselves in
speculating upon the nature of the universe, some hold that there is only one single existence, while others maintain that the multitude of existences is infinite; some regard all things as being in perpetual motion, while others assert that there is no such thing as motion at all; and while some think that everything is born and perishes, so others argue that nothing ever was born, and that nothing ever perishes.

He would also ask concerning such persons, "Whether, as those who have learned human sciences think that they can employ them when they please for their own service or that of others, so those who seek to dive into matters pertaining to the gods believe, when they have acquainted themselves with the necessary laws of causation respecting each of these things, that they can produce at will either wind or rain, or the changes of the seasons, or any other such phenomena as they choose? or whether, if they have no such expectation as this, the mere knowledge of the means by which each of these is caused satisfies them?"

Such remarks he would make concerning all who busied themselves in these speculations; but he himself was always willing to discuss any topics that might be of human interest,—inquiring into what was pious, what impious; what honourable, what base; what sobriety, what excess; what courage, what cowardice; what a state, what a statesman; what the government of men, what one who was capable of governing them.
And so too on other subjects, the knowledge of which he thought rendered men honourable and good, but ignorance of them fit only to be designated as no better than slaves.

Upon as many points, therefore, as he gave no clear indication of what his opinions were, it is no marvel that his judges should have been led astray; but in regard to facts which were patent to every one, was it not strange that they took no cognisance of these whatever? For once, when he was a member of the senate, and had taken the customary oath, in the which it was recited that he should "vote in conformity with the laws," he, being President of the people, when they voted, contrary to law,* for the death of the nine generals who accompanied Thrasyllus and Erasinides, would not give his suffrage, although they were incensed at him, and many powerful citizens even threatened him, because he considered the observance of his oath more obligatory than the gratification of the people at the expense of right, and than the defence of himself against those who had threatened him. For he held that the gods regarded men, not according to the generally received

* This event occurred after the battle of Arginusæ, b. c. 406, when Theramenes, who was serving in the Athenian fleet, was ordered, after the action, to bring off the disabled galleys and their crews. Not being able to accomplish this, he accused the victorious generals, upon his return home, of having caused the loss of life and property that ensued. They were all condemned to death; and the six who had arrived in Athens were executed.—See Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. iv. pp. 119-136.
opinion concerning them—which is, that they are acquainted with some things, but are ignorant of others; but Socrates maintained that the gods were omniscient in regard to everything that men said or did, or meditated in silence; and that they were omnipresent, and vouchsafed revelations to men touching all human affairs.

I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates was not orthodox in his opinions with regard to the gods, since he was a man who never, in any one instance, either spoke or acted irreverently concerning them; but, both in word and deed, talked and behaved in such a way towards them that any one else whose words and actions had resembled his would have been, and would have been considered to be, exceptionally religious.

CHAPTER II.

The conviction entertained by some, that "Socrates corrupted the youth," also seems wonderful to me, inasmuch as, in addition to what has been already said of him, he was, in the first place, the most continent of men in regard to his passions and appetites; in the next, remarkably well constituted to endure both cold and heat, and all kinds of toil; and also so educated as
to feel only moderate wants—and as he possessed but very little, so he very easily made that little suffice.

Was he, then, being such an one himself, likely to render others either impious, lawless, luxurious, incontinent, or indisposed to labour? Rather, he caused many to turn from such courses by inducing them to seek after virtue, and encouraging them to believe that if they would take heed to their ways, they would be honourable and good men. Not that he himself ever undertook to act as an instructor upon such subjects, but, by its being patent to all that such was his own method of life, he caused those who associated with him to hope that they too, if they followed his example, might become such as he was.

Yet was he not by any means neglectful of the body, nor did he approve of those who were so. He did not consider excess either of eating or of labour beneficial, but that such sustenance as could be taken without satiety should be got rid of by a proper degree of exercise; for he said that such a habit was conducive to health, and did not hinder the cultivation of the mind.

Neither was he in any way luxurious or ostentatious, either in his clothes or his shoes, or any of his modes of living. Nor, again, did he make his associates fond of money, while he checked them in other desires; neither from those who sought his advice would he take any fee. He thought that by refusing payment he could best preserve his independence, and said that those who
accepted remuneration from their disciples were like men who bound themselves to slavery, for that they were obliged to hold discussions with any one whose money they had taken. He marvelled, too, that any one who was a teacher of virtue should regard it as a matter of payment, instead of reckoning that he had gained most by the acquisition of a firm friend; or should fear that he who had been made an honourable and worthy character by his teacher would not feel the greatest gratitude towards him as his benefactor. Socrates, indeed, never delivered himself to this effect to any one, but he believed steadfastly that those of his associates who assented to the doctrines which he himself held, would be staunch friends to him and to one another throughout their whole lives.

How, then, could such a man "corrupt the youth,"—unless indeed the cultivation of virtue be corruption?

"But most certainly," said his accuser, "Socrates caused his associates to despise the established laws by inveighing against the folly of electing the ministers of state by ballot;* for he argued that no one would

* Literally, by beans, which, with metal-balls, stones, and sea-shells, were used by the Athenians for placing in their balloting urns. Hence Aristophanes (Knight's, v. 41) calls the "people" (δῆμος κυαμοτρώξ), a "bean-devourer," in allusion to the great political power which this method of voting gave to the democracy. The exercise of judicial power was, however, usurped by the public assembly but seldom, and then only on extraordinary occasions, such as that referred to in the text.—See Charles Hermann's "Political Antiquities of Greece," chap. vi. sect. 131.
like to employ a pilot or a builder or a flute-player chosen by ballot, or any one in any similar capacity, although blunders committed in such matters would occasion far less mischief than errors of statesmanship. By such teaching, therefore, young men were encouraged to contemn the enactments of the state, and to act forcibly in violation of them."

Now, it appears to me that persons who use their intellects, and imagine themselves capable of instructing the citizens as to what is most to their advantage, are the last people likely to commit acts of violence, as being aware that from violence dangers and enmities accrue, and that the same ends are better attained by persuasion, without any hazard, and in an amicable way; for those who are compelled by force, conceive enmity as though they had been robbed; whereas those who have been persuaded, feel amicably disposed, as though they had received a favour. Acts of violence, then, are not likely to be committed by men who use their intellects, but they are rather to be expected of those who possess sheer strength without judgment. Moreover, he who ventures to use violence must have abettors; but he who prevails through persuasion needs none, for he would consider himself able to carry his point single-handed. And least of all should such persons put any one to death. For who would prefer slaying a man, to preserving his life, and persuading him, and ultimately making him useful?
"But," said the accuser, "Critias and Alcibiades, who became the associates of Socrates, both worked manifold evils in the state; for Critias turned out to be the most grasping and outrageous of the oligarchs, while Alcibiades again was the most intemperate, insolent, and violent of all the democratic party."

Now, for whatever evils either of them may have inflicted upon the state, I shall offer no apology; but with respect to their association with Socrates, I will show how the matter really stood. These two were, in truth, by nature the most ambitious persons among all the Athenians, being desirous of carrying everything before them by their own personal influence, and becoming the most renowned of all men; they knew, too, that Socrates lived very independently on very small means; that he was most abstinent from all pleasures, and that he swayed those who argued with him any way he pleased by his reasonings. Seeing, then, as they did, that such was the case, and being actuated by such motives as they were, will any one affirm that it was because they were desirous of imitating Socrates in the life he led, and the abstinence he practised, that they sought his company, or that it was not because they thought that by associating with him, they would be rendered most efficient both in speech and action? I verily am of opinion that if any god had given either of them the choice of passing his whole life as he saw Socrates passing it, or of dying, both of them would have infinitely
preferred to die. And this they proved by their conduct; for directly they conceived themselves superior to their contemporaries, they hurried away from Socrates, and busied themselves in politics; that being the very purpose for which they had sought his society.

Now, perhaps, some one might object to this, that Socrates should not have taught his disciples politics before he had taught them discretion—a proposition which I, for one, by no means gainsay. But I perceive that all teachers prove to their disciples by their own examples how far they practise what they preach, and encourage them by their reasonings to follow a similar course. I know, too, that Socrates made it evident to his disciples how honest and good he was, and that he discoursed most admirably concerning virtue, and all human actions. I know, also, that both these men, so long as they associated with Socrates, behaved themselves discreetly, not as being in fear of any penalty or punishment at his hands, but as thinking, at that time, that it was best for their own interests so to act.

But many of those who are called philosophers would perhaps assert that a man who has at one period of his life been just, can never become unjust, nor a humble-minded man insolent; and so, too, in regard to anything that is capable of being learnt, that he who has once learned can never unlearn it. With such sentiments, however, I do not coincide; for I see that, as those who
do not train their bodies cannot properly perform the functions of the body, so those who do not exercise their mental faculties cannot perform those of the mind; for they are unable to do those things which they ought to do, or to abstain from that from which they ought to abstain. And hence it is that fathers keep their sons, however steady they may be, from bad companions, on the ground that intimacy with the good leads to the practice of virtue, whereas the companionship of the wicked destroys it.

And to this one of the poets* bears testimony when he says—

"Thou shalt learn goodness from the good; but those Who make companions of the wicked, lose Such understanding as they once possessed."

Another observes—

"Good men are sometimes good and sometimes bad."

And to this I can myself bear witness; for I perceive that as those who are engaged in inditing metrical compositions, if they are not careful as to their diction, forget the art; so those who neglect instructive admonitions become oblivious of them. And when any one forgets moral admonition, he loses the remembrance of those things

* Theognis, γνώσματι, lines 35, 36. It is not known who was the author of the verse which follows. In comparison with the former passage, see 2 Sam. xxii. 26, 27, and Ps. xviii. 26.
which the mind desired when it was tolerant of wisdom; and if a man is forgetful of these things, it is not to be wondered at that he becomes oblivious of wisdom also. And I see, too, that those who are given to excess in drinking, or who are carrying on amours, are the less able to apply themselves to their duties, or to abstain from actions which they ought not to commit; for many who could be frugal before they were in love, when they have fallen in love can be so no longer; and when they have exhausted their resources, betake themselves for the sake of gain to courses from which they have previously shrunk as considering them dishonourable.

How is it impossible, then, that one who has formerly been sober-minded may be sober-minded no longer? that he who was once capable of acting justly may become afterwards incapable of executing justice?

It appears to me, therefore, that whatsoever things are honest and good are matters of practice, and not the least of them, sobriety of mind; for the sense of pleasure implanted as it is in the self-same body in which the spirit exists, tempts the latter to pay no regard to sobriety of mind, and leads it but to gratify itself and the body at all hazards.

So, then, both Critias and Alcibiades, as long as they remained intimate with Socrates, were enabled with his aid to subdue their evil propensities; but when they renounced his society, Critias, for his part, flying to Thessaly, there became the associate of men much more
addicted to breaking the laws than to keeping them; while Alcibiades, on account of his personal beauty, being solicited by many women, even of high rank, and from the influence which he possessed both in the state and with the allies; being courted, too, by many men, and among them by those who were most able to flatter him; being held in honour by the people, and excelling others without an effort, like those athletes who from easy victories at gymnastic contests afterwards neglect their training—so he neglected himself.

This, then, being the case with each of them, and both of them being proud of their descent, elated with wealth, puffed up with power, petted by many, and thus rendered thoroughly corrupt, what wonder is it that when they had long been separated from Socrates they became overbearing in their conduct?

But, granting that they did act wrongfully, pray should the accuser impute the blame to Socrates? and should he argue that if, when they were both young, and therefore most likely to be inconsiderate and ungovernable, Socrates rendered them amenable to reason, he does not therefore deserve any credit for it? At any rate, other matters are not estimated after a similar fashion. For what flautist, or harpist, or teacher of any kind, who has turned out proficient pupils, is blamed, if, when they go to other teachers, they deteriorate? Or what father, if his son, while he associated with one man, was steady, but afterwards by intimacy with another became vicious,
would find fault with the former? and would he not rather, in proportion as his son appeared to be rendered worse by the second, be so much the more inclined to speak well of the first? But even fathers, when they are with their sons, are not held accountable for any faults those sons may commit, provided they themselves are well conducted. And according to the same rules ought Socrates to have been judged. If in any way he acted viciously, he was rightly regarded as a vicious man; but if he was continually engaged in virtuous acts, how was it just to blame him for depravity which he did not exhibit?

Granting, however, that he was himself innocent of any wrong-doing, yet if he commended Critias and Alcibiades when he saw them acting wrongfully, he would be justly liable to censure. But when he saw the former courting Euthydemus, and endeavouring to make use of him just as debauchees do those whom they wish to seduce, he sought to dissuade him from his design, saying, that it was not like a gentleman, or worthy of a man of honour and integrity, to fawn upon a person whom he admires and by whom he wishes to be highly esteemed, beseeching and entreating him, as paupers do, for favours, which after all were for no good purpose. But as Critias heeded not his remonstrances, and was not diverted from his course, Socrates, as the story goes, said in the presence of Euthydemus himself and divers others, that "Critias
appeared to him to be swinishly disposed, for that he sought to rub himself against Euthydemus just as pigs do against stones." Hence it was that Critias bore such a grudge against Socrates, that even when he was one of the Thirty,* and was appointed with Charicles to settle the laws, he remembered this circumstance, and inserted a clause forbidding any one to teach the art of disputation, expressly to annoy Socrates, and not as having any particular charge on which he could arraign him, but for the purpose of bringing against him the accusation which was commonly brought against philosophers, and lowering his character with the people in general. Not that I myself ever heard this from Socrates, nor did I ever know any one who said that he had heard it.

Critias, however, himself made it manifest; for when the Thirty were putting to death many of the citizens, some of them being by no means inconsiderable persons, and were encouraging several in their violation of the laws, Socrates casually remarked "that he should think it curious if a man who undertook to tend a herd of cattle, and suffered them to grow thinner and poorer, should deny that he was a bad herdsman; but he thought it still more remarkable that any one who undertook to act as the head of the state, and suffered the citizens to deteriorate both numerically and morally,

* The establishment of the "Thirty Tyrants" as the governing body at Athens, took place just after the end of the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 404. — See Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. iv. pp. 174-203.
should not consider that he was unfit for his position." This observation having been reported to the Thirty, Critias and Charicles summoned Socrates before them, and pointing out the law to him, warned him against holding further discourses with the young. Then Socrates asked them if they would allow him to put a question to them concerning any point of their inhibition which he did not exactly comprehend? Upon their acceding to his request, he said, "I am ready then to obey the law, but in order that I may not violate it unwittingly through ignorance, I wish to ascertain clearly from you whether it is because you think that the art of disputation encourages proper or improper discourse that you prohibit it? If it encourages proper discourse, the inhibition would clearly be against discoursing properly, but if it encourages improper discourse, it is certain that we ought to endeavour to discourse properly." Then Charicles, flying into a rage with him, exclaimed, "Since, Socrates, you do not understand what we have said, we give you an order which you may comprehend more easily, viz., that you are not to discourse with the young at all." "But," answered Socrates, "that there may be no mistake as to whether I do that which is forbidden or not, define to me at what age I am to consider men young." "So long," said Charicles, "as they are under the senatorial age, as not yet being sufficiently experienced. Do not discourse with any one who is under thirty years of
But," asked Socrates, "suppose I should wish to purchase an article, and a man under thirty should be inclined to sell it, may I not even ask him what is its price?" "Of course," answered Charicles, "you may ask such questions as these. But forasmuch as your questions, Socrates, generally bear reference to matters which you know all about, from such questions you must abstain." "If, then, a young man asks me such a question as 'Where does Charicles live?' or 'Where is Critias?' may I not answer him if I know?" "Yes," replied Charicles, "such questions as these you may answer." "But," said Critias, "you must abstain from descanting upon shoemakers and builders and braziers, for you talk so unceasingly about them that I should imagine they must be worn threadbare." "Must I then abstain from speaking of any quality that may attach to any of such people, as love of justice, or piety, or anything of that sort?" "Yes, in good sooth, you must," rejoined Charicles, "and especially beware of 'herdsmen,' or if you do not, look out lest you yourself make the herd thinner." Hence then it was evident that it was because the anecdote about the cattle had been repeated to them that they were angry with Socrates.

The nature of Critias' intercourse with Socrates, and the relations which existed between them, have now been explained.

Again, I, for my part, should say that no real educa-
tion could be imparted to a pupil by a teacher whom he disliked. And neither Critias nor Alcibiades were intimate with Socrates because they liked him what time they associated with him, but because, from the very commencement of their intimacy, they were aiming at the headship of the state; for during the whole period of their intercourse with him they affected the conversation of none more eagerly than they did that of persons who were engaged in political life.

Now it is related of Alcibiades, that before he was twenty years of age he held the following conversation with Pericles, who was his guardian, and likewise prime minister of state, respecting the laws:—

"Tell me," said he, "Pericles, would you have me taught what law is?" "By all manner of means," answered Pericles. "Teach me, then, I pray you, by the gods," rejoined Alcibiades; "since, for my part, although I hear some men praised as being obedient to the laws, methinks that they are not deserving of such praise unless they know what law is." "But, Alcibiades, there is nothing difficult in what you desire," said Pericles, "when you wish to know what law is; for all such measures as the people, approving in full conclave, enacts, declaring what is to be done and what not, are laws." "And which kind of actions do the laws enjoin—such as are good or such as are bad?" "The good, my child, of course; but the bad by no means," replied Pericles. "But suppose not the whole people,
but, as in the case of an oligarchy, the few meet together and enact what is to be done, what are such enactments?"

"Everything," answered Pericles, "which the ruling power in the state, after due deliberation, enacts as proper to be done is called the law." "If a tyrant, then, holding supreme power in the state, enacts for his citizens what they ought to do, is this too law?" "Even such things as a tyrant at the head of the state enacts," said Pericles, "are called the law." "In what, then, Pericles, do compulsion and lawlessness consist?" asked Alcibiades; "is it not when the stronger forces the weaker to do that which seems good to him, not by persuasion, but against his will?" "So it appears to me," answered Pericles. "Whatever, then, a tyrant by his enactments compels his citizens to do against their own judgment is lawlessness?" "I think so," said Pericles, "for I retract my assertion that whatever a tyrant enacts without persuading his citizens is law." "And such measures as the minority enact, not by persuading the majority, but by gaining the mastery over them, should we call these compulsory or not?" "Everything," replied Pericles, "that one man forces another to do without persuading him, whether enacted in writing or not, appears to me to be compulsion rather than law." "Whatever decrees, then, the mass of the people, having obtained the mastery over the wealthier classes, should pass, without having persuaded the latter, would be rather compulsion than law?" "Certainly, Alcibiades,"
answered Pericles; "and we, too, when we were of your age, were adepts at arguing as you now argue, for we used to busy ourselves in, and speculate upon,* the same kind of disquisitions as those to which you seem to me now to be paying attention." "I would, then," said Alcibiades, "that I had been intimate with you, Pericles, when you were most of an adept at handling such topics."

So, then, when Critias and Alcibiades considered themselves superior to those who had the direction of the state, they no longer maintained their intimacy with Socrates, for they both disliked him on other grounds, and were also angry if, when they did go to him, he reproved them for any fault that they had committed. Thus, then, they devoted themselves to politics, which was the very reason why they originally sought Socrates.

But Crito was an associate of Socrates, as also were Chærephon, and Chærecreates, and Hermocrates, and Simmias, and Cebes, and Phædonides, and others, who

* Literally, "argue sophistically upon." The "Sophists" were a set of teachers who taught philosophy and rhetoric publicly to any who were willing to pay for their lessons. Accordingly, all those who were anxious to distinguish themselves in the government or the law-courts resorted to their lectures in order to learn how to argue on either side of a question, so as to confute their opponents by making the worse appear the better reason; and it is from this fact that the term "sophist" has always been employed in a bad sense. The school, however, originally boasted of the most celebrated men in Athens, either as teachers or pupils.—See Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. iv. pp. 257–280.
attended him, not with the object of becoming accomplished orators or pleaders, but in order that, by being made good and honourable men, they might do their duty by their families and their domestics, to their relations and friends, to the state and to their fellow-citizens. And not one of these, either in his youth or in his more mature age, ever committed, or was ever accused of committing, any despicable action.

"But Socrates," said his accuser, "taught the young to look contemptuously upon their parents by making his followers believe that he rendered them wiser than their fathers, and alleging that any one might legally confine even his father upon proving mental incapacity against him,—adding this as an argument that it was lawful for the more ignorant to be put under restraint by the better informed." But Socrates maintained that he who put another under restraint on account of his ignorance would be rightly served by being himself kept in durance by those who happened to understand anything of which he was ignorant. Hence, in reference to this subject, he was often wont to inquire into the points of difference which exist between ignorance and madness; and while he was of opinion that madmen should be put under restraint, both for their own safety and that of their friends, he also thought that those who were ignorant of such things as they ought to know should by rights be taught by those who did understand them.
Again," said the accuser, "Socrates caused his followers to look with contempt, not only upon their parents, but upon their kindred generally, by asserting that relations were of no benefit to people when they were suffering illness or involved in a lawsuit, but that the doctors assisted them in the one case and the lawyers in the other." He stated, too, that "Socrates declared, with regard to friends, that their mere good-will was of no avail unless they could also be of some active service; and that those only were deserving of any esteem who knew what would tend to a man's advantage, and could point out the way to it." Accordingly, that "by thus persuading the young to regard him as the wisest of mankind, and the most capable of rendering others wise, he so disposed his disciples towards him that they held every one cheaply in comparison with him."

I know, indeed, that he did express such opinions with regard to parents, and other relatives, and friends; and said, moreover, that when the soul has departed, in which alone intelligence exists, men carry forth the bodies of their most intimate companions, and hide them away from sight as quickly as they can. He remarked, too, that every man of his own accord during his own lifetime, even from his own body, which he cherishes more than he does anything else, removes for himself, or allows others to remove for him, anything that is superfluous or useless. Thus people rid themselves of their own nails, and their hair, and their
callosities, and undergo troublesome and painful cuttings and cauterizations at the hands of surgeons, being even willing to pay them for performing such operations. Again, men eject the saliva from the mouth as far away from them as they can, because while it remains in the mouth it is of no use to them, but rather the reverse. And he talked in this way, not with a view of inducing any one to bury his father alive, or to cut him in pieces, but in order to demonstrate the worthlessness of that which is senseless. He exhorted each one to make himself as intelligent and as serviceable as he could, so that if he wished to be highly regarded by a father or a brother, or any one else, he might not indolently rely solely upon his close relationship with them, but strive to be of use to those whose esteem he was anxious to gain.

Another of the accuser's charges was that he selected the most immoral passages of the most celebrated poets, and used them as arguments to confirm those lessons of villany and tyranny which he imparted to his disciples. Thus he is said to have quoted the verse of Hesiod—

"Not work, but idleness disgraces men,” *

with the intention of fixing on the poet the sentiment that men should not abstain from any kind of work, be it ever so unjust or dishonourable, but should under-

* Hesiod's Ἕργα καὶ Ἡμέραι ("Works and Days"), line 311.
take even such deeds for the sake of profit. Whereas Socrates professed that occupation was advantageous and good for a man, and idleness injurious and bad; and as work was beneficial, and sloth harmful, so he maintained that those only who do good are really occupied and well occupied, while gamblers, or those who are engaged in any evil or pernicious pursuit, he termed idlers; and viewed in this light, the poet's sentiment—

"Not work, but idleness disgraces men,"

would be correct.

Again, the accuser alleged that he often used to cite that passage in Homer where it is said of Ulysses that—

"Whatever king or chief he chanced to meet,
Him he encouraged with such cheering words:
'Behoves you, sire, not tremble like a coward;
But, brave yourself, to make your comrades brave.'

Or if he heard some low plebeian brawl,
He struck him with his staff, and chid him thus:
'Be quiet, fellow, while thy betters talk;
For thou, too weak to argue or to fight,
Art neither good at action or debate.'" *

And it was alleged that he brought this forward as an argument that the poet meant to insinuate that

plebeians and poor people ought to be beaten. But Socrates never intended any such thing (for in that case he would have been of opinion that he ought to be beaten himself); but he asserted that such people as were of no benefit to others, either by word or deed, and were incapable of serving in the army, or in the ministry, or among the general body of the people, should they ever be called upon to do so, more especially if, in addition to all this incapacity, they were also of an overbearing disposition, that such ought to be restrained by any coercive measures possible, even if they happened to be ever so rich. And he showed that he was even diametrically opposed to the sentiments attributed to him, in that he was undisguisedly well disposed towards the common people, and a friend to men in general; for though he was surrounded by numerous admirers, both native and foreign, he never once exacted any fee from them for their attendance, but ministered of his own stores ungrudgingly to all. And of these treasures some* having received a small portion from him without payment, sold them again to others at a great price, and were not,

* Allusion is here made to Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy. He was the first of the disciples of Socrates who took money for teaching. Great difference of opinion prevailed as to his tenets. Both Xenophon and Plato held him in great contempt; and Aristotle speaks slightingly of him; while Horace (Epist. I. 1, 18, and I. 17, 23) and Diogenes Laertius (ii. 65, et seq.) think his doctrines worthy of admiration. For an account of him, and a concise summary of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, see Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voc. "Aristippus."
as he was, kind to the common people, inasmuch as they would not hold dissertations with any who had not money to give them in return.

But Socrates, in truth, when compared with other men, rendered his city far more illustrious than even Lichas did that of the Spartans, renowned as he was on this account; for Lichas certainly entertained at a banquet the strangers who were residing in Sparta on the occasion of the Gymnopaedia;* whereas Socrates throughout his whole life spent his own substance in making himself of the greatest possible use to any who were willing to avail themselves of his services, by rendering all who came to him better men before they took leave of him.

On these grounds, then, it appears to me that Socrates, being such a character as he was, deserved honour much rather than death at the hands of the state, and any one considering the case according to law would find such to be the fact. Thus the law is that if any one is a known thief, or clothes-snatcher, or cut-purse, or burglar, or kidnapper, or temple-plunderer, the penalty attached to such crimes is death, and of these no man was ever more innocent than was Socrates. Neither,

* A Spartan festival in honour of the Pythian Apollo, Artemis, and Leto, held yearly in the month of Hekatontæon (the end of July or the beginning of August) in commemoration of the victory of the Spartans over the Argives at Thyrea, B.C. 547. It derived its name from a dance of naked boys which took place during its celebration; for a full description of which, see Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities," sub voc. "Gymnopaedia."
again, did he ever cause the state to engage in any unsuccessful war, or expose it to sedition or treachery, or any other kind of mischief. He never once in his private transactions deprived any man of his property, or brought upon him any misfortune, nor did he ever labour under the imputation of having been guilty of any of the aforesaid crimes.

How, then, could he be obnoxious to the charges of the indictment—he who, instead of not reverencing the gods, as one of the counts had it, was among all other men a most conspicuous servant of the gods? And instead of corrupting the youth, which was another count in the indictment, he confessedly induced such of his followers as displayed vicious inclinations to desist from them, and encouraged them in the cultivation of the purest and highest virtue, by the which both states and families are properly governed. His actions, then, being thus regulated, how was he not deserving of marked distinction at the hands of the state?

CHAPTER III.

But in what respects he appears to me to have been of service to his followers, partly by the example of his own character, and partly by his conversation, of these I shall set down such reminiscences as occur to me.
Now, with regard to all matters connected with the gods, both his deeds and his words were manifestly in accordance with the answer which the Pythian priestess gives to those who inquire as to the method of performing a sacrifice, worshipping their ancestors, or any rite of a similar kind; for she replies that by acting in conformity with the laws of the realm they will act piously. And Socrates so acted himself, and recommended the same course to others, asserting that the conduct of those who adopted a different plan savoured both of supererogation and folly.

Again, he used to pray to the gods simply "that they would grant him good gifts," as believing that they best knew what was good; and those who prayed for gold or silver, or supreme power, or anything of this kind, he regarded as being on a par with those who pray for gambling, or fighting, or any other matter, of which the issue is quite uncertain as to how it will turn out.

When he offered humble sacrifices out of his small means, he did not consider himself less meritorious than those who, having multifarious and abundant resources, offered up numerous and rich sacrifices; for he said that it would ill become the gods to take pleasure in great rather than in small offerings, since, if they did so, they would often be more pleased with the gifts of the wicked than with those of the good; nor would man's life be worth having if offerings made to the gods by the bad were more acceptable to them than those which
were offered by the good. But he thought that the gods had most pleasure in the offerings of the most pious, and was fond of quoting the verse which says—

"Give to the gods according to thy means."

And he was wont to remark, that the maxim of "according to one's means," was also strongly to be recommended in one's actions towards one's friends and towards strangers, and in every relation of life.

And if he was convinced that he had received some intimation from the gods, he would no more have been persuaded to act contrary to such intimation than any one could have induced him to take a blind man as a guide on a journey, or one who did not know the road, in preference to one who could see, and was acquainted with it; and he condemned the folly of others who, by disregarding the intimations of the gods, sought to avoid the bad opinion of men. As for himself, he held all human behests as not worth a thought in comparison with the counsel of the gods.

He accustomed his mind and his body to such a mode of life that any one who should adopt a similar one would, unless some heaven-sent dispensation should prevent it, live cheerfully and securely all his days, without any fear of being in want of the necessary means for meeting his expenses. For he was so frugal that I doubt whether there is any man whose labour would not earn for him as much as satisfied Socrates. He took only
such food as he could consume with a relish, and sat down to table prepared to make his appetite for his meal the sauce to season it withal. All kinds of drink were agreeable to him, because he never drank unless he was thirsty. And if he ever accepted an invitation to a feast, he accomplished that which most people find extremely difficult, viz., to avoid overloading the stomach, against which danger he very easily guarded himself. And he counselled those who could not do so to abstain from such things as would stimulate them to eating when they were not hungry, or drinking when they were not thirsty; for he asserted that this was the way to disorder the stomach, the brain, and the mind. And he said, in joke, that it was through a surfeit of such delicacies that Circe changed human beings into swine; but that it was owing to the admonitions of Mercury and his own abstinence in refraining from committing similar excesses, that Ulysses escaped such a transformation.

Thus would he jest upon such subjects, although, at the same time, he thought very gravely about them. And with regard to love affairs, he counselled strict non-familiarity with handsome people, for he said that it was not easy for any one who was on terms of intimacy with them to keep their senses. Thus, having once heard that Critobulus, the son of Crito, had kissed the handsome son of Alcibiades, he asked Xenophon, in the presence of Critobulus, "Tell me, Xenophon, did you not think that Critobulus was a prudent man instead of a
rash one, and sensible rather than inconsiderate and adventurous?" "Certainly I did," answered Xenophon. "Henceforward regard him, then, as a most headstrong and venturesome person, as one who would even throw himself upon swords or leap into the flames." "Why, what, I pray you, have you seen him doing to make you judge thus of him?" inquired Xenophon. "Did he not have the boldness to kiss that remarkably handsome youth, the son of Alcibiades?" "But, in good sooth," said Xenophon, "if you consider this so hazardous a piece of business, I think I could almost have been inclined to have adventured it myself." "O wretched man!" ejaculated Socrates; "and what do you think are the penalties you incur by kissing a handsome person? Do you not expect forthwith to become a slave rather than a free agent? to spend a vast deal upon baleful pleasures? to be too much engaged to attend to anything that is useful or honourable? and to become of necessity engrossed in such objects as not even a lunatic would pursue?" "O Hercules!" cried Xenophon, "what wonderful consequences you attribute to a kiss!" "Do you marvel at my doing so?" inquired Socrates. "And do you not know," he continued, "that the tarantula, although in size it is not so big as a farthing, yet if its mouth only just comes into contact with a man, it wears him out with pain, and drives him out of his senses?" "Yes, by Jupiter," answered Xenophon, "for the tarantula injects some sort of poison by
its bite." "And do you not think, O foolish man!" rejoined Socrates, "that handsome people by their kiss, inject some essence that is invisible to you? Are you not aware that the animal which is called 'a blooming beauty' is by far more formidable than the tarantula, inasmuch as the latter by contact, but the former without it, and merely by being looked at, injects something, even from a very great distance, of such potency as to drive people mad? And hence it is, perhaps, that Cupids are called 'archers,' because those who are handsome inflict wounds from afar. But I advise you, Xenophon, to flee as fast as you can whenever you see a handsome person; and you, Critobulus, I advise to go away for a year; for you may perhaps in that time, albeit with some difficulty, be healed of your bite." This he insisted upon as the proper course to be pursued in love affairs by those who were apt to be seduced by them, since if the body did not long dwell upon such desires the soul would never notice them; or if the body did entertain them, they would not gain too much power over it. As for himself, he was manifestly so disciplined with regard to such affections, that he kept himself from the company of the beautiful and youthful, more easily than others do from those who are most ugly and deformed.

These were his sentiments with regard to all matters connected with eating, drinking, and love. And he considered that he personally derived no less gratifica-
tion from them by practising moderation than those do who attach the utmost importance to them; while, at the same time, he thought that they thus caused him infinitely less trouble.

CHAPTER IV.

But if any should think of Socrates (since some, both in writing and speaking of him, judge him merely from conjecture) as of a man well skilled in encouraging others to virtue, but himself incapable of pioneering them on their way to it, let them consider, not only by what questionings he confuted and exposed those who fancied they knew everything, but the conversations which he held every day with his companions; that so they may determine as to his ability for improving the morals of his disciples.

And, first, I will relate a dialogue which I once heard him hold with Aristodemus, surnamed "the Little," concerning the nature of the Deity. For having been told that the latter neither sacrificed to the gods, nor prayed to them, nor used the divination, but ridiculed those who did so, he said to him—"Tell me, Aristodemus, is there any man whom you admire for his talents?" "Certainly there is," replied he. "Mention the name, then, of any that you do admire." "Well, then," said Aristodemus,
"I admire Homer very much as a writer of epic poetry; Melanippides as a lyrical, and Sophocles as a tragic writer; Polycleitus as a sculptor, and Zeuxis as a painter." "And which seem to you the more worthy of admiration—those who fashion images unendowed with sense or motion, or those who form living creatures possessing sense and the power of action?" "Those, of course, by a long way, who form living creatures, since such are produced, not by chance, but deliberate intelligence." "And as to things concerning which it is not certain for what purpose they exist, and those which are manifestly of some use or other, which of the two would you judge to be works of chance, and which works of intelligence?" "Evidently it is those which exist for some use that are works of intelligence." "Do you not think, then, that He who in the beginning created man, endowed him with perceptive organs for some useful end,—as, for instance, with his eyes to see that which is visible, and his ears to hear that which is audible? Of what use would smells be to us if we had no nostrils? and what power of tasting sweetness and bitterness, or the various flavours that are pleasant to the mouth, should we have had if the tongue had not been formed to distinguish between them? Again, does it not appear to you something like a work of design that, since the organ of sight is so delicate, it should be protected by eyelids as by a door, which, when it is necessary to use the eyes, are thrown open,
but are closed in sleep; that the eyelashes are formed like a sieve, to prevent the winds from injuring them, and that the parts above them are furnished with eyebrows as with eaves, that so the perspiration from the head may do the eyes no harm; that the organs of hearing should be capable of taking in every variety of sound, and yet never become choked up; that the front teeth of all animals should be incisors, and the back masticators; that the mouth, through which is transmitted the provender which all living creatures require, should be placed near the eyes and the nostrils; and since what passes from the body is disagreeable, that the channels through which it is discharged should be turned away and removed as far as possible from the other senses? Can you doubt as to whether such arrangements, carried out as they are with so much design, are the result of chance or intelligence?” “No, by Jupiter,” answered Aristodemus; “for to one who regards them in the light that you do, these things appear to be planned by some skilful artisan, and well-wisher to all living creatures.” “And to have implanted the desire for offspring and maternal love, and a strong attachment to life among the young, and the greatest possible dread of death?” “Assuredly these instincts seem to denote design on the part of some Being who intended that living creatures should continue to exist.” “And with regard to yourself, do you think that you are an intelligent creature?” “Put some questions to me upon the point, at
any rate, and I will answer you." "Do you suppose, again, that there is no intelligence existing anywhere but in yourself, and this, as knowing that you have in your own body only a small portion of earth, which is so immense; and an infinitesimal quantity of water, which is so immeasurable; and that only an inconsiderable portion of other vast elements enters into the composition of your members,—can you, I say, being aware of all this, think that you have, by some piece of luck, appropriated to yourself alone that intelligence which is found nowhere else, and that other boundless and innumerable existences are regulated, as you suggest, without any kind of intelligent design?" "Yes, by Jupiter, that is my opinion; for I do not see any one who has control over such things in the same way as artificers have over their work here on earth." "But neither do you see your own soul, which is paramount over your body. Hence, according to this line of argument, you may aver that you accomplish nothing by intelligence, but everything by mere chance." And Aristodemus replied—"But I do not on that account despise the gods; I merely consider them as of too excellent a nature to demand any service from me." "For that very reason," remarked Socrates, "by how much the gods, being so exalted as they are, condescend to be of service to you, by so much the more does it behove you to honour them." "Be well assured," Aristodemus replied, "that, if I believed that the gods had
any regard for men, I would not neglect them.” “Do you not believe, then, that the gods have any regard for men?—they who, in the first place, created man alone of all animals to stand erect, and so to be capable of seeing farther before him, and contemplate more easily what is above him, and less exposed to injury in those parts where they have placed his eyes and his ears and his mouth; and, in the next place, have given to such other animals as progress by their feet alone, those members as the sole instruments of such progression, but to man have added hands also, whereby to execute most of those works which make us better off than they are? And that, although other creatures have tongues, they have endowed the human tongue alone, by its touching sometimes one part of the mouth and sometimes another, with the power of modulating the voice and of signifying men’s various wants one to another? And that the desire for sexual intercourse in other animals has been limited to certain seasons of the year, whereas it exists in us constantly till we arrive at old age? It did not, however, satisfy the Deity to take an interest in man’s body only, but, what is the most important point of all, He also implanted in him that most excellent essence—his soul. But in the first place, of what other animal does the mind comprehend the fact of the existence of the gods as the organisers of so stupendous and excellent a system? and what other race except that of men offers service to
the gods? or what intelligence exists more adapted than that of man to make provision against cold and heat, or hunger and thirst, or to alleviate disease, or to practise feats of strength, or to labour for instruction, or more capable of remembering what it may have heard or seen or learned? For is it not clearly manifest to you that men pass their lives like gods as compared with other creatures, and excel them in the nature both of their minds and bodies? For neither could a creature endowed with the body of an ox and the feelings of a man accomplish its wishes; nor do such animals as possess hands, but are devoid of intelligence, obtain any benefit thereby. But do you, who enjoy both these stupendous advantages, think that the gods have no regard for you? How, then, can they do anything that will ever convince you that they do take thought for you?"

"By sending," replied Aristodemus, "(as you affirm that they send to you) counsellors to direct me what I ought and what I ought not to do." "When, then," asked Socrates, "they communicate with the Athenians upon their consulting them through divination, do you not think that they communicate with you also? Or when they forewarn the Greeks, or the whole human race, by means of portents, do you imagine that they make an exception in your individual case, and put you aside with contempt? Again, do you imagine that the gods would have implanted in men's minds a belief that they were able to dispense blessings or miseries among
them unless they really possessed that power? and that men, having been so deluded throughout all ages, should never at any time have once discovered the imposition? Do you not recognise the fact that the oldest and wisest of human communities, both of cities and nations, are the most god-worshipping, and that men, at the most reflective periods of their lives, are most religious? Learn, too, my good friend," he continued, "that your soul, which dwells within your body, orders the latter according to its own will; so that you are bound to believe that the intelligence which subsists in each object directs that object agreeably to itself; and you must not imagine that while your vision is capable of ranging over a distance of many furlongs, the eye of the Deity is unable to survey the universe at a glance. Nor should you suppose that while your mind can contemplate things that are taking place at home and in Egypt and Sicily, that the Divine Intelligence is insufficient to regard all things simultaneously.

"Moreover, if by showing attention to men you find that they are willing to reciprocate your attentions, and that if you oblige them they are inclined to return the obligation; and as by communication with others you discover who are sensible people,—so, with regard to the gods, you should make the experiment whether, if you cultivate them, they will not vouchsafe to you their guidance in matters which are unrevealed to mankind in general; and you may thus recognise the fact that
the nature of the Deity is so stupendously constituted as to be able to see all things at once, and to hear all things, and to be present everywhere, and to take cognisance of everything at the same time."

On the whole, then, by such discourses as these Socrates seems to me to have led his associates to refrain from impious, unjust, or dishonourable conduct, not only as being in the sight of men, but even if they were alone in a desert, as they would be always of opinion that there was no one action that they could commit which would escape the notice of the gods.

CHAPTER V.

And if self-denial be indeed a good and estimable quality, let us consider whether he did not encourage its practice when he spoke of it in some such way as this:—"If, my friends, we were going to war, and had to choose a leader under whom we should have the best prospect of being ourselves preserved, and overcoming our enemies, pray, should we appoint such an one as we knew to be unable to withstand gluttony, or wine-bibbing, or sensuality, or pain, or drowsiness? And how could we suppose that a man who succumbed to these could bring us off safe and confound our foes? Or if towards the close of our lives we wished to com-
mit our sons to some person to be educated, or our unmarried daughters to be taken care of, or our property not to be squandered, should we think an intemperate man fit to be appointed trustee for such purposes? Should we, again, hand over to an intemperate servant the custody of our herds, our chattels, or the superintendence of our business? Or should we be willing to employ such a servant as an agent or purveyor, even without paying him wages? But if we would not engage even as a servant a man who is intemperate, how incumbent is it upon every one to guard against this vice in his own person! For, unlike the covetous who, when they despoil others of their property, seek to enrich themselves, the intemperate man, when he injures his neighbour, does not ameliorate his own condition, but, at the same time that he inflicts evil upon his friends, brings far more evil upon himself; if at least it be conceded that to ruin not only his family, but his own body and soul, is the greatest evil that any one can commit. And in society, who would like a man whom he knew to take more pleasure in eating and drinking than in his friends, and to prefer the company of harlots to that of his equals? Should not every one, then, as considering that temperance is the foundation of virtue, cultivate it before all things in his soul? For who without it can either acquire any good habits, or put them into practice as he ought to do? Or who that is a slave to pleasure, is not ill-conditioned both in his
body and mind? I swear, by Juno, that I think a freeman ought to pray that he may never happen to engage a servant who is intemperate, and that any servant who is too much given to sensual pleasures should supplicate the gods that he may meet with morally conducted masters; for by these means only can such a man of such a temperament hope to be saved.”

And if his utterances were on this wise, he proved himself still more continent by his actions than by his words, since he had command over himself not only in respect to corporeal pleasures, but also in those which accrue from the acquisition of money; for he was of opinion that any one who accepted money promiscuously set up a master over himself, and bound himself to a slavery no less degrading than any other in the world.

CHAPTER VI.

The conversations, too, which Socrates held with Antipho, the Sophist, are so well worth recording that we must not omit them.

On one occasion, Antipho wishing to entice Socrates' disciples away from him, walked up to him in their presence, and spoke as follows:—“I thought, Socrates, that those who studied philosophy were invariably ren-
dered happier thereby; but you seem to me to have derived the contrary result from it; at least you appear to live in such a style that not even a slave would continue with his master under similar conditions. Your food and drink are both of a most wretched kind; and you not only dress badly, but you wear the same garments both in summer and winter, and are constantly without your shoes and your coat. Moreover, you even refuse to accept money, the acquisition of which generally gladdens people, and its possession enables them to live more liberally and pleasantly. If, therefore, like instructors in other professions, who teach their pupils to imitate them, you also pursue a similar plan in regard to your followers, you must perforce look upon yourself as a teacher of misery.” And Socrates replied to these observations thus:—“You appear to me, Antipho, to have conceived the idea that my life is so wretched that I am convinced you would rather die than live as I do. Come, then, let us consider those circumstances which you regard as the hardships of my life. Is it a hardship that while others who receive money are obliged to perform those tasks for which they are paid, I, on the contrary, as I take no fees, am not bound to discourse with any one whom I do not like? Do you find fault with my way of living because my food is less wholesome and nourishing than yours? Or is it that my subsistence is more difficult to be obtained than yours, as being more rare and costly?
Is it, perhaps, because what you provide for yourself is more agreeable to you than what I procure is to me? Are you not aware that he whose food is the sweetest needs the less sauce, and that he whose drink is most pleasant, least longs for other beverages than those which he has? You know that those who change their garments do so on account of the variations of the temperature, and that people wear sandals that they may not be hindered from walking for fear of hurting their feet. But when have you ever heard of my preferring to remain in-doors because of the cold, or fighting with any one for the shade because of the heat, or not walking wherever my inclination led me because I dreaded injuring my feet? Are you ignorant of the fact that those who are by nature the weakest grow stronger by training their bodies in those exercises which they practise than those who neglect to do so, and that they bear the fatigue of such exercises more easily? And do you not think that a person who inures his body to whatever may happen to it does not feel hardships less than you who do not so accustom it? And do you imagine that for him who is not a slave to gluttony, or sleep, or sensuality, anything is a greater incentive to his giving the preference to other pursuits than the fact that he finds other objects more capable of affording him pleasure when he needs it, and also of inspiring him with the hope that they will be of constant benefit to him? Of this, at any rate, you
are aware, that those who despair of ever becoming proficients in anything are never happy; but those who look upon themselves as progressing either in agriculture or seamanship, or any other occupation that they undertake, are rejoiced at their own success. But do you imagine that the gratification derived from such sources is as great as that which arises from the consciousness that you yourself are becoming better, and gaining more estimable friends? And such is the consciousness that I continually experience.

"But if we should be called upon to render active assistance to our friends or the state, which of the two would have most leisure to do so—one who lives as I live, or one whose existence is passed in the way that you so much commend? And which would be the best-off in a campaign, the man who could not live without sumptuous fare, or he who was satisfied with whatever came to hand? Which, again, would hold out longest in a beleagured city, the man who required that which it was very difficult to procure, or he who was content to turn to account such materials as were most easily obtainable? You seem to think, Antipho, that happiness consists in luxury and lavish expenditure, but my opinion is, that like as the gods require nothing, so for a man to be satisfied with as little as possible argues the nearest resemblance to them; and as the divine nature is the most perfect, so the nearest approach to that nature is the closest approach to perfection."
On another occasion Antipho, while conversing with Socrates, said, "Verily, Socrates, I believe you to be a just man, but by no manner of means a wise one. And you yourself appear to me also to regard yourself in this light, for you never ask a fee from those who seek your advice. Yet if you possessed a garment, or a house, or any other commodity which you considered to be worth money, you would not give it away for nothing, or part with it for less than its value. It is evident, therefore, that if you thought the privilege of attending your discourses at all valuable, you would demand for it no less payment than it was worth. You may therefore be a just man, since you do not cheat people for the purpose of increasing your property, but wise you certainly are not, since your wisdom appears to be worth nothing."

To which remarks Socrates answered thus: "It is the general belief with us, Antipho, that beauty and wisdom can alike be disposed of for virtuous or vicious purposes, and we designate as prostitutes those who are willing to barter their beauty for money; but if any one attaches himself to an upright and good person, we consider him as a prudent man. And in like manner we style those who are willing to sell wisdom for money to any one who will purchase it, 'Sophists,' as if they prostituted their wisdom; but whoever makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be morally disposed, by teaching him all the good he can, him we consider to act as becomes a good and worthy member of the community."
And as for me, Antipho, just as some other men delight in a good horse, or dog, or bird, so do I personally rejoice still more in the possession of estimable friends; and if I know of any good thing, I both impart it to them, and recommend it to any others by whom I think they can be assisted in the pursuit of virtue. The treasures, too, bequeathed to us by the wise men of old in the books they have written, I dip into with my friends, and if, in conning them over in the course of our reading, we come across anything that is good, we make a note of it, and think it great gain if by such studies we become more endeared to one another."

And again, when Antipho, on one occasion, asked him how he could make statesmen of others, while he himself never busied himself with state affairs, if, indeed, he even understood them? "By which means then," inquired Socrates, "do I engage in state affairs to the greatest advantage—by busying myself in them alone, or by taking care that as many as possible may be capable of conducting them?"

CHAPTER VII.

Let us consider, moreover, whether by discouraging arrogance in his followers, he did not incite them to the cultivation of virtue.
He always insisted that there was no surer road to distinction than that which led a person to excellence in any capacity in which he aimed at enjoying the reputation of a proficient. And in order to establish the truth of his assertion, he taught as follows:—"Let us reflect what a man must do, who, not being a good flute-player, should nevertheless wish to pass as such. Must he not imitate really good flute-players in the externals of the profession? And in the first place, as the latter are handsomely equipped, and go about attended by a large retinue, so also must the former do. In the next place, as a great many people applaud the latter, so the former must get a great many people to applaud him. Yet must he never undertake to perform; for if he did, he would at once be convicted of being a ridiculous pretender, and not a bad flute-player only, but also a vainglorious braggart. Thus, after having incurred great expense without doing himself any good, and, besides all this, having earned a bad character, how would he avoid passing his life otherwise than in discomfort, unprofitableness, and derision?

"So, again, if any one, not being a skilful general or pilot, should nevertheless wish to appear so, let us consider what would be his disposition. If he desired others to think him capable of performing the duties attaching to such appointments, and yet could not convince them of his fitness for them, would not this be a source of trouble to him? And if he could so convince them,
would he not be still more unfortunately placed? For it is evident that he who is appointed to steer a vessel, or to command an army, without understanding his duties, would not only bring destruction upon those whom he would be very unwilling to destroy, but would himself be dismissed with ignominy and punishment."

In a similar manner he demonstrated the fact that it was useless for a man who was neither wealthy, nor brave, nor strong, to wish to be thought so; for he said that they were required to meet demands which were quite beyond them; and when it was found that they could not comply with such demands as they were deemed capable of complying with, people made no excuses for them whatever.

Him, too, he designated as no mean impostor who, by cozening people into a false estimate of him, robbed them of their money or their goods; but he said that he was the most dangerous deceiver of all who, being possessed of no qualifications that were worth a thought, seduced people into the belief that he was capable of acting as head of the state.

By such discourses as these, then, he appears to me to have endeavoured to dissuade his associates from vain-gloriousness.
E also appeared to me to encourage his disci-
ples in the practice of self-restraint in their
appetites for food, and drink, and sensual
gratification, and sleep, and in the endurance of
cold, and heat, and fatigue, by similar discourses.
And being aware that one of his followers was
intemperate in such matters, "Tell me," he said,
"Aristippus, if you had to take charge of and educa
two young men in such a fashion that one should be
rendered an efficient governor of his fellow-men, while
the other was not even to aim at governing at all, what
method would you pursue with regard to their respec-
tive educations? Shall we commence our investigation
with their food, as from the first rudiments?" And
Aristippus replied—"Food certainly appears to me to be a proper commencement; for no one could exist at all unless he took nourishment." "Is it not probable, then, that they will both feel a desire for eating when meal-time arrives?" "No doubt," answered Aristippus. "And which of the two should we custom to regard prompt attention to business as of greater importance than the gratification of his appetite?" "Of course, by Jove, the one who was to be educated for government, so that the affairs of state should not be neglected during his administration." "Therefore," said Socrates, "when they desired to drink, the same task of being able to resist drinking when he is thirsty is to be imposed on the same youth?" "By all means," answered Aristippus. "And which of the two should we expect to be moderate in sleep, so that he might be able to go to bed late and rise early, and even not to sleep at all if it should be necessary to keep awake?" "To this also," he said, "we should train the same youth." "And which," asked Socrates, "should we bring up to control his sensual appetites, so that by excess in them he might not be hindered in the necessary despatch of business?" "The same again," replied Aristippus. "And which of the two should we require not to shrink from toil, but willingly to undergo it?" "Once more, him whom we were educating to be a ruler." "And what of their being taught such branches of learning as would enable them to get the
better of their adversaries? To which of the two would such knowledge more properly belong?" "Most distinctly to him," said Aristippus, "whom we were educating to be a ruler; for without this kind of knowledge all other acquirements would be useless." "You think, then, that a person who had been thus brought up would be less likely to become a prey to his enemies than other animals are? For of these, forsooth, some are entrapped by their gluttony, and many others, although they are very timid, are enticed by hunger to the bait, and so are captured, while others again are ensnared by thirst." "That is certainly true," said Aristippus. "And are not others taken through their avidity for sexual intercourse, as, for instance, quails and partridges, who at the voice of the hen are excited by the desire and expectation of enjoyment, and losing all sense of danger, fall into the lure?" Aristippus admitted that it was so. "Does it not, then, seem to you disgraceful for a man to yield to the same passions as the most senseless of animals do? As, for example, adulterers enter into forbidden chambers, although they know that the adulterer runs the risk of incurring the penalties of the law, and of being lain in wait for, and insulted if he is caught. And since so much misery and disgrace impends over the adulterer, and there are so many pursuits to divert him from the quest of sensual gratification, yet that he should, in spite of all these considerations, incur such tremendous risks,—does not
this appear to you to be the conduct of a person who is
under the absolute influence of some evil genius?" "It certainly does seem like it to me," said Aristippus.
"And as it is the fact that the most necessary businesses
of life are transacted in the open air, such as warfare,
husbandry, and not the least important of other kinds
of occupations, do you not think that it argues a remark-
able degree of carelessness that most people are entirely
untrained to withstand cold and heat?" Aristippus
again replied in the affirmative. "Does it not, then,
occur to you that we ought to train him who is de-
stined to become a ruler to bear these unflinchingly?"
"Certainly," answered Aristippus. "If, therefore, we
designate those who can control themselves in all
these points as men capable of ruling, should we not
class those who are incapable of so doing among those
who have not the slightest claim to be appointed
rulers?" To this also Aristippus assented. "Well,
then, since you know what should be the classification
of each of these sets of men, have you ever considered
to which of the two classes you would be inclined to
remit yourself?" "I have, indeed," replied Aristippus;
"and I should by no means place myself among those
who are desirous of ruling; for it appears to me to
indicate a great want of sense in a man who finds it a
difficult task to procure the mere necessaries of life for
himself, not to be satisfied with seeking to supply his
own needs, instead of busying himself about providing
his fellow-citizens with such things as they require. And is it not great folly in him who lacks much that he wishes for, to undertake the management of the state, and so to subject himself to penalties if he fails to provide all that the state requires? For the state thinks it right to use its rulers as I use my domestics; and as I consider it the duty of my servants to supply me in abundance with such things as I want, but not to help themselves to them, so, too, bodies politic think it right so to use their rulers that the latter should secure as many benefits as they can for the state, but should not themselves participate in any of them. Those, therefore, who are willing to be constantly engaged in the transaction of business both by themselves and with others, I should esteem, when they have been trained after the manner we have indicated, to be fit to rank among people capable of ruling. Myself I class among those who wish to pass their lives as easily and pleasantly as possible.”

Then Socrates said, “Have you any objection to our also considering this question—viz., Which lead the pleasanter life, the governors or the governed?” “Not the slightest,” rejoined Aristippus. “Well, then, in the first place, of the nations with which we are acquainted, the Persians govern in Asia, while the Syrians and the Phrygians and the Lydians are governed. In Europe, the Scythians govern, and the Mæotians are governed; while in Libya, the Carthaginians are the governors, and
the Libyans the governed. Which of these people do you think lives most pleasantly? Or among the Greeks, the nation to which you belong, who seem to lead the most agreeable lives—those who hold the chief power, or those who are subject to it?"  "But," said Aristippus, "I do not regard myself as being in subjection, although I am not one of the governing classes; for there appears to me to be a middle path between the two, which I endeavour to keep, and which leads to happiness by avoiding supreme power on the one hand, and servitude on the other."  "If indeed," observed Socrates, "this same path of yours, leading neither to supreme authority nor to slavery, kept also clear of all human association, your remarks would be pertinent. But if while you live among men you refuse either to govern or be governed, and object to yield obedience to the ruling powers, I think that you will perceive how that the stronger have the means, by oppressing the weaker both in public and private life, of reducing them to the condition of slaves. Do those escape your observation who, when others have sown and planted, cut down their corn and lop their trees, and who attack their inferiors and those who will not be subservient to them, so ruthlessly on every occasion, that at last they prevail on them to prefer slavery to contending against their superiors? And, again, do you not know that in private life the courageous and the strong, by enslaving the pusillanimous and the weak, reap the fruits of their labours?"  "I do,"
said Aristippus; "but I do not, on that account, and that I may not experience such treatment, intend to shut myself up in one city, but to travel about everywhere." Then Socrates said, "Bravo! This determination of yours is forsooth an excellent one, for now that Sinnis and Sceiron and Procrustes are slain,* no one any longer attacks travellers. And yet those who are the ministers of state still continue to make laws in their several countries on purpose to prevent injury to themselves, and they employ other friends besides those who are termed 'their partisans' to assist them; and they build fortifications round their cities, and procure arms wherewith to repel those that seek to annoy them; and in addition to these various safeguards, they secure allies from without. And yet, notwithstanding all these precautions, they are attacked. Do you, therefore, having no similar protection, and loitering a consider-

* Of the three noted robbers mentioned here, Sinnis, who lived on the Isthmus of Corinth, after he had stripped passing travellers, bound them to the top of a fir-tree, which he fastened to the ground by a chain, and killed them by loosening the chain, and allowing the tree to spring back. Sceiron infested the frontier between Attica and Megaris; and after he had robbed wayfarers, he compelled them to wash his feet, and kicked them over the Sceironian rock into the sea, where they were devoured by a monster that lay at the bottom. Procrustes (the "Stretcher") was a name given to the robber Polypemon, or Damastes, who forced his victims into a bedstead that was either too large or too small for them, and so, by extending or compressing their limbs, he either squeezed or stretched them to death. All these malefactors are fabled to have been destroyed by the mythical hero, Theseus, who is said to have been contemporary with Hercules, and to have flourished circa 1260-1210 B.C.
able time along roads where a great many people are molested, when you happen to arrive at any city, where you are more powerless than any of the inhabitants, and being in such a position, that those who are inclined to do so would sooner attack you,—do you, I say, suppose that the mere fact of your being a stranger would protect you from injury? Or do you rely for your immunity from danger upon the fact that these cities promise a safe pass to every one upon his arrival or departure? or because you think that if you were captured you would be unprofitable to your master, on the ground that no one would willingly retain in his house as a servant a man who would not work, and who liked the most expensive diet? Let us consider, too, how masters treat servants of this sort. Do they not restrain their animal propensities by keeping them without food, and hinder them from pilfering by locking up every place from which they can abstract anything? Do they not hinder them from absconding by fettering them, and correct their laziness by the scourge? And how do you yourself act when you hear that any one of your own domestics has been guilty of any such faults?”

“I punish him,” replied Aristippus, “until I compel him to do his duty as a servant. But tell me, Socrates, in what do those who are brought up to learn the art of ruling, which you seem to me to regard as happiness, differ from those who undergo privations from necessity, since they suffer hunger and thirst, and cold and
want of sleep, and will voluntarily undergo all similar hardships? For my part, I cannot see how it makes any difference to a man, since his skin is the same, whether he is scourged voluntarily or against his will, or, having a body which is in every respect identical, whether his city is besieged with or without his consent, except, indeed, that the charge of folly attaches to him who courts troubles voluntarily." "What then, Aristippus?" said Socrates; "does not the voluntary endurance of such calamities appear to you to differ from the involuntary, inasmuch as he who fasts voluntarily can eat when he pleases, and he who is thirsty can drink, and so on in other matters; but he who is compelled to abstain by necessity from such things cannot put an end to his inconvenience at his own pleasure? Besides, those who undergo hardships voluntarily do so in the expectation of some happy issue, as, for instance, the hunters of wild animals toil in the hope of catching them. It is true that such rewards for labour are of little value, but of those who strive to secure valuable friends, or conquer their enemies, or by invigorating their bodies and minds to govern their own households becomingly, and to become benefactors to their country, and serviceable to their friends, how can you be right in supposing that such do not find it pleasant to labour for these ends, or that they do not live happy in their own self-approval, and as the objects of the respect and emulation of others? Moreover, indolence and indul-
gence in momentary pleasures neither conduce to a healthy state of body, so as to make it active, as the gymnastic trainers define activity, nor do they bring to the mind any knowledge that is worthy to be so called; whereas careful training, combined with patient endurance, makes men capable of following the paths of virtue and rectitude, as good men define them, and as Hesiod somewhere says—

"'Vice abounds everywhere, and lies not hid. 'Tis easy of approach, and dwells at hand; But before Virtue’s shrine the immortal gods Have stationed Toil. The way to it is long, Rugged and steep at first; but gain the top, Then that which was once rough becomes all smooth.'"

"And Epicharmus † bears testimony to the same fact in the following line—

"'The gods dispense all happiness to toil.'"

"And in another place he says—

"'Seek not for ease, poor fool, lest pain be thine.'"

* "Works and Days," lines 287-292.
† A comic Doric poet, born in the island of Cos (now Stanchio), circa 540 B.C. He is said by some authorities to have written fifty-two comedies, by others thirty-five, and the latter is the number of which the titles have been recorded by Athenæus. Only fragments of them have come down to us, which will be found in the "Fragmenta Philosophorum Græcorum," by F. G. A. Mullach, Paris, 1860, 2 vols. 8vo, vol. i. pp. 131-137. Plautus is said by Horace (Epist. II, line 53) to have founded his style on that of Epicharmus.
"Prodicus,* too, the Sophist, in his treatise concerning Hercules (which he ostentatiously produces to most of his disciples), makes the same assertion with regard to virtue, saying, as far as my memory serves me, somewhat as follows:—He tells us that Hercules, when he was advancing from boyhood to manhood (at which period youths, becoming their own masters, indicate whether they will enter life by the paths of virtue or those of vice), retired to a quiet spot, and sat down to make up his mind as to the question which of the two tracks he should follow. That two females of imposing presence seemed to approach him, the one lovely of aspect and lady-like in demeanour, her adornments the natural elegance of her figure, the modesty of her looks, the sobriety of her demeanour, and the purity of her garments. The other pampered to a gross softness, and having her complexion artificially beautified, so that it appeared both whiter and redder than was natural. Her stature, too, appeared heightened and her eyes dilated by art, and she was clad in a robe by means of which her charms were conspicuously displayed; and as she

* Prodicus, the Sophist, was a native of the island of Ceos (now Zea), and flourished probably circa 425 B.C. Like the rest of the Sophists, he delivered lectures to, and held discussions with, any who chose to pay for them, either privately or in classes. The arguments were conducted by means of question and answer in the manner set forth in the text as that adopted by Socrates, and the object was for the master to frame his questions so as to effect a reductio ad absurdum, and to confute his pupils by making the worse side of a question appear the better.—See Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. iv. pp. 257-280.
contemplated herself, she seemed to be constantly watching for the admiration of others, and frequently to be glancing back at her own shadow. As these two approached nearer to Hercules, she whom I have first described appeared to advance at the same pace, but the other, being eager to anticipate her, ran up before her, and said, 'I perceive, Hercules, that you are in doubt which road to pursue upon your entrance into life. Now, if you will make me your friend, I will conduct you along the most agreeable and smoothest paths; there is no pleasure of which you shall not taste, and you shall never experience any kind of annoyance. For, in the first place, you shall not cudgel your brains about war or business, but pass your time in considering what eatables and drinkables you find most agreeable to your palate, what sights and sounds especially delight you, what chiefly pleases your senses of smelling and touching, whose affection gratifies you most, how you may sleep most softly, and how you may obtain all these enjoyments with the least possible trouble. And if at any time the faintest idea of want of the means to procure such pleasures should occur to you, I shall never recommend either bodily toil or mental exertion as being necessary to provide such things, but you shall spend what others have earned, never abstaining from any possible source of money-getting, for I allow my followers to avail themselves of every conceivable plan for benefiting themselves.' Then Her-
cules, when he had heard this speech, said, 'O lady, what is thy name?' and she replied, 'My friends call me Felicity, but my enemies, libelling me, give me the name of Vice.'

"Then the other female advanced, and said, I also have come to you, Hercules, as being acquainted with your parents, and knowing your natural disposition when you were young. Hence I entertain the hope that if you follow the path that leads to my abode, you will become the accomplisher of worthy and illustrious exploits, and that I shall appear more honourable and comely through your noble deeds. I will not, however, cajole you with any specious promises of pleasure, but will truthfully lay before you realities as they are ordained by the will of the gods. Now, the gods grant nothing to mankind without labour and diligence; therefore whether you wish them to be propitious to you, you must worship them; or whether you desire the love of your friends, you must make yourself useful to them; or whether you covet honours at the hands of any state, you must benefit it; or whether you seek to be regarded as an object of admiration throughout the whole of Greece on account of your merits, you must endeavour to be of service to the whole of Greece; or whether you wish the earth to yield you abundant crops, you must cultivate it; or if you intend to make money by cattle-feeding, you must take care of your herds; if you incline to warlike enterprises as a means of advance-
ment and of obtaining freedom for your friends while you confound your enemies, you must both study the arts of war themselves from those who are skilled in them, and must also practise how to employ them advantageously; and if you wish your body to become muscular, you must accustom it to obey your mind, and exercise it with labour and hard training.

"And Vice interrupting her, said (as Prodicus relates), 'Do you see, Hercules, how rugged and long the road is by which this woman would lead you to enjoyment, contrasted with the smooth and short paths along which I shall conduct you to happiness?'

"'Miserable wretch!' exclaimed Virtue; 'and what blessings dost thou possess, or with what substantial pleasures art thou acquainted, seeing that thou art unwilling to exert thyself in any way to obtain them? Thou who dost not even wait for the natural craving for what is agreeable, but fillest thyself with all sorts of mixtures, eating before you are hungry, and drinking before you are athirst, contriving how to keep cooks that you may feed delicately, and buying high-priced wines, and running about seeking for snow in summer. And that you may sleep well, you prepare not only soft beds, but couches and cushions to recline upon; for you desire to sleep not on account of the labour you undergo, but because you have nothing to do. You gratify your passions unseasonably by all sorts of stratagems, and make tools both of men and women; for you train
your friends to be debauchees by night, and sluggards during the most useful part of the day. Although you are immortal, you are rejected of the gods, and despised of good men. You never hear that sweetest of sounds, the praise of yourself, neither have you ever once beheld the honest labour of your own hands. Who would believe your assertions, or who would assist you in your need? Who that had any sense would venture to join the orgies in which you indulge, since those who do so, even when they are young, are impotent in body, and when they grow older, become imbecile in mind? Being brought up in idleness and effeminacy in their youth, they pass their old age in squalid misery, ashamed, on the one hand, of their past deeds, and, on the other, weighed down with what remains for them to complete; so that having exhausted all their means of enjoyment in early life, they lay up for themselves misery for their declining days. But I am the companion of the gods and of good men, and no illustrious action, divine or human, is accomplished without me. I am most honoured, too, both among gods and men, by those whom it most concerns to cultivate me. I am regarded with affection by artisans as a help-mate; by householders as a faithful guardian; as a well-disposed champion by servants; as an active sharer in the employments of peace; a firm ally in the operations of war; and a most excellent partner in friendship.

"Moreover, those who cherish me enjoy both their
meat and their drink thoroughly, without attaching undue importance to such matters, for they do not partake of either till they feel the need of them. Moreover, they rest better than the indolent, and are neither vexed at the want of sleep, nor neglect their duties from over-indulgence in it. The young delight in the praises of their elders, while the old are pleased at being reverenced by the young. They look back upon their past deeds with satisfaction, and are rejoiced when they succeed by honest means in their present undertakings. Through my inspiration they are beloved by the gods, dear to their friends, and venerated by their country; and when the destined end of life overtakes them, they do not lay them down in oblivion and dishonour, but they flourish in men's memories, being celebrated in song for evermore. By pressing onwards in such a course as this, O Hercules, thou son of excellent parents, thou too canst secure to thyself the most lasting happiness.'

"Somewhat after the above fashion, too, Prodicus would relate how that Hercules was educated by Virtue; but he clothed his narrative in much more ornate language than that which I now employ. It becomes you, therefore, Aristippus, to ponder over this allegory, and to endeavour to take heed as to what conduct you pursue during the remainder of your life."
CHAPTER II.

Having heard one day that his eldest son, Lamprocles, had been angry with his mother, he said, "Tell me, my son, whether you know that there are certain people who are termed ungrateful?" "I know it well," answered the youth. "And do you understand what it is they do to acquire such a name?" "I do," replied Lamprocles; "for men call those ungrateful who, when they have received a kindness, do not return it, albeit they have the means of doing so." "They appear to you, then, to class the ungrateful with the unjust?" "They do," said the son. "And have you ever, now, really considered whether, as it is thought an unjust proceeding towards our friends to make slaves of them, but a just one to do so to our enemies, so it is unjust to act ungratefully towards our friends, but just to act in the same manner towards our enemies?" "By all means," replied Lamprocles; "and any man who has received a kindness, whether from friend or foe, and does not seek to return it, is, in my opinion, unjust." "If, then, this really is so, ingratitude would be manifest injustice?" The youth assented. "The greater benefits, then, that a man receives without returning them, the more unjust he would be?" To this also Lamprocles agreed. "Whom, then," returned Socrates, "can we find who receive
greater benefits from others than children do from their parents—the former owing their very existence to the latter, as they also do the opportunity of witnessing so many lovely objects of sight, and partaking of as many blessings as the gods vouchsafe to men; blessings which appear indeed to us so invaluable that we shrink, more than we do from anything else, from relinquishing them; and therefore bodies politic have made death the penalty for the gravest crimes, on the ground that they could not suppress injustice through fear of anything more terrible?

"And you surely do not suppose that men beget children merely for the sake of carnal gratification, since the streets and brothels afford plenty of opportunity for indulging in this? But we evidently consider what kind of women are likely to bring us the finest progeny, and uniting ourselves with them, we procreate children. The man, on the one hand, supports the mother of his family, and provides as abundantly as he can for their offspring everything that he thinks will conduce to their well-being in life. The woman, on her part, conceives the child, and undergoes all the pains and perils of parturition in agony and hazard of her life, imparting the nutriment by which she is herself supported; and having borne the burthen the full time, and brought it forth with many throes, she nourishes and cherishes it, although she has received no previous benefit from it, nor does the infant know who
it is that treats it so lovingly, and is incapable of signifi-
ying its own wants; but she, judging what will be best for it, and what will please it most, tries to gratify it, and feeds it for a long time, and patiently toils for it day and night, not knowing what return she will receive for all her care. Nor do parents consider it sufficient to provide bodily sustenance only, but when they deem their children fit to learn, they also teach them those lessons which they themselves esteem useful in life; and whatever they think that any one can teach better than themselves, they send their sons to him at their own expense, and adopt all the means in their power to render them as perfect as possible."

To these remarks the youth replied thus:—"But granted that my mother has done all this, and even much more than this, who can put up with her fierce temper?"

"And which," asked Socrates, "do you think is most difficult to bear—the fierceness of a wild beast, or that of a mother?" "That of a mother," answered Lamprocles; "at least, of such a mother as mine is." "Has she, then, either by biting or kicking you, ever inflicted upon you such injuries as many have sustained from wild beasts?"

"No, by Jupiter," rejoined the son; "but she says things which no one, for all the world, would be willing to listen to." "And do you," said Socrates, "forget how much vexation you have caused her by the peevish-
ness both of your words and deeds ever since the days of your childhood, and how you have kept her em-
ployed both by day and night, and what anxieties she suffered when you were ill?" "But I have never once said or done anything to cause her shame." "What, then?" rejoined Socrates; "do you consider it harder to listen to what she says, than it is for actors to bear the dreadful abuse which one heaps upon another in tragedies?" "But, I suppose," said Lamprocles, "that actors think little of such abuse, because they reflect that in the dialogue neither the speaker who utters reproaches gives vent to them with any evil intent, nor does he who threatens do so with any view of inflicting injury." "And being well aware, as you are, that your mother, whatever she says to you, says it not only without any mischievous design, but as being more anxious for your welfare than she is for that of any one else, are you offended with her? Or do you imagine that your mother harbours evil thoughts against you?" "No; in truth," answered the youth, "I do not entertain such a notion." Then Socrates said, "But do you not assert that she, who is so kind to you, and who takes the greatest possible care of you when you are ill, so that your health may be re-established, and that you may want for nothing that is needful for you, and who, moreover, invokes all the blessings of Heaven upon your head, and offers up her prayers for you, is a harsh parent? My opinion, indeed, is, that if you cannot endure such a mother as this, you cannot endure anything that is good. But tell me," he continued,
"whether it is your opinion that you ought not to show attention to anybody, or are you prepared to try and please nobody, and neither to follow nor obey a military commander or any other ruler?" "No, by Jupiter," answered Lamprocles, "such are not my sentiments."

"Would you be willing, then, to make yourself agreeable to your neighbour, so that he might kindle a fire for you, if you wanted one, or help you to benefit yourself; or, if you happened to meet with misfortune, to render you prompt and hearty assistance?" "I am willing," answered the son. "Again, if you fell in with a fellow-traveller or fellow-voyager, or any other companion, would it make no difference whether he should become your friend or your enemy, and do you think that the good-will of such persons is worth cultivating?" "I do think so," said he. "Are you, then, ready to pay attention to such as these, while you reconcile it to yourself to show no respect to your mother, who loves you more than any one else? Do you not know, too, that the state neither takes cognisance of, nor legalises a suit for any species of ingratitude, but overlooks the non-return of favours received; whereas if any one neglects to pay due attention to his parents, it imposes a penalty on him, and degrades him by incapacitating him from acting as chief magistrate, on the ground that the holy sacrifices which are offered up on behalf of the state would not be held sacred if he were to officiate, nor any other function performed by him be in accordance with
the laws of honour and justice? And, verily, if any one neglects to keep up the tomb of his deceased parents, this, too, the state inquires into in its scrutiny into the qualifications of candidates for the magistracy. You, therefore, my son, if you are wise, will beseech the gods to pardon you if you have in any way neglected your mother, lest they, on their part, should be unwilling to show any favour to you because of your ingratitude. You will also have respect to the opinion of men, lest, if they see that you despise your parents, they should all disregard you, and you should thus be openly deserted by your friends; for if people surmise that you are ungrateful to your parents, no one will give you credit for returning any kindness that he himself may show you."

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**CHAPTER III.**

And on one occasion, having heard that the brothers Chærephon and Chæreocrates, both of whom were acquaintances of his, had quarrelled, he said to the latter, when he saw him, "Tell, me, Chæreocrates, you surely are not one of those who esteem riches more highly than you do brothers? And this, too, as knowing that wealth is senseless, but a brother endowed with sense, and while the former requires protection, the
latter is able to afford it; and, moreover, that there is an abundance of the one, but the other exists individually only. It is also a marvellous circumstance that a man should regard brothers as encumbrances to him because he does not possess their fortunes, while he does not regard his fellow-citizens in the same light, because he possesses not their fortunes. In the latter case, however, he may perhaps argue that it is better for him to live in safety on a mere competency among others, than to live by himself exposed to danger, albeit he shared the possession of all the property of his fellow-citizens; whereas, in the case of brothers, men ignore such considerations. Those, too, who are in a position to do so, engage servants that they may have people to help them in their work, and provide friends, as knowing that they are in need of allies; but they neglect brothers as though they could make friends of their fellow-citizens, but not of their brothers. And yet it conduces greatly to friendship to have been born of the same parents, and to have been brought up together, since even among beasts a certain affection is engendered among those who have been reared together. And, moreover, men pay more respect to those who have brothers than to those who have none, and are less apt to impose upon them."

And Chœreocrates said, "But if the difference between us were a slight one, it would perhaps be my duty to bear with my brother, and not to avoid him on trilling
grounds, for, as you observe, a brother is a blessing if he behaves as a brother should do. But since my brother is in no respect what he ought to be, but in every point just the reverse, why should a man attempt impossibilities?" And Socrates answered, "But, Chærecrates, is Chærephon unable to please anybody, as he is unable to please you, or are there any whom he really can please?" "That is the very reason, Socrates, why I think that he deserves my hatred, for whereas he is able to please others, to me, whenever he is present, he is upon all occasions a nuisance rather than an assistance, both by his deeds and words." "So then," rejoined Socrates, "as a horse is a nuisance to a person who cannot manage him when he tries to do so, in like manner a brother is a nuisance to him who tries to manage him, but cannot succeed in doing so." "But," asked Chærecrates, "why should I be ignorant of the proper way to manage a brother, when I know how to speak well of him who speaks well of me, and to act kindly to him who acts kindly by me? To one, however, who endeavours to injure me both by word and deed, I can neither speak nor act kindly, nor shall I ever seek to do so." Then Socrates answered, "These are curious arguments, Chærecrates, for suppose you had a dog that was a good sheep-dog, and was fond of your shepherds, but growled when you came near him, you surely would not display anger towards him, but would endeavour to soothe him by kindness; whereas, in the
case of your brother, although you profess that he would be a great blessing to you if he conducted himself as he ought to do, and admit that you know how to act and speak well of a person, you do not attempt to contrive a method to induce him to behave in the best possible manner to you.” “I fear, Socrates,” remarked Chæreocrates, “that I do not possess the art of making Chærephon behave as he ought towards me.” “And yet,” said Socrates, “you need not, as it appears to me, devise any deep or novel plot against him, for I think that by appliances which are well known to yourself you can bring him to regard you very highly.” “You must first tell me,” said Chæreocrates, “whether you think that I am acquainted with any love-charm which, although I am in possession of it, has nevertheless escaped my own observation?” “Tell me now,” said Socrates, “suppose you wished to prevail upon one of your acquaintances to invite you to sup with him when he was about to offer a sacrifice, what would you do?” “I should begin,” said Chæreocrates, “by first inviting him when I offered my sacrifice.” “And if you wished to get one of your friends to look after your property while you were away from home, what would you do?” “I should, of course, undertake to look after his property while he was away.” “And if you desired to be hospitably entertained by a foreigner when you visited his country, what would you do?” “I should most assuredly be the first to entertain him when he visited
Athens; for if I sought to secure his aid in carrying out for me the objects for which I visited his country, it would certainly behove me to do the same for him in mine." "Then, have you been for a long time unwittingly acquainted with all the love-charms that are efficacious among mankind? or are you afraid to initiate an interchange of good offices with your brother lest you should appear to degrade yourself by so doing? And yet that man is deemed especially praiseworthy who is foremost to damage his enemies and benefit his friends. Hence, then, if Chærephon had appeared to me more naturally adapted than you to take the initiative in such a course, I should have essayed to have persuaded him to have been the first to try and make you his friend; but, as it is, you seem to me to be the most likely, by making advances to him, to bring about a reconciliation." And Chæreocrates said, "You speak unreasonably, Socrates, and not at all like yourself, when you recommend me, who am the younger, to make the first advances, since the contrary is certainly the universally established practice among all men, viz., that the elder should take the lead in everything, both in deed and in word." "How so?" asked Socrates. "Is it not the universally established practice that the younger should yield the path to the elder when they meet in the road; that he should rise up for the other to sit down; that he should honour him with the softest couch, and that he should give place to him in conver-
sation? But however that may be, do not you, my good friend, hesitate about endeavouring to conciliate this man, and he will very soon listen to you. Can you not perceive how covetous of honour and how liberal-minded he is? Badly-disposed and mean people you cannot affect otherwise than by making them presents, but honourable and good men you can best influence by meeting them in a friendly spirit.” And Chæræocrates said, “But suppose I followed your advice, and he should behave no better?” “Why, then, what do you risk,” asked Socrates, “except that you prove your own goodness and brotherly love, and his depravity and unworthiness of affectionate treatment? But I do not think that anything of this kind will happen; for I imagine that he, when he finds you challenging him to such a contest, will be very willing to enter the lists with you, in order that he may gain the victory over you in kindness both of words and deeds. You are now, however, both of you, in the same condition as if the two hands which Providence has created to assist each other should omit to perform this office, and be employed in hindering each other; or as if the two feet, which were formed by the divine ordinance to co-operate with one another, were to neglect to do so, and become a mutual obstruction one to the other. Would it not be great folly and madness to use to our injury those objects that were created for our good? And yet, as it seems to me, the Deity has designed brothers to be of greater help one to another
than hands or feet or eyes, or the other members which nature has given to men in pairs. For hands, even if it were necessary for them to act in concert with regard to things more than a cubit asunder, could not do so, neither could feet travel together simultaneously to places at a cubit's length apart; nor eyes, which seem to be able to discern objects at an immense distance, see things that are ever so close to them both in front and behind them at the same moment. But brothers, if united, can, even when they are widely separated in space, both act in concert, and mutually assist one another."

CHAPTER IV.

And I once heard him utter sentiments upon the subject of friends, which seemed to me capable of being of the greatest advantage both in the acquisition and use of them; for he said that although he heard many people declare that there was no possession so valuable as a wise and good friend, yet he observed that the generality of mankind were devoted to every pursuit rather than to that of gaining friends. He remarked that he noticed their excessive zeal in the acquisition of houses, and lands, and slaves, and cattle, and goods, and their anxiety to retain their own pro-
property; but as for a friend, whom they profess to be the greatest of all blessings, he declared that most people, so far as he could perceive, neither took the least pains to acquire one, nor studied how to retain those that they had already gained. Again, when friends and servants were ill, he said that he noticed how some people would both call in doctors for the latter, and use all possible exertions for their recovery, while to the former they paid no regard whatever. And if both died, they grieved for their servants, and considered that they had suffered a loss, but that they thought nothing of being bereaved of their friends. Also, of their other possessions, that there was nothing which they left without their own personal care and supervision, but that when their friends required attention, they utterly neglected them.

In addition to these remarks, he said that most people knew the number of their other goods and chattels, however large it might be; but with regard to their friends, although they had but a few of them, they were not only ignorant of how many they were, but even when they attempted to enumerate them to those who asked them to do so, they omitted some whom they had previously reckoned, so little did they value their friends. Yet to which of their other possessions was not a good friend, upon comparison, preferable? What kind of horse or team of cattle was so useful as a good friend? What servant was so kindly
disposed, or so steadfast? What other acquisition so absolutely advantageous? For a true friend holds himself in readiness to supply all his friend's wants, both of a private and public character; and if the latter desires to render a service to any one, he furthers his wishes in this respect. And if any cause for alarm disturbs him, his friend comes to his aid, sometimes by sharing his expenses, sometimes by co-operating with him; taking counsel with him in some cases, and in others compelling him to use force; greatly rejoicing at his success, and zealously supporting him when he falls into misfortune. There is no one thing which a man's hands execute for him, or his eyes behold, or his ears hear, or his feet perform, that a serviceable friend fails to accomplish; and frequently a friend does those things for a friend which the latter has not himself done, or perceived, or heard, or acted upon. And yet while some people carefully foster trees on account of their fruit, most men are indolently and stupidly neglectful of their friends.

CHAPTER V.

Once, too, I heard another of his discourses, which seemed to me to exhort the hearer to examine himself, so as to ascertain of what value he was to his friends;
for, seeing one of his disciples neglecting a friend who was sore pressed by poverty, he asked Antisthenes, when the man who had so misbehaved himself and many others were present, "Tell me, Antisthenes, are friends to be had for certain prices, as slaves are? For of slaves one perhaps is worth two minæ,* another not even half a mina, another five minæ, another as much as ten. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is said to have given a talent for an overseer for his silver mines. And I am considering," he continued, "whether, as there are certain ascertained values for slaves, so the same holds good with regard to friends." "Without doubt, it does," said Antisthenes; "at least, I, for my part, should rate one man as a friend at a much higher price than two minæ, while another I should hold dear at even half a mina; another I should prefer to ten minæ, and another I would purchase as my friend at the cost of all my possessions and resources." "Such being the case, then," said Socrates, "it would be well for every man to examine himself as to how he is estimated by his friends, and to endeavour to be as highly prized by them as possible, so that they may be the less likely to desert him. For," he continued, "I often hear one man say that his friend has given him up, and another, that such an one whom he believed to be a friend has preferred a mina to him. On all these grounds I am considering whether, as when one sells a bad slave, and

* An Attic mina was worth £4, 1s. 3d.; a talent about £215.
parts with him for anything that he will fetch, so also in the case of a worthless friend, it is advisable to give him up when one can get more for him than his value. But I never see good slaves sold, or good friends given up."

CHAPTER VI.

And he appeared to me to inculcate caution in the choice of friends by such conversations as the following:—“Tell me, Critobulus,” said he, “if we needed a good friend, on what grounds should we try to select one? Should we not seek for one who could resist gluttony, hard drinking, sensuality, sloth, and idleness; for he who succumbs to these would not be capable of doing his duty either to himself or to his friend?” “Of course he would not,” replied Critobulus. “Does it not, then, appear to you that we should avoid one who is dominated by such propensities?” “Certainly,” said the other. “Again,” asked Socrates, “any man who through his extravagance is no longer independent, but is always seeking assistance from his neighbours, who, when he borrows, cannot repay, and if he cannot borrow, hates him who will not lend, does not such an one appear to you a dangerous friend?” “Very much so,” replied Critobulus. “Should we, then, not avoid
him?" "Assuredly we should," said Critobulus. "And what of him who, having the means of making money, and desiring to be very rich, on this account becomes churlish, and delights in receiving but grudges paying?" "Such a character," said Critobulus, "appears to me more detestable than the former." "What, then, of him who, from his love of accumulating wealth, leaves himself leisure for nothing else but the pursuit of it?" "He, too, according to my opinion, is to be avoided, since he would be of no use to any one who required his services." "And what do you think of him who is of a quarrelsome disposition, and is inclined to set people at variance with their friends?" "Such an one as this, too, is by all means to be shunned." "Suppose a man, however, to have none of these failings, but to be very willing to receive favours, while he is utterly heedless of ever returning them?" "Neither would such a friend as this be of any service. But what sort of a person, Socrates, should we try to make our friend?" "Truly, I think one who, contrariwise to all this, is both self-continent with regard to his bodily pleasures, generally conscientious and fair-dealing, and anxious not to be outdone in benefiting those who have benefited him, so as to be of use to those who are his intimates." "But tell me, Socrates, how can we form a judgment on such points before we contract an intimacy with a man?" "When we pass a judgment with respect to sculptors," replied Socrates, "we do not
ground that judgment upon their words; but when we see that any particular one has executed his previous statues creditably, we conclude that he will be able to turn out his other works in a similar style.” “You say, then,” asked Critobulus, “that a man who has been known to have behaved kindly to his former friends, is likely to do so towards those whom he has acquired subsequently?” “Precisely so,” remarked Socrates; “just as I expect that one whom I have previously seen managing horses well will be equally able to manage other horses.” “Be it so,” said Critobulus. “But when any one appears to us to be worthy of our friendship, what means should we adopt to secure him as a friend?” “In the first instance,” replied Socrates, “it is necessary to inquire of the gods as to whether they would counsel us to make him our friend.” “Can you tell me, then,” asked Critobulus, “how such an one as appears fit for our friendship, and of whom the gods do not disapprove, is to be secured?” “By Jupiter,” returned Socrates, “he is not to be captured by swiftness of foot, as a hare is, or by the snare, like birds, or by force, like our foes; for it is a difficult task to secure a friend against his will, and it is hard, when you have got him, to keep him bound like a slave, inasmuch as those who are treated in this manner are more apt to become our enemies than our friends.” “How do they become our friends, then?” Critobulus asked. “It is said that there are certain incantations,
by the singing of which to whomsoever they please, such as understand them can secure their hearers as their friends; and that there are charms, which those who are skilled in their use, by administering to any whom they choose, become beloved by them." "And whence can we obtain a knowledge of such devices?" "Have you not heard from Homer the Siren's song to Ulysses, which commences somehow thus?—

"'Come hither, O thou prince renowned, great glory of the Greeks! '"

"Did the Sirens, then, Socrates, sing this same strain to other men, and detain them also, so that they could not tear themselves away from those who sung it?" "No; but they sung thus to those who loved to be honoured on account of their excellence." "You mean something of this kind—that we ought to apply such incantations to each individual as to lead him to think, when he hears them, that the man who is praising him is not doing so to ridicule him; for in that case he would be rather inimically disposed, and would repel us from him; as, for example, if one were to admire for his beauty and stature and strength a man who was aware that he was undersized and ugly and weak. But," continued Critobulus, "are you acquainted with any other charms?" "I am not," replied Socrates; "but I have heard that Pericles knew several, by chant-

* Odyssey, Book xii. line 184.
ing which to the state he made it love him.” “And how did Themistocles gain the affections of the state?” “Not, by Jupiter, by singing incantations to it, but by attaching to it, as it were, an amulet—some sort of benefit.” “You appear to me, Socrates, to mean, that if we would become possessed of a worthy friend, we should ourselves show our own worthiness both in speech and action?” “Do you, then,” asked Socrates, “think it possible for a bad man to procure good friends?” “At any rate,” replied Critobulus, “I have seen bad rhetoricians friendly with good orators, and incompetent generals on terms of intimacy with men eminently fitted for command.” “But with regard to those points which we were discussing, do you know any who, being themselves useless, are nevertheless able to make useful persons their friends?” “No, by Jupiter,” returned Critobulus; “but if it is impossible for a depraved man to gain for himself good and honest friends, what I am now concerned to know is, whether it is possible for one who is himself honest and good to become, without any difficulty, friendly with men of the same character?” “What perplexes you, Critobulus, is the fact that you often see honourable men, and such as refrain from any base conduct, acting as enemies rather than as friends to one another, and treating each other more harshly than those who are altogether worthless.” “And not only private individuals,” continued Critobulus, “but even states act in
this manner; for, although they carefully cultivate goodness and discourage vice, they are, nevertheless, often hostilely disposed towards one another. When I consider all these circumstances, I quite lose heart about the acquisition of friends. Bad people, I know, cannot live on good terms together, for how can the ungrateful, or the heedless, or the avaricious, or the faithless, or the incontinent, become friends? Indeed, it appears to me that the wicked are naturally enemies rather than friends to each other. But, again, as you remark, the wicked never harmonise with the good in a manner likely to establish mutual friendship. For how can those who commit bad actions be friends with those who abhor them? And if, moreover, those who lead a virtuous life are nevertheless at enmity about pre-eminence in the state, and hate each other through envy, who can be friends, or among what class of men can good-will and faithfulness exist?" "There are," replied Socrates, "certain distinct feelings which enter into such matters. Hence men are by nature partly disposed to friendliness one with another, as they require one another's aid, and sympathise with each other, and by co-operating together are of mutual assistance; and perceiving that such is the case, they entertain kindly feelings towards one another. On the other hand, they are to a certain extent inimically disposed, for where they regard the same objects as desirable and pleasant, they fight for
them, and become opposed to each other through their feelings being at variance. Contention and anger tend to open warfare, the love of self-aggrandisement produces ill-will, and envy engenders hatred. But, nevertheless, friendship, penetrating through all these obstacles, unites together the honourable and the good. Their virtue leads them to prefer a moderate competency without strife to the possession of unlimited resources acquired by contention. When hungry and thirsty, they can share their meat and drink ungrudgingly, and although they may take pleasure in sensual gratification, they can restrain themselves so as not to annoy people whom they ought not to annoy.

"Moreover, they are able, by refraining from covetousness, not only to divide their property in an equitable spirit, but to assist one another, and to settle their disputes not merely amicably, but in such a way as to produce mutual benefit. They can restrain their anger from going so far as to cause them repentance, and envy they utterly annihilate by giving up their goods to their friends to use as their own, and regarding their friends' property as theirs.

"Why is it improbable, then, that the honourable and good should accept political honours as a means not only of not injuring each other, but even of advancing one another's interests? Those, indeed, who covet distinction and influence in the state for the purposes of embezzlement, oppression, and luxurious living, would
be unprincipled, vicious, and unable to adapt themselves to any one else. But if a man desires to obtain pre-eminence in the state in order that he may both preserve himself from suffering wrong, and may be able to assist his friends in obtaining their rights, and during his terms of office endeavours to confer some boon upon his country, why would such an one be unable to adapt himself to one whose views were similar to his own? Will he be less capable of serving his friends by his association with the upright and the just, or less able to benefit his country by having the honourable and good as his colleagues?

"Now, it is evident that if, at the athletic games, it were allowable for the strongest competitors to band themselves together and enter the lists against the weakest, the former would be the victors in all the events, and carry off all the prizes. In these contests, therefore, such an arrangement is not permitted, but in political life, in which the honourable and good form the strongest party, there is no rule against any one's benefiting the state in conjunction with whomsoever he pleases. How then is it not a matter of profit that he should have the chief management of the state whose friends are of the best character, and who would have their aid and support, rather than their opposition, in his undertakings? Moreover, it is manifest that if any man commences hostilities against another he will require coadjutors, and plenty of them too, if he is to take
the field against the honourable and good; and those who are willing to serve as his allies must be well treated, so that they may be zealous in his cause. It is, therefore, much more to his advantage to behave well to the good, who are fewer in number, than to the bad, who are more numerous; since the wicked expect many more favours than the good. But cheer up, Critobulus, and endeavour,” he said, “to become good yourself, and when you have made yourself so, seek to secure honourable and virtuous men as your friends. And I may perhaps be myself able to assist you in your search after such, on account of the affection I entertain for you; for whenever I conceive a liking for people, I strive anxiously, and with all my power, as I love them, so to be loved again by them in return. I desire that as I regret their absence, so they should regret mine, and that as I miss their company, they also should long for mine. I perceive, too, that your views are of a similar nature, when you seek to form friendships. Do not, therefore, conceal from me who those are with whom you wish to contract an intimacy; for I think that owing to my being always very careful to please those who please me, I am not altogether unskilled in securing men.”

And Critobulus said, “I have long been anxious, Socrates, to avail myself of such instructions as you have given, especially if the knowledge of them will supply me with the means of influencing both those
who possess virtuous minds, and those who have handsome persons.” “But, Critobulus, there is nothing in my system which will induce those who are handsome to suffer any one to lay hands upon them; for I am convinced that men fled away from Scylla* because she offered to place her hands upon them, while every one, as the legend goes, lingered and listened with delight to the Sirens, because they never attempted to touch any one, but sang to people from a distance.” And Critobulus said, “Granting that I refrain from using my hands, teach me any good plan that you may be acquainted with for securing friends.” “But you will never apply your lips,” asked Socrates, “to their lips?” “Depend upon it, Socrates,” replied Critobulus, “that I will never suffer my lips to approach those of any other person, except they be beautiful.” “But, Critobulus,” remarked Socrates, “you have just uttered a sentiment which militates exactly against what is most to your advantage; for those who are beautiful will not permit such liberties, whereas the ugly submit to them even with pleasure, thinking that they are considered

* An allusion to ships being hurled against the rocks Scylla and Charybdis, which lay between Italy and Sicily. Scylla, according to Ovid, was a beautiful maiden, who was a companion of the sea-nymphs. The marine god Glaucus fell in love with her, and applied to Circe for some charms to make Scylla return his love; but Circe, being jealous of her, threw some magic herbs into the fountain in which she used to bathe, and metamorphosed her into a monster, having the upper part of her body like that of a woman, while the lower was that of a fish or serpent surrounded by dogs.
attractive on account of some mental endowment.” And Critobulus said, “Regarding me, then, in the light of one who is inclined to be fond of those who are beautiful, and very fond of those who are good, teach me with confidence the arts necessary to secure friends.” And Socrates asked, “When, then, Critobulus, you feel disposed to become friendly with any one, will you permit me to speak of you to him, and say that you admire him, and wish to become his friend?” “You may say so,” replied Critobulus; “for I never knew any one dislike those who speak well of him.” “But if I add to this, that, because you admire him, you also feel kindly towards him, you will not think that you are being misrepresented by me?” “By no means,” rejoined Critobulus; “for a kindly feeling is also engendered in my own breast towards those who I think are kindly disposed towards me.” “I may then say thus much concerning you,” continued Socrates, “to those whom you wish to make your friends; and if, moreover, you empower me to assert concerning you that you are attentive to your friends, and delight in nothing so much as in having good friends, and that you take no less pleasure in your friends’ good actions than you do in your own; that you rejoice at the prosperity of your friends no less than you do at your own; that you are never weary of labouring to promote the welfare of your friends, and that you esteem it a virtue in a man to surpass his friends in doing them
good, and his enemies in doing them harm,—I think I shall be an effective coadjutor to you in your search after worthy friends.” “But why,” inquired Critobulus, “do you speak to me thus, as if you were not at liberty to say of me whatever you please?” “No, by Jupiter,” exclaimed Socrates, “I am not at liberty to do so, as I once heard Aspasia* say; for she declared that skilful match-makers, in their reports of people’s characters, had great influence in promoting marriages, if the good points that they enumerated were true; but that such as praised people falsely did no good, since those who had been deceived equally hated both each other and the match-maker. And I, being convinced that her sentiments were correct, am of opinion that I ought not to say anything in your praise without I can assert it truthfully.” “You are then,” exclaimed Critobulus, “a friend of this sort to me, Socrates, that if I myself possess the qualifications necessary to the acquiring of friends, you would assist me in securing them, but if not, you would not indulge in any fiction to serve me?” “And whether, Critobulus,” rejoined Socrates, “do you

* A Milesian lady, celebrated for her beauty and intellectual attainments. She came to settle at Athens, and there captivated the great Athenian statesman, Pericles, who had quarrelled with his wife, and went to reside with her. Her house was the resort of all the literary, political, and artistic celebrities of the day; and she is said by some writers to have been the instructress of Socrates, although this statement seems to have been made on insufficient grounds.—See Smith’s “Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology,” sub vv. “Aspasia” and “Pericles;” and Thirlwall’s “History of Greece,” vol. iii. p. 87.
think I should be serving you most by praising you undeservedly, or by persuading you to endeavour to become a good man? But if this point is not clear to you, examine it by the light of the following arguments. Suppose, now, that being desirous of making you friendly with the master of a vessel, I should falsely praise you by recommending you as an excellent pilot, and he, relying on my recommendation, should commit the steering of his ship to you, who knew nothing whatever about it, do you at all expect that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship? Or if, by means of false representations, I should induce the state to intrust itself to you in a public capacity, as to a man fitted to discharge important military, judicial, and political functions, what do you think would happen both to yourself and to the state under your guidance? Or if, as a private individual, I should, by false statements, persuade any of the citizens to intrust his property to you as to a skilful and attentive manager, would you not, when your capabilities came to be tested, be evidently found not only to have inflicted loss upon your employer, but to have made yourself thoroughly ridiculous? But the shortest and the safest and the best way, Crito- bulus, is, in whatever point you wish to excel, to strive to acquire true proficiency in it, for all such things as are called 'excellencies' among mankind you will find upon consideration to be in every case capable of being increased by education and practice. I think, there-
fore, that we should pursue such a course in the selection of our friends; but if you know any other method impart it to me.” “Rather, Socrates,” said Critobulus, “I should blush to gainsay such opinions; for in doing so I should assert that which was neither honourable nor true.”

CHAPTER VII.

And again, with regard to the difficulties of his friends, such of them as arose from ignorance he endeavoured to alleviate by his counsel, and those which sprung from poverty, by instructing them to assist one another according to their ability. And in illustration of this, I will relate some anecdotes which I know concerning him.

Upon one occasion, observing Aristarchus looking gloomily—"You seem," he said, "Aristarchus, to be labouring under some burthen, and you ought to impart the cause of your heaviness to your friends, for mayhap we may be able to relieve you of some part of the load." To this Aristarchus answered—"I am indeed, Socrates, in a great strait, for since the revolution* has broken

* This event occurred just before the battle at Munychia, and the deposition of the Thirty Tyrants, B.C. 403.—See Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. iv. pp. 200-203.
out in the city, and many have fled to the Peiræus, those of my sisters and nieces and female cousins who have been left behind have come to take shelter with me, in such numbers that there are now fourteen free-born persons in my house; and we receive nothing from our land, for the enemy holds it; nor from our houses, on account of the scarcity of population that now exists in the city; and no one will buy our furniture, nor is it possible to borrow money anywhere, but it seems to me easier to pick it up in the streets than to obtain a loan of it. Now, it is a sad thing for me to leave my own relations to perish, but it is quite impossible for me to support so many people under such circumstances.” Then Socrates, having heard these words, said, “But how is it that citizen Ceramon, who maintains a great many people, is not only able to provide what is necessary both for himself and them, but adds so much more to his store as even to be rich; while you, on the contrary, having also to support a considerable number, are in fear lest you should all perish for want of even the mere necessaries of life?” “Because, by Jupiter,” answered Aristarchus, “those who depend upon him for support are slaves, but those who depend upon me are free-born.” “And which do you regard in the best light, the free-born persons who are with you, or the slaves who are with Ceramon?” “The free-born who are with me,” replied Aristarchus. “Is it not then,” asked Socrates, “a shameful thing that he, who
is surrounded by an inferior class, should have an abundance, while you, who have about you those who belong to a much higher grade, are in want?" "Certainly not," exclaimed Aristarchus, "since his household consists of artisans, mine of persons of a liberal education." "Those, then, are artisans who know how to manufacture any useful article?" "Assuredly," replied the other. "Is barley-meal, then, a useful article?" "Exceedingly useful." "And bread?" "Not less so." "What, too, of men's and women's clothes, such as coats and cloaks and mantles?" "These, again, are all extremely useful." "Do those, then, who are in your house," asked Socrates, "understand nothing about the manufacture of such articles?" "I imagine that they understand the making of all of them." "Do you not know, then, that from the manufacture of one of them, viz., barley-meal, Nausicydes supports not only himself and his household, but a great number of pigs and oxen also, and gains so much more besides that he is often able to subsidise the government? Cyrebus, too, maintains his whole family by the manufacture of bread, and lives in luxury. Demeas of Collyteus subsists upon cloak, and Menon upon tunic making, while most of the Megareans support themselves by the making of mantles." "No doubt they do," replied Aristarchus, "for they all purchase foreign slaves, whom they keep for the express purpose of compelling them to perform such tasks as they
think fit, whereas I am surrounded by free-born persons and relatives." "Because, then, they are free-born persons and your relatives, you think that they ought to do nothing else but eat and sleep? And do you find that other free persons, who spend their existence thus indolently, live better? Or do you think that they are happier than those do who understand, both theoretically and practically, those arts which are useful to support life? Or do you perceive that laziness and carelessness conduce to make men acquainted with such things as they ought to understand, and to their remembering what they have learned, or to the improvement of their bodily health and strength, or to the acquisition and preservation of what is useful for their support; but that industry and activity are of no profit to them? And with regard to those arts of which, as you say, your relatives have acquired the knowledge, did they learn them without any intention of ever making them available for their support, and of being in any way useful to them; or, on the contrary, with a view to exercising them for their own benefit? By pursuing which course would men show most wisdom, by living in idleness or by occupying themselves in useful pursuits? And would they become more upright by working for, or by indolently pondering over what they require? But, as matters now stand, it appears to me that you cannot have any real love for your female relatives, nor they for you, inasmuch as you regard them as burthensome to you,
and they see that you are annoyed at their company. There is a risk, therefore, that from such a state of feeling dislike will accrue, and the affection that you once had for each other will be impaired. But if you give them directions how to employ themselves, you will feel amicably disposed towards them, seeing that they are of use to you, and they will become attached to you when they are sensible that you are pleased with them; and, remembering with increased gratification the services they have rendered you, you will add to the goodwill which has thus sprung up between you, and will conduct yourselves more amicably and sociably towards each other. If, indeed, they had to undertake any work that was disgraceful, death would be preferable to it; but your relations are skilled in those arts which are probably the most honourable and becoming that can be exercised by women, and all people execute such things as they understand most easily, expeditiously, creditably, and pleasurably. Do not hesitate, then," he continued, "to suggest to them a course which will benefit both them and you, and which they, in all probability, will most readily adopt." "Now, by the gods, Socrates," exclaimed Aristarchus, "your arguments are so forcible, that although I have hitherto shrunk from obtaining a loan, as knowing that when I had spent what I had borrowed, I should not be able to repay the debt, I now think I can bring myself to do
so in order to provide means for commencing our tasks."

The result was that all things necessary for the start were procured. Wool was bought, and the women dined as they worked, and supped after they had finished work. Their countenances assumed a cheerful instead of a gloomy expression; instead of shunning each other's looks, they encountered them with pleasure; and they regarded Aristarchus as their protector, while he grew fond of them, as being of use to him. At last, going to Socrates, he related to him with delight all that had happened, and added, that the women accused him of being the only person in the house who ate the bread of idleness. Then said Socrates, "Why did you not tell them the 'Fable of the Dog'?" For the story goes, that when beasts could speak, the sheep said to her master, 'You act strangely, in that to us, who afford you wool and lambs and cheese, you give nothing except what we get from the ground; but with the dog, who supplies you with nothing of the kind, you share the food of which you yourself partake.' And the dog, hearing these words, exclaimed, 'Yes, forsooth, and with justice! since it is I who preserve you yourselves from being stolen by men or carried off by wolves; for if I did not guard you, you would not even be able to graze for fear of being destroyed.' For this reason, it is said, the sheep agreed to grant to the dog precedence in honour. Do you, therefore, tell these women that, like the dog,
you are to them a guardian and a protector; and that they by your means, and without suffering any indignity, are passing their time in safe and pleasant occupations."

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CHAPTER VIII.

On one occasion, seeing an old friend after a long interval of time, he said, "Where do you spring from, Eutherus?" "I have returned, Socrates, from living abroad since the conclusion of the war, and have but lately arrived from thence; for as we were despoiled of all our property beyond the frontier, and my father left me nothing in Attica, I am now compelled to live in the city, so as to procure the necessaries of life by my personal labour; for it seems to me to be better to do this, than to ask favours of anybody, especially as I have no security on which I could raise money." "And how long," asked Socrates, "do you think your body will be sufficiently strong to enable you to earn the necessaries of life by your labour?" "Not very long, by Jupiter," answered Eutherus. "And yet," said Socrates, "it is certain that when you become older you will require money to spend, although no one will be willing to hire you for your bodily strength."
"That is very true," remarked Eutherus. "It is therefore better for you," said Socrates, "henceforth to apply yourself to such kinds of occupations as will maintain you when you grow old, and to go to some person who has large possessions, and wants some one to superintend them, whose overseer you could be, and assist him in gathering in his crops and taking care of his estate, so as, by benefiting him, to be yourself benefited in return." "I should endure servitude, Socrates," he said, "with great reluctance." "Yet those who preside over states, and have the management of public affairs, are not on this account regarded in the light of slaves, but as freemen." "Briefly," replied Eutherus, "I am not at all inclined to expose myself to be found fault with by any one." "But, assuredly, Eutherus, it is not altogether easy to find any employment in which a person can always avoid cause for blame; for it is difficult to accomplish anything without making some mistake, and difficult, if you do so accomplish it, to meet with a critic who is sensible enough to recognise the fact; and even in those very occupations in which you say you are now engaged, I should much wonder if you were altogether able to escape being found fault with. You must, therefore, beware of captious employers, and look out for such as are indulgent. You must also undertake such duties only as you can carry out, and avoid such as you cannot; and whatever task you do undertake, you must
apply yourself to it to the best of your abilities and with the utmost zeal; for, methinks, that by such conduct you will run the least risk of exposing yourself to blame, and be the most likely to obtain help in your difficulties; that you will thus live most easily and securely, and lay up the best provision for old age."

CHAPTER IX.

I know, too, that he once heard Crito* remark how difficult it was for a man who wished to confine his attention to his own business only, to live in Athens. "For," said he, "at this very time, actions are being brought against me, not by persons who have suffered any injury at my hands, but because they think that I will give them a sum of money rather than be troubled." And Socrates asked, "Tell me, Crito, do you keep dogs for the purpose of guarding your sheep against the wolves?" "Undoubtedly," replied Crito; "since it

* An Athenian citizen of great wealth, who employed all his resources for the good of his country and fellow-citizens. He was one of the most steadfast of the disciples of Socrates, and his staunchest friend. We learn from Plato—who has named one of his "Dialogues" after him—that it was he who, after having in vain tried to persuade Socrates to escape from prison, and provided the means for his flight, attended him at the hour of his death.
is more to my advantage to keep them than not."

"Would you not, then, keep a man who would be willing and able to guard you against the attacks of those who are seeking to injure you?" "Most readily," answered Crito, "could I be assured that he would not turn against me." "But do you not perceive," asked Socrates, "that it would be much more to a man's pleasure and profit to ingratiate himself with a person like you, than it would be to incur your enmity? Be assured that there are such men in our city who would esteem it a very great honour to reckon you as a friend."

The result was that they fixed upon one Archedemus, a very able man, both in speech and action, but poor; for he was not the sort of person who would make money by any means, but, being an admirer of honesty, and naturally possessed of superior qualifications, he was able to make something out of the sycophants.*

Crito, therefore, whenever he gathered in his corn, or oil, or wine, or wool, or any of his agricultural produce which tended to support life, would devote

* A term derived from, and originally applied to, informers against persons who exported figs from Attica, a practice forbidden by law during a time of great scarcity. The statute afterwards became obsolete, but the term continued in use, and was employed to signify an informer of any kind. Of these there was always a large class in Athens, and as their information was often false, the word became a synonym for a slanderer or a misrepresenter of facts. It is in this latter signification that it is applied by us to a flatterer. For a fuller account of Archedemus, Crito, and the Sycophants, see Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol iv. pp. 128, and 223-227.
some of it as a present to Archedemus; and when he sacrificed, he would invite him to the feast, and showed him attention in all such matters. And Archedemus, regarding Crito's house as a place of refuge to him, was very devoted to him. He quickly discovered many injuries that Crito had suffered at the hands of the sycophants, and that many of them were his enemies; and he summoned one of them to a public trial, at which it would have to be settled what penalty he should pay either in purse or person. Now, the sycophant, being conscious of his many misdemeanours, tried all possible methods to get rid of Archedemus. But he would not be got rid of, until the other left off interfering with Crito, and gave him himself a sum of money besides. And when Archedemus had brought this and other similar transactions to a successful issue, then forthwith, as when any shepherd has a good dog, other shepherds also seek to station their flocks near him, in order to have the benefit of his dog, so many of Crito's friends besought him to lend them Archedemus as a protector of their interests also. To this request of Crito's Archedemus willingly acceded, and thus not only Crito but his friends were no longer molested. And if any of the latter, who owed Archedemus a grudge, taunted him with flattering Crito in return for the kindnesses he had received at his hands, Archedemus would ask, "Pray, is it disgraceful for one who has been served by worthy people, and has served
them in return, to make them their friends, and to avoid the wicked? And should they seek to make the honourable and good their enemies by wronging them, while they endeavour by abetting evil-doers to conciliate them, and associate with the latter in preference to the former?” So henceforward Archedemus became one of Crito’s intimates, and was highly esteemed by the other friends of Crito.

CHAPTER X.

I know, also, that he held the following conversation with one of his associates named Diodorus:—“Tell me, Diodorus,” said he, “if any of your domestics absconds, do you take any steps to recover him?” “Yes, by Jupiter,” replied Diodorus; “for I call together the others, and proclaim a reward for any of them who will bring him back.” “And if any of them falls ill, do you take care of him, and send for doctors to prevent his dying?” “Certainly,” answered Diodorus. “And if any one of your acquaintances,” continued Socrates, “who is infinitely more valuable than your servants, is in danger of perishing from want, do you not think that you ought to pay attention to him, and endeavour to save his life? Yet you know that
Hermogenes is not an ungrateful man, and that he would feel ashamed to receive a kindness from you without requiting you for it. Now, I consider the possession of a well-disposed and earnest assistant, and one who is capable of executing your orders, and not only this, but also of being useful to you in his own person, and of forecasting and forming plans for you, as valuable as many servants. In truth, good economists say that when you have an opportunity of purchasing a high-priced article at a trifling cost, you ought to secure it; and now, circumstances allow of your procuring good friends at a cheap rate." To this Diodorus replied, "You say well, Socrates, and therefore bid Hermogenes to come to me." "Not I, by Jupiter," exclaimed Socrates; "for I do not think it more equitable to send him to you, than that you should go to him, or that a greater benefit will accrue to him from the meeting than to you." So then Diodorus went to Hermogenes, and at a trifling cost secured a friend who made it his business to consider how he could best serve and gratify Diodorus either by word or deed.
NOW proceed to relate how useful Socrates was to those who were aiming at any post of honour, by making them attentive in pursuing the objects of their desire.

On one occasion, for example, having heard that Dionysodorus had visited the city, and announced that he would give lessons in the art of generalship, he said to one of his own disciples, who was ambitious of gaining public distinction as a general, "It is surely shameful, young man, that he who aspires to take the command of the forces of the state should, when the opportunity offers of learning how to do so, neglect to avail himself of it; and such an one would be much more justly punished by the state than one who should undertake
to make statues for it without ever having studied the statuary's profession. For since, in the perils of war, the whole community is intrusted to the commander, the greatest benefits naturally accrue from his successes, and the greatest evils from his mistakes. How, then, would not he who was desirous of occupying such a post, and yet neglected to learn its duties, be deservedly punished?" By such observations he induced his hearer to go and take lessons. And when, after having attended the lectures, he paid a visit to Socrates, the latter began to jest about him, saying, "Since Homer, my friends, has described Agamemnon as being worthy of respect, so does not this young man appear to be more deserving of our respect now that he has learned to be a general? For as he who has learned to play upon the harp, even if he is not using his instrument, is nevertheless a harpist, and he who has studied the physician's art, even although he does not exercise it, is still a physician, so this youth from henceforth will always be a general, although he should never be appointed to that post; whereas he who lacks the proper knowledge is neither a general nor a physician, although he should be unanimously elected to act in those capacities. But," he said to him, "in order that, if any one of us should ever have to command a division or a company under you, we may better understand our duties as soldiers, tell us how your teacher commenced his instructions in generalship." "He commenced," replied the young
man, "as he ended; for he taught me tactics, and nothing else." "And yet," exclaimed Socrates, "what a small branch of the art of generalship that is! for a commander-in-chief must be capable of providing everything that is necessary for war, and for the proper provisioning of his troops. He should be a good mechanic and handicraftsman, careful, patient, quick-witted; kind, and yet severe; simple, yet cunning; anxious to keep his own stores, but ready to seize those of others; lavish, yet rapacious; munificent, but fond of saving; cautious, yet enterprising; and possessed of many other qualifications, both natural and acquired, which he who would make an efficient general must be master of. Doubtless it is of advantage to be a good tactician also; for a well-ordered army differs from a disorderly one, as stones, and bricks, and wood, and tiles, when they are all thrown together in a confused heap, are of no use; but when those materials which will not fall to pieces or decay, such as the stones and the tiles, are put at the bottom and top, while the bricks and the wood are arranged in the middle, as is done in building—then a house, which is a valuable piece of property, is the result." "Really, Socrates," said the young man, "the analogy which you have instituted is perfect; for in war we place the best troops in the van and at the rear, and the worst in the main body, so that they may be led on by those in front of them, and urged forward by those behind." "If," rejoined
Socrates, "your master has taught you how to distinguish the good from the bad, the plan you mention would be an excellent one; but if he has not done so, of what use are his instructions? For example, suppose he were to desire you to arrange some silver coins, so as to place the best examples first and last, and the worst in the middle, without showing you which were the genuine and which the spurious, his orders would be of no use." "But," said the young man, "he certainly did not teach us this, and so we should have to distinguish the good from the bad ourselves." "Why, then, should we not consider how we may best avoid making mistakes on this point?" "I am willing to do so," replied the young man. "Well, then," said Socrates, "if we had to capture a sum of money, should we not be right in placing those men who were most covetous of money in the van?" "So it appears to me," answered the young man. "And what should those do who are about to undertake perilous enterprises? Should they not place those who are most ambitious of honour in the front?" "These, at any rate," said the young man, "are such as would most readily incur danger for the sake of glory; neither are they difficult to discover, but being conspicuous everywhere, they are easily to be found." "But did your master," asked Socrates, "merely teach you to draw up an army, or did he also teach you how each division was to be employed?" "By no means," he replied. "And yet
there are many circumstances," said Socrates, "to which neither the same plan of drawing up an army nor of leading it will always apply." "But, by Jupiter," exclaimed the young man, "he never thoroughly explained this." "Then, by Jupiter," said Socrates, "go back to him, and question him upon these points; for if he understands them, and is not altogether shameless, he will blush at having taken your money and sent you away in ignorance of them."

CHAPTER II.

Having on a certain occasion met a general elect, Socrates asked him, "Why do you think that Homer styles Agamemnon 'the shepherd of the people'? Is it not, pray, because, as a shepherd ought to care for the safety of his sheep, and to provide what is necessary for them, so that the purpose for which they are kept may be answered, so a general ought to provide for the safety of his soldiers, and for their proper support, so that the object for which they serve may be effected? for they serve to conquer the enemy, and thus improve their own condition. Or if not, for what conceivable purpose has the poet glorified Agamemnon by styling him—

"'Both powerful warrior and beloved king?" *

* Iliad, Book iii. line 179
Is it not because he would have been a 'powerful warrior,' not if he had been victorious single-handed against the enemy, but because he was the cause of victory to the whole army? And he would have been a 'beloved king,' not if he had merely been careful to render his own individual life pleasant, but because he sought the happiness of all those over whom he ruled. For a man is made a king, not for the purpose of taking good care of himself alone, but that those who elected him may be benefited by his rule; and all men serve as soldiers in order that their lives may be as prosperous as possible, and they appoint generals with this very object, that they may conduct them to that prosperity. The commander of an army, therefore, is bound to carry out the objects for which he was elected. For as it is not easy to discover any course of conduct more honourable than this, so there is none that is more disgraceful than its converse."

And in thus estimating the qualities which constituted the peculiar excellence of a good commander, he omitted all other requirements, and insisted only upon this, viz., that it was incumbent upon him to render those whom he commanded happy.
CHAPTER III.

I know that on one occasion he held the following conversation with one who had been elected to the post of a cavalry officer:—"Can you tell me, young man, why you were anxious to command the cavalry? It was not, I presume, that you might ride at the head of the troops; for the horse-archers are appointed to that post of honour, seeing that they ride even before the colonels themselves?" "That is true," replied the young man. "Neither, I suppose, was it for the sake of being noticed, for even madmen are noticed by everybody." "Again you speak the truth," said the young man. "Was it, then, because you think that you can make the cavalry more efficient, and hand it over, when so improved, to the service of the government; and if there should be any need for its employment, that you, as its leader, could confer some benefit upon the state?" "That certainly is my hope." "And assuredly," rejoined Socrates, "it will be a most honourable trait in your character if you are able to effect this object. But I suppose the command to which you have been elected has regard both to horses and their riders?" "It has," replied the young man. "Come, then," continued Socrates, "tell us first how you propose to improve the horses." "I do not," replied the other, "consider that to be any part of my business; for
every man individually should look after his own horse.” “If, then,” said Socrates, “they should parade their horses before you, some of them so unsound in the hoofs or legs, or so weak and out of condition that they could not follow you; others theirs so ill-broken that they would not stand where you posted them, and others theirs such kickers that it would be impossible to post them at all, what would be the use of your cavalry, or how could you, as the commander of such a force, be of any service to the state?” And the young man answered, “Your remarks are just, and I will henceforth try my utmost to look after the horses.” “How, too, about the riders? Will you not endeavour to improve them?” “I will,” said the other. “You will first of all, then, make them more expert in mounting their horses?” “I ought to do so,” he replied; “for thus any one of them who should fall off would be more capable of recovering himself.” “And if you have to hazard an engagement, will you order your men to draw the opposing forces down to a sandy plain like that on which you have been accustomed to exercise, or will you endeavour to train them so as to act on any sort of ground on which the enemy may be likely to post himself?” “The latter is the better plan,” answered the young man. “And will you take any pains to render as many of your men as possible expert at hurling their javelins from on horseback?” “This also had better be attended to.” “And have you con-
considered the best way of whetting their courage, and exciting them against the enemy, if you intend to make them more eager to fight?"  "If I have not hitherto done so, I will now commence the experiment."  "And have you considered at all how your men will be induced to obey you most readily? for without obedience neither horses nor troopers will be of any use, be they ever so good and brave."  "You speak the truth, Socrates," replied the young man; "but what is the best method of inducing them to be obedient?"  "You know this, I suppose, that men are most willing to follow those whom they think most capable of leading them? Thus, in sickness, they most readily rely upon him whom they regard as the most skilful physician; those who are passengers on board ship upon him who seems the most experienced pilot; and those who are engaged in agriculture on him whom they consider the best husbandman."  "Of course they do," replied the young man.  "Is it not then probable," asked Socrates, "that, with regard to horsemanship also, whosoever shall seem most skilled in the art, him men will be most willing to obey?"  "If then, Socrates, I should be manifestly the best horseman among them, will that be sufficient to induce them to obey me?"  "It will; especially if, in addition to this, you show them that it will be more honourable and safer for them to obey you."  "But how," demanded the other, "shall I prove this to them?"  "Much more easily, by Jupiter," replied
Socrates, "than if you had to prove to them that evil was better and more profitable than good." "You mean to insinuate," said the young man, "that a cavalry commander, in addition to his other qualifications, should endeavour to acquire the power of speaking?" "And do you suppose," asked Socrates, "that you can command cavalry by silence? Or have you never considered that whatever things we have been taught, by force of habit, to be the best for us, and by which we guide our lives, are all of them inculcated by the instrumentality of speech? And that if any one masters any other valuable branch of science, he acquires it by means of speech? Do not the best instructors make the freest use of speech, and those who comprehend the deepest subjects, discourse upon them in the most suitable language? Or have you not noticed this, that when a chorus is selected out of this our city (like that which is sent to Delos*), no other troupe from

* Delos, the smallest but most renowned of the group of islands called the Cyclades, situated in the Grecian Archipelago, was fabled to be the birthplace of Apollo and Artemis, and was one of the chief seats of their worship. The festivals and games held in their honour were attended with great pomp and magnificence, and were celebrated every fifth year with gymnastic and musical contests, choruses and dances. Every year the Athenians sent a sacred vessel thither, bearing the priest of Apollo crowned with laurels, in order to inspect the island. The quinquennial celebration was called the greater, the annual the lesser Delia; and at the former, although the islanders, in common with Athens, were allowed to supply some of the choristers, victims, and various other things appertaining to the solemnities, yet the leader and the principal performers were invariably Athenians, and that people always took the whole conduct of the ceremonies into their own hands.
elsewhere is able to compete with it, nor can so many handsome men be assembled together in any other city as in this?" "Again you speak truly," said the young man. "Do you not think, then," continued Socrates, "that if any one addressed himself diligently to the task of improving our cavalry here, we should far surpass others in this, as in other points, both with regard to the equipment and discipline of our men and horses, and in the alacrity with which we encountered the dangers of the field, if we thought that praise and honour would accrue to us thereby?" "It is probable," replied the other. "Make no delay, then," said Socrates; "but endeavour to encourage your men to such conduct as will contribute to your own welfare, and also to that of your fellow-citizens through your influence." "I will by all means make the attempt," said the young man.

CHAPTER IV.

And one day, seeing Nichomachides returning from an election for heads of public departments, he asked him—"Who have been appointed generals, Nichomachides?" And Nichomachides answered thus—"Have not the Athenians, Socrates, acted exactly as is their wont? For they have not elected me, pierced through as I have
been while borne on the roll of lieutenants and captains, and desperately wounded as I am" (here he drew aside his robe and showed the scars of his wounds); "but they have elected Antisthenes, forsooth, a man who never saw service as an infantry soldier, and did nothing remarkable when in the cavalry, but understands only the accumulation of money." "And is not this a good recommendation, in that it renders a general capable of providing necessaries for his troops?" "But merchants," replied Nichomachides, "are capable of accumulating money, but that does not make them fit to head an army." And Socrates said—"Antisthenes, at any rate, is of an emulous disposition, which is a necessary qualification for a general. Have you not noticed that whenever he has been chorus-master,* he has on all occasions carried off the victory with his choruses?" "But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Nichomachides, "there

* Chorus-master, or choregus. This was one of the leitour giai or public services (hence our word liturgy) which every citizen who possessed a certain property qualification at Athens was obliged by law to undertake. The choregia was one of the most expensive of these liturgies, and the choregus had to provide the choruses for the tragedies and comedies performed, and the religious festivals celebrated at Athens. In this capacity he had to supply the conductor, and all the vocal and instrumental performers, whom he not only had to pay for their actual services, but to maintain and lodge during the time they were in training. It devolved upon him also to provide the masks, dresses, and various other properties for the plays that were to be represented, and in fact to defray most of the expenses incidental to their proper production. The same chorus did not perform upon every occasion, but various ones, who appeared under different choregi; and that choregus who performed his duties most efficiently carried off the victory, in the honours of which his tribe also participated.
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is no analogy between the leading of a chorus and of an army." "But yet," continued Socrates, "this Antisthenes, although he himself understood neither singing nor the training of choruses, was nevertheless able to procure the services of those who were most famous for these accomplishments." "And on the same principle," said Nichomachides, "he will find in his army some to draw up his men, and others to fight for him." "If, therefore, he is as successful in finding out and putting forward the best man in military as he is in choral affairs, it is probable that he will be as victorious in the former as he was in the latter. And there is every likelihood that he will be more willing to incur expense in order to secure victory in the field with the whole state, than he would be to carry off the prize for a chorus with his single tribe." "Do you assert, then, Socrates, that the same man who manages a chorus successfully must also be able to handle an army properly?" "I certainly maintain," said Socrates, "that whatever a man presides over, if he knows what is required and is able to provide it, he will be a good president, whether it be over a chorus, or a family, or a state, or an army." And Nichomachides exclaimed—"By Jupiter! I should never have expected to have heard you maintain that good domestic managers would also make good generals." "Come, then," said Socrates, "let us investigate their respective duties, that we may ascertain whether they are identical or the reverse." "Will
ingly," said Nichomachides. "Is it not, then, the duty of each to render those whom they govern obedient both to their commands and their wishes?"

"Certainly it is," replied the other. "Again, is it not their duty to appoint to every one his allotted tasks?"

"That is also their duty," said Nichomachides. "And the punishing of the bad and rewarding the good is also, I suppose, the province of each of them?" "No doubt it is," replied the other. "And does it not argue well for both, that those who are under their orders should be well disposed towards them?" "Unquestionably it does," said Nichomachides. "And does the securing of allies and auxiliaries seem to you to be conducive to both their interests or not?" "As conducive to their interests, of course." "Should they not each be careful to guard their resources?" "By all means," answered the other. "Should they not both, then, be diligent and attentive to their respective duties?" "In these points," rejoined Nichomachides, "the analogy holds good between them, but they have not both to fight." "But, at any rate, I suppose they both have enemies?" "That, no doubt, they have." "Is it not, then, equally their interest to gain the superiority over such?" "Certainly it is. But, passing over this question, if it should be necessary to fight, of what use would skill in managing a household be?" "It would, in such a case," replied Socrates, "be, as I should imagine, of the greatest possible use; for a
good manager of a household, knowing that nothing is so advantageous and valuable as to get the better of your adversaries in a contest, and nothing so unprofitable and injurious as to be worsted by them, will zealously seek out and provide all such things as may most conduce to secure the victory, and will carefully watch and guard against everything that tends to his defeat. He will, likewise, fight with alacrity if he sees that his preparations are such as are adapted to secure the victory, and he will be no less averse from engaging should he find himself insufficiently prepared. Do not, therefore, Nichomachides,” he continued, “despise men who are skilled in the management of a household; for the management of private affairs differs from that of public only in their magnitude, but in other respects they closely resemble one another. The chief point, however, is, that they are neither of them conducted without men; and private matters are not conducted by one sort of men and public business by another; for those who have the superintendence of public affairs do not select men different in kind from those who are employed by managers of their own private households. And those who understand how to turn such men’s services to account are good administrators both in private and public affairs; but those who have not such knowledge perpetrate blunders in both.”
CHAPTER V.

And on one occasion, conversing with Pericles, the son of the famous Pericles, he said—"I entertain the hope, Pericles, that with you as commander-in-chief, our state will flourish and become more renowned in war, and that she will vanquish her enemies." And Pericles answered—"I could wish, Socrates, that your words might be verified, but I cannot see my way to their accomplishment." "Are you willing, then," said Socrates, "that we should converse upon the subject, with a view to ascertain how it may be possible to effect this?" "I am willing," replied Pericles. "Are you aware, then, that the Athenians are as numerous as the Bœotians?" "I am aware of the fact," replied Pericles. "And from which do you think the largest bodies of fine and efficient men could be selected—the Bœotians or the Athenians?" "Neither in this respect do the Athenians appear to me to be inferior." "And which of the two people do you consider to be the most united among themselves?" "The Athenians, in my opinion at least; for many of the Bœotians, being oppressed by the Thebans,* bear a grudge against them, but I never notice similar feelings displayed at Athens."

* Thebes, the chief city of Bœotia, and the head of that league of twelve or fourteen cities known as "the Bœotian Confederation," was one of the most celebrated cities of antiquity.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography," sub voce "Thebæ Bœotia."
"But, moreover, the Athenians are, as you will admit, the most covetous of honour and the kindest-hearted of all people; and these are sentiments which act as very strong incentives to men to undergo danger for the sake of glory and their country." "The Athenians," remarked Pericles, "are certainly not deficient in these qualities." "Assuredly, too, no people can point to more numerous and nobler exploits performed by their ancestors than the Athenians can, by which consideration many of them are strongly influenced and stimulated to the cultivation of valour and bodily prowess."

"All your assertions are true, Socrates; but you know that since the defeat of the thousand under Tolmides at Lebadeia, and of Hippocrates and his forces at Delium,* the reputation of the Athenians stands lower with the Bœotians, while the courage of the Thebans is rated higher by the Athenians; so much so, indeed, that the Bœotians, who before these events did not dare, even in

* The former of these events took place B.C. 447, when Tolmides, contrary to the advice of Pericles, marched into Boeotia with one thousand Athenians and some allies, and took Chaeronea, which he garrisoned; but while advancing on Coronea, he fell in with a body of Bœotians, Locrians, and Eubœans, by whom he was utterly routed and slain. The second event occurred B.C. 421, when the Athenian generals, Demosthenes and Hippocrates, had arranged to invade Boeotia from three different points at once. The latter had seized and fortified Delium, a frontier town between the two countries, and was on the point of returning to Athens when the Bœotian forces arrived. A battle took place just within the Attic territory, in which the Athenians were totally defeated and Hippocrates killed. Xenophon is said to have been engaged on the field, and to have been carried some distance by Socrates after he had fallen from his horse during the flight.
their own territory, to take the field against the Athenians without the Spartans and other Peloponnesian allies, are now actually threatening to invade Attica single-handed; while the Athenians, who formerly, when the Boeotians were unaided, used to lay waste their country, are at this moment in dread lest the Boeotians should ravage Attica.” “I know,” said Socrates, “that such is the case, and therefore the state seems to me now all the more inclined to appoint an efficient leader, as recognising the fact that confidence inspires carelessness, indolence, and insubordination, while fear renders men more attentive, obedient, and orderly. And you may perceive an analogy to this in people’s conduct on board ship; for as long as they are in no fear, they are disorderly above measure: but let them dread a storm or some hostile attack, and they not only implicitly obey orders, but even await the giving of directions most anxiously and in silence, just like dancers.” “Well, then,” said Pericles, “if the people are now more than usually willing to obey orders, it would seem to be the proper time for inquiring how we can best encourage them to strive to regain their ancient pre-eminence, glory, and happiness.” “If,” said Socrates, “we wished them to reclaim possessions which other people held, we should most effectually urge them on to this by representing to them that the property had belonged to their ancestors, and was rightfully theirs. Similarly, as we wish them to strive to
eminence, have neglected themselves, and so become degenerate." "What course should they then now pursue in order to regain their ancient high position?" "It appears to me by no means doubtful, that if they will ascertain what were the measures adopted by their ancestors, and act in accordance with them, they will be in nowise less excellent than they were. But, if they omit doing this, let them at any rate take example by those who now hold the supremacy of Greece,* and by imitating their practices, and employing the same methods as they employ, they will probably become not at all inferior to them, but even, if they take proper care, their superiors." "You mean," said Pericles, "that honour and probity flourish in a locality far distant from our city. For when will the Athenians ever reverence old age as the Spartans do? since the former commence their contemptuous conduct towards their elders even with their parents. Or when will they train their bodies in a similar manner, despising good condition as they do, and turning into ridicule all those who cultivate it? And when will they obey their rulers as the Spartans obey them, seeing that they now take a delight in setting them at nought? Or when will they act as harmoniously together? they who, instead of co-operating for their mutual interests, intimidate one another, and envy each other more than

* i.e., The Lacedæmonians. The constitution of Sparta is often praised by Xenophon as being superior to that of Athens.
any other people. More than any other people, too, they wrangle in their public and private assemblies, and go to law oftener one with another, and prefer thus to live upon each other, rather than to unite for their general benefit. They treat public business as if it concerned others rather than them themselves, and not only quarrel over the transaction of it, but actually rejoice in having the power of so doing. From these sources a vast deal of ignorance and misery are engendered in the state, and enmity and hatred of one another prevails extensively among our fellow-citizens. Hence I am in constant dread lest such feelings should produce some terrible national calamity too grievous for the state to bear.” “Do not imagine, Pericles,” said Socrates, “that the Athenians suffer from a disorder that is so utterly incurable. Do you not see how orderly they are in naval affairs, what willing obedience they yield to their leaders in the gymnastic contests,* and how they submit themselves in a way that is not sur-

* Gymnastics formed an essential part of a liberal education at Athens, and the gymnasiarchia, or superintendence of the gymnasia, formed one of the public services or liturgies already mentioned (see ante, p. 121). In these, as well as in the choral performances, contests took place between the various tribes at the great games and festivals, and those who competed for them underwent regular training under persons who afterwards attended them in the arena, and directed their movements there. The exercises comprehended under the term gymnastics consisted not only of feats of strength, as among us, but included also running, wrestling, boxing, ball-playing, throwing the quoit and javelin, and a variety of what we term athletic sports—See Smith’s “Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities,” sub vv. "Gymnasium," "Lampadephoria," and "Pentathlon."
passed by any other people to the directions of their chorus-masters?" "It is indeed extraordinary," remarked Pericles, "that people engaged in such occupations should so implicitly obey those who are in authority over them; but that the infantry and cavalry, who are supposed to excel the rest of the citizens in worth and valour, should at the same time be the most insubordinate of all classes." Then said Socrates—"And is not the council of the Areiopagus,* Pericles, composed of men of approved character?" "By all means," answered Pericles. "And do you," continued Socrates, "know of any tribunal that acts more honourably, lawfully, solemnly, and equitably, either in the administration of justice or any other business?" "I find no fault with them in these respects," replied the other. "We must not, therefore," said Socrates, "despair of the Athenians on the ground of their insubordination." "And yet, in military matters, where prudence, order, and subordination are of the greatest moment, they utterly disregard them." "They do so, perhaps,"

* The name of the highest criminal court of Athens. It also took cognisance of certain political, civil, and religious matters; but there has been much difference of opinion among various writers upon the subject of the extent of its powers with regard to these latter questions, and also as to the number of members composing it. Whatever these may have been, it is certain that its character stood very high in the estimation of all the Athenian public, and the Areiopagites were invariably treated with the utmost respect as men of the greatest moral worth, both in their public and private capacities.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities," sub vv. "Areiopagus," "Archon," and "Epheta."
rejoined Socrates, "because their leaders in such matters understand but little about them. Do you not notice, in the case of harp-players, choristers, wrestlers, and athletes of any kind, that no one attempts to direct them unless he himself understands their respective arts, but that all who act as instructors in such professions are able to point to the sources from whence they obtained their knowledge of the callings over which they preside; whereas most of our generals act without any previous instruction at all? I do not, however, regard you as one of these; for I take it that you can tell when you began to practise generalship, just as you can when you began to practise wrestling; and I suppose that you have treasured up in your memory many of those principles of warfare which your father inculcated upon you, and that you have collected from various sources all the information you could acquire upon every point that might be useful to you as a general. I conclude, too, that you take all possible care that you may not be unwittingly ignorant of anything that may be serviceable to you in such a capacity, and that if you are personally deficient in such knowledge, you have applied to persons who possess it, sparing neither your pocket nor your influence to learn from them such matters as you yourself did not understand, and to earn their valuable co-operation." And Pericles replied—"You do not, Socrates, deceive me by making me believe that you say these things of me
because you think that I have been properly instructed in these matters, but because you design to show me how that a man who is about to act as a general should pay great attention to them all. And with this opinion of yours I thoroughly coincide.” "And have you considered this, Pericles," continued Socrates, "that we have on our frontiers huge mountains, which extend as far as Bœotia, through which narrow and rugged passes lead into our country, and that its centre is also girded about by inaccessible mountains?" "Certainly I have," answered Pericles. "And have you not heard that the Mysians and Pisidians,* who occupy very strong positions in the country of the great king, and are but lightly armed, are able to make incursions into the king's territory, and while they commit great ravages there, nevertheless maintain their own independence?" "I hear that such is the case," said Pericles. "And do you not think," asked Socrates, "that the Athenians, if equipped with even lighter arms, when they are young and active, could, by occupying the mountains which bound our country, inflict great injury upon their enemies, and form a most efficient bulwark for our own countrymen?" "I think," answered Pericles, "that all such manœuvres would be useful." "If, then, these

* These nations occupied parts of the north-west and south of Asia Minor (now Turkey in Asia), and were not only in the habit of making incursions into Persia (of which the king was always styled by the Greeks "the great king"), but had also established settlements there.
plans satisfy you," rejoined Socrates, "be earnest, my good friend, in endeavouring to realise them; for whatever portion of them you carry out will redound to your own credit and to the benefit of the state. But if you fail in any of them through want of support, you will neither injure the state nor bring disgrace upon yourself."

CHAPTER VI.

And when Glaucon, the son of Ariston, attempted to harangue the people, with a view to obtaining the presidency of the state, although he was not yet twenty years of age, and none of his relations or friends could prevail upon him to refrain from getting himself pulled down from the rostrum and making himself ridiculous, Socrates, who felt kindly disposed towards him for Charmides, the son of Glaucon, and for Plato's sake, prevented him from prosecuting his design. For meeting the young man by chance, and wishing to induce him to listen to his advice, he stopped him, and addressed him somewhat in these terms:—"So you have made up your mind, Glaucon, to be the chief governor of our state?" "I have," replied the other. "By Jupiter," replied Socrates, "it is as honourable a post as any among men can be; for it is evident that if you succeed in this you will be in a
position not only to obtain all the objects of your own ambition, but also be able to serve your friends. You will exalt your father's house and magnify your country. Your name will be celebrated first in our own state, and afterwards throughout Greece; and you will perhaps be regarded as a second Themistocles even among barbarous nations, and an object of admiration wherever you may be." So Glaucon, being mightily flattered at hearing these words, willingly tarried. And when this had happened, Socrates proceeded to say—"But is it not evident, Glaucon, that if you seek to be honoured, the state must be benefited by you?" "Certainly," replied Glaucon. "By the gods, then," exclaimed Socrates, "do not conceal from us, but declare at once from what point you intend to start in order to benefit the state." But when Glaucon continued silent, as considering how he would begin, Socrates said—"Pray now tell me whether, just as if you wished to aggrandize a friend's household you would endeavour to make him richer, so you would also strive to make the state wealthier?" "By all means," replied Glaucon. "Would it not, then, become wealthier if its revenues were increased?" "Probably so," said Glaucon. "Tell me, then," said Socrates, "from what sources do our state revenues seem to you to be derived, and what is their extent? For, no doubt, you have considered how, if any one of them falls short, you may make up the deficiency, and how, if any of them fail altogether,
you may acquire others." "But, by Jupiter," rejoined Glaucon, "I have never considered anything about this." "Well, then," continued Socrates, "if you have neglected to study these topics, you can at any rate tell me what our state expenditure is? For you surely intend to cut off all superfluity in this respect?" "Neither, by Jupiter," said Glaucon, "have I had leisure to turn my attention to this subject." "Let us, then, omit the consideration of how to make our state wealthier; for how can any one who is ignorant of its expenditure and income exercise control over these matters?" "But, Socrates," said Glaucon, "it is also possible to enrich one's state even at the expense of one's enemies." "Extremely possible, by Jupiter," rejoined Socrates, "if one is stronger than they; but should one be weaker, one may lose all that one has." "You speak the truth," said Glaucon. "Therefore," continued Socrates, "he who is considering what sort of people he purposes to go to war with, ought to be acquainted with the strength both of his own country and of the enemy's, so that if his own state is the more powerful, he may advise it to undertake the war, but if it be weaker than that of the enemy, he may counsel caution." "What you say is correct," remarked Glaucon. "In the first place, then," continued Socrates, "tell us what is the strength of our own country, both in land and sea forces; and, secondly, what is that of our enemies." "But, by Jupiter, I cannot tell it you by
rote." "Well, then," rejoined Socrates, "if you have a written summary of them, produce it, for I should listen to this with very great pleasure." "But neither, by Jupiter," replied Glaucon, "have I ever even written out such a list." "Well, then," said Socrates, "let us also omit the topic of war as a starting-point for our speculations, since, on account of the magnitude of the considerations involved in it, you have not, perhaps, as you have but lately commenced your administration, as yet thoroughly investigated these points. But I feel sure that you have at any rate turned your attention to the garrisoning of the country, and you know how many garrisons should be maintained and how many are needless; how many men are required to form them and how many are redundant; and you intend to propose the strengthening of those which are necessary, and the displacing of those which are superfluous." "By Jupiter," exclaimed Glaucon, "as far as I am concerned, I should displace them all, since, from their negligent method of keeping guard, the country is often robbed of its property." "And yet, if the garrisons were removed altogether, do you not think that anybody who had the slightest inclination to plunder us could do so? But," he added, "have you gone personally to examine into this matter, or how do you know that a negligent guard is kept?" "I conjecture that such is the case," replied the other. "Well, then," said Socrates, "shall we defer our consideration of this topic also until such
time as we rely not upon conjecture, but upon specific
information?" "Perhaps it will be better if we do so,"
answered Glaucon. "With regard to the silver mines,*
then," said Socrates, "I know that you have never
visited them, so as to be able to tell us why there
is less revenue derived from them now than there
formerly was." "I cannot tell you, because I have
never been there." "No doubt, they are said to be in
a very unhealthy situation, so that when it becomes
necessary to take this matter into consideration, you
can plead that as a sufficient excuse." "You are
bantering me," exclaimed Glaucon. "But I feel sure,"
resumed Socrates, "that you have not neglected to
calculate how long the corn which is grown in the
country will suffice to support the city, and how much
is required for the year's consumption, so that any
scarcity, in this respect at least, may not escape your
notice, but that you will be able, from your own

* These silver mines were situated at Laurium, now Legrana, or
Alegrana, near Sunium, the extreme southern promontory of Attica,
at about twenty-two miles distance from Athens. They were the pro-
erty of the state, and were one of the chief sources of its prosperity
from a very remote period of its history. Certain of the districts were
sold or let to companies or individuals, partly in consideration of a sum
or fine paid down, and partly for a rent amounting to one twenty-fourth
of the produce of their workings, and the sums so received were paid
into the treasury. The value of the mines had greatly deteriorated in
the time of Xenophon from the gradual failure of the ore, and at the
end of the first century of the Christian era, they altogether ceased to
be worked; but modern travellers tell us that the heaps of scoriæ and
shafts of the ancient mines are still visible.
knowledge, to advise with the state upon its necessities, and so to assist and save it." "You suggest," said Glaucon, "an exceedingly vast field of action, if at least it is requisite to pay attention to these matters also." "But yet," rejoined Socrates, "no one could ever administer his own household properly without knowing what it stood in need of, and taking care to supply its wants. But since the city consists of more than ten thousand households, and it is difficult to provide for so many at once, how is it that you have never essayed to cater even for one family—say that of your uncle, as it certainly needs assistance? And if you are able to provide for his establishment, you can then take others in hand. If you cannot be of service to one, how can you be so to a great number? Just as if a man cannot carry a talent, is it not self-evident that he cannot carry a heavier weight, and that it is absurd for him to attempt it?" "But, Socrates," said Glaucon, "I would be of service to my uncle's household, if he would but be guided by me." "Well, then," said Socrates, "if you cannot induce your uncle to be guided by you, how do you expect to be able to make all the Athenians, including your uncle, follow your lead? Beware, Glaucon, lest, while you are ambitious of acquiring glory, you do not meet with the reverse of it. Or do you not perceive how hazardous a thing it is for a man to speak upon or to undertake matters in which he has no experience? Reflect upon other
men that you know, who are of such a character that they talk about, and busy themselves in, affairs of which they are ignorant, and do they seem to you to obtain more praise or blame in reference to them? Regard, again, those who do understand the subjects upon which they converse and act, and you will find, I think, that in every business those are the best thought of, and the most admired, who have the most extensive knowledge of it; and that those who are the most ignorant are the most lightly esteemed and despised. If, therefore, you desire to stand high in the respect and admiration of the state, strive to obtain a thorough knowledge of the business in which you intend to engage. For if, after you have surpassed others in accomplishing this, you then undertake to conduct the affairs of the state, I should not be surprised if you very easily attain the object of your ambition."

**CHAPTER VII.**

And perceiving that Charmides, the son of Glauccon, was a man of worth, and of far greater ability than many who were at that time employed in state affairs, but that he, nevertheless, shrank from presenting himself before the people, and accepting a post in the
administration—"Tell me, Charmides," said he, "if a man who was capable of winning a crown in the public games, and so acquiring honour for himself and making his birthplace more renowned throughout Greece, and yet should be unwilling to contend for it, what opinion would you entertain of his character?" "I should certainly consider him as being both effeminate and pusillanimous." "And if any one," continued Socrates, "by taking part in the affairs of the state, could at the same time add to its prosperity and his own honour, and yet should shrink from undertaking the task, might he not justly be regarded as a coward?" "Perhaps so," replied Charmides; "but with what intent have you put these questions to me?" "Because," replied Socrates, "I think that you, although you have the ability to engage in duties which it becomes you as a citizen to undertake, nevertheless shrink from them." Then Charmides asked—"And in what transaction have you discovered this ability of mine, as you term it, that you thus condemn me?" "At the councils," answered Socrates, "at which you meet those who are transacting the business of the state. On those occasions I notice that when they consult you upon any point, you give them very excellent advice, and if they commit any blunder, you deservedly find fault with them." "But," objected Charmides, "there is a vast difference, Socrates, between a private discussion and haranguing in public." "And yet," said Socrates, "a
good arithmetician can calculate just as well in a crowd as he can when alone, and those who play the harp best when by themselves, are also the best performers in public." "But do you not recognise the fact that bashfulness and timidity are inherent in men's natures, and affect them far more in crowds than they do in private assemblies?" "I feel compelled, then," said Socrates, "to point out to you how that you are not bashful in the presence of the most intelligent, or timid in that of the most powerful people; but yet you are ashamed to speak before the most foolish and weak. Is it to such folks as fullers, or cobblers, or carpenters, or brassfounders, or farmers, or merchants, or chafferers in the market, and those who are for ever thinking how they may make a profit by their dealings, that you are bashful about making a speech? And it is of these very classes that a public meeting is composed. In what respects do you think your conduct differs from that of an athlete who, being superior to professional opponents, yet fears to encounter mere amateurs? For do not you, who speak without diffidence before the most talented politicians (some of whom think but lightly of you), and who are far superior to many who are constantly delivering political orations, shrink from addressing those who have never turned their attention at all to politics, and have never shown any contempt for you, for fear that you should be laughed at?" "And pray," asked Charmides, "do not those who
speak admirably at a public meeting often seem to you to be laughed at?"  "Certainly," said Socrates, "and so also do the others,* and therefore it is that I wonder at your being so ready to encounter one sort of audience, while you fancy that you have not sufficient ability even to present yourself before the other.  Be not ignorant, of yourself, my good friend, and do not make the same mistake which most people do; for men generally, although they are very eager to know all about their neighbours, do not display the same anxiety in reference to themselves.  Do not you, therefore, pretermit this task, but strive more and more to apply yourself to such duties as become you.  And do not neglect the business of the state if you can in any way improve its institutions; for if these stand on a sound basis, not only the rest of your fellow-citizens, but your own personal friends, and you yourself, will reap the most substantial advantage.

* By "the others," Socrates means those to whom Charmides gave such excellent advice in private, but who laughed at him behind his back, perhaps more than those whom he addressed in public would do.
CHAPTER VIII.

And when Aristippus attempted to confute Socrates, as he had himself been previously confuted by him,* the latter, wishing his associates to profit by the occasion, answered not as those do who are on their guard lest by any chance their words should be misinterpreted, but, like those who are firmly convinced that they are discharging their duty to the utmost of their power. Aristippus then asked him whether "he knew anything good," so that if he should instance any such thing as meat, or drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, he might, forsooth, prove that it was sometimes an evil. But Socrates, as knowing that if anything annoys us, we desire some means of putting an end to the annoyance, answered just in the way that it was best to do. "Do you ask me, for instance," said he, "whether I know anything good for fever?" "Not I," answered Aristippus. "Well, then, for ophthalmia?" "Nor for that either." "For hunger, then?" "No, nor yet for hunger." "Then," said Socrates, "if in truth you ask me whether I know anything good, that is good for nothing whatever, I neither know it, nor do I require to know it."

And when Aristippus asked him again whether he

* See ante, Book II. chap. i. pp. 54 68.
knew anything beautiful, “Yes, many things,” replied Socrates. “Do they then all resemble each other?” inquired Aristippus. “Some of them,” replied Socrates, “are as unlike one another as it is possible for them to be.” “How, then, can the beautiful be unlike the beautiful?” “Because, by Jupiter,” said Socrates, “a man who is beautifully formed for running is unlike another who is beautifully formed for wrestling, and a shield which is beautifully made for resisting blows is very different in every single particular from a javelin which is beautifully made for being hurled forcibly and swiftly.” “You answer me,” said Aristippus, “exactly as you did when I asked you whether you knew anything good.” “And do you imagine,” asked Socrates, “that the Good is one thing and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that, with reference to the same objects, everything that is beautiful is also good? Thus, for instance, in the first place, virtue is not good with reference to some objects, and beautiful in regard to others. Again, too, in like manner, human beings are designated as beautiful and good in reference to the same objects, and human bodies appear beautiful and good in reference to the same objects. And so all other things which are subservient to men’s uses are considered beautiful and good in reference to those points in which they answer their purposes.” “Can, then, a dung-basket be a beautiful thing?” asked Aristippus. “Yes, by Jupiter,
it can," answered Socrates; "and a golden shield may be an ugly thing, if the former be well-made, so as to be adapted for its particular use, and the latter ill-made." "You maintain, then, that the same things can be both beautiful and ugly?" "Yes, by Jupiter, I do maintain it, and also that the same things may be good and bad; for frequently that which is good for hunger is bad for a fever, and what is good for a fever is bad for hunger. And often what is beautiful in running is ugly in wrestling, and what is beautiful in wrestling is ugly in running. In a word, whatever is good is also beautiful in reference to those objects to which it is well-adapted, and whatever is bad is ugly in respect to those objects to which it is ill-adapted."

And when he said, too, that the houses which were beautiful were also useful, he seemed to me at least to teach us what sort of houses we should build. And he speculated on the subject thus:—"Pray, ought not he who cares to have a house built as it should be, contrive so that it should be as pleasant and convenient as possible to live in?" This being admitted, he proceeded—"Is it not, then, pleasant for it to be cool in summer and warm in winter?" And when his hearers had assented to this proposition, he continued—"Does not the sun, in such houses as front the south, shine obliquely during the winter-time into the porticos, while in the summer it passes vertically over the roofs,
and affords us shade? Is it not well, therefore, if at any rate this position be a good one for a house, to build it in such a way that it shall be highest towards the south, so that the winter sun may not be shut out, and lower towards the north, so that the cold winds may not beat upon it so violently? To speak as concisely as possible, that would be probably the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling-house to which the owner could most agreeably betake himself at all seasons, and in which he could most safely deposit his goods. Paintings and decorations deprive us of more pleasure than they afford."* And he said that the sites most appropriate for temples and altars were those which were most exposed to view, and yet the least frequented; for that it was pleasant for people to look upon the worshippers while they were praying, and to be able to approach the temple without fear of contamination.†

* Socrates here doubtless alludes to the mural paintings and decorations with which the ancient Athenians were fond of adorning the insides of their houses. In order that these might not be injured by the climate, the chambers which contained them were in the innermost part of the building, so that they might be as far removed as possible from the influence of the sun's rays. Hence those rooms which were so decorated were generally the darkest and most cheerless, and, moreover, the keeping them in order was a constant source of expense.

† Contact with diseased persons, corpses, criminals, and other causes of defilement were more likely to occur in a crowded than in a lonely neighbourhood; and the law was that no one who laboured under defilement should be allowed to approach the temples and altars for the sake of joining in any religious ceremony.
And being asked again whether courage could be taught, or whether it was a gift of nature, "I think," said he, "that as one body is formed by nature more capable of enduring labour than another body, so also that one soul by nature meets danger with more fortitude than does another soul; for I perceive that men who are brought up under the very same laws and institutions differ very much from one another in daring. I hold, however, that by education and practice all natures are capable of being improved in bravery; for it is evident that the Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bucklers and spears to fight against the Spartans, and it is plain, too, that the Spartans would not like to engage either the Thracians with small shields and javelins or the Scythians with bows. And I see that men differ from each other equally in their nature with regard to all other matters besides these, and that they improve considerably by practice. Hence it is manifest that those who are the most gifted, and those who by nature are the dullest, should both study and practise those acquirements in which they desire to excel.

He drew no distinction between wisdom and temperance, for he considered a man who knew what was honour-
able and good, and how to practise it, and who, recognising what was base, had the power to withstand it, to be both wise and temperate. Being asked, again, whether he esteemed those who, knowing what was their duty, acted in opposition to that knowledge, as wise and continent, he said—"I regard such people merely as foolish and intemperate characters, for I suppose that every one, in any case in which it is possible for him to do so, chooses that which he thinks will be best for him, and acts accordingly. And my opinion is, that those who do not act rightly are neither wise nor temperate."

He asserted, too, that justice and every kind of virtue was wisdom, for that all just and virtuous deeds were honourable and good, and that those who could recognise this fact would never prefer any other actions to these; while they who could not perceive this would never perform such actions, but would commit some error even if they undertook them. Hence that the wise acted honourably and well, but that the unwise were not able so to act, or else committed some mistake if they made the attempt. And that since all just deeds, and whatsoever things are honourable and good, are carried out in accordance with virtue, it was manifest that both justice and every other kind of virtue was wisdom.

He asserted that the opposite of wisdom was insanity, but he did not reckon ignorance as insanity, although
for a man not to know himself, and to fancy and believe that he knows things of which he is ignorant, he considered as a very near approach to insanity. People in general, he remarked, do not say that those are insane who make mistakes upon points of which the majority of mankind are ignorant, but they call those insane who go wrong in regard to matters with which almost every one is familiar. Thus, if a man should fancy himself so tall as to stoop when going through the gates of the city wall, or so strong as to attempt to lift up houses, or to address himself to any task which every one knew to be utterly impracticable, people would say that he was insane; but that those who make trifling mistakes are not usually considered insane, but as people generally designate strong desire "love," so they call great aberration of intellect "insanity."

And when speculating upon the nature of envy, he defined it as being a certain kind of sorrow entertained not on account of the misfortunes of friends, nor resulting from the prosperity of enemies, but he asserted that the envious were never vexed but at the good success of their friends. Hence, when certain persons professed astonishment at any one's feeling grieved at the prosperity of his friends, he reminded them that many men are so disposed towards others that although they would never neglect them in adversity, but would render them any assistance in their misfortunes, yet they are annoyed at their prosperity. A sensible man, he
affirmed, would never entertain these feelings, but the foolish were constantly subject to them.

And when considering what want of occupation was, he said that he found that all men, indeed, were occupied in some way or another, but yet that the majority were unoccupied; for that dice-players and buffoons were employed, but yet, he declared that all such individuals were unoccupied, for that they had it in their power to betake themselves to other avocations better than those. He did not hold that a man was unoccupied by giving up a good employment for a worse, but that any one who did so, as he had once been well employed, was acting viciously in this respect.

Kings and commanders, he maintained, were not those merely who wielded sceptres, or were elected by some haphazard, or chosen by lot, or who had obtained their position by violence or fraud, but those who understood the art of government. For when some one admitted that it devolved upon a governor to issue orders, and upon the governed to obey them, he showed how that on board ship it was the experienced man who took the command, while the steersman and all the crew and passengers obeyed him. In agriculture, too, he argued, that those who were landholders; in sickness, those who were ill; in bodily exercises, those who trained their bodies, and in all other pursuits, those who were engaged in any business requiring care, took the personal superintendence of it if they thought they understood it; but
if not, that they were not only willing to listen to any experienced person who might be at hand, but would even send for those who were at a distance, in order that, by acting under their directions, they might do that which was proper. He showed, too, that in woollen-work women dictated to men; for that the former understood how it should be done, while the latter did not. And if any one objected to this argument, that a tyrant should not be guided by judicious advisers—"And why," Socrates would reply, "should he not be guided by them, seeing that a penalty attaches to any one who does not listen to a good adviser? For in whatever matter a person refuses to act upon the advice of a judicious monitor, he will assuredly commit some error; and if he does commit an error, he will pay the penalty." And if any one happened to remark that a tyrant might even put a wise counsellor to death, he said—"And do you think that he who destroys his best allies can escape the penalty of so doing, or that he only runs a chance of incurring misfortunes? And do you imagine that he will by such a course of action be more likely to live in safety, or to bring himself to speedy ruin?"

And when another asked him what he thought the worthiest object of man's pursuit, he replied—"Well-doing." And when he was asked, again, whether he considered good fortune as an object that should be pursued, he answered—"I regard good fortune and action as
opposites in every respect; for when a person who requires anything lights upon it by chance, that I hold to be good fortune; but for a person to perform any virtuous action by dint of learning and practice, that I consider to be well-doing. And those who make this the object of their pursuit appear to me to act as they ought to do."

And he maintained that the best men and the dearest to the gods were those who, in agriculture, performed their agricultural tasks well; in medicine, their medical, and in politics, their political duties; but that a man who did nothing well, was neither useful for any purpose, nor dear to the gods.

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CHAPTER X.

But, moreover, whenever he chanced to converse with any who practised the arts, and employed them as a means of gaining a livelihood, even to such he was of service. Thus upon one occasion, when visiting Parrhasius, the painter, he said to him, in the course of conversation, "Tell me, Parrhasius, is not painting the art of portraying visible objects? At any rate, you painters imitate concavity and convexity, light and
shade, hardness and softness, the rough or the smooth, and old or new substances by representing them through the medium of colours." "You speak truly," replied Parrhasius. "When, then, you would represent beautiful forms, since it is not easy to find one human being perfect in every respect, do you, by selecting out of many models that which is best in each, so produce figures which as a whole are faultless?" "We do so," answered the painter. "And do you also portray the disposition of the mind according as it may be most persuasively, most agreeably, most amicably, most regretfully, or most lovingly inclined? Or is this inimitable?" "How can that be imitated, Socrates, which has neither proportion, nor colour, nor any of those qualities which you just now indicated, and which is totally invisible?" "But cannot a man wear an expression either of friendship or of hatred when looking at another?" "I think he can," answered Parrhasius. "Cannot that expression, then, be imitated by the expression imparted to the eyes?" "Certainly," replied the other. "And do those who take a lively interest in the good or evil fortune of their friends, and those who do not, appear to you to wear the same kind of expression in either case?" "No, by Jupiter, they do not; for they look cheerful at their successes, and melancholy at their failures." "Is it not, then," asked Socrates, "possible to imitate these looks also?" "Undoubtedly it is," answered Parrhasius. "Surely, then,"
said Socrates, "nobility and liberality of disposition, meanness and illiberality, sobriety and good sense, insolence and rusticity, show themselves in the countenances and gestures of men either in their standing or their moving postures." "You speak truly," said Parrhasius. "Cannot these expressions, then, be imitated?" asked Socrates. "Certainly," replied the other. "Whether do you think, then," continued Socrates, "that men look with most pleasure on representations of good and honourable and amiable characters, or on those of the base and the depraved and the hateful?" "There is, by Jupiter," exclaimed Parrhasius, "a vast difference between them."

And once while visiting Cleito, the statuary, and conversing with him, he said, "I see and know, Cleito, that you make statues of all kinds, as of runners, and wrestlers, and boxers, and pancratiasts;* but how do you impart to your figures that lifelike appearance which so engages men's minds as they gaze upon them?" And when Cleito hesitated, and did not give an immediate answer, "Do you," asked Socrates, "make your statues more lifelike by assimilating your work to living models?" "Certainly," replied Cleito. "Do you not thus make those parts of the body

* The name given to those athletes who contended in the pancratia, or matches both for boxing and wrestling. The word signifies "power of all kinds;" and these combats, demanding great strength and activity, developed the muscles, and were only engaged in by athletes who were in high training, and were thus the best models.
which are apparently drawn up or down, compressed or separated, stretched out or relaxed, more like truth and reality in their gestures?" "Undoubtedly," answered Cleito. "And does not the accurate representation of the bodily feelings of those who are engaged in any action afford a certain degree of pleasure to the spectators?" "It is probable, at any rate, that it would do so." "Must you not, then, copy the menacing looks of the combatants, and must not the joyful expression of the victors be faithfully represented?" "Certainly," replied Cleito. "The sculptor, therefore, should express the workings of the mind by the form."

Going once to Pistias, the corslet-maker, and Pistias having shown him some well-made corslets, he said, "By Juno, what an excellent invention is this, Pistias, by which you can cover a man's breast, which is the part that needs protection, while it leaves him at liberty to use his hands. But tell me, Pistias," he continued, "why, since your corslets are neither stronger nor more costly than those of other makers, do you command a higher price for them than they do?" "Because, Socrates," replied Pistias, "I make them better proportioned than others." "And is this proportion perceptible in the measure or weight of each corslet, so as to make it evident that it is worth more; for surely you do not make them all alike in size and weight, if they are to fit different persons?"
"But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Pistias, "I do so make them; for without this, a corslet would be of no use."
"But are not the bodies of some men well, and of others ill proportioned?" asked Socrates. "Undoubtedly," replied Pistias. "How, then," continued Socrates, "can you make a well-proportioned corslet suit an ill-proportioned body?" "By making it fit; for one which fits is well-proportioned." "You appear to me," rejoined Socrates, "to talk of good proportion not as an abstract quality, but simply in relation to the individual, just as you might say of a shield or a cloak that it is well-proportioned to him that wears it; and the same rule seems, according to what you say, to apply to other things also. But perhaps there may be some decided advantage gained by making corslets to fit."
"Tell me, Socrates," said Pistias, "if you know any."
"Those corslets which fit are less oppressive by their weight than those that do not fit, although one is, in reality, as heavy as the other; while those that do not fit, either from their dragging at the shoulders, or pressing too much upon some other part of the body, are galling and inconvenient. But those which fit, by distributing their weight partly over the collar-bone and scapula, partly over the shoulders, partly over the breast, partly over the back, and partly over the stomach, are little felt as a burden to be borne, but seem rather like a natural appendage." "You have mentioned the very reason why I consider my corslets to be worth
more than others," said Pistias. "Nevertheless, some people prefer purchasing ornamental and gilded corslets." "Yet," said Socrates, "if, for the sake of such decorations, they forego the question of their fit, they seem to be purchasing an ornamental and gilded nuisance. But," he continued, "since the body does not always remain in the same posture, but is sometimes stooping, and at other times upright, how can corslets that are made to fit it exactly, be well adapted for wear?" "They are not so, by any means," replied Pistias. "You would imply," said Socrates, "that those corslets which are best adapted for wear are not the most accurately fitting ones, but those that do not gall the wearer." "The observations you yourself make upon the matter, Socrates, are correct, and you comprehend the subject most clearly."

CHAPTER XI.

There being at one time in the city a beautiful woman, named Theodota, who was willing to be on intimate terms with any one who would pay her court, and some one who was in Socrates' company talking of her, and saying that her beauty beggared description, and
that all the painters, to whom she displayed her various charms, were anxious that she should sit to them,— "We must go," said Socrates, "to see her, for it is impossible to comprehend by hearsay that which surpasses description." "You had better, then, lose no time in following me," said he who had broached the subject.

Repairing, therefore, to Theodota's house, and finding her standing to a painter, they inspected her. And when the painter had finished, Socrates said—"Ought we, gentlemen, to express our obligations to Theodota for having exhibited her charms to us, or she to us for our having inspected them? For, if the exhibition is rather to her advantage, does she not owe her acknowledgments to us? but if the balance of pleasure derived from the sight is on our side, ought we not to feel grateful to her?" And when some one remarked that his observations were just, he continued thus: "As matters now stand, then, she obtains present admiration from us, and will gain future profit, when we have mentioned her to others. Whereas we, who at this moment desire to enjoy the charms we have beheld, shall go away disquieted, and when we have gone away shall be tormented by longing regrets; and thus we shall be her slaves, and she will be our mistress." And Theodota exclaimed—"By Jupiter, if this is really so, I indeed ought to be obliged to you for coming to see me."

And soon after this, finding her most expensively appareled, with her mother attired and adorned in a
manner above the common, and with a large retinue of female servants, who were both good-looking, and even, although in a menial capacity, not carelessly dressed, and her house luxuriously appointed in every other respect, Socrates said—"Tell me, Theodota, do you possess any landed property?" "Not I," said she. "But perhaps you have a house that brings you in an income?" "Neither have I a house," answered she. "Do you not, then, employ workmen?"* "No, I do not," said she. "How, then," asked Socrates, "do you manage to live?" "If any one of my admirers," replied she, "is generous to me, I live upon him." "By Juno, Theodota," exclaimed Socrates, "what a fine property is such a man! and it is much better to own a flock of friends, than of sheep, or oxen, or goats. But," he continued, "do you trust to chance for a friend to wing his way to you like a fly, or do you yourself employ some contrivance to attract him?" "And why should I seek for any contrivance in order to effect this?" asked Theodota. "Much more appropriately, by Juno," replied he, "than the spiders do; for you know how they procure their sustenance. They weave fine webs, and feed upon whatever falls into them." "And do you advise me," she asked, "to weave a web to catch something?" "You do not surely imagine

* It was not at all unusual for the highest families in Athens to compel their slaves to work at various trades during their spare time, and the produce of their extra labour often added largely to the income of their owners.
that you will secure friends, that prey which of all others is most worth capturing, without craft? Do you not see what numerous acts hare-hunters have recourse to, although the value of the animal is so trifling? For as hares feed in the night, men provide night-hounds to track them with, and as they slink under cover of a day, they therefore procure other hounds, which, by their scent, trace out the way they took from their feeding grounds to their forms; and because they are so swift of foot as to get clean out of sight by running, men also employ fleet dogs, so that they may be captured by coursing. And forasmuch as even then some of them escape the dogs, they place nets across the paths by which they flee, so that they may fall into them, and thus become entangled.” “And by what device,” asked Theodota, “can I hunt down friends?” “By employing some individual instead of a dog, by Jupiter, to trace out and discover for you men who are admirers of beauty, and have money, and who, when he has discovered them, will contrive to entangle them in your nets.” “And what sort of nets have I?” asked she. “One you have, at any rate,” answered he, “which is eminently well adapted to enfold victims—viz., your person; and within it you possess an instinct which tells you how you may give pleasure by a glance, and by what sort of conversation you can captivate a man, and how you ought to receive affably one that pays you attention, and to reject him who treats you
with disdain; how to nurse tenderly a friend who is in ill health, and to sympathise greatly with him in any success that he has achieved, and to show gratitude in your soul to one who cares sincerely for you. The art of loving tenderly I am indeed well assured that you understand, and not only that, but of loving with sincere good-will; and your friends like you because you conciliate them not by words alone, but by deeds." "But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Theodota, "I do not plot to bring about any of these results." "And yet," continued Socrates, "it is of great importance to humour a man's nature and treat him judiciously, for you can neither make nor keep a friend by force, albeit he is an animal that is easily captured and secured by kind treatment and a sense of gratification." "You speak truly," said she. "You must, then," he continued, "in the first place, make upon those who have a regard for you such demands only as will give them the least possible trouble; and, in the next, you must requite them by gratifying them in the same manner, for so they would be most likely to befriend you, and to love you the longest, and do you the most kindnesses. And you will please them most by granting them your favours upon their own solicitation only, for you know that even the most savoury viands appear distasteful if one places them before a person when he does not care for them, and that they even disgust those who have eaten to satiety. But if one offers them after having excited a craving
for them, they are exceedingly relishable, even although they are of a very indifferent kind." "But how," asked she, "can I excite such a craving in any one of those who come to me?" "First, by Jupiter," replied he, "by not obtruding yourself upon those who are already satiated, or even reminding them of yourself, until, having recovered from their satiety, they again feel a desire for your company. In the next place, when they do show such a desire, remind them of yourself by modest familiarity, and by showing your willingness to gratify them, while, at the same time, you hold off until their ardour becomes very demonstrative. For the same gifts become much more enhanced in value when people long for them, than if they are bestowed at a time when no such longing is felt." And Theodota said—"Why, then, Socrates, do you not become my fellow-hunter in the pursuit of lovers?" "So I will, by Jupiter," exclaimed he, "if you can persuade me." "How," returned she, "can I persuade you?" "You will discover the way to do this, and manage it for yourself, if you find that you have any need of me." "Come to me, then," said she, "very often." And Socrates, making a joke of his own love of retirement, answered—"But, Theodota, it is not by any means easy for me to find time to do so, inasmuch as my own numerous engagements, both private and public,* leave

* Socrates must have either mentioned his "public engagements" as a joke, or else have meant that he prepared others for public life,
me no leisure. Moreover, I have mistresses who will not suffer me to be absent from them day or night, and who are learning from me the use of love potions and incantations.” "Is this, too, one of the sciences that you profess, Socrates?” asked she. "For what other reason, then," he asked, "do you suppose that Apollo- dorus here and Antisthenes* never leave me, and why else that Cebes and Simmias† come to me from Thebes? Be well assured that all this influence was not obtained without many charms and incantations and magical wheels.” ‡ "Send me, then, your wheel," said she, "that I may set it spinning, to draw you to me before any one else." "But, by Jupiter," answered he, "I do not wish to be drawn to you, but that you although he himself took no part in it. See his conversation with Antipho, as given in the last paragraph of Book I. chap. vi. p. 50 ante.

* Antisthenes, who was the founder of the sect of philosophers known as the Cynics, flourished B.C. 360. Diogenes was the most celebrated individual of this school, the name of which is derived from kuon, "a dog," in allusion to Cynosarge, the gymnasium in which they met, or, as some think, from the nature of their teaching, or lying about the streets and public thoroughfares, and sleeping in tubs, like dogs.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub vo. "Antisthenes" and "Diogenes.”

† Cebes and Simmias, who were brothers, are introduced by Plato in his Phaedon. They were very intimate with Socrates, and were among those who were present at his death. Cf. ante, p. 23.

‡ Literally, "wry-necks." These were small birds, so called either from their cry, or from the constant motion of their heads (Lat. torquilla), which were tied to a wheel having four spokes. The person using the incantation whirled this round, all the time chanting certain words, which were believed to be effectual in producing the desired effect, especially in reclaiming lost lovers.
should come to me." "Well, then, I will come," said she, "and be sure you admit me." "I certainly will do so," answered Socrates, "unless I should have with me any mistress whom I prefer to you."

CHAPTER XII.

Observing that one of his followers, called Epigenes, although he was young, was nevertheless in a bad state of body, he said—"How unlike to that of a professional athlete you keep your body, Epigenes!" And he replied—"I am not a professional athlete, Socrates." "You are no less so," urged Socrates, "than those who are about to contend at the Olympic games.*

* These games, held in honour of Jupiter Olympius every fourth year, were the most renowned of the Greek festivals. They were celebrated on the plain of Olympia, now Antilato or Antilalla, in Elis, a province lying on the western side of the Peloponnesus, now the Morea. The date of their original institution is uncertain; but they were revived B.C. 776, and ever after served as an epoch of Grecian chronology, every forty-ninth month being the commencement of a new Olympiad. Those who gained the prizes were considered to have attained the height of human honour and happiness, and the states of which they were natives, and the families to which they were related, were regarded with admiration by the whole nation. Pindar, the great poet of the Greek games, has given us some splendid odes upon this great gathering, as he has also upon the three other principal festivals, viz., the Pythian, the Nemean, and the Isthmian games. For a full description of them, see Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities," sub vv. "Olympia," "Nemea," "Pythia," "Isthmia;" and for an account of Pindar and his works, the "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voce "Pindarus."
do you regard that struggle for life with the enemy which the Athenians will require of you when the occasion arises as an insignificant one? And yet, in the dangers of war, there are not a few who lose their lives from want of bodily strength, or preserve them by dishonourable means. Many, again, from the same cause, are taken alive, and are doomed as prisoners of war, if they meet with such a fate, to the bitterest slavery for the rest of their lives, or undergoing the most dreadful hardships, and sometimes paying for their ransom more than they possess, they drag out the remainder of their days in the want of common necessaries and the endurance of misery of all kinds. Many, too, acquire an infamous name, being regarded as cowards on account of the weakness of their frames. Do you despise such penalties as attach to a bad condition of the body, or do you think that you can bear them without finding them a grievance? It is certainly my opinion that what he has to endure who trains his body so as to have it in sound condition, is far easier and pleasanter to be borne than those infictions to which I have referred. Or do you consider an unsound condition of body to be generally more healthful and profitable than a good condition? Or do you contemn the advantages which arise from good bodily condition? Yet the consequences of a good state of body are different in every respect from those of a bad state; for those whose bodies are in a good state
are healthy and strong, and many, through this being the case, preserve their lives honourably amid the struggles of war, and also escape all perils. Many, too, succour their friends and benefit their country, and on this account are held worthy of gratitude, acquire great glory, and attain the highest distinction. Hence they both pass their own lives more pleasantly and honourably, and also leave behind them a better provision for their children. Nor, because the state does not insist upon public drilling for war, should we on that account neglect to train ourselves privately, but should do so no less carefully than if we acted under compulsion. For be well assured that neither in any other contest, nor in any undertaking whatever, will you come worse off for having your body better trained. The body bears a part in every action of men’s lives; and in every demand that may be made upon it, it is of great advantage that it should be in the best possible condition; since even in that in which you would suppose there was the least need for bodily exertion, viz., in the power of thinking, who does not know that many fail greatly in this respect on account of their bodies not being in a healthy state; and that forgetfulness, despondency, irritability, and madness, arising from an ill condition of the body, in very many cases attack the intellect so violently as to overthrow the senses? But those who are in good bodily health are generally secure against such mischiefs, and free from any danger of suffering
them, in so far, at all events, as they arise from any ill condition of their bodies. But it is more probable that a good condition of body will be serviceable in producing results diametrically opposite to those produced by a bad condition; and in order to enjoy sensations the reverse of those which we have indicated, what is there which any man in his right mind would not undergo? Moreover, it is disgraceful for a man to grow prematurely old through self-neglect, before proving to himself what he might become if he were in the best and strongest condition of body. And this he cannot prove if he neglects himself; since such results are not usually arrived at without effort."

CHAPTER XIII.

On one occasion, when a certain person was indignant because, when he saluted some one else, the latter did not return the compliment, Socrates exclaimed, "How absurd is it that although, if you had met a man in a bad state of bodily health, you would not have been angry—yet you are annoyed because you have encountered one who is somewhat clownishly disposed in mind!"

And when some one else remarked that he did not
enjoy what he ate, "Acuménus," said Socrates, "prescribes an excellent remedy for that disease." And being asked the nature of it, "To abstain from eating," rejoined Socrates; "for he says that by abstinence you will live more pleasantly, frugally, and healthfully."

Again, when another person complained that the drinking-water at his house was warm, "When you want a warm bath, then," said Socrates, "it will be ready for you." "But it is too cold to bathe in," answered the other. "Do your servants, then," asked Socrates, "object to drinking and bathing in it?" "No, by Jupiter," replied he; "and I have often wondered to see how gladly they use it for both of these purposes." "Pray, which is the warmer," asked Socrates, "your drinking-water, or that at the temple of Æsculapius?" "That at the temple of Æsculapius," answered he. "And which is the colder for bathing in, yours or that at the temple of Amphiaraus?" *

* A physician in practice in Athens, was a cotemporary and friend of Socrates. He is mentioned by Plato in the "Phædrus," and also by Leo Allatius in his "Epist. Socratis et Socraticorum," 4to, Paris, 1637, and Orellius.

† Æsculapius, the god of healing and the medical art, was worshipped not only generally throughout Greece, but also in many other countries of the ancient world. His temples, the most renowned of which was at Epidaurus, were usually built outside the towns, in the most healthy situations that could be selected, and near wells or fountains which were believed to have healing properties.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voce "Æsculapius;" of "Antiquities" under "Asclepieia," and of "Geography" under "Epidaurus."

† Amphiaraus, who was one of the two survivors after the war against Thebes, and was fabled to have been swallowed up by the earth, and
"That at the temple of Amphiaraus," he said. "Consider, then," rejoined Socrates, "how near you are to being more difficult to please than servants and sick people."

And when some one was chastising an attendant severely, Socrates asked him why he was so angry with his servant. "Because," replied the other, "he is very gluttonous, very stupid, very covetous, and very lazy." "And have you ever reflected, then, which deserves the most stripes, you or your servant?" asked Socrates.

Another man feeling nervous at having to travel to Olympia, Socrates asked him, "Why do you dread the journey? Do you not walk about at home almost the whole day? And if you go thither, you will walk and dine, walk and sup, and then go to rest. Do you not know that if you were to stretch out into one line the walks which you take in five or six days, you would soon get from Athens to Olympia? And it is better for you to start a day too soon than to procrastinate; for it is irksome to be obliged to lengthen your stages beyond a moderate distance; but to take shorter ones, by spending one more day on the journey, is most con-

afterwards made immortal by Jupiter, was worshipped as a hero first at Oropus, a town on the borders of Attica and Boeotia, near which a magnificent temple was founded to him, and afterwards throughout Greece. His oracle ranked among the five principal ones, and a full account of it will be found in Smith's "Dictionary of Antiquities," sub voce "Oraculum."
venient. Therefore, it is better to start early, than to be hurried on the road."

Another, saying that he was quite prostrated by the fatigue of a long journey, Socrates asked him whether he had carried any burthen. "Not I, by Jupiter," answered he, "except only my cloak." "And did you travel alone," continued Socrates, "or had you an attendant with you as well?" "I had an attendant," replied he. "Was he empty-handed," asked Socrates, "or did he carry something?" "He carried our bed-clothes, by Jupiter, and the rest of our utensils." "And how did he get over the journey?" inquired Socrates. "Much better than I did, I think," replied the other. "But suppose you had been compelled to carry his load, how do you think you would have fared then?" "Wretchedly, by Jupiter," exclaimed he; "or rather, I should never have been able to have carried it at all." "How, then, does it seem becoming to you that a man who is trained to exercise, should be less able to bear fatigue than a slave?"

CHAPTER XIV.

And on one occasion, when some people had met to sup together, some of whom had brought very little meat
with them, while others had furnished a large supply,* Socrates ordered the slave either to place on the table the small quantity for every one to partake of in common, or else to apportion to each one his share. Then they who had contributed a great deal were ashamed to partake of that which was put on table for general consumption, without having what they had furnished placed upon the table also. This, therefore, was likewise added to the general stock; and so when they were helped to no more than those who had contributed only a little, they discontinued purchasing provisions at a great cost.

And observing that a certain person at a supper took no bread, but ate his meat entirely without it, a discussion having arisen about names with regard to the reason why any particular epithet should be bestowed, "Can we, gentlemen," asked Socrates, "tell why a man is called a 'meat-eater'?" For all people eat meat with their bread when they can get it; but I do not imagine that they are ever designated as 'meat-eaters' on that account." "I should not suppose they were," said one of the company. "But," resumed Socrates, "supposing a man to eat his meat without bread, not because he was in training, but simply because he preferred doing

* It was a common custom at Athens for several people to meet at a sort of club-dinner or picnic, held for convivial or charitable purposes, and for each guest to bring his own dish; or else some one individual provided for all upon the payment of a fixed sum per head. —See Smith's "Dictionary of Antiquities," sub voce "Erani."
so, would he seem to be a 'meat-eater' or not?"

"Scarcely any man could be more so," remarked the other. And another of the guests asked, "And what of him who eats a great deal of meat with a very little bread?" "To me," replied Socrates, "it appears that he, too, deserves the name of a 'meat-eater,' and at a time when others would pray to the gods for an abundance of corn, he very likely would pray for a plentiful supply of meat." And when Socrates had thus spoken, the young man, thinking that his discourse was directed against him, did not indeed leave off eating meat, but took some bread with it. Then Socrates, seeing that he did so, said, "You that are sitting near this youth, notice whether he takes bread with his meat or meat with his bread."

At another time, noticing that one of the company partook of a great variety of dishes with one small morsel of bread, he said, "Can any cookery be more extravagant, or more apt to spoil the food, than that which he indulges in who partakes of several dishes at the same meal, and impregnates his mouth with all sorts of flavours at the same time? As he mixes up more ingredients than the cooks do, he makes what he eats more expensive, and such things as they abstain from mixing, on the ground that they are incongruous, he, by mingling together, commits a blunder (if at least they are right), and renders their skill of no avail. And how can it be otherwise than absurd for a man
to provide the best and most experienced cooks, and then, although he claims for himself no knowledge of their art, to spoil everything that has been prepared by them? Besides this, there is another evil which arises from a man's partaking of many dishes at the same time, viz., that if there is not a great variety upon the table, he thinks that he is stinted; and misses that to which he has been accustomed. But he who uses himself to one dish, with one piece of bread, will be perfectly satisfied with that one when there are not a variety placed before him."

He also remarked, that to "fare well" applied, in the Athenian language, to "eating," and that the "well" was added to indicate such food as neither disagreed with the mind or the body. Hence he said that those "fared well" who lived temperately.
BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates was also so serviceable in every transaction and for every kind of business, that even to any one who has but a limited understanding, it must be evident that nothing could be more conducive to a man's interest than to have been intimate with him, and to have spent one's time with him upon every opportunity. For even the recollection of him, now that he has passed away from us,* is no small advantage to those who were accustomed to associate with him and to listen to him; for he benefited his intimates no less when he was jesting than when he was in earnest. For he would, perhaps, often say that he

* The death of Socrates took place B.C. 399. The Memorabilia were written probably about B.C. 390.
loved some one, yet it was evident that he did not do so on account of the beauty of their persons, but of their minds, being enamoured of those who were by nature well disposed toward virtue. And he judged of the goodness of people's abilities from their quickness in mastering any subject to which they might apply themselves, and recollecting what they had learned, and being anxious to acquire all such branches of knowledge as are available for the well ordering of a household or a state, or to the general good management of men and of human affairs; for he said that such, when they had been duly educated, would not only be happy themselves and good managers of their own households, but that they would make other men and other states happy. He did not, however, approach every one in the same way; but to those who rated their natural abilities so highly as to despise instruction, he taught that those abilities which were apparently the best the most needed instruction; pointing out to them that of horses, those of the purest breed, being the most spirited and restive, if they are broken in when young, become the most useful and valuable, but if they are not broken in, remain the most unmanageable and worthless; and of the best-bred dogs, which are both hard-working and fond of attacking wild animals, that those which are highly trained prove the keenest and most serviceable in the chase, whereas, if they are untrained, they are useless, wild, and refractory. In like manner with re-
gard to men who possessed the best natural abilities
and the greatest strength of mind, and who were the
most energetic in everything that they undertook, that
those who were best educated and instructed in their
duties became the most valuable and useful, for they
accomplished the most numerous and important good
deeds; whereas, if they were uneducated and re-
mained without instruction, they became the vilest
and most mischievous characters; for, from not under-
standing how to discern their duties, they frequently
embarked in evil enterprises, and being arrogant and ob-
stinate, were difficult to be restrained or diverted from
their purpose. Hence they worked the most numerous
and the most irreparable mischiefs.

And those who prided themselves upon their riches,
and fancied that they had no need of instruction, under
the impression that their wealth was sufficient for them
to carry out all their designs and procure them universal
homage, he brought to their senses by saying, that he
would be a fool indeed who should suppose that he
could distinguish between what was good and what was
evil without instruction; and that any one was an idiot
who, though he could not make such a distinction, yet
imagined that by means of his wealth he could procure
every object of his wishes, and accomplish all that was
most advantageous for him. He said, too, that a man
must be void of sense who, not being able to accomplish
that which was advantageous to him, should suppose
that he could be prosperous, and that every condition of his life was either well or sufficiently provided for; and that he was equally void of sense who, being without any understanding, yet thought that, on account of his wealth, he would pass as being good for something; or that, being evidently good for nothing, he would nevertheless enjoy a good reputation.

CHAPTER II.

I will now relate how he bore himself towards those who thought that they had attained to the very highest pitch of instruction, and prided themselves upon their acquirements. Hearing, for instance, that Euthydemus, surnamed the "handsome," had made a large collection of the writings of the most renowned poets and sophists, and fancied that by their means he was already superior to his contemporaries in wisdom, and entertained great hopes of surpassing them all in his ability both as a speaker and a man of action; first having ascertained that he had not yet engaged in any public business* on account of his youth, but that if he wished to transact

* Literally "entered into the agora," or market-place (in Rome, the forum), where all public business was transacted, the legal age for engaging in which was twenty.
any, he stationed himself at a certain saddler's shop of those that were near the market-place, Socrates also went thither himself, taking with him certain companions. And upon some one's inquiring whether it was from association with some one of the wise men, or from his own natural capacity, that Themistocles so far excelled his fellow-citizens that the whole state looked to him whenever it stood in need of a distinguished man, Socrates, wishing to draw out Euthydemus, said that it was absurd, forsooth, to imagine that men could not become distinguished in arts, that were but of small account without competent instructors, but that the ability to preside over the state, which was a task of the greatest difficulty of any, accrued to men spontaneously.

And when Euthydemus was present on another occasion, seeing him about to leave the company, as if he wished to be on his guard against seeming to admire Socrates on account of his wisdom, the latter remarked:— "When, my friends, our Euthydemus here arrives at the proper age, and any state question is proposed for discussion, it is very evident, from the nature of his studies, that he will not hold himself aloof from its councils, and I fancy that he has already prepared a splendid proem for his public orations, taking precautions against being supposed to have learned anything from anybody. It is clear, then, that when he commences his harangue, his exordium will be something in this style:— 'O men of Athens! never at any time have I learnt anything from
anybody, nor, if I have been informed that there were certain individuals who were clever both in speech and action, have I ever sought their company, nor have I been careful that any of the knowing ones should become my teacher. Nay, I have even pursued the opposite course, for I constantly avoided not only learning anything from anybody, but even the appearance of so doing. Nevertheless, such opinions as suggest themselves to me spontaneously, I will submit to you for your consideration.' So, on the part of those who were seeking to obtain a government medical appointment, it might answer for them to begin a speech thus:—'I, O men of Athens! have never at any time learned the medical art from any one, nor have I been desirous to obtain any medical man as my teacher, for I have constantly avoided not only learning anything from the medical men, but even the appearance of having studied this science. Nevertheless, confer upon me this appointment, for I will endeavour to educate myself by experimentalising upon you.' Then all the company laughed at this specimen of an exordium.

And since it was now evident that Euthydemus was paying attention to Socrates' remarks, but yet was himself guarding against making any observations, under the impression that by his silence he would become invested with a reputation for modesty, Socrates, wishing to check any such notion, said—"Surely it is strange to conceive for what reason those who wish to
play the lyre or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any similar accomplishments, should endeavour to practise as unremittingly as possible those arts in which they desire to excel, and this not only by themselves, but by the aid of those who are held to be masters in them, doing and undergoing everything for the sake of never acting without their sanction, as being convinced that they cannot under any other conditions attain celebrity; while of those who desire to become eminent orators or politicians, there are some who fancy that they will become spontaneously, and on the spur of the moment, capable of accomplishing their object. And yet, by how much these latter are more difficult to master than the former, appears plainly from the fact that although a far greater number of people are engaged in them, a much smaller proportion succeed. It is evident, therefore, that those who aim at the one require more extensive and decided training than those who seek the other."

So then, at first, Socrates would only make such remarks as these, while Euthydemus heard him as if by chance. But when he noticed that the latter stayed more willingly while he was discoursing, and that he listened more attentively, he at last went by himself to the saddler's shop, and as Euthydemus approached and sat down beside him, he said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really, as I hear you have, made a vast collection of the writings of those men who are reported
to have been wise?" "Yes, by Jupiter, I have," replied the other; "and I am still collecting, until I shall have become possessed of as many as I can possibly procure." "Then, by Juno," rejoined Socrates, "I admire you, in that you have not preferred the acquisition of the treasures of gold and silver to that of wisdom; for you manifestly hold that silver and gold are unable to make men better, but that the sentiments of the wise enrich their possessors with virtue." And Euthydemus was pleased at hearing these remarks, as thinking that he appeared to Socrates to be seeking after wisdom according to right principles. But Socrates, perceiving that he was gratified with his commendation, asked—"And in what particular branch is it that you wish to excel, that you collect these writings?" And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should give, Socrates again asked—"Is it as a physician, for there is a vast collection of the writings of physicians?" "Not I, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus. "Do you wish, then, to become an architect, for a man of sense is needed for that profession also?" "Not I, indeed," answered the other. "Would you desire to be a good geometrician, then, like Theodorus?" * "Nor a geometrician

* Theodorus of Cyrene was a Pythagorean philosopher contemporary with Pericles (circa B.C. 470-430); and it is stated by some writers that Plato went to Cyrene for the express purpose of attending his mathematical lectures.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voce "Theodorus of Cyrene."
either," rejoined Euthydemus. "Would you be an astronomer, then?" asked Socrates. And when the latter said "No," "A rhapsodist,* then?" suggested Socrates; "for it is reported that you possess the whole of Homer's poems." "Not I, indeed," exclaimed Euthydemus; "for I know that the rhapsodists, although they are most accurately acquainted with all the Homeric poems, yet in other things are, as men, excessively foolish." Then Socrates said, "Perhaps, then, Euthydemus, you aim at acquiring that sort of faculty by which men become good politicians and economists, capable of governing, and useful equally to others as well as to themselves?" "I ardently desire, Socrates," answered the other, "to become possessed of that faculty." "Then, by Jupiter," rejoined Socrates, "you aim at the noblest faculty, and at the most exalted science; for this is the very art peculiar to kings, and is designated the 'royal art.' But," he continued, "have you ever considered whether it was possible for an unjust man to excel in it?" "Certainly I have,"

* The rhapsodists were so called from ῥαψοτομ ψηφή (rhapto od), to "sew or piece together," because they went about reciting passages taken from the Epic poets. Some of them, it is said, cultivated their memories to such an extent that they could repeat whole books of Homer. Hence Socrates asks Euthydemus whether it was with a view of learning them by heart that he had made such a large collection of them. The most popular of these rhapsodists were Hippias, Stesimbrotus of Thasos, and Metrodorus of Lampsacus. — See "A Critical History of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece," by William Mure, of Caldwell (8vo, London, 1853), vol. iv. p 95, and Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, sub voce, ραψοδός.
replied Euthydemus; "and a man cannot be even a good citizen without a sense of justice." "Well, then," said Socrates, "have you acquired this?" "I think, Socrates," answered Euthydemus, "that I should appear no less a just man than any other." "Are there, then, works of just men as there are of artisans?" "Decidedly there are," replied the other. "As, then, artisans are able to point to their works, so the just would be able to detail theirs." "Why should I not be able," asked Euthydemus, "to detail the works of justice? and, by Jupiter, as I think, those of injustice too? for we may see and hear of no small number of such things every day." "Shall we, then," suggested Socrates, "write on one side a D, and on the other an A, and under the D place whatever seems to us to be a work of justice, and under the A whatever appears to be one of injustice?"* "If you think that we require these letters, make them." Then Socrates, having written the letters as he had proposed, said, "Is there such a thing existing among mankind as falsehood?" "Of course there is," answered Euthydemus. "Under which head, then," asked Socrates, "shall we range this?" "Evidently," said Euthydemus, "under that of injustice." "And again," asked Socrates, "is there such a thing as deceit?" "Unquestionably," replied the other. "And under which

* Δ (D). being the initial letter of δίκαιος (dikaios), "just," and Α that of ἄδικος (adikos), "unjust."
head shall we place this?" "No doubt, also under that of injustice," answered Euthydemus. "And what about villany?" "That is injustice too." "And slavery?" "Again under injustice." "Shall we then, Euthydemus, place none of these under the head of justice?" "It would be a wonderful thing," replied Euthydemus, "if we did that." "How so?" asked Socrates. "Supposing, for instance, that any general had captured an aggressive and hostile state, and reduced its inhabitants to slavery, should we say that he had committed an act of injustice?" "Certainly not," replied Euthydemus. "Nay, should we not rather say that he had acted justly?" "Undoubtedly." "And what if, while he was at war with his enemies, he should deceive them?" "That, too," said Euthydemus, "would be just." "And if he should abstract and carry off their property, would he not be acting justly?" "Assuredly he would," said Euthydemus; "but I supposed at first that you were only putting your questions in reference to our conduct towards our friends." "Must we not, then," continued Socrates, "place also under the head of justice all those things which we have placed under that of injustice?" "So it seems," replied the other. "Are you willing, then, that, after having so placed them, we should make a new distinction, and say that it is just to act thus towards our enemies, but unjust with regard to our friends, and that towards the latter we
should conduct ourselves as guilelessly as possible?” "I consent to such a distinction," said Euthydemus. "Well, then," asked Socrates, "supposing any general, seeing his troops dispirited, should falsely tell them that auxiliaries were at hand, and by this falsehood should put an end to their despondency, under which head are we to place such an act of deceit?" "In my opinion," said Euthydemus, "under that of justice." "And if any parent whose son required medical treatment, but would not take medicine, should deceive him by giving him his medicine as food, and by this piece of deception should restore him to health, on which side again are we to place such an act of deceit as this?" "As it appears to me," said Euthydemus, "upon the same side." "Well, then, supposing a man for fear lest his friend, who was in a state of despondency, should commit suicide, were to steal or convey away his sword, or any other weapon of a similar kind, on which side must this be placed?" "And this too, by Jupiter," exclaimed Euthydemus, "must go under the head of justice." "You admit, then, that not even towards our friends does it behove us invariably to act without guile?" "No, by Jupiter, it does not," said Euthydemus; "and I retract what I have advanced, if you will allow me to do so." "It is much better for me to allow this," said Socrates, "than that you should be permitted to place actions under their wrong heads. But again, of those who deceive their
friends to their injury (so that we may not even omit this point of view from our examination), which of the two men is the more unjust, he who does so wittingly, or he who does it inadvertently?" "Truly, Socrates, I myself have no longer any faith in my own answers, for everything appears to me now to be totally different to what I lately thought it was. Nevertheless, I should say that he who deceives one wittingly is a more unjust man than he who does so inadvertently." "Does it appear to you, then, that there is a method of learning and understanding what is just, as there is of acquiring a knowledge of reading and writing?" "It does so," replied Euthydemus. "And whether of the two should you consider the better grammarian—him who should purposely write or read incorrectly, or him who should do so involuntarily?" "Certainly him who should do so purposely; for whenever he pleased he could do both correctly." "He, therefore, that of set purpose writes or reads incorrectly may be a good grammarian, while he that does so involuntarily is not a grammarian at all?" "How can it be otherwise?" "And whether does he who lies and deceives wittingly know what is just, or he who does so inadvertently?" "Manifestly he who does so wittingly." "You assert, then, that a man who understands reading and writing is a better grammarian than one who does not understand them?" "I do." "And that he is a more just man who understands justice, than he who does not?" "So it appears.
But I really seem to myself to be making these admissions I don't know how."  "And what, pray, of a man who, although he wished to tell the truth, never gave the same account of the same thing; but, when speaking of the same road, should say at one time that it led to the east, and at another time towards the west; or when stating the result of a sum, should put it sometimes at a higher and sometimes at a lower total; what would you think of such an one?"  "That he was evidently a man, by Jupiter, who knew nothing of those things that he thought he knew."  "Do you know any persons who are termed 'slave-like'?"  "I do."  "Are they so called on account of their wisdom or their ignorance?"  "Evidently on account of their ignorance."  "Is it, then, on account of their ignorance of the art of brassfounding that they obtain this sobriquet?"  "Certainly not."  "Is it, then, because they are ignorant of architecture?"  "No, nor yet on that account."  "Is it, then, because they do not understand shoemaking?"  "Not for any one of these causes," replied Euthydemus; "but rather the reverse; for most of those at least who understand such handicrafts are slave-like."  "Is this, then, an epithet applied to those who do not know what is honourable and good and just?"  "So it appears to me," said the other.  "Should we not therefore endeavour as strenuously as possible to avoid being slave-like?"  "But, by the gods, Socrates," exclaimed Euthydemus, "I fully be-
lieved that I was pursuing a wise and philosophical course of study, by which I expected to be instructed more efficiently than by any other in all the duties that attach to a man who is earnestly striving after honour and virtue; but now you may imagine how disheartened I feel when I recognise the fact that, notwithstanding all my previous pains, I am not even able to answer the questions put to me upon subjects which I ought to understand better than any other, and have no path to pursue by taking which I may improve my character."

Then said Socrates—"Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever chanced to go to Delphi?" "Yes, that I have, by Jupiter—twice," answered Euthydemus. "And did you notice the inscription, 'Know Thyself' * somewhere on the temple walls?" "I did." "And did you give no heed to the legend, or did you attend to it, and endeavour to examine yourself as to what sort of a character you may be?" "No, by Jupiter," returned Euthydemus, "I did not do that, for I thought that I knew this at least perfectly well already, since I should scarcely know anything else if I did not know myself." "And do you think, then, that he knows himself who knows merely his own name, or he who, as people when they are buying horses, do not consider that they have ascertained what they wish to ascertain before

* The saying attributed to Solon, as one of the "seven wise men of Greece," the others being Chilo, Pittacus, Bias, Periander, Cleobulus, and Thales.
they have proved whether the animal is tractable or obstinate, powerful or weak, swift or slow, and how it is with regard to other points which are of advantage or disadvantage to one who wants a horse—so he, having examined himself with regard to the power he has of being serviceable towards the needs of his fellow-men, arrives at a knowledge of his own capabilities?"

"In this case," rejoined Euthydemus, "it certainly appears to me that he who does not know his own capabilities does not know himself." "But is not this evident," said Socrates, "that by knowing themselves men secure a vast number of blessings; whereas by self-deception they incur an enormous amount of misery? For, in truth, those who know themselves, know what is adapted to them, and distinguish between what they can and what they cannot effect; and, by acting in accordance with their powers, they both provide such things as are needful for them, and fare prosperously; and, abstaining from undertakings that they do not understand, they live unblamed, and escape adversity. Hence, also, they are enabled to form an estimate of others, and from their intercourse with their fellow-men, they both provide for themselves what is beneficial, and secure themselves against misfortunes. Whereas, those who do not know themselves, but are deceived as to their own capabilities, are in the same position both with regard to other men and other human affairs; for they neither comprehend what they
want, nor what they do, nor the characters of those with whom they mix, but, running into error upon all these particulars, they both fail in obtaining what is good, and fall into calamities. But they, on the other hand, who comprehend what they are doing, succeed in their undertakings, and become esteemed and honoured. Those who resemble them associate gladly with them, and those who go wrong in their affairs seek their advice respecting them, and covet their protection, and place their hopes of good in them; and on all these accounts they love them better than they do any other men. Those, on the other hand, who have not a clear conception of what they are doing, but who make an unhappy choice in life, and miscarry in their various enterprises, not only suffer pains and penalties personally, but become, on this very account, objects of contempt and ridicule, and lead despised and dishonoured lives. So also in the case of states: you see that of such as, from ignorance of their own strength, go to war with those who are more powerful, some are altogether uprooted, while others are reduced from freedom to slavery.”

Then said Euthydemus—“Be well assured, Socrates, that on all these grounds I feel convinced that self-knowledge must be regarded as a quality of the highest importance, but from what source we must seek first to derive it is a matter which I look to you to explain, if you will kindly consent to do so.” “Well, then,” said Socrates, “you have, I suppose, a perfect knowledge of
the difference between things good and evil?" "Yes, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus, "for otherwise I should be inferior to the slaves." "Come, then," said Socrates, "enumerate some of them to me." "That, at any rate, is not difficult," answered the other; "for, to begin with, I consider the very fact of one's being in sound health a good, and being out of health an evil. Next, of the things which produce these effects, as drink, food, occupations, such as conduce to health I hold to be good, but those which engender disease as evil." "Therefore," remarked Socrates, "both health and disease, when they are the causes of good, would be good, but when they are the causes of evil, they would be evil." "But whenever," asked Euthydemus, "can health be the cause of evil, or disease of good?" "When, by Jupiter," answered Socrates, "men who, on account of the exuberance of their strength, have taken part in some unsuccessful military expedition by land or damaging voyage by sea, or any similar enterprise, and have perished, while those who on account of their weak health have been left at home have been saved." "You speak truly," said Euthydemus; "but you also see that, in the case of successful enterprises, such as are endowed with strength share them, while those who are in ill-health are left out of them." "Are such things, then, as are at one time advantageous and at another injurious to be considered rather as blessings or as evils?" "One can predicate nothing definite con-

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cerning them, by Jupiter, when they are viewed in this light. But wisdom, Socrates, is indisputably a good thing; for what business will not a man transact better for being wise than for being ignorant?" "What, then?" asked Socrates, "have you never heard of Dædalus,* how that after he had been seized by Minos, he was compelled for his wisdom to serve him as a slave, and was deprived both of his country and his liberty; and how, when he was attempting to make his escape with his son, he lost the boy, and was unable to save himself, but was carried away among the barbarians, and a second time reduced to a servile condition among them?" "I know, by Jupiter, that there is such a legend." "And have you never heard of the woes of Palamedes?† For in truth, it is the general

* Dædalus is said to have instructed his sister's son, Perdix, in sculpture, and to have killed him out of envy for his great proficiency in the art. For this he was condemned to death by the court of the Areopagus at Athens, and fled to Crete, where he was imprisoned by Minos, the king of the island, on account of some offence he had given him. Dædalus, however, escaped safely to Sicily by means of wooden wings, which he had fixed on with wax; but his son Icarus, to whom he had also given a pair, melted his wax by flying too near to the sun, and was drowned in the Ægean Sea.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voce "Dædalus."

† Some writers say that Palamedes was killed by Ulysses, because he compelled the latter to join in the expedition to Troy against his will. According to others, he was put to death by Agamemnon, Diomede, and Ulysses, who were jealous of his fame as a warrior, and had a forged letter, purporting to come from Priam, the king of Troy, concealed in his bed; and so caused him to be executed for treachery. While Xenophon adopts the version given in the text. There are also various stories of the manner of his death.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voce "Palamedes."
song concerning him, that it was on account of his wisdom that he was envied and put to death by Ulysses."

"This story is also told," said Euthydemus. "And how many others do you think have been carried off to the king's* territories on account of their wisdom, and been there compelled to serve as slaves?"

"But happiness, Socrates," said he, "seems to be an undoubted good." "Yes, Euthydemus," observed Socrates, "unless one compounds it of doubtfully good materials." "But what, of such things as go to make up happiness, can be a doubtful good?" asked the other. "Nothing," replied Socrates, "unless we join to it beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or anything of this sort." "But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Euthydemus, "we must join to it something of the kind, for how could any one be happy without them?" "Well, then, by Jupiter," said Socrates, "we shall join to it one of those accidents which are the cause of divers troubles to mankind; for many are ruined through their beauty by those who are madly in love with their budding charms, while many, through an excessive estimate of their strength, undertaking enterprises which are beyond their powers, involve themselves in no small calamities. Many, again, who have become enervated through and plotted against for their wealth, have perished; while many, on account of their prominent

* The King of Persia, who was so styled by the Greeks. He was also sometimes called the "Great King."
position and political power, have suffered great misfortunes.” “Well, then,” said Euthydemus, “if, forsooth, I do not talk correctly even when I commend happiness, I confess that I know not what men ought to ask of the gods.” “But,” continued Socrates, “it may be that you have not deeply considered these matters, from the belief that you were already sufficiently well acquainted with them; but since you are preparing yourself to be prime minister of a democratic state, no doubt you know, at any rate, what a democracy is?” “I certainly suppose I do,” said Euthydemus. “Does it, then, appear to you possible that one who does not know what the demos is should know what a democracy is?” “No, by Jupiter, it does not,” answered the other. “And what, then, do you consider the demos* to be?” “I consider it to be the poorer classes of the citizens.” “Do you, then, know which are the poor?” “Why should I not know?” “You also know, then,

* Euthydemus here refers to the δῆμος, or “people,” according to their plutocratic power, and not according to the signification which the word generally bore at this period, which was that of the plebs, or common people, as contradistinguished in their political views from those who were above them by birth as well as by their moneyed position. The demi were originally subdivisions of the ten tribes of Attica into certain districts, each having a town or village as its chief centre. By the constitution of Cleisthenes all the members of the community who registered themselves in these towns or villages had political rights conferred upon them, and aliens, and even slaves, it is said, were enfranchised by him, so that the demos came to signify ultimately the “commonalty,” as opposed to the higher classes of the people.—See Thirlwall’s “History of Greece,” vol. ii. pp. 72 76.
which are the rich?" "Just the same as I know which are the poor." "And what sort of people do you define as being rich, and what kind as poor?" "Those who have not enough wherewith to purchase the necessaries of life I call poor, and those who have more than enough, rich." "Have you remarked, then, that to some who have excessively small means, the little they have is not only adequate for their support, but leaves them a surplus, while to others even a very large fortune is not sufficient?" "Yes, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus; "and you are quite right to put me in mind of it; for I have even heard of princes who have been so straitened by their necessities that they have been forced to commit acts of injustice, like the poorest people." "If this be so, then," said Socrates, "we must rank these princes among the demos, and those whose property is but small, if they are good managers, among the rich?" (And Euthydemus replied, "It is evident that my own want of skill compels me to admit this also; and I am considering whether it is not best for me to be silent altogether, for I seem to know absolutely nothing."")

He therefore departed in a most dejected frame of mind, esteeming himself very lightly, and regarding himself as being in very truth no better than a slave.

So, then, of those who were handled in the same way by Socrates, many came to him no more, whom also he
considered as his more stolid kind of disciples. But Euthydemus conceived that he could adopt no other means of becoming a man of note than by associating with Socrates as much as possible, and he consequently never left him unless on some business of the most urgent necessity, and he even imitated some of his ordinary habits.

So Socrates, finding him thus disposed, no longer puzzled him, but explained to him, in the most simple and lucid manner he could adopt, what he conceived it to be most to his interest to know, and what was his best method of preparation.

CHAPTER III.

Socrates was never urgent that his followers should become skilled orators, or men of business, or mechanics, but preferred that, previously to their acquiring these accomplishments, sober-mindedness should be engendered in them; for he judged that without sobriety of mind, those who were possessed of such capabilities were only the better qualified to commit acts of injustice and mischief.

In the first place, therefore, he endeavoured to make his disciples sober-minded with regard to the gods.
Thus sundry individuals, who were among his audience when he conversed with various persons upon this topic, have narrated his discourses; and I was myself present when he held a dialogue with Euthydemus somewhat after this fashion:—"Tell me, Euthydemus," said he, "has it ever occurred to you to consider how carefully the gods have provided for all the requirements of men?" And Euthydemus replied, "No, by Jupiter, it has not." "But you know, at least," continued Socrates, "that, first of all, we need light; and that the gods give to us?" "Yes, by Jupiter," rejoined Euthydemus; "for if we had no light, we should, as far as the use of our eyes goes, be in the position of the blind." "But, moreover, as we stand in need of rest, they afford us night as a most welcome season for repose." "And this is a boon," exclaimed the other, "that is indeed worthy of our gratitude." "And forasmuch as the sun, being luminous, reveals to us the hours of the day, and all other objects, while the night, on account of its darkness, renders them less distinct, have they not caused the stars to shine forth at night, to show us the time of night, and enable us to perform many necessary tasks?" "Such is the case," said Euthydemus. "And again, the moon indicates to us not only the divisions of the night, but of the month." "It certainly does so," said the other. "And what of the fact that the gods, seeing that we require nourishment, have raised it for
us out of the earth, and have appointed seasons suitable for its growth, which supply us in great abundance and variety not only with such things as are needful for us, but with those which contribute to our enjoyment?" "All these gifts," replied Euthydemus, "also indicate their love for men." "And that they give us water, which is so valuable on account of its both generating and bringing to maturity, in conjunction with the earth and the seasons, all those products which are useful to us, and which aids in nourishing our individual selves also, and by being mixed with all our sustenance, renders it easier of digestion, and more healthful and pleasant; and that since we want such quantities of it, that they should supply it to us without stint?" "This also," rejoined Euthydemus, "argues great foresight for us." "And that they should give us fire as a protection against cold and darkness, and as an auxiliary in every art and every necessary occupation in which men engage? For, to speak concisely, there is nothing which is of any real importance towards supplying the needs of man's life that is prepared without the aid of fire." "This again," said Euthydemus, "indicates excessive affection for mankind." "And that they diffuse round us the air so liberally, that it not only protects and fosters our lives, but enables us to traverse the seas by means of it, and to procure various necessaries by voyaging hither and thither in different quarters of the globe,
how is not this a benefit beyond all calculation?" "It is not to be expressed," said Euthydemus. "That the sun, too, when he inclines towards us in the winter, should approach the earth so as to bring some things to maturity, and to cause others to wither when the season of their prime has passed away? And that when he has accomplished this task, he should come no nearer, but turn back again, for fear lest he should injure us by giving us more heat than we require; and that when, moreover, in his departure, he reaches the point at which it is manifest that if he retired any further we should perish with cold, he should again turn back and approach us, and revolve in that orbit of the heavens in which he is of the greatest service to us?" "By Jupiter," remarked Euthydemus, "these laws do indeed appear as if they had been established for the sole benefit of man." "And once more (since it is plain that we could not endure either heat or cold if it came upon us all of a sudden), that the sun should approach us so gradually, and retire from us so gently, that we arrive at extreme heat and extreme cold by degrees which are to us imperceptible?" "I am indeed considering," rejoined Euthydemus, "whether the gods employ themselves in any other way than administering to men's wants; only one thought alone hinders my coming to this conclusion, viz., that the other animals also participate in these benefits." "But is it not also evident," asked Socrates, "that these
animals exist and are nurtured for man's sake? For what other living creature derives so many advantages from goats, and sheep, and horses, and oxen, and asses, and the various other kinds of beasts, as man does? And to me, indeed, it appears that they are of more value than the vegetable world to him, or, at any rate, he is nourished and enriched no less by the one than by the other. And many races of mankind do not use the fruits of the earth as a means of subsistence, but support life on the milk and cheese and meat obtained from their herds; and all men, by taming and training the serviceable animals, employ them as useful assistants in war, and for many other purposes." "In all this I also agree with you," said Euthydemus; "for I observe that of the animals, even those that are much stronger than we are, become so subservient to man that he uses them for whatever end he wishes." "And again, inasmuch as there exist many beautiful and useful objects which differ one from another, that the gods have conferred upon man perceptions adapted to each of them, through which we are capable of appreciating all their advantages; and that they have implanted in us rationality, by means of which we reason upon what our senses perceive, and, by storing it in our memories, learn how far each object is beneficial, and put into practice many contrivances for the enjoyment of good and the avoidance of evil? And that they should have bestowed upon us the faculty of
speech, by means of which we impart all these blessings to others, by communicating a knowledge of them, and ourselves participate in them, and enact laws, and carry on our affairs of state?" "The gods appear, Socrates, to take great care of man in every way."

"And as we are unable to calculate what will be for our future benefit, that they should aid us also in ascertaining this by revealing coming events to those who consult them, and instruct them as to the best course to pursue?" "To you, at least, Socrates," replied Euthydemus, "the gods appear to behave in a more friendly way than they do to other people, if, at least, it is the case that they point out to you beforehand, even without your asking them, what you ought and what you ought not to do."

"At any rate, you will yourself acknowledge that I speak the truth, if you do not expect to behold the gods in their bodily forms, but are satisfied from beholding their works to worship and honour them. Consider, too, that the gods themselves suggest to us that we should do this; for the other deities† that vouchsafe blessings to us do not confer

* This is an allusion to the ἀλμοῦ (daemon) of Socrates, who argued that he received some kind of an internal intimation from an invisible deity as to what he ought to do and what to avoid. And this was one of the charges on which the accusation of his having introduced new deities was founded. Cf. p. 2, ante.

† According to the tenets of Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics, besides one great superintending power, there were also a variety of lesser deities employed in the government of the world and in conferring gifts upon men. Among the Romans, also, Cicero and his followers held the same opinions.
them upon us by coming openly into our presence. So, likewise, the deity who regulates and sustains the whole universe, in which exists everything that is lovely and good, and who upholds it unimpaired, well-ordered, and undecaying for the use of his creatures, and swifter than thought to obey his behests without any deviation, is himself revealed to us, indeed, in the execution of his mighty works, but is invisible to us in the performance of them. Reflect, again, how that the sun, although he is conspicuous to all men, does not suffer them to look at him too minutely, but if any one attempts to gaze steadfastly at him, he deprives them of their eyesight. The agents of the gods you will, in like manner, find invisible; as the thunderbolt, which, although it is manifestly launched from on high, and prevails against every object that stands in its way, is never seen, either in its approach, or its contact, or its departure. Neither are the winds themselves visible, although their effects are evident to us, and we are sensible of their advent. And the soul of man, again, which partakes of the divine nature, if anything human does, manifestly rules within us, but is itself unseen. Meditating upon these things, therefore, it behoves you not to hold the gods in light esteem because they are invisible, but, recognising their power as displayed in their works, to pay them the honour due to their divine nature.” “I am quite convinced, Socrates,” said Euthydemus, “that I shall never in the slightest de-
gree fail in my reverence for the deity; but I am disheartened at the thought that no man can ever, as it appears to me, sufficiently requite the gods for all their favours.” “Do not be cast down on that account, Euthydemus,” said Socrates, “for you know that the Delphian deity, when any one consults him as to how he can most acceptably worship the gods, answers—‘According to the laws of your country;’ and the law, I take it, that prevails universally is, that men should propitiate them with sacred offerings, each one according to his means. How, then, can any one honour the gods more perfectly or religiously than by acting in accordance with their behests? We must not, however, do less than our means enable us to do; for when a person acts in this way, it is, I conceive, quite clear that he is not then paying due honour to the gods. But it befits him who in no respect fails to honour the gods according to his means, to be of good cheer and to hope for the greatest blessings; for no one can reasonably expect greater benefits from any one than he can from those who have it in their power to render him the most valuable services, or to secure their favour by any surer way than by pleasing them. And how can he please them better than by obeying them as implicitly as possible?”

By such utterances, and a course of conduct in harmony with them, he rendered his associates both more pious and more sober-minded.
Neither, indeed, did Socrates conceal his opinions upon the subject of justice, but displayed them openly in his actions, both by behaving equitably and profitably to all men in his private life, and in his public capacity by obeying the ruling powers in all such matters as were laid down by law, and by conducting himself in such a manner, both as a citizen and a soldier,* that he was conspicuous above any other man for his adherence to discipline. And when he presided at the public assemblies, he would not allow the people to pass illegal decrees, but opposed himself to so much violence on the part of the populace as I do not think any one else could have withstood. And when the Thirty † commanded him to do anything contrary to the law, he refused to obey them. Thus, when they forbade him to discourse with the young, and ordered him to lead away a certain citizen to execution, he alone disregarded their edicts, on the ground that they were illegal. When, again, he was traversing the indictment of Meletus,‡ although others, when pleading, were accus-

* Socrates, at one period of his life, served in the army, and was present with Xenophon at the battle of Delium, between the Athenians and Boeotians, B.C. 424.
† See ante, p. 7, 18-20.
‡ Meletus was an obscure poet at Athens, who was glad to gain notoriety by appearing as one of the prosecutors of Socrates. Not very long
tomed to speak so as to gain the favour of the judges, and to flatter them and supplicate them, in direct contravention of the laws, he would not on his trial adopt any of these ordinary illegal devices; but although he might, had he in the slightest degree consented to do so, have easily gained an acquittal from his judges, he nevertheless preferred to die, in conformity with the laws, than to save his life by transgressing them.

And he oftentimes both made this statement to others, and with Hippias of Elis* I know that he discoursed somewhat after this fashion. For Hippias, returning to Athens after a long absence, encountered Socrates as he was remarking to some people how surprising it was that, if any one wished to have another instructed in shoemaking, or architecture, or brass-founding, or riding, he was never in any difficulty as to where he should send him to be taught, [and there are some who maintain that if any one desired to teach even a horse or an ox to act justly, plenty of masters after the execution of the latter the Athenians repented of having condemned him, and Meletus was stoned to death as having been one of the instigators of his murder.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voce "Meletus."

* Hippias of Elis was a celebrated Sophist, who travelled about Greece, and acquired great wealth by his lectures and public discussions. He was a contemporary of Plato, who, in two Dialogues (the "Hippias Major" and "Minor"), has described him as a man possessed of great literary and artistic attainments, but excessively vain and self-opinionated.—See Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voce "Hippias."
could be found everywhere for them],* while if a man wished either to learn justice himself, or to have it taught to his son or his servant, he would be at a loss to know where he could meet with the requisite instruction. Then Hippias, hearing him make these remarks, said, jeering him as it were—"What, Socrates, are you still repeating the very same expressions which I heard you indulging in ever so long ago?" "Yes, Hippias," replied Socrates, "and what is more wonderful still, is, that I am not only repeating the very same expressions, but I am discoursing upon the very same topics; but you, perhaps, from your excessive learning, never repeat your observations over again." "Assuredly," rejoined Hippias, "I always endeavour to say something new." "In reference to subjects, then, upon which you possess incontrovertible knowledge—as for instance, with regard to the letters of the alphabet—if any one should inquire of you how many and what letters formed the word "Socrates," would you endeavour to say one thing at one time and another at another? Or to those who questioned you in arithmetic, whether twice five made ten, would you not give the same answer at one time as you did at another?" "Upon such subjects as these, Socrates," returned Hippias, "I always repeat what I have said before, just as you do. But with regard to justice, I verily believe

* Some commentators regard the passage within brackets as corrupt, and reject it altogether.
that I have something now to advance which neither you nor any one else can gainsay." "Then, by Juno," cried Socrates, "you claim to have discovered a mighty boon, since our judges will now cease from differing in their decisions, our citizens will abstain from disputing about what is just, and from suing each other at law and quarrelling, and states will no longer hold conflicting views with regard to what is just, or go to war. And indeed I scarcely feel as if I could ever part with you until I have had the knowledge of so enormous a blessing communicated to me by its discoverer."

"But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Hippias, "that you shall never have, before you yourself declare what you consider justice to be; for it is quite sufficient that you laugh at others, questioning and puzzling every one, while you yourself are unwilling to give a definition to anybody, or to state your opinion clearly upon any subject whatever." "How so, Hippias?" asked Socrates. "Have you not noticed that I never desist from setting forth what I consider justice to be?"

"And what, then, may this your definition of it be?"

"And if I do not define it in words, but illustrate it by my actions, does not practice appear to you to afford a stronger testimony as to my opinions than theory?"

"Yes, by Jupiter," replied the other, "it does; for many who talk justly act unjustly, whereas he who acts justly cannot be an unjust man." "Have you, then,
ever heard of me as a perjurer, or a common informer,* or as a person who involves the state in seditions, or commits any other unjust act?" "I have not," rejoined Hippias. "And do you not think that to abstain from unjust acts is justice?" "You are evidently, even now, Socrates," said Hippias, "endeavouring to avoid giving clear utterance to your sentiments as to what you consider justice to be, inasmuch as what you are talking of are not the things that the just do, but those from which they abstain." "But for my part," said Socrates, "I thought that the being unwilling to commit acts of injustice was a sufficient proof of justice; but if you do not hold the same opinion, consider whether this is more to your mind—for I hold that whatever is in conformity with the laws is just." "Do you then assert, Socrates, that conformity with the laws and justice are identical?" "I certainly do so," replied Socrates. "But I fail to gather from you what sort of an action you define as being in conformity with the laws, and what sort as just." "But you know the laws of the state," said Socrates. "I do," replied the other. "And

* Literally "a fig-shower," from σύκον (sukon), "a fig," and φαίνω, fut. φαίνο (phaino, fut. phano), "to show." There was a law to forbid the export of figs from Attica, and hence a person who laid a secret information against another, on any charge whatever, was called a "sycophant." Thence the term was applied to those who gave false or bad advice, and afterwards, on that account, it was also used of a flatterer.
what do you consider them to be?" "Those enactments which the citizens have passed to inform us what we should do, and what we should avoid doing." "Would not that man, then," asked Socrates, "be a law-abiding person who directed his life as a member of the body politic in conformity with those laws, and a law-breaker if he transgressed them?" "Assuredly he would," answered Hippias. "Would not he, then, who obeyed them, be performing just actions and he who disobeyed them, unjust?" "Certainly." "Is not he, then, who performs just actions, just, and he who acts unjustly, unjust?" "How can it be otherwise." "He, therefore, who acts conformably to the laws, is just, and he who violates them, unjust." "But, Socrates," asked Hippias, "how can any one attach much importance to the laws, or to the abiding by them, seeing that their very framers themselves often either abrogate or alter them?" "So, also, states," remarked Socrates, "which have commenced a war, frequently become reconciled again." "Very frequently," said Hippias. "What difference do you think you make, then, when you find fault with those who abide by the laws, although they may be repealed, and when you blame those who act prudently in warfare by concluding a peace? Or do you object to those who vigorously support their respective countries in times of war?" "Not I, by Jupiter," exclaimed Hippias. "And have you not heard it said of the Lace-
demonian, Lycurgus,* that he would never have made Sparta at all different from other states, had he not laboured above all things to inculcate into her a spirit of obedience to the laws? And of the rulers of states, do you not know that those who are most effectual in enforcing the laws are the best, and that that state in which the members of the community are most obedient to the laws, fares best in peace, and cannot be overthrown in war? Moreover, unanimity appears to be the greatest blessing to a state, and over and over again the senate and leading men exhort the people to cultivate it; and throughout the whole of Greece a law prevails that the members of each state should swear to live in concord, and they everywhere take an oath to that effect. And this, I conceive, is done not with the object of making citizens agree as to the merits of the same choruses, or unanimous in their praises of the same flute-players, or in their approval of the same poets, or that they should take delight in the same recreations, but that they should yield obedience to the laws. For when the members of the community abide by these, bodies politic wax stronger and more prosperous; but without unanimity, neither can a state be

* Great difference of opinion exists as to the exact date of the great Spartan legislator, Lycurgus, but the best authorities fix it at circa B.C. 880. For the nature of his political and social enactments, see Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," sub voce "Lycurgus;" Grote's "History of Greece" (12 vols. 8vo, London, 1869), vol. ii. pp. 338-420; and Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. i. pp. 291-302.
well administered, nor a household properly managed. And as a private individual, how would any man be more likely to avoid state penalties, and gain more respect, than by obeying the laws? And how could he otherwise be exposed to fewer defeats in the law courts, or how could he gain more victories there? And to whose care would any one think that he could more safely intrust his property, or his sons, or his daughters, and in whom would the whole community place more implicit confidence, than in the man who abides by the laws? From whom, again, would parents, or relatives, or domestics, or friends, or citizens, or strangers be more likely to obtain their rights? And to whom would the enemy more readily intrust the arrangements for truces, treaties, or conventions for establishing peace? Or whose alliance would be more eagerly sought than that of a law-abiding man, and to whose leadership would allies more readily submit themselves or commit the guardianship of their forts or cities? And from whom would any one who had done him a kindness expect more gratitude than from a man who respects the laws? or whom would one more willingly oblige than a person from whom one expects to receive gratitude? Whose friendship would any one more desire, or whose enmity more deprecate, than he would that of such a man? Or with whom would one be less inclined to quarrel, and most disposed to be friendly, and least of all at variance? And with whom would most people
wish to be on terms of friendship and alliance, and only a very small proportion on those of hatred and antagonism? I therefore, Hippias, declare obedience to the law and justice to be identical; but if you hold a different opinion, state it to me.” “But,” said Hippias, “by Jupiter, Socrates, I do not think that my opinions are in any way at variance with yours in respect to justice.” “But do you know, Hippias,” asked Socrates, “that there are certain laws which are unwritten?” “Such as those,” said Hippias, “that are in vogue in every country with reference to the same points.” “Could you affirm, then,” continued Socrates, “that men enacted them?” “How could they do so,” inquired Hippias, “inasmuch as they could neither assemble together nor use the same language?” “By whom, then, do you suppose that such laws were made?” “I think,” answered Hippias, “that the gods established them for the guidance of mankind, for the worship of the gods is the first law which prevails universally among all men.” “Is not reverence for parents also a universal law?” “It is so.” “Is it not also a law that parents should not intermarry with their children, or children with their parents?” “But this no longer, Socrates,” remarked Hippias, “appears to me to be one of the laws of the gods.” “And why not?” asked Socrates. “Because I see,” returned the other, “that there are some who transgress it.” “And there are many other laws,” said Socrates, “that they
transgress; but those who disobey the laws of the gods, incur penalties from which men cannot possibly escape, as they frequently can when they violate human enact-
ments, in some instances by concealment, in others by force.” “And what sort of penalty is that, Socrates,” asked Hippias, “which parents who intermarry with their children, or children who intermarry with their parents, cannot escape?” “The heaviest of all penalties, by Jupiter,” answered Socrates; “for what greater mis-
fortune can befall a father than to have bad children?” “But why,” said Hippias, “should those fathers have bad children who, being good themselves, are not pre-
vented by any circumstance from having families by good wives?” “Because, by Jupiter,” replied Socrates, “those who procreate children should not only be good, but in full bodily vigour; or does the procreative power appear to you to be the same in those who are in the prime of life as it is in those who have not yet reached, or those that have passed it?” “No, by Jupiter,” answered the other, “it is not likely that it would be the same.” “Which of the two, then, is the more perfect?” “Clearly,” rejoined the other, “that of those who are in the prime of life.” “That of those, then, that have not yet arrived at their prime is not strong enough?” “It is not likely, by Jupiter, that it would be,” said the other. “Accordingly, they should not as yet have families?” “No, they should not.” “Do not those, therefore, that procreate children under
these conditions have them when they ought not?"
"So it appears to me." "What other persons, then," asked Socrates, "are likely to have bad children, if these are not?" "I agree with you," returned the other, "upon this point also." "Well, then," continued Socrates, "is it not a universal law that men should recompense those who show kindness to them?" "It is so," replied Hippias; "but this, too, is a law that is often broken." "And do not those that break it suffer the penalty by being deserted by such of their friends as are worth having, and being compelled to have recourse to people who hate them? And are not those who do good to such as wish to avail themselves of their services good friends to themselves? And are not those who do not return kindnesses to those who benefit them hated by the latter for their ingratitude, and yet, because it serves their turn to be intimate with such people, do they not pay the greatest court to them?" "By Jupiter," exclaimed Hippias, "all these results do indeed seem to proceed upon some godlike principle; for that the laws themselves should carry with them punishment for such as transgress them appears to me to indicate some legislator who is wiser than man." "Whether, then, do you think, Hippias, that the gods enact laws which are in consonance with justice, or in opposition to it?" "In consonance with it," answered Hippias; "for scarcely would any other being establish just laws if a god did
not." "So it is certainly agreeable to the will of the gods, Hippias, that what is just and what is in conformity with the laws should be identical."

By such conversations and such conduct he rendered his followers more observant of justice.

CHAPTER V.

I now proceed to set forth the means he adopted to make his associates more practical men of business.

As he considered temperance to be an incalculable advantage to any one who was about to engage in any important enterprise, he, more than any man, gave evidence to his disciples of practising it in his own person, and also in his discourses inculcated upon them its observance, as being more necessary than anything else. Accordingly, he was both himself continually mindful of whatever conduced to this virtue, and never ceased directing the attention of all his followers to it; and I know that on one occasion he held a conversation with Euthydemus upon the subject, somewhat to the following effect:—

"Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "whether you regard freedom as a valuable and honourable possession for an individual or a state?" "I regard it as more so
than any other possession,” replied the other. “If a man, then, is under the control of his bodily pleasures to such a degree that he is powerless to act according to his highest instincts, do you consider him to be free?” “By no means,” said Euthydemus. “For, probably acting in the best possible way appears to you to constitute freedom, and the being under the control of influences that prevent one’s so acting you regard as an indication of want of freedom?” “Certainly,” replied Euthydemus. “The intemperate, then, appear to you to be, in every respect, as people who are without freedom?” “Yes, by Jupiter,” exclaimed Euthydemus, “and naturally so.” “And do the intemperate seem to you merely to be prevented from acting in the best possible way, or to be forced to do those things that are most disgraceful?” “They appear to me,” replied he, “to be no less compelled to do the one than they are prevented from doing the other.” “And what do you think of those masters who prevent men from doing what is best for them, and coerce them into doing that which is most injurious?” “That they are the worst masters possible.” “And what sort of slavery do you consider the most grievous?” “That,” said he, “under the worst masters.” “And do not the intemperate suffer the most grievous kind of bondage?” “So it appears to me,” answered the other. “And does not intemperance, by repelling men from wisdom, which is their chief good, seem to you to precipitate them into
its opposite evil? Does it not, likewise, appear to you in reference to what is useful to them, that it hinders them from acquiring a knowledge of it by seducing them to pleasure, and frequently, by diverting from their duty even those who know the difference between good and evil, lead them to prefer the worse to the better course?" "That is certainly the case," replied Euthydemus. "And of whom can it be predicated that he is less under the influence of sobriety of mind than it can of the intemperate man? for, I take it that the actions resulting from sobriety and intemperance are diametrically opposite to each other." "I assent to this proposition also," said Euthydemus. "And do you consider that there is anything which makes men disregard everything that is decorous more completely than intemperance?" "I do not, indeed," replied he. "And do you think anything can be worse for a man than that which induces him to select such things as are hurtful to him in preference to those which are beneficial, which prompts him to court the one and neglect the other, and which urges him on to a course totally opposite to that which is pursued by the sober-minded?" "I do not think anything can be worse," said Euthydemus. "Is it not probable, therefore," continued Socrates, "that temperance will produce in men effects just the reverse of those which are produced by intemperance?" "Certainly," replied the other. "Is it not probable, then, that such habits as produce those
contrary effects would be most beneficial to a man?"
"It is so, Socrates," said he. "And have you ever re-
lected upon this fact, Euthydemus?" "Upon what fact?"
asked the latter. "That intemperance does not actually
lead men to those pleasures to which it pretends to lead
them, whereas temperance produces more real pleasure
than anything else." "How so?" asked Euthydemus.
"Because intemperance, by its never permitting men to
feel the want of food, or drink, or sexual intercourse, or
sleep (the longing for which alone causes men really to
enjoy eating, drinking, or sexual intercourse, and makes
them lie down and sleep tranquilly), prevents their de-
riving any pleasure, which can properly be so called,
even from the most necessary and ordinary acts. Tem-
perance, on the other hand, as she alone renders men
capable of resisting excess in such matters as I have
mentioned, so also she alone enables them to find any
gratification, which is really worthy of the name, in
those actions of which we have spoken." "Your state-
ments are, in every respect, incontrovertible," said
Euthydemus. "But, moreover, a man, by learning
what is honourable and good, and applying his mind to
some branch of knowledge, which enables him to train
his own body properly, and to manage his domestic
affairs judiciously, and to make himself useful to his
friends or to the state, but grievous to his enemies (from
which knowledge not only the greatest advantages but
the highest pleasures accrue), the temperate derive from
such actions a gratification, in which it is impossible for the intemperate to participate. For of whom can we more confidently affirm that he is less in a position to attain to the accomplishment of any of these ends than we can of a man who is always anxious to seize upon any species of pleasure that may be nearest at hand?"

Then said Euthydemus—"You seem to me to maintain, Socrates, that he who is dominated by his love of bodily pleasure cannot be possessed of any virtue whatever." "And pray, Euthydemus," asked Socrates, "in what respects does an intemperate man differ from the most ignorant brute? For if any one, instead of regarding his highest interests, seeks invariably to avail himself of any pleasure that comes within his reach, what distinction is there between his conduct and that of the most unreasoning beasts? But the temperate alone have the power of weighing what is best in every transaction, and by classifying each particular pursuit, both in their deeds and their words, according to its own proper essence, of selecting such as are good, and rejecting whatever is evil."

And it was this power, he declared, that rendered men most virtuous and happy, and most capable of reasoning; for he said that the phrase "to reason" was derived from the practice of people's holding conferences for the purpose of debating on various matters, and distinguishing between them according to their several natures. Wherefore, he thought that it behoved
every one to render himself an adept in the art of reasoning, and to study it as diligently as possible; for that, by means of it, men became most estimable, best fitted to guide others, and most skilful in argument.

CHAPTER VI.

And I will now endeavour to prove that he did render his disciples more skilful in argument. For he held that those who understood the nature of each individual existence would probably be most capable of explaining them to others; but he said of those who did not possess any such knowledge, that it was no wonder that they were both deceived themselves, and also led others into error. Consequently, he never ceased investigating with his associates the nature of every individual existence.

It would, indeed, be an enormous task to set down in detail all his various definitions of the terms employed by him in his various discourses; but so much as I think will serve my purpose, and will show how he conducted his investigations, that will I relate.

First, then, he inquired into the nature of piety somewhat after this fashion:—“Tell me, Euthydemus,”
he said, "what do you conceive piety to be?" "The chief good of man," replied the other. "Are you able, then, to define to me what sort of a person you would designate as pious?" "One, as it seems to me," answered Euthydemus, "who honours the gods." "And is it permissible for every one to honour the gods according to his own fancy?" "No; there are certain laws which define how we are to honour them." "Would not he, therefore, who is best acquainted with those laws be most likely to honour the gods in a proper manner?" "I think so," replied the other. "Accordingly, he who knows how to honour the gods, does not think that he should honour them in any way that is contrary to that knowledge?" "I suppose not," said Euthydemus. "He, then, who knows the decrees of the law respecting the gods, will honour them as the law directs?" "Certainly, he will." "And does not he who honours the gods conformably to law, honour them as he ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "And he who honours them as he ought to do, is a pious man?" "Of course he is," replied the other. "He, therefore, who knows what the law decrees with respect to the gods, may be correctly defined by us as a pious man?" "So, at least, it appears to me," said Euthydemus. "But, with regard to our conduct towards our fellow-men, may every one behave himself just as he thinks fit?" "No; but in regard to them also, he who knows what is decreed by the laws, and
how to conduct himself towards others, agreeably to those decrees, will act conformably to the law." "Do not those, then, whose conduct towards one another proceeds upon this principle, conduct themselves properly?" "How can it be otherwise?" answered the other. "And do not those who behave as they ought to do towards others, behave themselves well?" "Certainly," said Euthydemus. "And those who behave well to men, behave well in all transactions as between man and man?" "Most probably," answered the other. "Do not those, then, who obey the laws act justly?" "Decidedly," replied Euthydemus. "And do you know what sort of actions are said to be just?" "Those which are sanctioned by the law." "Those, therefore, who do what is sanctioned by the law, act justly, and as they ought to act?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Those, therefore, who act justly, are just?" "I certainly think so," said Euthydemus. "But do you think that any one is obedient to the laws who does not know what they sanction?" "Assuredly not," replied he. "And if people know what they ought to do, do you think that there are any who suppose that they ought not to do it?" "I do not think so." "Those, therefore, who know what is conformable to the law, with regard to men, act justly?" "No doubt they do," remarked the other. "And are not those who act justly, just people?" "Who else is, if they are not?" inquired Euthydemus. "Shall we not be correct, then,
in defining just people to be those who know what is conformable to law in respect to mankind?" "So it certainly seems to me," said Euthydemus.

"And how shall we define Wisdom? Tell me, whether do men appear to you to be wise in such matters as they understand, or are there some who are wise upon points that they do not understand?" "Men are clearly wise upon such matters as they understand," rejoined Euthydemus; "for how could any be wise upon things that he did not understand?" "The wise, then, are wise by knowledge?" "And how otherwise could any one become wise except through knowledge?" "Do you regard wisdom, then, as anything else than that by means of which men become wise?" "I do not." "Knowledge, therefore, is wisdom?" "It appears so to me." "But do you deem it possible for a man to know everything in the world?" "No, by Jupiter! but, as it seems to me, only a very inconsiderable portion of them." "It is not, therefore, possible for a man to be wise upon every subject?" "No, by Jupiter, I should think not," exclaimed the other. "Each one is wise, then, upon that particular subject which he understands?" "That is my opinion," said Euthydemus.

"And shall we adopt the same method, Euthydemus, in our investigations as to what the Good is?" "How do you mean?" asked Euthydemus. "Do you think that the same thing is beneficial in every individual
case?" "I do not." "So, then, what is beneficial to one person seems to you sometimes to be hurtful to another?" "Very much so," replied the other. "And would you designate as good anything that is not beneficial?" "I should not," returned the other. "Whatsoever then is beneficial is good to him to whom it is beneficial?" "I think so," was his answer.

"And can you define the Beautiful, if anything possesses this quality, in any other way than by describing it (be it a person, or a vessel, or any other object) as beautiful in regard to those purposes for which you know that it is so?" "No, by Jupiter, I cannot," said Euthydemus. "For whatever purpose, therefore, each particular object may be useful, for that purpose it is beautiful to use it?" "Undoubtedly," replied the other. "And is any particular object beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use it?" "No, not for any other," said Euthydemus. "The useful, then, is beautiful for every purpose for which it is useful?" "Those are my sentiments," answered the other.

"And do you regard Courage, Euthydemus, as coming under the category of good qualities?" "As one of the best," replied he. "Do you conceive it to be useful in very small emergencies?" "No, by Jupiter," rejoined Euthydemus, "but in the very greatest." "Does it then appear to you to be useful with respect to dangerous and formidable undertakings to be ignorant of their
nature?" "By no means," said the other. "Those, therefore, who do not fear such enterprises because they are ignorant of their character, are not courageous?"

"No, by Jupiter," said Euthydemus, "for in that case many madmen and cowards would be courageous."

"And what about such as are afraid of things that are not terrible?" "They are still less courageous, by Jupiter, than the others." "Those, then, that are good in reference to terrible and dangerous circumstances you would consider as courageous people, and those who are bad as cowards?" "Certainly," replied the other. "But do you regard any as being good in reference to such circumstances, except those who are able to behave well in them?" "None," replied the other. "And those who are not able to behave well in them you regard as bad?" "Whom else can I consider so?" asked he. "But does not each class of them think they are behaving as they ought to behave?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Do those, then, who cannot behave well in them, know how they ought to behave?" "I suppose not," said Euthydemus. "Those, then, who know how they ought to behave, these have the power of conducting themselves accordingly?" "They and they alone," assented Euthydemus. "So, then, those who do not lose their presence of mind under such circumstances do not behave badly in them?" "I think not," said the other. "But those who behave badly in them have lost their presence of mind?" "Probably," answered he. "Those,
then, who know how to behave well in difficulties and dangers are courageous, but those who are confounded by them are cowards?" "So they seem to me," said Euthydemus.

Monarchy and tyranny he looked upon as both being forms of government; but he held that they differed one from the other. The government of men with their own consent, and over states in compliance with fixed laws, he regarded as a monarchy; that over men against their will, and over states not in obedience to law, but according to the dictates of the ruler, as a tyranny. And wherever the ruling body was composed of those who acted in compliance with legal enactments, he defined that government as an aristocracy; where it was chosen from men selected on account of their wealth, as a plutocracy; and where it consisted of the whole body of the people, as a democracy.

And if a person should contradict him on any point without having anything definite to say, but should assert independently of all proof that some individual whom he mentioned was better versed in politics, or braver, or superior in any respect, he would bring the whole question to the test by some such reasoning as the following: —"Do you maintain that the person whom you commend is a better statesman than the one whom I am upholding?" "I do." "Why, then, should we not commence by considering first what are the duties of a good statesman?" "Let us do so." "Would not he,
then, be superior in the management of the public funds who increased the revenue of the state?" "Certainly," replied his opponent. "And in war, he who rendered it victorious over its enemies?" "How can it be otherwise?" "And in diplomacy, he who should convert foes into friends?" "Naturally." "And he who, in haranguing a popular assembly, should quell sedition and induce a spirit of unanimity?" "It appears so to me." So when the argument was brought to a conclusion by such a process as this, the truth was made manifest even to his opponents.

And when he wished to sift any subject thoroughly, he proceeded to reason upon it from such premises as are generally admitted—thinking that this was a safe method of conducting the discussion. Hence he, more than any one I have ever known, brought his hearers to agree with him; and he said that Homer* assigned to Ulysses the character of "a safe rhetorician" on account of his ability to conduct his line of reasoning by means of arguments acknowledged as valid by all mankind.

* Xenophon must here have forgotten the exact words of the passage here quoted by Socrates, as Homer does not apply the epithet given in the text to Ulysses, but the latter uses it in a dispute with Euryalus, and intimates that as one man is most conspicuous in action, so another excels in oratory, and (ὁσφαλέως ἀγορεύει) "is a safe speaker."—See "Odyssey," viii. 171 et seq.
CHAPTER VII.

And that Socrates expressed his genuine convictions to those who came to attend his discussions is, I think, evident from my previous statements. I will now, therefore, proceed to show how careful he was to make his disciples complete masters of such kinds of businesses as were suited to them. He, more than any other person with whom I am acquainted, was anxious to discover in what branch of knowledge each of his followers respectively excelled, and such precepts as would conduce to make them good and honourable characters he most readily communicated to them all, in reference to such matters as he himself understood; but with regard to subjects as to which he was personally less instructed, he introduced them to those who were proficients in them.

He taught them, too, how far it behoved a properly educated man to be instructed on each particular branch of knowledge. For instance, he said that he should study geometry up to such a point as would enable him, if ever he should require to do so, to take or hand over land correctly by measurement, or to divide it, or to point out in what proportions it should be worked; and that it was so easy to acquire the science, that any one who applied his mind to it might discover by mensura-
tion the extent of all the land in the world, and quit his master with a perfect knowledge of how to measure it. On the contrary, he disapproved of the pursuit of geometry up to diagrams, which puzzled the intellect; for he said that he did not see to what practical use it could lead.* Albeit he himself was by no means unskilled in such studies, he maintained, nevertheless, that they were enough to wear out a man's life, and to prevent his acquiring a knowledge of many other invaluable branches of instruction.

He advised his followers to make themselves acquainted with astronomy also, but this only up to such a point as would teach them to distinguish the various periods of the night, or the month, or the year, in travelling by land or sea, or when they were on guard; and whatever occupations are appropriate to any particular time of the month or year, to be able, by recognising the seasons of the above-mentioned periods, to use them as signs when they ought to apply themselves to their tasks. And thus much information, he said, was easily acquired from those who hunted by night and pilots, and from many others whose business it was to be acquainted with such matters. But, from pursuing the study up to such a point as to know what bodies do not revolve in the same circle, the various planets, and

* This observation is made in condemnation of those philosophers who spent their time in such studies, with a view to speculating upon and discussing matters which Socrates held to be above man's powers of investigation.—See ante, pp. 3–7.
MEMOIRS OF Socrates.

the unnamed constellations, and from wearying themselves by investigations into their respective distances from the earth, the periods of their appearance, and their causes, he earnestly dissuaded them; for he said that he did not see what was gained by such studies—although he was himself to a certain extent devoted to them—as he maintained that they also wore out men's lives, and kept them from many other useful occupations.

And as to the celestial bodies generally, he dissuaded men from investigating too closely the divine economy of the heavens; for he held that such matters were beyond human ken, nor did he think that any one who sought to clear up points which the gods themselves did not wish to divulge, was acting acceptably to them. He said, too, that a person who was over-anxious about such matters ran the risk of even going out of his mind, just as Anaxagoras* did, who prided himself greatly upon

* A philosopher of the Ionic school, born at Clazomenæ, in Lydia (now Kelismen), circa B.c. 500. He settled at Athens when he was about twenty years of age, and gave lectures there. He enjoyed the friendship of the great statesman Pericles, who is said to have defended him on a charge of impiety. He was, however, fined and banished, and sought refuge in Lampsacus, one of the Greek settlements in Mysia, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont (now the Dardanelles), where he died B.C. 427. After his death, the inhabitants of Lampsacus, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius, appointed a day of recreation for all the youths, to be observed once a-year in honour of his memory, under the name of the Anaxagoreia. The distinguishing characteristic of his philosophy was that the universe was created, sustained, and governed by νοῦς—"intellect." For further details of his life and teaching, see "Handbook of the History of Philosophy" by Dr Albert Schwegler, translated by James Hutchison Stirling, LL.D., 1871, pp. 27-30 and 375-380.
his ability to explain the divine economy. For he, when he asserted that fire and the sun were identical, ignored the fact that men stare into the fire without inconvenience, but cannot even look upon the face of the sun; and that those who are exposed to the sun's rays are tanned by them, but that fire does not produce the same effect. Neither did he perceive that of the productions of the earth none can come to maturity without sunshine, but that they all wither and perish when exposed to the heat of the fire. And, again, when he asserted that the sun was a fire-heated stone, he forgot this, that a stone neither shines in the fire nor retains its heat for any lengthened period; whereas the sun is, and continues to be, the most luminous of bodies throughout all time.

He also exhorted his disciples to learn the art of reasoning; but in this, as in all other studies, he cautioned them against fruitless labour; although up to such a point as was useful, he took all matters into his consideration, and investigated them with his companions.

He likewise encouraged his associates to take great care of their health, both by learning as much as they could from those who knew what would preserve it, and each person by studying for himself throughout his life what kind of food or drink or what sort of exercise was most adapted to him, and how by the use of them he might continue in the soundest condition; for that if a person paid thus much attention to himself, it
would be a difficult matter to discover a physician who could tell him better what was beneficial to his health than he could himself.

But if a person desired to be helped by wisdom superior to that of man, he advised him to apply himself to the study of divination,* because, he said, any one who possessed a knowledge of the signs whereby the gods vouchsafe indications to men in reference to human affairs, could never be destitute of divine counsel.

CHAPTER VIII.

Now, if any one should imagine that, when he was condemned to death by the judges for his assertion that the divinity forewarned him what he should do, and what he should abstain from doing, he was convicted of speaking falsely concerning the divinity,† let

* The art of divination (μαντική). See ante, pp. 2-4, for Socrates' belief in its efficacy; and for the nature of it generally, Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities," sub vv. "Divinatio," "Oraculum," and "Haruspices;" and Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. i. pp. 204-208. Cicero also wrote a treatise, "De Divinatione."

† See ante, p. 2, 3. For an account of the belief of Socrates with regard to his daemon and his religious tenets generally, see Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. iv. pp. 267-270; George Grote's "Plato, and other Companions of Socrates" (3 vols. 8vo, London, 1865), vols.
him consider, in the first place, that he was already of such an advanced age* that his life must have come to a close, if not then, yet not very long after. Secondly, that he relinquished only the most burdensome portion of life, in which all men feel their mental faculties impaired; whereas he acquired additional glory by exhibiting the power of his mind in pleading his own cause more truthfully, independently, and fairly than any other individual would have done, and in submitting to his sentence of death with the greatest resignation and fortitude.

It is indeed generally admitted that no one ever met his fate in a nobler manner; for he was compelled to live for thirty days after his condemnation, on account of the sentence having been passed during the month of the Delian festival,† and, by law, no one might be publicly executed until the return of the sacred expedition from Delos. During the whole of this period he was openly seen by all his acquaintances, passing his time in every respect according to his usual wont, although he had always been previously remarkable,


* Socrates was in his seventy-first year at the time of his death.
† Cf. ante, p. 119. The Delian festivals were held in the Athenian month Thargelion (May), and were divided into the "greater" and the "less." The former took place every fifth year, and the latter annually, and it was during their celebration that the city of Athens was purified, and no criminal was allowed to be put to death.
above all other men, for the cheerful and easy manner of his life. And how could anybody have died more nobly than this? Or what sort of death can be more noble than that which is suffered most nobly? And what kind of death can be more happy than the noblest, or what more dear to the gods than that which is happiest?

And I will also repeat an anecdote that was once related to me concerning him by Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, who said that after Meletus had already laid the indictment against him, when he himself heard him discoursing upon all manner of topics rather than that of his trial, and told him that he ought to be considering what defence he should make, that his first question was—"But do I not appear to you to have been all my life turning my attention to this point?" And when Hermogenes asked him how, he said to him, that he had passed all his life in examining what actions were just, and what unjust, and acting in accordance with the former, while he repudiated the latter; and this he conceived to be the most careful mode of preparing his defence. And the other answered him thus—"Do you not see, Socrates, that the judges at Athens have ere now condemned many an innocent person to death from offence taken at his language, while they have allowed many who were guilty to escape?" "But, by Jupiter, Hermogenes," replied he, "while I was already in the very act of
beginning to consider what should be the nature of my defence to the judges, the divinity opposed my proceeding.” And he answered—“You tell a marvellous tale.” “Do you regard it as marvellous,” asked Socrates, “that the deity thinks it better for me that I should now bring my life to a close? Are you not aware that I refuse to admit that any man has up to this present time spent his existence better or more enjoyably than I have done? For I consider that their lives are the best who study most to become as good as possible, and theirs the most enjoyable who feel that they are constantly progressing in virtue.

“I am conscious that, with regard to myself, such has been the case up to this very moment; and in associating with others, and viewing myself in comparison with others, I have constantly continued to come to the same conclusion respecting myself. And not only I myself, but my friends also steadfastly adhere to the same opinion concerning me, not because they love me (for those who are in love would naturally thus regard the objects of their affection), but because they consider that their own characters were improved by association with me.

“And if I should live any longer I shall, perhaps, have to bear the penalties of old age, to lose my sight and hearing, to feel my intellects impaired, to become slower at learning and quicker at forgetting, and in such gifts as I once excelled others, to find myself in-
ferior to them. And if, in good truth, I did not, under such circumstances, notice my condition, life would be worthless; but, if I did notice it, how could I continue to live otherwise than less profitably and pleasantly?

"But if I die unjustly, that will reflect disgrace upon those who have killed me unjustly; for, granting that injustice is disgraceful, how is it not a disgrace to commit any unjust action whatever? But what disgrace will it be to me that others were incapable of either deciding or acting justly in my case? And I myself perceive that, with regard to men who have lived before me, the judgment formed by posterity respecting those who have acted wrongfully, and those who have suffered wrong, is by no means similar. Hence, I know that I, too, if I am now to die, shall be regarded by mankind in a very different light from that in which those who have slain me are viewed; for I feel assured that it will always, for all time, be witnessed concerning me, that I have never once wronged any one, or made him a worse character, but that I have ever aimed at the improvement of those who have associated with me." This, then, was the kind of discourse that he held with Hermogenes and sundry others.

And of those who knew Socrates as he really was, all such as are lovers of virtue feel more regret for him than they do for anybody else, even up to the present day, as for one who contributed in the highest degree to their moral progress. And to me, most emphatically
(being, as I have described him, so pious, that he undertook nothing without the counsel of the gods; so just, that he never injured any one—no, not even in the slightest degree—but was of the greatest service to those who associated with him; so temperate, that he never preferred pleasure to virtue; so sensible, that he never erred in distinguishing the better from the worse, without requiring aid from any one else, but being of himself perfectly competent to discriminate between them; so capable of discoursing upon and defining such matters; and so skilled in estimating the characters of others, and in convincing those that were in error, and persuading them to the pursuit of virtue and all that was honourable and good), he seemed to be such an one as the very best and happiest man could be. But if any one is not satisfied with my opinion, let him compare the characteristics of others with those of Socrates, and form his judgment accordingly.

THE END.