THE PHAEDO OF PLATO
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EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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TO

R. D. ARCHER-HIND
PREFACE

This edition of the *Phaedo* is designed for the student of Greek rather than the student of philosophy. For the student of philosophy English scholarship has given us two editions of the *Phaedo*, those of Professor Geddes and of Mr. Archer-Hind, the former stimulating and full of poetical suggestions, whilst the latter may be regarded as almost the final word in the interpretation of this dialogue, combining the finest scholarship with a knowledge and appreciation of Platonic philosophy second to that of no living Platonist. But the scope and method of both these editions put them out of reach of the schoolboy, and the present edition is inspired by the belief that the *Phaedo* is worth reading as a masterpiece of literature to others than professed students of philosophy. I have twice read the *Phaedo* with the Sixth Form of the Manchester Grammar School, and came to the conclusion that
though the dialogue inevitably introduces the boy to some entirely new ideas—in itself no disadvantage—it does not in the main present difficulties which an intelligent boy cannot cope with. Writing with this object, I have given my attention mainly to the interpretation and the language of the dialogue, discarding the discussion of philosophical ideas, except so far as was necessary to elucidate the meaning. In the Introduction I have attempted to give in the simplest possible form an account of the Platonic Ideas, some understanding of which is necessary to make the dialogue intelligible.

My debt to Mr. Archer-Hind is one which I cannot adequately express: I knew the *Phaedo* first through his edition, which was thoroughly in my 'system' before I began to write. In particular, I have to thank him for his courtesy in allowing me to use *in toto* his summary of the argument, which appears at the head of the chapters in my notes: the summary is taken verbatim from his edition, with the exception of chapter xlviii., where my interpretation differs from his. From other editions I have borrowed little: what I have taken from Professor Geddes I have acknowledged in each case, whilst I have used the German edition of Wohlrab as a store-
house of Platonic quotations. The text of this edition is based on that of Mr. Archer-Hind, the variants from which are noted in the commentary. I have deliberately avoided an apparatus criticus or an account of the mss. of the Phaedo, partly because the textual difficulties are few and of no great importance, partly because my experience suggests that boys make little or nothing of a list of mss. and variant readings.

In conclusion, I would express my thanks to Mr. E. Barker, Fellow of Merton College, for his kindness in reading the proofs of my Notes and in making numerous valuable suggestions; and to Mr. H. Sidebotham, Scholar of Balliol, for the same service to my Introduction.

H. W.
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INTRODUCTION

A. THE COMPOSITION AND SCOPE OF THE PHAEDO

§ 1. The position of the Phaedo among the Platonic dialogues

The Phaedo, in spite of the fact that a considerable portion of it is occupied with subtle dialectical arguments on abstruse metaphysics, has been close to the hearts of thoughtful men of all ages. References to it in subsequent literature are numberless; and the youngest of us has heard how Cato, when the overthrow of the Roman Republic made death preferable to life, fortified his resolution and cheered his last hours by reading this noble work. Dealing with a subject the loftiest and most universally interesting, the soul’s immortality, enriched with the imagination of a poetical mind and adorned with all the graces of style of the most finished master of Greek prose, portraying moreover the majestic death-scene of the greatest, the most human and most courageous of Greeks, it is small wonder that this dialogue has attracted the admiration and affection of generations of men.
The date of composition of the *Phaedo* cannot be fixed with any great precision: it contains no historical allusion which would help to determine it. Nor is the point of any special interest, except to observe that its metaphysical doctrine marks it as belonging to the earlier period of Plato's philosophical development.

The writings of Plato are all inspired by the teaching of Socrates: the *Phaedo* belongs to a group of dialogues inspired directly by his death—the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedo*. The *Apology*, the only Platonic composition not in the form of dialogue, professes to give Socrates' defence on the charge of impiety, but is in reality a glorification of the life and character of Plato's master against his detractors. The *Crito* tells how Socrates refused to disobey the laws by escaping from prison when the opportunity was provided by Crito. The *Euthyphro* discusses the meaning of 'piety,' for the violation of which Socrates was condemned to death. The *Gorgias* is in the main an indictment of the 'Rhetores' and of the whole political life of Athens, breathing the bitterness natural to one whose master had been put to death by the Athenian democracy. The *Phaedo* purports to give an account of Socrates' last days in prison, and his conversation with a number of friends on the immortality of the soul.

§ 2. The setting of the Phaedo

Phaedo is represented as telling the story to his friend Echecrates of Phlius a short time after Socrates' death (v. note on χρόνον συνχρόνο 57 B). We are told that Plato himself was not present (Πλάτων δὲ,
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οἶμαι, ἡσθένει 59 β): yet we may be sure that every
detail of the final scene was made known to so close
a friend of Socrates, and we need feel no hesitation
in accepting as historical the purely narrative part
of the dialogue—e.g. the list of those present, the dis-
missal of Xanthippe, the manner of taking the poison;
Socrates' dying words: ὁ Κρίτων, τῷ Ἀσκληπιώ
ὅφειλομεν ἀλεκτρόνα, 118 A. Intrinsic probability,
as well as the absolute naturalness of the incidents
mentioned and the absence of deliberate dramatic
effect, points to the conclusion that the setting of
the dialogue is true to fact.

§ 3. The subject of the Phaedo: complex character
of the Platonic dialogue

If the question be raised, 'What is the subject
of the Phaedo?' the obvious answer that rises to the
lips is 'the proof of the soul's immortality.' Super-
ficially the answer is correct, and conveys that view
of the dialogue which gives it its main interest to
the average reader: it is further borne out by the
alternative title to the Phaedo, "περὶ ψυχῆς." But it
is the Platonic manner to weave two or three strands
into the texture of his compositions. In the Republic,
which has the alternative title "περὶ δικαίου," the
attempt to define 'justice' leads Plato to frame an
'Ideal State.' In the Sophist, again, the ostensible
motive of the dialogue, the definition of the sophist,
involves an elaborate exposition of the dialectical
method of διαίρεσις, 'division of genus into species,'
and incidentally there is introduced the metaphysi-
cal problem of ὕν and ὑν ὕν, Being and Not-being,
which to Plato at any rate is not subordinate
in importance to either of the other two motives.
Looking at the *Phaedo* from this same point of view we can trace three distinct themes or motives of the dialogue.

The argument arises out of an apparent paradox. Socrates asserts (1) that in this life we are under the protection of good and wise gods, (2) that the philosopher will be glad to quit this life. Challenged by Kebes to explain this inconsistency, Socrates replies ἀλλ' ὑμῖν ὦ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἢ ὅτι τὸν λόγον ἀποδοικεῖαι, ὦ μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβως τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οὕτεθαι ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, 63 E. 'Well, you shall be my jury: and I would like now to make good to you my position, that a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy seems to me to be justified in feeling confidence at the approach of death, in the sure hope that in that other world after death he will win the greatest blessings.' To prove this Socrates shows that the aim of the philosopher throughout life is to make the soul independent of the body, i.e. of its weaknesses and passions, and that accordingly death, the entire emancipation of soul from body, is the complete realization of the philosopher's aim. Kebes now points out that this is assuming that the soul will continue to exist after death: Socrates admits the objection, and proceeds to prove that the soul is immortal. Formally, then, it is clear that the main thesis is that quoted above from 63 E, that the philosopher is justified in contemplating death with equanimity, with its corollary, that 'the man who would fain be ready to meet death with cheerfulness must lead the philosopher's life.' It is this corollary which gives the dialogue its 'ethical' character (its full title is Φαίδων, ἦ
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περὶ ψυχῆς, ἡθικός): and to this ethical exhortation Socrates reverts so soon as the soul's immortality is, or seems to be, established; cf. 81 a and 107 e εἰπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖ ταῖ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτον μόνον ἐν ψ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ πάντος, καὶ ὁ κύνονς νῦν δὴ καὶ δοξεῖν ἄν δειος εἶναι, εἰ τίς αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει, 'since the soul is immortal, it requires attention obviously not only for the sake of that period of time to which we give the name of "life," but for the sake of all time, and the danger of neglecting it would now seem to be a very terrible one.'

One of the first arguments Plato uses to prove the soul's immortality is the theory that all learning is 'recollection,' ἀνάμνησις, 72 e sqq.; the soul, according to this theory, has had an existence previous to this life, and has had knowledge of the 'Ideas' (v. Introd. B), a knowledge which it loses at the moment of birth and is constantly recovering during life by being reminded of the Ideas by the visible objects of the world, which are their images. This doctrine of ἀνάμνησις rests on the Theory of Ideas, and at the end of the ἀνάμνησις argument Simmias admits εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίον εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἦμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἦμῶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἦν σὺ νῦν λέγεις, 'our argument finds an excellent refuge in the position that the existence of the soul prior to our birth rests on the same assurance as the existence of this Being of which you are now speaking.' Here we come in sight of the great principle on which the final and convincing proof of immortality is based, the kinship of the soul with the Ideas, and the essential truth of the existence of these Ideas. The final proof, put in its briefest form, is this: 'the de-
finition of soul involves the Idea of Life; now no Idea can admit its opposite, nor can any form of existence which embraces an Idea in its definition admit the opposite of that Idea: therefore soul cannot admit the Idea of Death, the opposite of Life, which is involved in the definition of soul.' This is the third strand in the texture of the *Phaedo* —the principle that the Ideas are the source of all existence and all knowledge.

Thus the dialogue has three motives—(i) that which is formally the main thesis, 'that the philosopher, and only the philosopher, is warranted in facing death cheerfully'; (ii) to make good this position Socrates is led to prove that the soul is immortal; (iii) the proof of the soul's immortality involves an exposition of the doctrine of the Ideas as the principle of 'Causation' in the universe. The natural bent of Plato's genius towards metaphysical speculation suggests that this last motive was no subsidiary one, but rather that one of the three which lay next his heart, and on which he felt the most absolute assurance. At the same time he is too great an artist to destroy the unity of the dialogue by losing sight of the original motive in the more absorbing dialectic on the Ideas: to this original motive he constantly reverts, and the 'myth' at the end of the *Phaedo* has its proper place in this artistic unity, enforcing the moral of the dialogue, 'to lead the philosophic life,' by a description of the beauties of that 'purer world' to which the liberated soul of the philosopher wings its way after death, with a companion picture of the underworld to which the unpurified soul is doomed for a season; and the same moral is driven home, by the indirect method natural to an artist, by the practical example of
Socrates' unfailing courage, cheerfulness, and even playfulness in the hour of death.

B. THE PLATONIC THEORY OF IDEAS

§ 1. Plato's position difficult to define precisely

The argument of the Phaedo assumes in the hearer an acquaintance with the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas: 74 A φαμέν ποι τι εἶναι ὣσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερον τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ὄσον: 'we say that there is such a thing as "equal"—I am not speaking of log equal to log, stone to stone, or anything else of the kind—but beyond all these something quite different, equality itself'; and the dialogue cannot be made intelligible without some attempt to explain the doctrine as simply as so unfamiliar and metaphysical a question will permit. This task is rendered somewhat more difficult by the fact that Plato is not a dogmatic philosopher, with a hard and fast, carefully elaborated system: his works, as might be expected of one who is breaking new ground, show a constant development of thought, and his position on this, as on other subjects, is very different in his later writings from that developed in the earlier. The Phaedo, as has been indicated above, belongs to the earlier phase of Plato's metaphysic, and in it he regards the Ideas from the same point of view as in several other dialogues which form the earlier group, comprising, besides the Phaedo, the Republic, Phaedrus, Symposium, Meno, Cratylus, and possibly the Theaetetus: this view is subsequently criticised and amended in such dialogues as the Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus, and reaches its
most complete development in the Timaeus. With these later developments we are not concerned, but only with the doctrine of the Ideas as evolved in the Phaedo.

A further complication arises from the difficulty of determining with anything like precision how much of Plato's thought is his own, and how much is due to Socrates. By a familiar literary convention, partly from an artistic instinct and partly as a tribute to the master who had inspired him, Plato in almost all his dialogues puts his thoughts into the mouth of Socrates. A comparison, however, of the Platonic dialogues with Xenophon's Memorabilia, or 'notable sayings of Socrates,' suggests that the great original thinker is Plato himself, and that he is indebted to Socrates not so much for his doctrine as for his method of dialectic, question and answer.

§ 2. The Socratic λόγοι: a theory of 'knowledge'

In the particular case of the Theory of Ideas we can trace back to Socrates a germ, certainly, of the doctrine, but a germ as widely removed from the Platonic development as the seed from the flower. Socrates' main interest as a teacher was ethical, and he started with the fundamental proposition that 'virtue is knowledge': Xen. Memorabilia III. ix. 5 ἐφ' δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πῶςαν ἀρετήν σοφίαν εἶναι· τὰ τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετὴ πράπτεται καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὐτ' ἀν τοὺς ταῦτα εἴδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τοὺτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράπτειν, ἄλλα καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν ἀμαρτάνειν. Knowledge, then, being the one thing needful, it remained to determine what was the object of knowledge, what was the really
knowable. The earliest Greek thinkers, the physical philosophers of Ionia, were all impressed with the shifting and transitory nature of the visible phenomena of the material universe; and the dictum of Heraclitus, πάντα ρεῖ, found its logical counterpart in the sceptical position of the Sophist Protagoras, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. This was a maxim which the ethical teacher could not accept—it is the subversion of all ethical principle or theory; and Socrates, looking about him for something stable and knowable among the shifting phenomena of the world and amid the diversity of men's judgments and opinions, found it in what we might call indifferently 'definitions,' 'universals,' or 'concepts,' λόγοι: cf. Phaedo 99 e ἔδοξε μοι χρημαί εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἑκείνως σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. He would take a group of men's judgments (as Socrates was mainly concerned with human judgments, and not with physical phenomena, it will be as well to take the former as a type), e.g. various acts which men call δίκαιοι; he would then by his dialectical process strip from these acts and judgments upon them all that was accidental, individual, unessential, and by this inductive method attempt to frame a definition, or λόγος, of τὸ δίκαιον, what we should call the 'conception of justice': these universals alone, he maintained, can be known.

§ 3. Plato developed this theory of 'knowledge' into a metaphysical theory of 'Being'.

Up to this point we have simply a 'logical' theory, a theory of knowledge; the great step taken by Plato is to develop this theory of knowledge into a theory of ontology, a theory of 'Being.' If
these universal concepts, such as τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ καλὸν, and the like, are the only things that can be known, it follows, from the Platonic point of view, that they are the only things that really 'exist.' Plato accepts the Heraclitean πάντα ρεῖ, but instead of deducing from it the conclusion that nothing can be known, he maintains that there is an existence, beyond and above the phenomena of the material world, which can be known, which is the true and proper object of knowledge—the world of Ideas: the Socratic λόγοι, or mental 'concepts,' take to themselves in the Platonic system an independent existence, they are an invisible world comprehended not by the senses but by the pure intelligence. These Ideas are called by various names,—οὐσία, 'essence' or 'real Being,' εἶδος or ἴδεα, 'Form' or 'Type,' or again by such phrases as αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον or αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι δίκαιον, 'that which justice really is,' αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, and the like. For every group of things which have a common attribute, there exists a corresponding 'Idea': Socrates, Plato, Kebes, Simmias, being ἄνθρωποι, imply an αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; the horses we see in the world imply an αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν ἴππος; square tables, round tables, three-legged tables imply an αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι τραπέζια; various beautiful objects an αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι καλὸν, various just acts an αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι δίκαιον, various equal objects an αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν ἅπαξ, and so forth; every group of objects which have a common name, or judgments which have a common predicate, imply a corresponding Idea. It has been observed that Plato is not a philosopher of cut and dried tenets, and we are not to imagine that Plato had analysed in detail every conceivable aspect of this theory of Ideas and framed an answer to every imaginable criticism: it is significant that when he wishes to
express the relation between 'Idea' and 'particulars' his language is not precise—100 D οἷκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτῷ (a particular object) καλὸν ἡ ἡ ἐκεῖνον τοῦ καλοῦ (the Idea of beauty) εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία εἶτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὁπως προσγενομένου. The whole theory, indeed, is tinged with poetry, and Plato's rich poetical imagination clothes the Ideas with an almost living personality: they exist in a pure world apart, and form a sort of hierarchy, the lord of them all being the highest Idea, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: in their society dwell the souls that have not been born (v. note on ἀνάμνησις, beginning of ch. xviii.), and to their company return the souls of men who have lived the true philosophic life.

The phenomena of the visible world, then, according to Plato, have no real independent existence of their own; they are mere images—ἐἰκόνες—of the Ideas, by their resemblance to which they recall to us those Ideas which we 'have known long since and lost awhile.' Ontologically the Ideas are the 'cause' of the phenomena of the world: Socrates is small, great, just, or beautiful, 'because,' and only in so far as, he participates in the Ideas of smallness, greatness, justice, or beauty. A somewhat different aspect of the same thing appears in the discussion of the νοῦς theory of Anaxagoras (chs. 46-47), though it is not there formally associated with the theory of Ideas. There Socrates is represented as complaining of disappointment with Anaxagoras, who, after assigning νοῦς as the ruler of the universe, did not, as Socrates expected, explain everything by proving that 'it is best that it should be so,' but went out of his way to find other αἰτίαι of various kinds by the methods of science. Here we have an indirect but clear allusion to the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, the supreme
Idea of Good, which is elaborated in the Republic and elsewhere. This ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, besides being the supreme and final object of knowledge, is also the supreme and final cause of all things, as being at once the source and the end and aim of their existence (v. note on μετὰ φρονήσεως 69 B). Thus the ontological and teleological views of existence are brought into line, both culminating in the supreme 'Idea of Good.'

C. Characters of the Dialogue

PHAEDO, the narrator of the whole story, was a native of Elis: in the war waged by Athens and Sparta against Elis (401 B.C.) he was taken prisoner and brought as a slave to Athens. He must have been soon ransomed (by Kebes, according to Aulus Gellius), for in 399 B.C. we find him an intimate member of the Socratic circle and a special favourite of Socrates: he would appear, from the allusion in 89 B εἰσώθει γὰρ, ὡπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μοι εἰς τὰς τρίχας, to have been quite young at the time of Socrates' death. After that event he returned to his native town, where he founded the Elean school of philosophy. As a philosopher he is classed with the more famous Euclides of Megara by the satirist Timon of Phlius—

ἀλλ’ οὐ μοι τούτων φλεοντων μέλει· οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλον οὐδενός, οὐ Φαιδωνος, ὥστε γε μέι, οὐδ’ ἐριδάντεω Ἐκλείδων, Μεγαρεύσιν ὃς ἔμβαλε λύσσαν ἐρισμοῦ.

The Megarian school were known as ἐριστικοὶ and διαλεκτικοὶ: they developed the Socratic method of dialectic by question and answer.

ECHECRATES of Phlius is well chosen by Plato as
the auditor of Phaedo’s narrative: little is known of him, save that he is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius as one of the last of the Pythagoreans, and as having heard Philolaus, the Pythagorean lecturer at Thebes, who is mentioned in 61 D. As a Pythagorean he would be likely to listen with sympathy to the unfolding of the doctrine of the Ideas, for Aristotle tells us that the Pythagorean theory of numbers had much in common with the Platonic theory of Ideas.

Socrates, the protagonist of this as of most of Plato’s dialogues, is too familiar a figure to need introduction. It will suffice to indicate how in the course of the dialogue Plato brings out some of his most salient characteristics: his piercing glance from beneath the bushy eyebrows—ἐπιβλέψας 63 A, ταύρηδων ἀποβλέψας 117 D: his irony, in his allusion to the quality of Euenos’ poetry (60 D), in his advice to that somewhat effeminate person to ‘follow him as quickly as possible’ (61 B), and in his question οὗ φιλόσοφος Εὖνος; (61 C): his unfailing courage and tranquillity in the face of death, as evidenced by his spending his last hours in his favourite occupation of philosophic discourse, by his parting instructions concerning his children and his burial (115 B), and finally by his reproof of his friends’ extravagant sorrow (117 D): his patience and gentleness in hearing and weighing the interjections of his hearers (89 A, 103 A): his piety in fulfilling a possible interpretation of his recurring dream by ‘writing poetry,’ in calling on the god to aid their argument (95 B), and in enjoining upon Crito to pay to Aeschylus the customary offering of a man recovered from sickness (118 A): his playful humour, as witnessed, possibly, by this last command to Crito, by his desire to pour a libation from the
poison, and by his mockery of his own grandiose language (115 A). Had we no other record of Socrates than this, we should be left with a clear picture of that great man, not complete in every detail, yet with sufficient definition of character to win our love and admiration.

SIMMIA S and KEBES, the two interlocutors of Socrates throughout the dialogue, are inseparably associated in our minds. Both were neanískoi at the time of Socrates' death (89 A): both were Thebans who had attended the lectures of Philolaus, and both became devoted adherents of Socrates. We read in the Crito (45 B) that Simmias had brought with him sufficient money to effect the release of Socrates, and that Kebes was likewise ready to do all in his power for the same end. Of Simmias Socrates says in the Phaedrus (242 B) that no one except Simmias had caused the production of more dialogues than Phaedrus—Συμμίαν Θηβαίον ἔξαιρω λόγου: both are recorded to have written philo-

phic dialogues themselves. Yet, though so closely associated, their different characters are clearly marked in the Phaedo. Simmias is credited by Socrates with earnestness in argument—οὗ φαύλους ἐσκέεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου 86 D: yet his main con-

tribution to the dialogue, the suggestion that the analogy between ψυχὴ and ἀρµονίᾳ is fatal to im-
mortality, quickly breaks down before the dialectic of Socrates, and earlier on (76 D) Simmias was forced to admit, on another objection he raised, ἔλαθον ἐµαυτόν οὐδὲν εἰπὼν. Again, after the final proof of immortality, Simmias, though he can find no flaw in the argument, feels some uneasiness—οὗτος ἀντός ἔχω ὅπῃ ἀπειστὸ ἐκ γε τῶν λεγοµένων· ἵπτο µέντοι τοῦ µεγέθους περὶ δὲν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην
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ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπεισίαν ἐτὶ ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων: a touch of vagueness and hesitancy is traceable in all he says. Kebes has none of these misgivings as to the fallibility of the human reason: he is hard to convince—καρπερωτατός ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀποστείν τοῖς λόγοις (77 Α)—but once his reason is convinced, he is quite satisfied: his characteristic quality is πραγματεία (63 Α), he is keen on the scent of an argument—ἀεὶ λόγους τινὰς ἀνέρεννα (63 Α), quick to detect a flaw. It is Kebes who starts the most fertile objections, who asks why suicide is unlawful (61 Β), calls upon Socrates to explain his paradox about welcoming death (62 Α)—contrast this with the somewhat superficial charge of inconsistency in 103 Α—, raises the question of immortality (70 Α), brings up ἀνάμνησις (72 Ε), and in 87 Α requires that Socrates should not be satisfied with the soul's 'superior durability,' but should demonstrate its absolute imperishable-ness, if our uneasiness at death is to be allayed: he is the seeker for truth after Socrates' own heart.

Crīto plays no important part in the dialogue: he is the chief interlocutor in the Crīto, where he tries to persuade Socrates to escape from prison. He was a wealthy Athenian, no philosopher, but a warm friend and admirer of Socrates, for whom he stood bail at his trial (115 Β): to him Socrates entrusts his last behests (116 Β). His relation to Socrates is admirably summed up by Diogenes Laertius—οὗτος μάλιστα φιλοσοφορώτατα διετέθη πρὸς Σωκράτην, καὶ οὗτος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτοῦ ὡστε μηδέποτε λείπειν τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν.

Apollodorus, who is mentioned as breaking out into uncontrollable weeping when Socrates drank
the hemlock (117 d), appears also in the Symposium (173 d), where from his enthusiastic temperament he is called ὁ μαυρόσ: he is twice referred to by Xenophon as a devoted admirer of Socrates, but ἄλλος εὑρήκη.

The rest, who are merely mentioned as present, are Critobulus son of Crito, Hermogenes, who also appears in the Cratylus, Epigenes son of the orator Antiphon, Aeschines, Antisthenes, the founder of the 'Cynics,' Ctesippus, mentioned again in the Euthydemus, and Menexenus, after whom one of Plato’s dialogues is named: these were Athenians. Finally there were the Theban Phaedondes, and the two Megarians, Euclides, founder of the Megarian school, and his friend Terpsion.

D. On the Origin and Development of Prose Dialogue

Thucydides records a historic remark of Pericles to the effect that Athens drew to herself the produce of the whole world—ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τὴς πόλεως ἐκ πόλεις γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἦμιν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρα τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γινόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων (Thuc. ii. 38); the same remark might be applied with equal truth to the field of literature, where Athens had the genius to appropriate the various forms invented in the different quarters of the Greek world. History she borrowed from Ionia, Rhetoric from Sicily, Comedy, according to tradition, from Epicharmus of Sicily and Suzarion of Megara, whilst in Tragedy she fused together the Ionian Epic and the Dorian Dithyrambic chorus. The philosophic dialogue might seem to be a form of literature in which she could
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fairly claim originality. Yet tradition as to Plato’s sources of inspiration carries us into curious by-ways of Greek literary history, to a writer who is little more than a name to us, Sophron of Syracuse, who wrote what were known as μίμοι. The ‘mime’ or farce was a popular form of entertainment with the folk of S. Italy and Sicily, who possessed a strong natural gift for humorous and grotesque impersonation: it was a short dramatic sketch of ludicrous incidents and characters from everyday life. It was from this mime of S. Italy and Sicily that the Romans developed their ‘fabula Atellana,’ or ‘Oscum ludicum,’ and their old dramatic ‘satura,’ whose legitimate descendants are some of the earlier satires of Horace. Sophron of Syracuse, the most prominent Greek writer of mimes, lived in the middle of the fifth century B.C., and tradition has it that Plato, on his visit to Syracuse, was presented by Dion with a copy of his works, which so interested him that he slept with it under his pillow (cf. Hesychius, Sophron). The satirist Timon of Phlius says plainly that Plato learned from Sophron the art of writing dialogues—τὸ Σώφρονος βιβλίων ἀφ’ οὗτος ἐμμηχανεν γράφειν τοῖς διαλόγοις: and the two men are associated in a somewhat cryptic sentence in Aristotle’s Poetics ch. i. § 7 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχομεν ὄνομάσαι κοινὸν τοῖς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμοις καὶ τοῖς Σωκρατικοῖς λόγοις. So little is known of Sophron that it is a vexed question whether he wrote in prose or verse: a scholiast’s note says of him οὗτος γὰρ μόνοι τῶν ποιητῶν μνήμοις τυχέντοι καὶ κάλοις ἔχροστατο, ποιητικῆς ἀναλογίας καταφρονήσας, which Professor Mahaffy interprets to mean that he wrote a sort of rhythmical prose something like Walt Whitman’s ‘so-called poems.’ Two other Greek writers are mentioned
by tradition as lineal descendants of Sophron and his mimes—the recently discovered Herondas, who wrote μυμίαμβοι in the Iambic Seazon metre, and Theocritus, who is said to have copied certain of his Idylls directly from Sophron: but this can hardly be taken as proof that Sophron wrote verse. Professor Gilbert Murray so thoroughly acknowledges the kinship of Plato to Sophron as to speak of some of Plato’s earlier dialogues, such as the Laches and Hippias Major, as mimes. If we attempt to extract the kernel from this tradition about Sophron, it is obvious in the first place that Plato was not determined by the example of Sophron to adopt the dialogue as his form of composition: there can be no doubt that that form was indicated to him by the method of Socrates, whose teaching was all conducted by conversation, question and answer, what afterwards became famous as the method of Dialectic—διαλεκτική, literally ‘conversation.’ As Socrates was to be the mouthpiece of Plato’s thought, it was almost necessary from the literary point of view that he should give his compositions a form which would recall to his readers the historic Socrates and his method of teaching. Dialogue once determined upon, it was clearly desirable that it should be as dramatic as possible, and we can well believe that Plato would study with attention the closest models he could find to dramatic prose dialogue. These he found to his hand in Sophron and his compatriot Epicharmus, and they were the more to his purpose as both had a good deal to say on contemporary philosophy—Epicharmus in particular was imbued with those Pythagorean tenets that gained so strong a hold on Sicily and S. Italy: indeed a Sicilian rhetorician, Alcimus, quoted by Diogenes
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Laertius (iii. 12. 9 sqq.), wrote a book to show that Plato borrowed all his philosophic doctrines from Epicharmus! It is this study, then, of Sophron and Epicharmus as models of dramatic style that would seem to be meant by the tradition associating Plato with the mime.

The Dialogue, in addition to its literary propriety for a record of Socrates' teaching, has some obvious advantages as a vehicle for philosophic discussion. Its dramatic character lends variety and life to the dead monotony of a discourse: and Plato in particular showed a skill which none of his imitators have rivalled in imparting dramatic reality, as well as dramatic form, to his dialogues by giving characters as well as names to his 'dialogi personae.' The dialogue further enables difficulties and objections, which require solution, to be raised in a perfectly natural manner. In particular the form of dialogue so often used by Plato, as for example in the Phaedo, where the conversation is reported by one who was present to one who was not, enables the writer to give artistic colour to the setting, to indicate the tone in which each thing is said and the impression made on the speaker's audience, and to introduce those interludes in the conversation which are so skilfully used by Plato to mark a stage in the development of the argument, or the approach of a critical point (cf. in the Phaedo 69 E, 77 E, 84 C–85 D, 88 C, 107 A). In his longer works, more particularly where he is dealing with a big and difficult subject (e.g. in the later books of the Republic), Plato abandons the dramatic form and lapses into monologue: this would appear to have been the method of the lost dialogues of Aristotle, for Cicero, writing in that style, says 'scripsi Aristoteleio more.'
The philosophers of the various Socratic schools almost all wrote dialogues; of these little but the names survive, so that in extant classical Greek literature Plato stands alone in this form of composition. Five centuries had passed before there arose another great writer of prose dialogue, Lucian of Samosata (second century A.D.), who wrote dialogues modelled on Plato in style, but with the comic element outweighing the philosophic. In Latin Cicero is Plato's most famous imitator: in our own language we have the dialogues of Addison, the philosophic discussions of Bishop Berkeley, closely modelled in form on Plato, and, best known of all, the Imaginary Conversations of Walter Savage Landor.

E. The Trial and Condemnation of Socrates

§ 1. Anomaly of the Condemnation

It is one of the ironies of history that the man whose last hours were spent in discoursing on the immortality of the soul and exhorting his youthful hearers to a virtuous life, and who faced death cheerfully in the assurance that it was to take him into the presence of 'good and wise gods' (63 b), should be lying under sentence of death on a charge of 'impiety' and 'corrupting the young.' That this charge could possibly be brought against Socrates by his worst enemy is hard enough to understand: that a majority out of five hundred and fifty intelligent jurors should have condemned him to death on such an indictment seems almost to pass the bounds of belief. Nor do we solve the puzzle by hastily condemning the jury that sentenced him of ignorant fanaticism: fanaticism was the thing furthest re-
moved from the Athenian citizen at the end of the fifth century B.C. We shall do better to consider whether any justification, or at any rate explanation, of so unmerited a sentence is to be found either in the life and teaching of Socrates himself, or in the peculiar circumstances, social and political, of the time when he was brought to trial.

§ 2. Socrates ranked in public opinion as one of the Sophists

Our main source of information with regard to the trial is Plato's *Apology*, purporting to be the speech made by Socrates in his defence, and no doubt historically accurate as a record of the main lines of argument actually adopted by Socrates. In that speech Socrates mentions that the indictment was twofold: he was accused of (i) 'disbelieving in the gods in whom the city believed, and introducing new deities'; (ii) of 'corrupting the young'—ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὗς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ νὰ δαιμόνια εὑσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. He distinguishes between his actual accusers, Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon, and those other accusers who had been prejudicing public opinion against him for years past. Many years before, the oracle of Delphi had declared that 'there was no man wiser than Socrates'; and Socrates, with the pious impulse to prove the truth of the oracle's statement, straightway set himself to test the wisdom of those who had a reputation for it in Athens—statesmen, orators, poets, handicraftsmen, and the like. In the course of his investigation he proved to his own satisfaction that their boasted wisdom was ignorance; they knew nothing but
thought they knew a great deal, whereas he was wiser than they in recognising that he knew nothing. Socrates' whole life was devoted to persuading his fellow-citizens to look into their own minds, to test their opinions and beliefs, to be dissatisfied with mere tradition, mere 'thinking that they understood,' to empty their minds of prejudice and make-believe, and to get down to some bed-rock of secure conviction on which to build up an edifice of true knowledge. Such a mode of life, in addition to rousing the personal hostility of the exposed professors of knowledge, was apt to identify Socrates in popular opinion with the Sophists, who proclaimed themselves able to 'make the worse argument appear the better,' and the outcome of whose teaching was that nothing is knowable. The logical result of the method and doctrine of the Sophists was the dictum of Protagoras, 'man is the measure of all things,' i.e. that what a man believes is true for him, that there is no such thing as absolute truth. Nothing could have been further from the spirit of the Socratic teaching properly understood: but owing to similarity of method and to his constant determination to examine everything to its foundation and not to accept tradition, he became identified in public opinion with the Sophists, whose teaching was subversive of morality, and hostile to the most venerable traditions of Athens. The Sophist Protagoras, only a few years before Socrates' trial, had been condemned to death for impiety at Athens on account of his sceptical views: some twenty years earlier, Diagoras of Melos had been proscribed at Athens for atheism, and the comic poet Aristophanes in the Clouds (423 B.C.), a play which holds Socrates up to ridicule as the type of the Sophist, indicates the affinity.
of Socrates to Diagoras by calling him 'Socrates the Melian.' It would carry us too far afield to discuss how Aristophanes came so to misjudge Socrates: but there can be little doubt that the Clouds marked out the latter as Sophist in public opinion to the end of his days.

§ 3. The charge of 'Impiety'

Some slight colour was lent to the charge of 'introducing new deities' by the frequent allusions Socrates made to what he calls τὸ δαμόνιον, a divine voice within him, which from time to time warned him to refrain from some course he was contemplating. As to the other part of the first count in the indictment, the charge of 'not believing in the city's gods,' Xenophon puts it on record in the Memorabilia (1. iii. 1) that Socrates conformed to the city's laws in the matter of sacrifices and worship— ἦ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναίρει ποιοῦντας εὑρεβῶς ἄν ποιείν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρῇ, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καὶ ματαιοὺς ἐνομίζειν εἶναι. Yet the charge may very likely be true, if taken in its literal sense of 'not accepting all the traditions of the Greek mythology as current among the Athenians.' An instructive passage in Plato's Phaedrus (p. 229) throws some light on the attitude of Socrates with regard to the popular mythology. 'Being asked whether he believes the Attic legend of Boreas and Orithuia, he replies that he should indeed be only following the example of many ingenious men if he rejected it and attempted to explain it away; but that such speculations, however fine, appeared to him to betoken a mind not very happily constituted: for the subjects
furnished for them by the marvellous beings of the Greek mythology were endless, and to reduce all such stories to a probable form was a task which required much leisure. This he could not give to it, for he was fully occupied with the study of his own nature. He therefore let these stories alone, and acquiesced in the common belief about them—"χαίρειν ἑάςας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζόμενῳ περὶ αὐτῶν" (Thirlwall). Socrates spoke either of ὁ θεὸς or οἱ θεοὶ indifferently: the Platonic Socrates is no doubt a monotheist; the historic Socrates probably troubled himself little about the distinction, holding that 'the proper study of mankind is man.' But the charge of atheism, taken in its spirit rather than its letter, was never more inappropriate to any man than to Socrates.

§ 4. Corruption of the Young

It was undoubtedly this second count in the indictment that told most heavily against Socrates. The conviction underlying the verdict in the minds of the jury was that the effect of Socrates' teaching had been to encourage the young in ἱβρίς, in a want of respect for things venerable. In the Clouds, mentioned above, the young pupil of Socrates is represented as insolent to his aged father, and we can well believe that in some unfortunate cases young men who were not very wise, and who got hold of the wrong end of the Socratic teaching, were puffed up with a conceit of their own wisdom, and thought they knew something better than their fathers had known. A democracy is not above being jealous of political free-thinking, and though Socrates was in the best sense thoroughly patriotic and loyal to
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the Athenian democracy, he criticised freely some of her institutions, notably the election by lot of magistrates, which most Athenians regarded as the Palladium of their political liberty. It is significant that two of his most distinguished pupils, Xenophon and Plato, were warm admirers of the Spartan constitution. Xenophon, before the condemnation of Socrates, had served in Asia under Cyrus, the arch-enemy of Athens, and a few years later was actually fighting under his hero, the Spartan king Agesilaus, against the Athenians at Coronea, and was in consequence exiled from Athens. But the enemies of Socrates could point to worse examples than Xenophon of what they maintained to be the results of his teaching. One of his favourite pupils had been Alcibiades, a notorious instance of ἄρχοντας, who had been sentenced to death for impiety in connection with the mutilation of the Hermae (415 B.C.), and who had worked more mischief for Athens during the closing years of the Peloponnesian War than any other single man. Nor was even he the worst offender: Critias, the leading spirit of the worst excesses of the Thirty Tyrants, had been in his early days a companion of Socrates. At the time of the trial Athens was only beginning to recover from the misery created by the tyranny of the Thirty: it was a moment when Athenians were likely to look askance at any who had ever been associated with the Tyrants, or who were under suspicion of not being wholly in sympathy with the restored democracy. It is significant that the most reputable of the three prosecutors, Anytus, had been the comrade in arms of Thrasybulus, the champion and hero of the restoration. Socrates to-day needs no defence against the imputation of being in any degree responsible
for the iniquities of Alcibiades or Critias: but it is obvious that their misdeeds must have aggravated the prejudice against him in the minds of those who only knew him from the outside, and that the years immediately following the Tyranny of the Thirty offered a favourable opportunity to those who wished to work him mischief.

§ 5. Socrates' attitude during the Trial

Enough perhaps has been said to indicate some palliation for the verdict of 'guilty' brought in against Socrates: the majority for condemnation was a very narrow one, and it is certain that had Socrates adopted a conciliatory attitude in his defence, he would have been acquitted. Instead of that Socrates manifested the most complete indifference as to the issue of the trial, assuring the jury that if set free with a warning to 'mend his ways,' he should refuse to do so, preferring to obey 'the god' rather than the jury. This same attitude of indifference Socrates maintained when the question arose what was to be the sentence. The prosecutors proposed death as the penalty, and in a case like this, an ἀγών τιμητός, where no fixed penalty was assigned by law, it rested with the convicted defendant to propose an alternative penalty, an ἀντιτίμημα to the τίμημα of the prosecution: between these two the jury were bound to choose, the law forbidding them to adopt any compromise. Socrates began by proposing that he should be feasted daily in the Prytaneum as a public benefactor: he was ultimately induced by his anxious friends to propose a fine of thirty minae: beyond that he would not go. In face of such a contemptuous counter-proposal the jury had practically
no choice but to sentence him to death, so that for the death-sentence Socrates alone was responsible, as he would have been the first to admit. The Athenian jury little imagined that their verdict would go far to cancel all the glorious achievements of Athens in the judgment of posterity to the end of time. Socrates was indeed least worthy of death of all men: still let us do the jury the justice of admitting that their verdict, and even their sentence, was not quite the irrational outburst of intolerant fanaticism that it has so often been made out to be. Socrates forgave his judges: let us imitate his large-mindedness.

[The best account and refutation of the charges against Socrates is to be found in Plato's Apology and in Xenophon's Memorabilia, bk. i. chs. 1–3.]
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

[ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἤθικὸς]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΔΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ, Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΤΗΡΡΕΤΗΣ

I. Αὐτός, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγένον Σωκράτηι ἐκεῖνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἢ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλοι τοῦ ἢκούσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτός, ὃ Ἐξέκρατες.

5 EX. Τῇ οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἄττα εἶπεν ὁ ἄνηρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἔτελεύτα; ἡδεώς γὰρ ἂν ἔγω ἄκουσαμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὔδεις πάνιν τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναξ, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκται ἀρχόν συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν, ὡστὶς ἂν ἢμῖν σαφῆς τι ἀγγείλαι οἶδος τῇ ἤμι περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε 7

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Β
δὴ ὁτι φάρμακον πιῶν ἀποθάνοι, τῶν δὲ ἅλλων οὐδὲν εἰχεν φράζειν.

58 ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρα ἐπύθεσθε ὅν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

EX. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἦμων ἠγγειλὲ τίς, καὶ ἑσαυμάζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλὴ ύστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανόν. τί οὖν ἦν τούτο, ὧν Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τίς αὐτῶ, ὧν Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη, ἐτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρόμινα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δήλον Ἀθηναίου πέμπουσιν.

EX. Τούτῳ δὲ δὴ τί ἔστω;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ πλοίον, ὃς φασίν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν ὧν Ὁθεσεύς ποτὲ εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δῖς ἐπτᾶ ἐκεῖνους ψευτὸ άγων καὶ ἐσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὐζαντό, ὃς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθείεν, ἐκάστου ἐτοὺς θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δήλον. ἥν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκεῖνον κατ' ἐναιτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύει τῇ πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δήλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοίον καὶ πάλιν δεύρο. τοῦτο δὲ ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἀνέμου C ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἄρχῃ δ' ἔστι τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου. τοῦτο δ' ἐτυχεν, ὥσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ
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ταύτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

II. Ἐξ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θάνατον, ὁ Φαίδων; τί ὡς τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραξθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶπον οἱ ἀρχιόντες παρείναι, ἀλλὰ ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τίνες, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

Ἐξ. Ταύτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγείλαι, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει ὑψά.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὡς μήν διηγήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτῶν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἡδίστων.

Εκ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσμένους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον Ε

παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆτε εὐδαιμόνιον γὰρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὡς Ἐξέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἄδεως καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὡστε μοι ἐκεῖνυ παρ- ἱστασθαι μηδὲ εἰς "Ἄδου ιὸντα ἀνευ θείας μοῦ ρας ἵπποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὗ πράξειν, εἰπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ 59
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

δὴ ταῦτα οὐδέν πάνυ μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσήγει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὕ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἢμῶν ὄντων, ὀσπέρ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοι τινες ἤσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνώς ἀτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀγάθης κράσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὥμοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμομένως ὧτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἐμελλε τελευ-τᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνὼτε δὲ δα-κρύοντες, εἰς δὲ ἢμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως,

Β Ἀπολλόδωρος· οὐσθα γὰρ ποι ὁν ἀνδρα καὶ τὸ τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

EX. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκεῖνος τε τοιῶν παυτάπασιν οὕτως εἰχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγώγη ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

EX. Ἐτυχον δὲ, ὁ Φαίδων, τίνες παρα- γενόμενοι; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτάβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐτί Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Λειχένης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τίνες τῶν ἐπιχωρίων· Πλάτων δὲ, οἴμαι, ἤσθενε.
EX. Τι δε; 'Αρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος
ού παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δήτα· ἐν Ἀιγύπτῳ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο
εἶναι.

EX. Ἀλλος δὲ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδὸν τι ὀνεὶ τούτοις παραγένεσθαι.

EX. Τι οὖν δή; τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ

λόγοι;

ΠΙ. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔξι ἀρχής πάντα
πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. ἂεὶ γάρ δὴ καὶ τὰς
πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ
οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτην, συλλεγόμενοι
ἐῳθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ὧν καὶ ἡ δίκη
ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἢν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου.
περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἔως ἀνοιχθεὶ τὸ
δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβουσι τε ἀλλήλων· ἀνεῴ-
γετο γὰρ οὐ πρός ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶ, εἰσῆμεν
παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν
μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωιαίτερον
συνελέγατο· τῇ γὰρ προτεραιᾷ [ἡμέρα] ἐπειδὴ
ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἑσπέρας, ἐπυ-
θόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον

ἐνη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλων ἢκειν ὡς
πρωιαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰσόθις. καὶ ἤκομεν καὶ
ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπα-
κούειν, εἴπεν περιμένει καὶ μὴ πρότερον
παριέναι, ἐὼς ἂν αὐτὸς κελεῦῃ· λύνοις γὰρ,

ἐφη, οἱ ἐνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν
ὅπως ἄν τῇ ὅ τῇ ἡμέρα τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν
δ' οὖν χρόνον ἑπισχὼν ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσινεῖαι. εἰςελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ἐανθίππης, γυγώσκεις γὰρ, ἐχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ἐανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησε τε καὶ τοιαύτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οία δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης, ὕστατον δὴ σὲ προσεροῦσιν νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὁ Κρίτων, ἐφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτήν οὐκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπήγγεις τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν

Β τε καὶ κοπτομένην' ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψε τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἄμα, ως ἄτοπον, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνδρείας, ἐσικε τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ὁ καλούσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἤδυ· ως θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἄμα μὲν αὐτῶ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγόνυσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, εὰν δὲ τις διώκῃ τό ἐτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδὸν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τό ἐτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δ' οὖντε. καὶ μοι

C δοκεῖ, ἐφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Λίσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ως ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταῦταν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφὰς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὃ ἂν τὸ ἐτερον παραγένηται ἐπι- ακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἐτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δέσμου
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ήν εν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγείνον, ἦκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδον.

IV. Ὅ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν Νή τὸν Δία, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐφη, εὖ γ’ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γὰρ τοῦ τῶν ποιημάτων ὅπερ πεποίηκας δ’ ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Ἀισώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἡδῆ ἡροῦτο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐηνὸς προῆυ, ὅ τι ποτε διανοηθεὶς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐηνὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἔρωτά, εὖ οἴδα γὰρ ὅτι ἔρισθεται, εἴπετε, τῷ χρῆ λέγειν. Δέγε τοίνυν, ἐφη, αὐτῷ, ὡς Κέβης, τάληθη, ὅτι οὐκ ἔκεινος βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμαιναι αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταύτα· ἦδειν γὰρ ὅσ οὐ βάδιον εἶν’ Ἔ

15 ἀλλ’ ἐνυπνίνων τίνων ἀποστείρῳμενος τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος, εἰ πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάπττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἅτα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνυπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἀλλοτ’ ἐν

20 ἀλλή ὅψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐφη, μουσικήν ποεί καὶ ἐργαζόμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὁπερ ἐπραπτόν τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτὸ μοι παρα-κελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὡσπερ οἱ τοῖς...

25 θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὖτῳ τὸ ἐνυπνίον ὁπερ ἐπραπτόν τοὺτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικήν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσίας μεγάλης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τούτῳ πράττοντος· ἦν δ’
πλατωνος

επειδή η τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ η τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτῇ διεκόλυμε με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἐδοξε χρὴναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημόδη μουσικήν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθήσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν, ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἄφοσίωσασθαί ποιήσαντα

B ποιήματα καὶ πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ, οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὐ ἦν ἡ παρούσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεὸν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητής εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταύτα δὴ οὖς προχείρους εἴχον μύθους καὶ ἡπιστάμην τοὺς Ἀισώπους, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἱ πρῶτοι ἐνέτυχον.

V. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Κέβης, Εὔηνω φράζε, καὶ ἐρρώσθαι καὶ, ἄν σωφρονὶ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα. ἀπειμὶ δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὴμερον' κελεύονσι γὰρ 'Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ὁ Οἰνον παρακελεύει, ἐφη, τούτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, Εὔηνω; πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντευκήκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἠσθημαι οὔδ' ὀπωσὶν τούτων σοι ἑκὼν εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δὲ; ἡ δ' ὅς; οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὔηνως; Ἐμοιγη δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐθελήσει τοῖνυν καὶ Εὔηνος καὶ πᾶς ὢτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἰσως βιάσεται αὐτῶν' οὐ γὰρ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἁμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε τὰ σκέλη.

D ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὕτως ἦδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. ἦρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· Πῶς τούτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν.
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εἶναι ἐαυτοῦ βιαζέσθαι, ἐθέλειν δὲ ἂν τῷ ἀποθνῄσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπεσθαι; Τί δὲ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σὺ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάφω συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. 'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἂ μὲν οὖν τυχχάνω ἀκηκοός, φθόνος οὖν δὲ εἰς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεί, ποιάν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἴμεθα εἶναι; τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοί ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἥλιου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ; VI. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμίτων εἶναι αὐτῶν ἐαυτῶν ἀποκτινύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢδη γὰρ ἐγωγέ, ὥπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάφῳ ἡκούσα, ὅτε παρῷ ἢμῖν διητάτο, ἦδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὖ δεό τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφῆς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πῶς τοτὲ οὐδὲν ἀκύκοα. 'Αλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἐφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσας, ἵσως μέντοι θαυμαστὸν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τούτῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἄπλούν ἔστιν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυχχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα, ἕστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἡ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἵσως σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτῶς ἐαυτοῖς εὐ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργετήν, καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἥρεμα ἐπειγελάσας, Ἰττω Ζεὺς, ἐφη, τῷ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπὼν. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειν, ἐφη δὲ Σώκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι,
άλλι ἵσως γ' ἔχει τινά λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμέν οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τε τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διυδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τὸδε γε μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Ὀμογε, φησὶν ὁ Ἰοβ. Οὐκοῦν, ἡς οὐ, καὶ σὺ ἄν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἰ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτινύου, μὴ σημάνατος σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἄν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰ τινα ἔχους τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῦ ἄν; Πάνυ γ', ἐφη. Ἐσως τοῖνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἀλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θέος ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὦσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.

VII. Ἀλλ' εἴκος, ἐφη ὁ Ἰοβ. τοῦτο γε φαίνεται. ὁ μὲν τοῦ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἄν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, δὲ οὐκεκεν τοῦτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπως, εἶπερ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ, θεὸν τε ἐναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἕκείνου κτῆματα ἐναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπώντας, ἐν ἦ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἴπερ ἄριστοι εἰσὶν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται θεοὶ, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ποι οὕτως ὁ το ἀυτός οὐκοῦν ἀμείνου ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν
 ánθρωπος τάχ', ἂν οἴηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὁ πλήσιτα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι, ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ ποὺ ἂν ἂεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίων. καὶ τοι οὕτως, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, τοῦναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὁ νῦν δὴ εἶναι τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματεία, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας 63 εἰς ἡμᾶς Ἀεί του, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερεννᾶ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὔθεως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὁ τί ἂν τις εἴπῃ. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, νῦν γε μοὶ δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τι γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμεῖνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ραδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοὶ δοκεῖ Ἀεί εἰς ἂν πείνειν τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὕτω ραδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπτων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθοὺς, ὡς αὐτῶς ὁμολογεῖς, Θεοῦς. Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἴμαι γὰρ ἡμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὡσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

VIII. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὡς, πειραθῶ πιθανότερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ὡμην ἦξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοῦς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, ἐπειτα
καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἔνθαδε, ἡδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν ταῖς θωμαῖοι· ποὺ ἐκείνος ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διυχυρισαίμην· ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἦζειν, εὐ ἴστε ὅτι, εἶπεν τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διυχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταύτα ὃν όμοιος ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλὰ εὐελπίς εἰμὶ εἰναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καὶ, ὥστε γέ καὶ πᾶλα λέγεται, πολὺ ἀμείνου τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τί οὖν, ἐφή ὁ Σιμμίας, ὁ Σῶκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ δὲ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοθῆς; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἄγαθον τοῦτο, καὶ ἄμα σοι ἀπολογία ἔσται, εὰν ἀπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃς. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἐφή. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψόμεθα, τί ἔστιν ὁ βούλευσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πᾶλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐφή ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πᾶλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, εὖςτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δῖς καὶ τρῖς πίνειν τοὺς τὶ τοιοῦτον ποιώντας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἐνα, ἐφή, χαίρειν αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἐαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δῖς δώσων, εὰν δὲ δεῖ, καὶ τρῖς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τὶ ἢδειν, ἐφή ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ μοι [πᾶλαι] πράγματα παρ-
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ἐχει. Ἡ Ἐα ἀυτῶν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἢδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδούναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἁνήρ τῷ ὅντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μὲλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οὐσευθαί ἁγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ πῶς ἂν οὐν δὴ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχω, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

IX. Κινδυνεύονυι γὰρ ὁσοί τυγχάνουσιν ὁρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύονσιν ἡ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθὲς, ἀτοπον δὴπο ἂν εἰὴ προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἡ τοῦτο, ἡκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτῶν ἁγανακτεῖν, ὅ πάλαι προεθυ- μοῦντο τε καὶ ἐπετήθευνον. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ Β

πάνυ γε μὲ νῦν δὴ γελασεῖοντα ἑποίησας γελάσαι. οἴμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εῦ πάνυ εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὅντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατώσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοι εἰσίν τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ᾽ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἵ τε θανατώσι καὶ ἥ ἄξιοί εἰσίν θανάτου καὶ οἴου θανάτου οί ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἰτωμεν γὰρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ζ ἐκεῖνοι· ἤγομεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ
γε, ἐφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τούτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέαν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τούτο; ὅπως ἄλλα τούτο, ἐφη. Σκέψαι δή, ὃ ἀγαθέ, ἐὰν ἁρὰ καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἀπερ ἔμοι.

Δὲ ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον ὁμαί ἡμᾶς εἶσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἔσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἁδονάς καλουμένας τὰς ποιάσεις, ὅποια σῖτων καὶ ποτῶν; Ἡκιστα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Τι δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τι δέ; τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; ὅποι ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ύποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἄτιμαζειν, καθ’ ὅσον ἡ μπολή ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; Ἀτιμάζειν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὃ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἐφη, ἢ τοῦ τοιοῦτον πραγματεία ὅπερ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἄλλα καθ’ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχῆν τετράφθαι; Ἕμοιγε. Ἀρ’ οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δῆλος ἔστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύον ὁ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχῆν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σῶματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δήποτε, ὃ
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

Σιμμία, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὁ μηδὲν ἢδον τὸν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς τι πείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἥδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Χ. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εἰάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνίαν συμπαραλλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόῦτο λέγω. ἡρα ἔχει ἀλήθειαν Β τίνα ὡσις τε καὶ ἀκόη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἁμῖ τρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβέσ οὐδὲν οὔτε ὅρομεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖ εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολή αἰ γε ἀλλαὶ· πᾶσαι γάρ ποι τοὺς φαυλότερα εἰσίν· ἤ σοι οὖ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ' ὡς, ἢ ψυχή τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γάρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρη τι σκοπείν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, C εἰπερ ποι ἀλλοθι, κατάδηλον αὐτὴ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων; Ναί. Λογίζεται δὲ γε ποι τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τοιούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἰδηδοῖ τῆς ὁδονύ, ἀλλ' ὁ τι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνησαι ἔδοσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνίαν αὐτῶ μηδ' ἀπομενή ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἐστι τάντα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχή μάλιστα ἀτιμᾶζε τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ξητεῖ D
δὲ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τουάδε, ὁ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτῷ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμέν μέντοι νῆ Δία. Καὶ καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν; Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Ἡδὴ οὖν πώποτε τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ’ ὃς. Ἀλλ’ ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔφηγω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑμείας, ἵσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἑ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὁν; ἀρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἄληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὁδὲ ἔχειν; ὃς ἄν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὖ σκοπεῖ, ὡς ἄν ἐγγύτατα ἰοὶ τοῦ γνώναι ἕκαστον; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἄν τοῦτο ποιήσει καθαρώτατα, ὡστε ὃ τι μάλιστα αὐτὴ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἵοι ἐφ’ ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὑψι παραπεθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοείσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρόμενος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ εἰλικρινεῖς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῦ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖς ὃ τι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὄρτων καὶ ὡς ἐπος εἴπειν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔώτις τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλῆθειῶν τε καὶ φρονήσιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ, ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἔστιν, ὁ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; ἦπερ- φυώς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἄληθὴ λέγεις, ὅ Ἔωκρατες.
XI. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων Β
παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάντε συνε τοῖς γυναικών
φιλοσόφοις, ὡστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιάυτα
ἀττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὁσπερ ἀτηραπός
τις ἐκφέρειν ἤμας, ὅτι, ἐως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν
μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυρ-
μένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιοῦτον κακοῦ, οὐ
μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἔπιθυμούμεν,
φαμέν δὲ τούτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς. μυρίας μὲν
γὰρ ἡμῶν ἁσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν
ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἂν τινες νόσοι
προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὁντος
θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ φόβων
καὶ εἶδωλῶν παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλανέριας ἐμπὶ-
πλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὡστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὅσ
ἀληθές τὸ ὅντε ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν
ἐγγύστερεν οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους
καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδέν ἀλλο παρέχει ἡ
τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτοι ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ
τῆς τῶν χρημάτων κτήσεως πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι
γίνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτάσθαι
diὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπεία
καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἁσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας
πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ᾽ ἐσχατὸν πάντων
ὅτι, εάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σκολὴ γένηται ἂπτ᾽ αὐτοῦ
καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς
ζητήσεσιν αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ παραπίπτον θόρυβον
παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὡστε μὴ
dύνασθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τάληθες, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομεν ποτε
C
καθαρώς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐ αὐτῆ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὔ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταί εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ξῶσιν δὲ οὖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυνοῖθαν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμῶν ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν· τότε γὰρ

αὐτῆ καθ’ αὐτῆν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρίς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ’ οὖ. καὶ ἐν ὦ ἢ ἄν ἔσωμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν τ’ ὑμάς καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος αἴροντες, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἔσομεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι’ ἡμῶν

Β αὐτῶν πάν τὸ εἰλικρινές. [τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἅρος τὰ ἀληθέν.] μὴ καθαρῶς γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ. τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὡς Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἄλλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξᾶσαι πάντως τοὺς ὀρθοὺς φιλομαθεῖς· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντὸς γε μᾶλλον, ὡς Ἀκρατεῖς.

ΧΙΙ. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφ’ ὁ Ὀδυσσέας, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὃ ἔταρη, τολλῆ ἐπὶ ἄφικαμεν οἱ ἔγω πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἰπέρ ποιο ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὐ ἐνεκα ἡ τολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὡστε ἢ
γε ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἁγαθῆς ἐπιδοσι γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ, ὅς ἤγειται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡσπερ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τούτῳ ξυμβαίνει, ὡσπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἱκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑπείτη μόνην καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυμόμενην ὡσπερ δεσμοῖν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτῷ γε θάνατος ὄνομαζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντάπασι γε, ἡ δ' οὐ. Λύειν δὲ γε αὐτὴν, ὃς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται αἰεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὁρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσοφιῶν, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, οὐ; Φαινεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὡσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἄν εἰ ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ' ἐαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγχυτάτω ὅντα τοῦ τεθυναί ὄυτω ξῆν, κατειθ' ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἁγανακτέιν; [οὐ γελοῖον ;] Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τῶν ἄντι ἁρα, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία, οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθυμήσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθυναί ἥκιστα αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπων φοβερον. ἐκ τῶν δὲ σκοπεῖ. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὴ γεγομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἁγανακ-
τοίεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἄν ἄλογία εἰη, εἰ μὴ ἀσμενοι
έκεισε ἰοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπὶς ἔστιν οὐ
dιὰ βίου ἱρὸν τυχεῖν· ἱρὸν δὲ φρονήσεως· ὃ
tε διεβέβληντο, τοῦτον ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος
αὐτοῖς; ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ
γυναικῶν καὶ νίκου ἀποθανόντων πολλοί δὴ
ἐκόντες ἥθελησαν εἰς "Λιδοὺ ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης
ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὑψεθαί τε ἐκεῖ
ὅν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ
ἀρα τις τῷ ὅντι ἔρων, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν
αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύ-
β ξεσθαί αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἦ ἐν "Λιδοὺ, ἀγανα-
κτήσει τε ἀποθυγήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἁσμενος εἰςιν
αὐτόσε; οἰςθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὅντι γε ἢ, ὁ
ἐταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταύτα δόξη,
μηδαμοὺ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεθαί φρονήσει
ἂλλ' ἦ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ οὔτως ἔχει, ὅπερ
ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἄν ἄλογία εἰη, εἰ φοβοῖτο
τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μέντοι νη Δία,
ἣ δ' ὦς.

XIII. Οὐκοῦν ἰκανον σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη,
tούτο ἀνδρὸς ὅν ἂν ὕδης ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα
ἀποθανεῖσθαί, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος, ἄλλα
τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ πον οὔτως
tυγχάνει ὁν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος,
ἤτοι τὰ ἔτερα τούτων ἦ ἀμφότερα. Πάνω,
ἔφη, ἔχει οὔτως ὡς λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ
Σιμμία, οὗ καὶ ἡ ᾧνομαξομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς
οὗτοι διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως
ὅπου, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἦν.
καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὑνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὀλγοφόρος ἐχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἃρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλγοφοροῦσίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ἐὰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δή, ὡ Σώκρατες; Ὁδισθα, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομενωσίν; Ἐστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσὶ πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἁλογόν γε δέει τινα καὶ δείλα ἀνδρείον εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; Εὗ ταύτων τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν: ἀκολασία τινὶ σωφρονεῖς εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἄδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὀμος αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τοῦτῳ ὀμοίων τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐθῆ σωφροσύνην: φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἥδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκεῖνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχουνται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατοῦμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολα-σίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἥδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι: ἀλλ' ὀμος συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις υφ' ἥδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἥδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὀμοίων ἐστὶν ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπῳ τινα δὲ ἀκολασίαν αὐτοῦς σεσωφρονίσθαι. Ἐσοικε γὰρ. Ὡ μακάριε Σωκράτη, μὴ γὰρ σοὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἢ ὅρθη πρὸς ἄρτην ἄλλην, ἥδονας πρὸς ἧδονας καὶ λύπας πρὸς
λύπας καὶ φόβου πρὸς φόβου καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὡσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ’ ἦ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὅρθον, ἀντὶ B οὐ δεῖ ἄπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ἁνοῦμεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πιττρασκόμενα τῷ ὅντι ἦ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ εὐλλῃβδὴν ἀλήθης ἀρετῇ ἦ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγινομένων καὶ ἀπογινομένων καὶ ἑδοὺν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων. χωρίζομεν δὲ φρονήσεως ἄλλαττόμενα αὐτὲ ἀλλήλων μή σκιαγραφία τις ἦ Ἐρευνήτηρ ἡ τουαύτη ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ ὅντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὗτον ὑγιές οὐδ’ ἀληθές ἔχῃ, τὸ δ’ ἀληθές τῷ ὅντι ἦ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, C καὶ ἦ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἦ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτῇ ἦ φρόνησις μή καθαρμός τις ἦ. καὶ ΚΙΝΔΥΝΕΥΟΥΣΙ καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετάς ἡμῖν οὕτωι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαύλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἄν ἀμύντω καὶ ἄτελέστος εἰς Ἐλίδων ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κεῖσται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἕκεισε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ, ὡς φασίν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρθηκο-D φόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι. οὗτοι ἦ ὅπου εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἔμην δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἦ οἱ περιφοινικότας ὅρθος. ὃς δὴ καὶ ἔγιν κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ πρόποι προοθυμήθην γενέσθαι· εἰ δ’ ὅρθος προοθυμήθην καὶ τι ἡνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε
Δελθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἔθελη, ὁλίγον ὑστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογούμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε

despolías οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, ἤγομένους κάκει οὐδὲν ἤττουν ἡ ἐνθάδε despotaiς te ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεὑξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίρους [τοῖς δὲ

tολλοῖς ἀπιστιάν παρέχει]. εἰ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανότερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἡ τοῖς

Athenaion dika斯塔ίς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

Χ. IV. Εἰπόντος ὁ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη. ὁ Σωκρατές, τα μὲν ἄλλα ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τα δὲ περὶ ἑτῆς ἄμυς πολλὴν ἀπιστιὰν παρέχει τοῖς

αὐθρόπους, μὴ ἔπειδαν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σῶματος οὐδαμοῦ ἐτι ἐκεῖνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ [διαφθειρήται τε καὶ ἀπολλύνηται], ἢ ἂν ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἀποθυμήσῃ, εὑρεῖ τὸ αὐτολλαττομένῃ τοῦ σῶματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὡσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς δια-

σκεδασθείσα οὐχὶ θαι (διαπτομένῃ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ἐπεῖ, εἰπερ εἰ ἡ ποι ἀγαθή καθ' ἀυτὴν συνήθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη) τοῦτων τῶν κακῶν ὅν σὺ ὑπὶ δὴ διήλθες, πολλὴ ἂν ἐπὶς εἰ ὁ καὶ καλῆ, ὁ ἑκρυβρατεῖς, ὡς ἅληθῆ ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὁλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἐστι, τε ἡ ψυχῇ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ των δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ ἑκρυβρατής, ὁ Κέβης: ἀλλὰ τὴ δῆ

ποιῶμεν; ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει δια-


μυθολογόμεν, εἴτε εἰκός οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; Ἔγγοις οὖν, ἐφη ο Ἐκβεσις, ἦδεως ἀν ἄκουσαμι, ἦντων δόξαιν ἐχείς περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὔκοιν γ' ἀν
C οἴμαι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεὶν τινα νῦν ἄκουσαντα, οὔδ' εἰ κωμῳδιστοίς εἰη, ὡς ἁδο-
λεσχό καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεὶ, χρη διασκοπεῖσθαι.

XV. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇ δε πή, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν Ἀιδοὺ εἰσίν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν
ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ
tις λόγος, οὐ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσίν εὐθένδε
ἀφικόμεναι εκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεύρο ἀφικ-
νοῦσαι καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ
ei τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν
D ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ἔωντας, ἀλλο τι ἢ εἰεὶν ἀν
αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν εκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποὺ πάλιν
ἔγιγνοντο μὴ οὕσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμηρίουν
τοῦ ταῦτ' εἴναι, εἰ τῶν ὀντοῦ θανατοῦ γίγνοντο ὑπερ
ὅτι οὐδαμὸδεν ἀλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ἔωντες ἢ
ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλον
ἀν τοῦ δεόι λόγου. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ
Κέβης. Μή τοῖνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ' ὅς, 15
σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶν μαθεῖν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ἔωνον πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ
E ἐξαλλήβηθην ὡσπερ ἐχεῖ γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων
ἴδωμεν, ἢρ' οὖτωσι γίγνεσθαι πάντα, οὐκ ἀλλοθεν
ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὥστες τυχάναι 20
ὁν τοιοῦτον τι, οἶνον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ
ἐναντίον ποι καὶ δίκαιον ἄδικος, καὶ ἀλλὰ ἢ
μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἀρα
Αναγκαίον, οὕτως ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῶ ἐναντίον. οἶον ὅταν μεῖζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἐξ ἐλάττων ὄντος πρότερον ἐπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἐλαττὸν γίγνηται, ἐκ μεῖζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὑστερον ἐλαττὸν γενήσεται; Ἐστιν οὖτω, ἐφη. Καὶ μήν ἐξ ισχυρότερον τὸ ἀσθενεστέρον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θάττον; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἄν τι χείρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἄν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἰκανῶς οὖν, ἐφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὖτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ' αὐ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιὸνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἰον μεταξὺ ἀμφότερων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυνών ὄντων δύο γενέσεως, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον, ἀπὸ δ' αὐ τοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον. μεῖζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίνους, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὖτω τὸ μὲν αὔξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνει; Ναί, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἴ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαίον, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἐκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' οὐς.

Χ. Τί οὖν; ἐφη, τῷ ζῆν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, σώστερ τῷ ῥηγηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθυνάτε, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ
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αλλήλων τε γήγενται ταῦτα, εἰπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυναῖν ὑποτείον; Πῶς γὰρ οὕ; Τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν ἑτέραν συνήγαγαν ὅν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δὲ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἰκανῶς σοι, ἐφη, ἢ οὐ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σὺ, ἐφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φής τῷ ζῷῳ τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; "Εγὼγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ναί. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζωτός τί τὸ γεγρόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἐφη. Τὶ δὲ, ἢ δ' ὁς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνηκός; Ἄναγκαίον, ἐφη, ὀμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῷο. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνηκότων ἄρα, ὁ Κέβης, Ε τὰ ζωτά τε καὶ οἱ ζωτές γέγρωνται; Φαίνεται, ἐφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἐφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ήμῶν ἐν "Αἰδον. Ἐοικεῖν. Ὡκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσεόν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἡ γ' ἑτέρα σαφῆς οὕσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθηνότης εἰς σαφῆς δήποποι, ἢ οὐ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἢ δ' ὁς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἑναντίαν Γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθηνότης ἑναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως ποὺ, ἐφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὁς, εἰπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνηκότων ἄν
εἰς γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ξώντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώ-
σκεσθαι; Ἡπάνυ γε. Ὅμολογεῖται ἀρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ξώντας έκ τῶν τεθνεότων γεγονέναι οὔδεν ἢττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεότας έκ τῶν ξώντων· τοῦτο δὲ οὕτως ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεό-
tων ψυχὰς εἶναι που, οἴδεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. 
Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφή, ὁ Σώκρατες, έκ τῶν ὁμολογη-
μένων ἀναγκαίων οὕτως ἔχειν.

XVII. Ἦδε τοίνυν οὕτως, ἐφή, ὁ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ. ἐι γὰρ μὴ ἂεὶ ἀνταποδιδοῖ τὰ ἐτέρα τοῖς ἐτέροις γυνόμενα ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιμόντα,

5 ἀλλ' εὐθείᾳ τις εἰς ἡ γένεσις έκ τοῦ ἐτέρου Β μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρ' καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρου μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἰσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἀν σχοῖν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἀν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γυνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφή. Οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν, ὃ δ' ὄς, ἐννοῆσαι ὁ λέγων. ἀλλ' οἶνον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοῖ γυνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἰσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' <ἀν> λήρον τοῦ Σ

15 Ἐνυδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἀν φαίνοιτο, διὰ τὸ καὶ τάλλα πάντα ταύτων ἐκείνως πεποι-
θέναι, [καθεύδειν]. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν' πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μῆ, ταχύ ἀν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονός εἰῃ, ὡςοῦ πάντα χρήματα.

20 ὥσαυτῶς δὲ, ὁ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθυμήσκοι μὲν πάντα, ὁσα τοῦ ξῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδῆ δὲ
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ἀποθάνου, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχῆματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἀρ' οὐ πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ τελευτώντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ

Δ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θυήσκοι, τίς μηχανή μὴ οὐ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. 'Εστιν γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατόμενοι ἀμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τῷ ὁντὶ καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς εἶναι.

Ε  ΧVIII. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβῶν, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνον γε τῶν λόγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἐστίν, ὅν σὺ εἶπος θαμὰ λέγειν, ότι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὕτα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἑντὸς ἀναμμυσκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἣν ποὺ ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχή πρὶν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἰδεὶ γενέσθαι. ὡστε καὶ ταῦτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἐσικεν εἶναι. Ἀλλά, ὁ Κέβης, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβῶν, ποίαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησον με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἐνι μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ, εάν τις καλῶς ἔρωτα, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἡ ἐχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς.
ἐπιστήμην ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἰοὶ τ', ἦσαν τούτο ποιήσαι· ἐπεὶ τοι ἐὰν τις ἑπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγη ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων,

20 ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὁτι τούτο οὕτως έχει. Εἴ δὲ μῆ· ταύτη γε, ἐφη, πείθει, ὁ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι δὴ τηδὲ πή σοι ἄν σκοπούμενῳ συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμμησις ἔστιν;

25 'Απιστῶ μέν σοι ἐγνωκε, ἡ δ' ὦς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὗ, αὐτὸ δὲ τούτο, ἐφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμμησθήσαι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἔξ ὅνν Κέβης ἐπεχειρήσει λέγειν ἢδη μέμνημαι καὶ πεθομαι· οὐδέν μενταῦ ἦττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν, πῇ

30 σὺ ἐπεχειρήσασα λέγειν. Τῇδ' ἐγνωκε, ἡ δ' ὦς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δῆπον, εἰ τις τι ἀναμμησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τὸντο πρότερον ποτε ἐπιστασθαί. Πάννυ γ', ἐφη. 'Αρ' οὖν καὶ τὸδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμην παραγίγνεται τρόπῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τινα τρόπον τόνδε· ἐὰν τίς τι [πρότερον] ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τίνα ἀλλήν αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἔκεινο γηρό, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτερον ἐννοῆσαι, ὥσ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἀλλη, ἄρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμισθήση, οὐ τὴν ἐννοιαιν ἔλαβεν; Πώς λέγεις; Οἶον ὑδ τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη ποι ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπων καὶ λύρας. Πώς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν οἴσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασται, ὅταν ἰδοσιν λύραν ἢ ἰμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι ὦς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἰσθε χρῆσθαι, πᾶσχουσι τοῦτο· ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ
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ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς, οὐ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμηνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα ποὺ μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι 50

Εὐὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ ὃς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἐστὶ; μᾶλιστα μέντοι, ὅταν τις τότε πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἄ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μη ἐπισκοπεῖν ἢδη ἐπελέληστο; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δὲ; ἢ ὃς· ἐστὶν ὑπὸν 55

γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπων ἀναμνησθήναι; καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθήναι; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ

74 Σιμμίαν ἀναμνησθήναι; Ἑστὶ μέντοι, ἔφη. 60

XIX. Ἄρι οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἰναι μὲν ἢ ὁμοίων, εἰναι δὲ καὶ ἄπο ἄνομοίων; Συμβαίνει. Ὁλλ ὅταν γε ἂπο τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμμηνήσκεται τῖς τι, ἢρ οὐκ ἀναγκαίον τὸδε προσπάσχειν, ἐν- 5

νοεὶν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκεῖνον ὦν ἀναμνήσθη· Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ἡκόπη δὴ, ἢ δ' ὃς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. 65

φαμέν πού τι εἰναί ῥαόν, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ ὦν ἔτη λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἀλλ' τῶν τοιοῦτον οὐδέν, 10

ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔτερον τι, αὐτὸ τὸ

Β' ῥαόν· φωμέν τι εἰναί ἡ μηδέν; Φωμέν μέντοι

νῃ Δ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ δ' ἐστὶν; Πάνω γε, ἢ δ' ὃς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἢρ οὐκ 15

ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ξύλα ἡ λίθους ἡ
Αλλα ἀττα ἰδόντες ἵσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοησαμέν, ἐτερον ὅν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἐτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἵσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνιότε χαύτα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἵσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὖ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τι δέ; αυτὰ τὰ ἵσα ἐστίν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὁ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταύτων ἄρα ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταύτα τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλα μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἐφη, τῶν ἵσων, ἐτέρων οὖν ἐκείνου τοῦ ἵσου, ὡμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνενοηκάς τε καὶ εἰληφας; Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις.

[Ὀυκοῦν ἢ ὀμοίον ὄντος τούτου ἢ ἀνομοίου; Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἐως ἃν ἄλλο ἑδών ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὑφεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἰτε ὀμοίον εἰτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.]

Τι δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς; ἢ πᾶσχομεν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τά ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις καὶ οῖς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἵσοις; ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἵσα εἶναι ὡσπερ αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστιν ἢ ἐνδει τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἴον τὸ ἵσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἐφη, ἐνδει. Ὀυκοῦν ὀμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ, ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὅ νῦν ἐγὼ ὅρω, εἶναι οἴον ἄλλο τι τῶν οὔτων, ἐνδει δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἴον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἐστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖον που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεὶν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ὁ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεστέρως δὲ ἐχειν;
'Ανάγκη. Τι οὖν; τοιούτων πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὐ, περὶ τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντάπασι γε. Ἄναγκαιον ἀρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ 50 πρὸτόν ἴδοντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸδε ὀμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατῶν εἶναι ἐννοησαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἱδεῖν ἢ ἀψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἀλλῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων ταύτων δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταύτων γὰρ ἔστιν, ὁ Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὦ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ ἐκ γε τῶν 55 β αἰσθήσεων δεί ἐννοησαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἑκείνου τε ὁρέγεται τοῦ δ' ἐστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερά ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὕτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἀρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὅραν καὶ ἄκουειν καὶ τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἐδει ποὺ εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου 60 τὸ ἐστιν, εἰ ἔμελλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἵσα ἑκείσε ἀνοίσειν ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἶον ἐκείνο, ἐστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλοτερα. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὁ Σώκρατες. Οὕκον γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐσφράζομεν τε καὶ ἡκούσαμεν καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς αἰσθήσεις Κ εἰχόμεν; Πάνω γε. Ὑδει δ' ἐγε γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τήν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναι. Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. Ἔοικεν. 75 ΧΧ. Οὕκον εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ
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τοῦ γενέσθαι ἐχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἡπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἱσον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἱσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἦμιν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἄγαθον καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου καὶ, ὁπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οῖς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ δ ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὡστε ἀναγκαίοι ἦμιν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. Ἐστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπικελήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἂν ἡγίσθησαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἔστιν, λαβόντα τοῦ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι· ἢ οὔ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὁ Σμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάντως δὴ ποῦ, Ἐ ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δὲ γε οἴμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὑστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεις χρόμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἂς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἰχομεν, ἃρ οὐχ ὁ καλοῦμεν μανθάνεις ὀικεῖαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἀν εἰ; τοῦτο δὲ ποὺ ἀναμμυνήσκεσθα λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἄν λέγοιμεν; Πάνω γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ ἐγὼ τοῦτο γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενον τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσιν λαβόντα ἐτερῶν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὁ ἐπελέληστο, ὁ τοῦτο ἐπιλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιου ὅν ἢ ὁ ὁμοιοῦ ὡστε, ὁπερ λέγω, δυνόν τα ἐτερα, ἦτοι ἐπιστάμενοι γε.
αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὑστερον, οὔς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀναμμηνύσκονται οὔτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμμησις ἂν εἶη. Καὶ μᾶλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ Σώκρατες.

XXI. Πότερον οὖν αἴρει, ὃ Σιμία; ἐπιστατῆσθαι μένουσ ἢμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμμηνύσκεσθαι ὑστερον δὲν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἢμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντα ἐλέεσθαι.—Τί δὲ; τόδε ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὅν ἐπίσταται ἔχει ἂν δοῦναι λόγου ἢ οὐ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγου περὶ τούτων δὲν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλούμην μέν τὰν, ἐφη ὁ Σιμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὐριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπινος ὁ ποιεῖται ὃ τούτο ποιήσαι. Οὐκ ἀρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπιστασθαι γε, ἐφη, ὃ Σιμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὔδαιμος. Ἀναμμηνύσκονται ἀρα ἀ ποτε ἑρμάθον; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἰ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄφ' οὐ γε ἀνθρωπον γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δὴτα, Πρότερον ἀρα. Ναί. Ἡσαν ἀρα, ὃ Σιμία, αἰ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Ἐφ' ἂν ἂν, ἀρα φηγομέναι θαμβάνομεν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ταὐτάς ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις, οὖν σὰρκα λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. Εἰεν, ὃ ἔταιρε, ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτά, ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντες γε,
υτάς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἀρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν· ἢ ἐν
οὕτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν θ'περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ
χεὶς ἅλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ
ὡκρατεῖ, ἅλλα ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπὼν.

XXII. Ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὥ
σμία; εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἂεί, καλὸν
εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία,
καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα
ιναφέρομεν, [ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρί
Ε
ροτερεῖς ἡμετέραν οὕσαν, καὶ ταύτα ἐκεῖνη ἀπει
ζόμεν, ἀναγκαίοι, οὕτως] ὁσπερ καὶ ταύτα
ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχήν εἶναι
cαὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ ταῦτα,
ἄλλως ἄν ὁ λόγος οὕτος εἰρημένος εὖ; ἢρ'
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταύτα τε εἶναι
cαὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς
gεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταύτα, οὔδε τάδε;
Τπερφυῶς, ὁ Ὁσκράτης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ
μοι ἡ αὐτή ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε
καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν
te ψυχήν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν τὴ
οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἐγνω
οὐδὲν οὕτως οὐνεὶ ἐναργεῖς ὃν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα
tὰ τοιαύτα εἶναι ός οἴνος τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε
cαὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νῦν δὲ
ἐλεγε· καὶ, ἐμοί δοκεῖ, ἰκανῶς ἀποδεδεικταί.
Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης; δεῖ γὰρ
καὶ Κέβητα πεῖθειν. Ἰκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας,
ός ἐγνως οἴμαι· καὶ τοι τάρτατοσ ἀνθρώπων
ἔστιν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλ’ οἴμαι

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Β ούκ ἐνδεώς τοῦτο πεπείθθαι αὐτὸν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή.

XXIII. Εἰ μὲντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐτι ἦσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὡσ Σῶκρατες, ἀποδεδείχθαι, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐνεστηκέν ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθησκόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαν-νύται ἡ ψυχή καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἦν. τὶ γὰρ κωλύει γιγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτῇ καὶ ἔννιστασθαι ἀλλοθέν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπους σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τοῦτον, τότε καὶ αὐτήν τελευτάν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; Εἰ λέγεις, ἐφη, ὡς Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὅσπερ ἡμοῦν ἀποδεδείχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή. δεῖ δὲ προσαποδείξει ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἦσται ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀποδείξεις ἐχειν. Ἀποδεδείκται μὲν, ἐφη, ὡς Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖνα τοῦτον ταύταν τοῦ λόγου εἰς ταύταν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πάν τὸ γίγνον ἢ τοῦ τεθνεώτος. εἰ γὰρ ἦστιν μὲν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ μεną πῶς ὡς ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνη εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεὶ αὖθις αὐτῆς γίγνεσθαι αὖθις αὐτῆς γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδεδείκται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.
XXIV. Ὄμως δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἤδεως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἐτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδείεαι τὸ τῶν παῖδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνέμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσά καὶ διασκεδάνυσιν, ἄλλος τε καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο τό ἡμερία τῆς Σοκράτης, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν. μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἄλλ' ἵσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἑν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται· τοῦτον οὖν πειρόμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδείει τὸν θάνατον ὁσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἥμερας, ἐως ἂν εἴπησητε. Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, τῶν τοιούτων ἁγαθῶν ἐπιφόδον ληψώμεθα, ἔπειδὴ σὺ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἐν ἡ ἐνεισὶ ποὺ ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὗς πάντας χρῆ διερεύνασθαι ξητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπιφόδον, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὁ τι ἄναγκαιότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ξητείν δὲ χρῆ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἵσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ μαριῶς εὐροτεῖ μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· οἴθεν δὲ ἀπελάπομεν ἑπανέλθωμεν, εἰ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὑμᾶς μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.
XXV. Ὅψκοιν τοιόνδε τι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι εὰντοὺς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν τοῦ διασκεδαστήκην, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς, δεδιέναι μὴ πάθη αὐτὸ, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ <οὐ>; καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον ἡ ψυχή ἔστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; 'Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. 'Ἀρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὃντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαφεύγειν ταύτῃ ὑπὲρ συνετέθη· εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἀξίωθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εὖπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη, οὕτως ἐχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Ὅψκοιν ἀπέρ ἂει κατὰ ταυτά καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχειν, ταύτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξίωθετα, ἃ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταυτά, ταύτα δὲ σύνθετα; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἰωμεν δὴ, ἐφη, ἔπὶ ταυτὰ ἐφ' ἀπέρ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν

Δ λόγῳ. αὐτή ἢ οὐσία ἢς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἔρωτωντες καὶ ἀποκρυψόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἂει ἐχει κατὰ ταυτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἰσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ ἔκαστον ὅ ἐστιν, [τὸ ὅν,] μὴ ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦ ἐνδεχεται; ἢ ἂει αὐτῶν ἔκαστον ὅ ἐστι, μονοειδὲς ὃν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταυτὰ ἐχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῷ ἄλλῳ σὺν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδεχεται; Ὁσαύτως, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταυτὰ ἐχειν, ὁ Σωκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν], οἶον ἀνθρώπων ἢ
%XV. Ὁθομεν οὖν βούλει, ἐφη, δύο εἰδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὀρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ᾠειδές; Ὁθομεν, ἐφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ᾠειδές ἄει κατὰ ταυτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὀρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταυτά; Καὶ
tοῦτο, ἐφη, θομεν. Φέρε δή, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ἄλλο τι ἡμών αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σώμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοίω-
tερον τῷ εἴδει φαίμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ξυγγεγένεστερον τὸ σώμα; Παύτι, ἐφη, τοῦτο γε δήλον, ὦτι
tῷ ὀρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὀρατὸν ἡ ᾠειδές; Οὐχ ὡτ’ ἀνθρώπων γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη. Ἀλλά ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὀρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῆ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν: ἡ ἄλλη τινὶ οἶει; Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς
λέγομεν; ὀρατὸν ἡ ἀόρατον εἶναι; Οὐχ ὀρατὸν. Ἀειδές ἄρα; Ναὶ. Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχῆ σώματος ἐστιν τῷ ᾠειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶ ὀρατῶ. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες.
Από τον αύτο διώκτη αυτήν, ως εδώτα, η φύσις προστιθέται, η Σωφράτησ, η έκ τον ζωή για την όμηρον, ως έκ τον ζωή κατά τον ζωή σωφράτησ, της εδώτα, της δύσκολης, κατά τον ζωή σωφράτησ, η πώς και η σπουδή. Ρήμα της εδώτα, από τον αύτο διώκτη αυτήν, ως εδώτα, η φύσις προστιθέται, η Σωφράτησ, η έκ τον ζωή για την όμηρον, ως έκ τον ζωή κατά τον ζωή σωφράτησ, της εδώτα, της δύσκολης, κατά τον ζωή σωφράτησ, η πώς και η σπουδή.

Ει δια της Αθήνης, η Πλάτων προστιθέται, η Σωφράτησ, της εδώτα, της δύσκολης, κατά τον ζωή σωφράτησ, της εδώτα, της δύσκολης, κατά τον ζωή σωφράτησ, η πώς και η σπουδή.
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τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα
5 ἀν πότερον σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι,
καὶ πότερον τῷ θυντῷ; ἢ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι τὸ
μὲν θείον οἴον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν
πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θυντὸν ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ
dουλεύειν; Ἡμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχή

10 ἐσικεῖν; Δῆλα δῆ, ὦ Σῶκρατε, ὃτι ἢ μὲν
ψυχή τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θυντῷ. Σκόπει
dῆ, ἐφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἐρη-
μένων τάδε ἡμῶν ἐμβαίνει, τὸ μὲν θείῳ καὶ
ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλυτῷ

15 καὶ ἀεὶ ὦσαντως κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχοντι ἐαυτῷ
ὁμοίοτατον εἶναι ψυχῇ, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίῳ καὶ
θυντῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοητῷ καὶ ἀδιαλυτῷ
καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχοντι ἐαυτῷ ὁμοίο-
τατον αὐ εἶναι σῶμα. ἐχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα

20 ἀλλο λέγειν, ὃ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ οὐχ οὕτωσι
ἐχει; Ὑνκ ἐχομεν.

XXIX. Τι οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχοντων ἀρ
οὐχι σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει,
ψυχῇ δὲ αὐ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἰναι ἢ
εγνὺς τι τούτου; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἡμοιοίς οὖν,

5 ἐφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τὸ μὲν
ὁρατὸν αὐτῶν, [τὸ σῶμα,] καὶ ἐν ὀρατῷ
κείμενον, ὃ δῆ νεκρῶν καλοῦμεν, ὃ προσήκει
διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν, οὐκ εὕθως τούτων
οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλὰ ἐπιεικὸς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει

10 χρόνων, ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἐχων τὸ
σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ
μάλα. συμπεσοῦν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταρεχευθέν,
δ' ολον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον. ἕνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῆ, ὥστα τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατα ἐστιν. ἦ οὐ; Ναι. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδὲς, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰχόμενον γενναίον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἀιδοὺ ως ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἄγαθον καὶ φρόνιμον θεὸν, οἱ, ἂν θεὸς ἐκεῖθεν, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἱτέον, αὐτὴ δὲ δὴ ἥμιν ἡ τοιαῦτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκώς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διασφέροσται καὶ ἀπόλολος;

Ε ὡς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποί; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ μάλλον ὡδ' ἐχεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυνεφέλκοισα, ἀτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτῷ καὶ συνηθροισμένη τούτῳ εἰς αὐτήν], ἀτε μελετῶσα αἰει τούτο— τούτῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὁντὶ τεθνάναι μελετῶσα· ἢ οὖ τούτ' ἄν εἰη μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασι γε. Οὐκοῦν οὐτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὀμοίων αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θείων τε καὶ ἀθανατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ ἀφικομενή ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαιμον εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἔρωτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν
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θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

XXX. Οὕτω νὴ Δία, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης. 'Εὰν δὲ γε οἶμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἀτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἔρωσα καὶ γεγονητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἰδιώνων, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἄλλ' ἡ τὸ σωματειδές, οὕ τις ἄν ἄφαιτο καὶ ἰδοί καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσατο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὀμμασι σκοτώδεις καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἵρετον, τοῦτὸ δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἷεὶ ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καὶ αὐτὴν εἰλικρινὴ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐδ' ὀπωστίον, ἐφη. 'Αλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένη γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμολία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεπούησε ἡμφυτον; Πάνυ γε. 'Εμβριθεὶς δὲ γε, ὃ φίλε, τοῦτο οἰεσθαι χρή εἶναι καὶ βαρύ καὶ γεώδεις καὶ ὀρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἐλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, φοβοὶ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἄ δη καὶ ὄφθη ἄττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδὴ φαντάσματα, οία παρέχονται αἱ τοιαύται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἄλλα τοῦ ὀρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὀρῶνται. Εἰκὸς γε, ὁ
Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὁ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τῇ γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὐσίας· καὶ μέχρι γε τούτον πλανῶνται,
Ε ἔως ἂν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμία πάλιν ἐνδεδῶσιν εἰς σῶμα. 35
XXXI. 'Ενδοῦνται δὲ, ὡσπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαύτα ἣθη ὑπὸ ἃττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκώναι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Τὰ ποία δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; Οἶνον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ύβρεις καὶ φιλοσοφίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδυσθαί· ἦ οὐκ 82 οἰεί; Πάνω μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δὲ γε ἁδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγάς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτίνων γένη· ἦ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσε φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἴσαι; Ἀμέλει, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δὴ ὃς, ἡμίλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα, οἱ ἂν ἔκαστα ἰοί, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; Δῆλον δὴ, ἐφη· πῶς δ' οὖ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἐφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ Β καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἵντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἄρετην ἑπιτητηδευκότες, ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἐθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἀνευν φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πὴ δὴ οὕτω εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Τῇ; οὐ τούτοις εἰκὸς ἔστιν εἰς τοιούτων πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν τε καὶ ἴμερον γένος, ἦ
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μὴ αὐτὴν δি' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἔστιν, ὡς ἄν μᾶλιστα αὐτῶς ὁ δεδεμένος ἕυλλήπτωρ εἶ ὑ τῷ τοῦ δεδέσθαι,—ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἥρεμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένῃ ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστῇ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὦμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὦτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλῃ ἢ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ.

Βο τί ἄν νοησῇ αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὦτων· ο τί δ' ἄν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῆ  εν ἄλλοις ὃν ἄλλο, μηδέν ἤγεισθαι ἄληθες· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὀρατόν, δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾶ νοητόν τε καὶ ἀειδές. ταῦτη οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἄληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῆ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φάβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἡ ἐπιθυμίας, οὔτε τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐπαθεν ἀπ' 

C αὐτῶν ὄν ἄν τις οἰκείη, οἶνον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τάς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὁ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἐσχατόν ἔστι, τούτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τούτο, ὃ Σώκρατες; ἐφη ὁ Κέβης. "Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς
άνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἄμα τε ἡσθήναι ἢ λυπηθήναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργεῖστατον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθεύστατον, οὐχ οὐτως ἔχων· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα <τὰ> ὄρατα· ἢ οὔ; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδείκται ψυχή ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δὴ; "Ὅτι ἐκάστη ἡδονή καὶ λύπη ὁσπερ ἡλυ έχουσα προσηλοί αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερνη καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἄπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὄμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἶμαι ὀμότροπός τε καὶ ὀμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδεποτε εἰς "Αἰδοῦ καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀκολούθησαν ἀναπλέα ἐξεῖναι, ὡστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὁσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοὺς συνοισίας. Ἀληθευστὰ, ἐφή, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες.

XXXIV. Τούτων τούτων ἔνεκα, ὁ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμμω εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι, οὐχ ὅν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν· ἢ σὺ οἴει; Οὐ δὴ ἐγώγη. Ὅτι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω λογίσασται ἄν ψυχὴ ἄνδρος φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἶθεῖν τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρήναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λυπόσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδίδοναι ταῖς ἱδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν ἂν ἐγκαταδείω καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἑναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειρίζομεν· ἀλλὰ γαλήνην


τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὕσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θείου καὶ τῷ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ύπὲ ἐκείνου

Β τρεφομένη, ξήν τε οἴεται οὗτοι δεῖν, ἐός ἀν ξῆ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενές καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιούτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλαχθαί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταύτα γ᾿ ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὥ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ύπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἦ.

C ΧΧΧV. Σιγή οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολλῶν χρόνων, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἢν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελε- γέσθην· καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἱδὼν αὐτὸ ἦρετο. Τί; ἐφη, ὡμίν τὰ λεχθέντα μὸν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεώς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἐτὶ ἐχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἰ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξεῖναι. εἰ μὲν ὁυ τι ἀλλο σκοπεῖ- σθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δὲ τι περὶ τούτων ἄπο- ρεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκυνήσητε καὶ αὐτὸι εἰπεῖν καὶ

D διελθεῖν, εἰ πὴ ὡμίν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἄν- λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὐ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἰ τι μάλλον οἴεσθε μετ’ ἐμοῦ εὐπορίσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἐφη. Καὶ μήν, ὥ Σώκρατες, τάληθη σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἐτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ
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έπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι ὅκνεῖν δὲ ὁχλον παρέχειν,
μὴ σοι ἀηδὲς ἢ διὰ τὴν παρούσαν συμφοράν.
καὶ ὃς ἀκοῦσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἥρεμα καὶ φησίν,
Βαβαί, ὃ Σιμμία· ἢ ποὺ χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαμι ὡς οὐ συμφορὰν
ηγοῦμαι τὴν παρούσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδὲν
ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πεῖθεν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε, μὴ
dυσκολώτερον τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν
βίω· καὶ, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαιλό-
tερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, οἱ ἐπειδὰν
αἰσθώνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες
καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ
μάλιστα ἄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ
tὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι, οὐπερ εἰςὶ θεράποντες. οἱ
δὲ ἁνθρωποὶ διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δεὸς τοῦ θανάτου
καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασὶν
αὐτοὺς θηρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης
ἐξάδεων, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὁρμεύω
ἄδει, ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥυγῷ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην
λυπηται, οὔδε αὐτὴ ἢ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδῶν
καὶ ὁ ἔσοψε, ᾧ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θηρινοῦντα
ἄδειν· ἄλλ' οὐτε ταῦτα μοι φαίνεται λυποῦμενα
ἄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἄλλ' ἀτε οἴμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλ-
λωνος ὄντες μαντικοὶ τὲ εἰς καὶ προειδότες
tὰ ἐν ἧν Ἀιδοὺ ἀγαθὰ ἄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται
ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ
ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ποὺ
οἴμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς
tοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χείρον' ἐκεῖνων τὴν
μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὔδε δυσθυ-
μότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου ἃ ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὁ τι ἂν βούλησθε ἐως Ἀθηναίων ἔωςιν ἄνδρες.

Σένδεκα. Καλῶς, ἑφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὁ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὐθ ὅδε, ἦ σοι ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρήμενα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὁσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἡ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἡ παγχάλητον τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐτὲν τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἑλέγχει καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῶς σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνω μαλθάκοι ἐναι ἀνδρός. δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἡ μαθεῖν ὅτι ἔχει ἡ εὐρείν ἡ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξ.-

Λεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὠχοῦμενον ὁσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδὸς κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὁχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπροευθύναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐγωγε ὡς ἑπαίσχυνθομαί ἐρέσθαι, ἑπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἔμαυτόν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ἑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἂ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἑπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπὸ τὰ εἰρήμενα, οὐ πάνω φαίνεται ἴκανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

Ε Ἡ XXXVI. Καὶ ὁ Σώκρατης, Ἰσως γάρ, ἑφη, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὅτι δὴ οὐχ ἴκανῶς. Ταῦτα ἐμοιγε, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἢ δὴ
καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἂν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ
χορδῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον λόγου εἴποι, ὡς ἡ
μὲν ἀρμονία ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ
πάγκαλον τι καὶ θείον ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ
λύρᾳ, αὐτῇ δὲ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματα
τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ
καὶ τοῦ θυετοῦ ξυγγενῆ. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἡ κατάξη
tis τὴν λύραν ἡ διατέμη καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς
χορδάς, εἰ τις διυσχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ
ὅπερ σὺ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἐτι εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν
ἐκεῖνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι· οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴν
ἀν εἰ in τὴν μὲν λύραν ἐτι εἶναι διερρωγμένων
tῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θυετειδεῖς οὕσας,
τὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε
καὶ ἀθανάτου ὄμοφυῆ τε καὶ ξυγγενῆ, προτέραν
τοῦ θυετοῦ ἀπολομένην. ἄλλα φαίη ἀνάγκη ἐτι
που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ
ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπησθεῖσας, πρὶν τι
ἐκεῖνην παθεῖν,—καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὁ Ἐσκρατεῖς,
οὐμαί ἐγὼ καὶ αὐτὸν σε τούτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι,
ὅτι τοιοῦτον τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν
ψυχήν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος
ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ
καὶ ἕρην καὶ υγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων των, κρασιν
εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τῆς ψυχῆς
ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ
πρὸς ἅλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὕσα
ἀρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα
ἡμῶν ἁμέτρως ἡ ἐπιτιθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων
κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχήν ἀνάγκη εἰθὺς ὑπάρχει
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ  

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ἀπολωλέναι, καίτερ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὡσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἳ τ’ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐργοῖς πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν, ἔως ἄν ἥ κατακαυθῇ ἢ διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰδόθει, καὶ μειδίάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἐφη, λέγει ὁ Συμμίας. εἰ οὖν τὶς ὑμῶν εὐπορώ- 

teres ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ 

φαύλως ἐοικεν ἄπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ 5 

μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἐτι 

πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκούσατε, τί αὖ οὐδὲ ἐγκαλεῖ 

Ε τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώ- 

μεθα τῷ ἐροῦμεν, ἐπειτὰ δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἡ 

συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, εάν τι δοκόσι προσάδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, οὖτως ἦδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. 

ἀλλ’ ἀγε, ἢ δ’ ὂς, ὁ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ 

σὲ αὐθαῖτον [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]. Λέγω δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὂς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐτὶ ἐν 

τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς 15 

πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταῦτα ἐγκλημα ἐχεῖν. ὅτι 

μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τὸ 

to εἴδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνω 

χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθὲς ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, 

πάνυ ἰκανῶς ἀποδείχθαι· ώς δὲ καὶ ἀποθα- 

νότων ἡμῶν ἐτι που ἐσταί, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τὴδε.
ός μὲν οὐκ ἵσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχῇ σώματος, οὐ ξυγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος· ἐτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὅρας ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ γε ἀσθενέστερον ἑτὶ ὦν; τὸ δὲ πολυ-βχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἑτὶ σφιξθαί ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τούτῳ τότε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἰ τι λέγω· εἰκόνος γὰρ τινός, ὡς ἑοικεν, κἀγὼ ὁσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμὸ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὡμοῖος λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὁσπερ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφαίνον πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τούτων τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλολεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀλλ' ἐστὶ που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὁ ἁμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος, ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλολεν, καὶ εἰ τις ἀπιστοὶ αὐτῷ, ἀνεροτήθη πότερον ἐπολυχρονιώτερον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἰματίου ἐν χρείᾳ τοῦτος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριμαμένου δὲ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ του ἀνθρώπου, οἷοτο ἀποδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἁρα μᾶλλον ὁ γε ἀνθρώπους σῶς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ γε ύφηνοριώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλολεν. τὸ δ' ὁμαί, ὁ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ᾧ λέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβωσί ὅτι εὐθεῖς λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὕτως πολλᾶ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἰματία καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἑκείνων μὲν ὑστερος ἀπόλολεν τοῦ ὅντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἷμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον τοῦτον ἐνεκα ἀνθρωπός
ἐστιν ἵματίον φαυλότερον οὐδὲ ἀσθενεότερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἴμαι εἰκόνα δέξατ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἦ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενεότερον καὶ ὀλυγχρονιότερον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίνῃ ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σῶματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη βιώῃ· εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἐτὶ ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβό-Ε μενον ἀνυφαίνοι, ἀναγκαῖον μενταν εἰ̃, ὡπότε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τοῦτον μόνον προτέραν ἀπολλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε ἒν ἡ τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπεν διοίκοιτο. ὡστε τοῦτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὕτω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα βαρρείν, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἐτί πον ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἐτί τῷ λέγοντι [entifier] ἡ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσεις, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνώπιον ἐτί εἰναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖ-σθαι αὐθις. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἵσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὡστε πολλάκις γηγομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν· δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἔκεινο μηκὲν συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὖ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἐν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπολλυσθαι· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην
XXXVIII. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρει ὁ λεθρόν, μηδένα φαίνη εἰδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὅτι οὐκ ἀισθάνεσθαι ήμῶν· εἰ δὲ τούτο οὐτως ἔχει, οὐδὲν προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοίτως θαρρεῖν, ὅσ ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἐστὶ ψυχή παντάπασιν ἠθάνατον τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἠεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.

EX. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὁ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἕχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτον τι λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται· τίνι οὖν ἐτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὃς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανός οὖν, ὃν ὁ Ὁσκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν. θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἰδί, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὁσπερ ὑπέμνησεν μὲ ῥήτεις ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μου ταῦτα προσδόκητο· καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὁσπερ ἐξ ἄρχης ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου, ὃς με πείσει ὃς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συνάπτεθήσει
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η ψυχή. λέγει οὖν πρὸς Διός, πη τοῦ Σωκράτης ἐμετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κάκεινος, ὀσπερ ὑμᾶς φής, ἐνδηλύσ τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἡ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πράως ἔβοϊρθε τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐβοϊρθησεν ἡ ἐνδεώς; πάντα ἦμῖν δίελθε ὃς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Ἐχέκρατε, πολλάκις θαυμάζας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἡ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχεων ὃ τι λέγω οἴκειν ἵσως οὔδεν ἀτοποῦ. ἀλλὰ ἐγώγη μᾶλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτὸν πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἠδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἦμῶν ὡς ὅξεως ἤσθετο ὃ πεπόνθημεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἦμᾶς ἱάσατο καὶ ὀσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἠττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προὐτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ΕΧ. Πῶς δή;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἔρω. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίψην ἐπὶ χαμαίζη. λοι τυνὸς, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ψυγῆσωτέρου ἡ ἐγῶ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθη γὰρ, ὅπως τύχοι, παῖζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὐριὸν δὴ, ἔφη, ἵσως, ὁ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἐοικεν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ Σωκράτης. Οὐκ ἂν γε ἐμοὶ πείθη. Ἀλλὰ τί; ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ. Τῇμεροῦς, ἔφη, κάνω τὰς ἦμᾶς καὶ σὺ ταῦτας, ἐάντερ γε ἦμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτῶν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἐγὼγ’ ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἶγν
καὶ μὲ διαφέροι ὁ λόγος, ἑνυρκον ἃν ποιησάμην ὡσπερ Ἀργείοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίον τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἄλλα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἶδος τε εἶναι. Ἄλλα καὶ ἐμὲ, ἐφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἔως ἐτί φῶς ἐστίν. Παρακαλῶ τούνν, ἐφη, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλ’ ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὔδέν διώσει, ἐφη.

XXXIX. Ἄλλα πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Το ποῖον; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Μὴ γενόμεθα, ἦ δ’ ὡς, μισόλογοι, ὡσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐφη, ὅ τι ἂν τις μεῖζὸν τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἦ λόγους μισήςασ. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἦ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεύσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἤγισασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιή καὶ πιστῶν τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν, ἐπεῖθα ὡς ὡς ὡς εὑρείν τοῦτον ποιηρὸν τε καὶ ἀπιστῶν καὶ αὐθίς ἑτερόν· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθη τις, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦτων μάλιστα οὕς ἂν ἤγισαίτο οἰκειοστάτους τε καὶ ἑταῖροστάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμα προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἤγειται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγίες εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦ οὐκ ἤσθησα σὺ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ’ ὡς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρησθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους; εἰ γὰρ πον
μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρήτω, ὦστερ ἐχει, οὗτος ἄν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς
90 σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἐκατέρως, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφην ἐγώ. "Ὡστέρ, ἢ δ' ὦς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἷει τι σπανιότερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα μικρῶν ἐξευρείν ἀνθρώπων ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτι ὅτι ἢ αὐ ταχύν ἢ βραδύν, ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλόν, ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνω γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ.

Β Οὐκοῦν οἷεί, ἐφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἁγὼν προτεθείη, πάνω ἄν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρῶτους φανήναι; Εἰκός γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γὰρ, ἐφει. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὁμοίοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προαγώντος ἐγὼ ἐφεστόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἢ, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἄλλῃ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπετα ὀλίγον ύστερον αὐτοῦ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίσχετε μὲν ὃν, ἐνίσχετε δ' οὐκ

C οὖν, καὶ αὕθες ἑτερος καὶ ἑτερος· καὶ μᾶλλον δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἰσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οὗναι σοφότατοι γεγο- νέναι τε καὶ κατανεομέναι μονοὶ ὅτι οὐτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ύψιές οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὖτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὅτα ἄτεχνῶς ὦστερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἢφην ἐγώ, ἄληθὶ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Φαίδων,
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ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἰῆ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δ' ὄντος δὴ τινος ἄληθοὺς καὶ βεβαιοῦν λόγον καὶ δυνατοῦ κατα
νοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγιγνεσθαι τοιοῦτοις τισὶ λόγοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἄληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μή ἕαυτόν τις αἵτωτο μηδὲ τὴν ἕαυτον ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἄλγειν ἀσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἕαυτον τὴν αἵτιαν ἀπώσατο καὶ ὃδε τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἄληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

XI. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἔφη, τούτο εὐλα
βηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παρίσωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ύπόσε εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τολὴ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἤμεις οὕτω ύπίσως ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ύπίσως ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἢμοι δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ βανάτου. ὡς κινδυνεύων ἐγώγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὡσπέρ οἱ πάνω ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονεῖκοις. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅτι μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὅν ἂν ἢ λόγος ἢ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐδεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παρούσις, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν. οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἄληθῆ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἰη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἢμοι ὁ τι μάλιστα
Β δόξει οὖτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὃ φίλε ἐταίρε, θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἡλιθίη ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθήναι· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτον ἔστω παροῦσιν ἀνθής ἐσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἦ δὲ δὴ ἄγνοια μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ, κακῶν γὰρ ἄν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὄλγον ὑστερον ἀπολεῖται. παρεκκενασμένος δὴ, ἔφη, ὡ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὔτωσι ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἀνεμοι πείθησε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, εὰν μὲν τι ὑμνὸν δοκῶ ἄληθες λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μῆ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἀμα ἐμαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἔξαπατήσας ὑστερ μέλιτα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπών ὀιχύσομαι.

Χ.Π. Ἀλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτον με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, εὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀπιστεὶ τε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὄμως καὶ θεοτέρον καὶ κάλλιον ὅν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύστηκα ἐν 5 ἀρμονίας εἰδει ὦσα. Κέβης δὲ μοι ἐδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοι συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρωνιστῶρων γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸδε ἄδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σῶματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν ἀυτὴ ἀπολλύστηκα, καὶ ἡ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὀλέθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμα γε ἂν ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἄρα ἀλλ' ἡ ταυτ' ἐστίν, ὁ
Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀ δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;
Συνωμολογεῖτιν δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον Ε
οὖν, ἐφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐμπροσθεὶς λόγους όυκ
ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ' οὖ; Τοὺς μέν,
ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὖ. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὡς, περὶ
ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐὰν δ' ἐφαμεν τὴν
μάθησιν ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως
ἐχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἀλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν
εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδείχναι;
'Εγὼ μὲν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς
ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς
οὔδενι λόγῳ. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας, καὶ
αὐτός οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνω ἀν θαυμάζομι, εἰ
μοι περὶ τοῦ τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ δόξειεν. καὶ ὁ
Σωκράτης, Ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἐφη, δι᾽ ἔνε
Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνῃ ἢδὲ ἡ ὀνήσις,
τὸ ἄρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν
δὲ ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα
ἐντευκέσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ποι ἂποδέξει Β
γε αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ώς πρότερον ἢν ἄρμονία
συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἢ ὡς ἐδει αὐτὴν
συμπεθήναι. ἢ ἂποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη, ὁ
Σωκράτης. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὡς, ὅτι ταῦτα
σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, όταν φῆς μέν εἶναι τὴν
ψυχήν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἴδος τε καὶ
σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἢκ
τῶν οὐδέποτο οὕτων; οὗ γὰρ δὴ ἄρμονία γέ
σοι τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπεικόσιες, ἄλλα πρότερον
καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαί καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἐτι
ἀνάρμοστοι οὕτε γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων
ξυνίσταται ή ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὕτως οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνίστηται; 45 Οὐδαμός, ἑφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μὴν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, πρέπει γε εὑπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνισθού εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἑφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὕτως τοῖνυν, ἑφη, σοὶ οὖν ξυνισθοῦσ, ἄλλ’ ὄρα τὸ πότερον αἱρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τῇ μάθησιν ἀνάμμωσιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἑφη, ἐκείνου, ὁ Σῶκρατες. ὁδὲ μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἀνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ δ ἑικότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, οθὲν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων ταῖς ἀποδείξεις ποιομένους λόγοις ξύνοιδα οὕσιν ἀλαξόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὑ μάλα ἔξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασίν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι’ ὑποθέσεως ἑξίας ἀποδείξεσθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὡσπερ αὐτῇ ἔστιν ἡ οὐσίᾳ 

Ε ἐξουσία τήν ἐπωνυμίαν τήν τοῦ ὁ ἔστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανὸς τε καὶ ὁρθῶς ἀποδεδείγματι. ἀνάγκη οὕν μοι, ὡς ἐστίκη, διὰ ταύτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδεχεσθαι λέγοντος, ὡς ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἄρμονία. XLII. Τί δέ, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ὁ Σιμμία, τήδε; 93 δοκεῖ σοι ἄρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέτει προσήκειν ἄλλοις πῶς ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἄν ἐκείνα ἔχῃ ἢ ὧν ἄν συγκεκριμένα; Οὐδαμός. Ὅμως μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγὼ μοι, ὁδὲ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο
παρ' ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἡ ποιή̣ ἡ πάσχη̣; Συνέφη.
olta ἡγεῖθαι γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τοῦτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαί. Συνεδόκει.
Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεὶ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινηθῆναι ἡ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἀλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν.
Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἡφη. Τί δὲ; οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἑκάστῃ ἁρμονίᾳ, ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῆ; Οὐ µανθάνω, ἡφη. 
Οὐχὶ, ἢ ὅς, ἂν µὲν µᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, µᾶλλον τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἰη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ' ὦτον τε καὶ ἐπ' ἐλαττον, ὥττον τε καὶ ἐλάττων; Πάνυ γε. Ἡ οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ συµκρότατον µᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ µᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἐλαττον καὶ ὦτον αὐτὸ· τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν; Ὡοῦ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἡφη. Φέρε δή, ἡφη, πρὸς Διὸς· λέγεται ψυχῆ ἢ µὲν νοῦν τε ξεχεν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθὴ, ἢ δὲ ἀνοιάν τε καὶ µοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακῆ; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἀληθῶς µέντοι. Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχῆν ἁρµονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα οὖντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρµονίαιν αὐτὶ τινα ἀλλὴν καὶ ἀναρµοστίαν; καὶ τὴν µὲν ἡρµόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἁρµονία οὕση ἀλλὴν ἁρµονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀναρµοστὸν αὐτήν τε εἰναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλήν; Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἡφη ὁ Σιµµίας, εἰπτείν· δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἀττ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέµενος. Ἄλλα προσωµο-
λόγηται, ἐφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἦττον ἔτεραν ἐτέρας ψυχήν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἦττον μηδ’ ἦττον μηδ’ ἦττον ἄρμονίαν [ἀρμονίας] εἶναι· ἦ γὰρ; Πάντων γε. Τήν δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἄρμονίαν οὐδαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἢρμόσθαι· ἐστὶν οὔτως; Ἔστιν. Ἔδ ὡς ἦττον μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἢρμοσμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τι πλέον ἢ ἠλαττον ἄρμονίας μετέχει, ἦ τὸ ἱσον; Τὸ ἱσον. Ὁυκοῦν ψυχῆ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ’ ἦττον ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχή ἐστιν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἢρμοσταί; Οὐτώ. Τοῦτο δὲ γε πεπονθύια οὐδέν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἄρμονίας μετέχοι ἀν; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τοῦτο δ’ αὖ πεπονθύια ἀρ’ ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἡ ἁρετής μετέχοι ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἰπέρ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἁρετή ἄρμονία εἶν; Οὐδὲν πλέον. Μᾶλλον δὲ γε ποι, ὁ Ἑιμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχή μεθέξει, εἰπέρ ἄρμονία ἐστὶν: ἄρμονία γὰρ δῆπον παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὔσα, ἄρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ’ ἂν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μέντοι. Οὐδὲ γε δῆπον ψυχή, οὔσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἐκ γε τῶν προειρήμενων; Ἔκ τοῦτον ἀρα τοῦ λόγου ἦμιν πάσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζωὸν ὀμοίως ἁγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἰπέρ ὀμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἰναι. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὁ Ὀκρατεῖς. Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ’ ὦς, οὔτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἢ 65
υπόθεσις ἡν, τὸ ψυχήν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

XLIII. Τί δὲ; ἡ δ' ὅς· τῶν εὖ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἐσθ' ὁ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἀρχεῖν ἡ ψυχήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ ἔγγογε. Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα παθήμασιν ἡ καὶ ἐναντιομένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιώνδε, οἶον καύματος ἐνόστος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ποὺ ὀρῶμεν ἐναντιομένην τὴν ψυχήν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἡ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μῆποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὕσιν, ἐναντία· ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλάτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο οὕτων πάθος πάσχου ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὁν τυγχάνει οὕσα, ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ οὕτοτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν; Ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τούναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσα τε ἐκεῖνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιομένη ὀλύγου πάντα διὰ πάντος τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπό- ξουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀληθῶν, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ιατρικὴν, τά δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τά μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τά δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἀλλή οὕσα ἀλλὰ πράγματι διάλεγομένη; οἶον πού καὶ Ὁμήρος ἐν Ὄδυσσείας πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὅδυσσέα
πλήξας κραδίνην ἤμιπατε μῦθον·
καὶ κύντερον ἀλλο ποτ' ἐξήν. 30

ἄρ' οἴει αὐτῶν ταύτα ποιήσαι διανοούμενον ὡς
ἀρµονίας αὐτῆς οὐσίας καὶ οίας ἀγεσθαί ὕπὸ
tῶν τοῦ σῶµατος παθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οίας ἀγείν
tε ταύτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσις αὐτῆς πολὺ
θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἥ καθ' ἀρµονίαν; 35
Νὴ Δία, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐμοίγει δοκεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα,
ὁ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν
ἀρµονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς
95 ἐοικεν, Ὄμηρος θείως ποιητῇ ὁµολογοῦµεν οὔτε
αὐτοὶ ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἐχει οὕτως, ἑφι. 40

XCIV. Εἰεν δὴ, ἦ δ' ὁς ὁ Σῶκράτης, τὰ
μὲν Ἀρµονίας ἡµῖν τῆς ᾩδαῖκης ἰλεά πως,
ὡς ἐοικε, μετρίως γέγονε· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδµου,
ἑφι, ὁ Κέβης, πῶς ἰλασόμεθα καὶ τῖν λόγῳ;
Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἑφι ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν· τούτων 5
γοὺν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀρµονίαν 
θαυµαστῶς μοι ἐπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Συμµίου
γὰρ λέγοντος ὁ τι ἕπορει, πάνω ἑθαύµαζον, εἰ
Β ΤΙ ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνω
μὲν ὡς μοι ἀτόπως ἐδοξέων εὐθὺς τὴν πρῶτην
ἐφοδον ὡς δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταυτὰ δὴ
ὁν ἀν θαυµάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδµου λόγον
ei πάθοι. Ὡ γαθέ, ἑφι ὁ Σῶκράτης, μὴ μέγα
λέγε, μὴ τις ἡµῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν
λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἑσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταυτὰ
μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελῆσει, ἥµεις δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς
ιῶτες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἁρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ
C δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὅν ξητεῖς· ἄξιος ἐπιδεικθήναι
Ημῶν τὴν ψυχήν ἀνώλεθρών τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ὀύσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνήρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖ-σθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανῶν ἐκεῖ εὐ πράξεων διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλω βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητον τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρσος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἱσχυρὸν τὸ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἢν ἐτὶ πρό-τερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φής πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἄθανασίαν μὲν μῆ, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τὸ ἐστὶν ψυχὴ καὶ ἢν ποὺ πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνου καὶ ἦδει τε καὶ ἐπράπτειν πολλὰ ἀττα· ἀλλὰ διὰ ὅτι οὔδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπων σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἄρχῃ ἢν αὐτῇ ὅλεθρον, ὡσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρο-μένη τε ὅ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῇ καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρει δὲ δὴ, φής, οὐδὲν εἶτε ἄπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἶτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἰη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι, ὡς ἀθάνατον ἐστὶ. τοιαῦτ' ἀττα Ε ἐστὶν οἷμαι, ὁ Κέβης, ἡ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπτύθησας πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἓνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι θουλεί, προσθῆς ἢ ἀφελης. καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἀλλ' οὔδεν ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἐφη, οὔτε ἄφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα ἡ λέγω.

XLV. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισκόπων καὶ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν τι σκεφτώμενος, Ὁ
πλατωνος

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φαίλων πράγμα, ἢψη, ὁ Κέβης, ξητείς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἕγὼ οὖν σοι διέμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὃν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὃν λέγεις χρήσει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἢψη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαι γε. "Ἀκούει τοίνυν ὡς ἑροῦντος. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἢψη, ὁ Κέβης, νέος ὃν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γὰρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἐκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυτόν ἄνω κἀτω μετέβαλλον σκοτῶν τὰ

β τοιάδε, ἃρ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὡς τινὲς ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ἃδα συντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον τὸ αἵμα ἐστὶν ὁ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἄρη ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστίν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοὺς ἀκούειν καὶ ὀράν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γύνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξας λαβούσης τὸ ἡρμῆειν κατὰ ταύτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοτῶν, καὶ τὰ

c περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἐδοξά πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυῆς εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δὲ σοι ἐρῶ ἵκανὸν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἥπιστάμην, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως
οὗτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὡστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ἀ πρὸ τοῦ φῶμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἅλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τι ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τούτῳ γὰρ φῶμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξί σάρκες προσγένωντα, τοῖς δὲ ὀστεῖσι ὅστα, καὶ οὗτῳ κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἅλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὄλγον ὄγκον ὄντα ύστερον πολύν γεγονόναι, καὶ οὗτῳ γήγερεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν· οὗτος τότε φῶμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; Ἐμοιγε, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψασί δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. φῶμην γὰρ ἰκανὸς μοι δοκεῖν, ὅποτε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστάς μέγας σμικρῷ, μεῖζον εἶναι αὐτῷ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππον· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτῶν προσέσθαι καὶ τὸ δίπτηχυ τῶν πηχουαίον μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτῶν ὑπέρεχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πάρρῳ ποιν, ἐφη, νη Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων τοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς ὁ ὁὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἐνὶ τις προσθῇ ἐν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ὃ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστέθην καὶ ὃ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῶν ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ ἐν εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρίς ἄλληλων ἦ, ἐν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἡστὶν τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐπλησίασαν ἄλληλους, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία
αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ ἡμοῦδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθήναι. οὔδε γε ὡς, ἐὰν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἐτί πείθεσθαι ὡς αὐτῇ αὖ αὐτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τὸτε αὐτία τοῦ δύο ἑγνεσθαι· τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἐτέροι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἐτέροι ἀφ᾽ ἐτέρου, οὐδὲ γε δι᾽ ὅ τι ἐν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι ἐτί πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνι λόγῳ δι᾽ ὅ τι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τούτων τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἄλλα τιν᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτῶς εἰκῆ φύρω, τούτων δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσέμει.

XLVI. Ἄλλα ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἐφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγνωσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αὐτίου, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αὐτίᾳ ἡσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξε μοι τρόπον τινὰ ἐν ἑχειν τὸ τῶν νοῶν εἶναι πάντων αὐτίου, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα [κοσμεῖν] καὶ ἐκαστὸν τιθέει ταύτῃ ὑπὸ ἀν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλωτο τὴν αὐτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου, ὑπὸ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὑπὸ βέλτιστον αὐτῶ ἔστιν ἢ ἐναι ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δή τοῦ λόγου τοῦτον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἄλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ
βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι: τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἀσμενὸς εὐρήκειν ϕύμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀνάξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατείᾳ ἐστιν ἡ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν Ε ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἁμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἁμεινον ἢ τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίνειν αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἁμεινον ἢν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀπο- 98 φαίνωτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεόμενος αἰτίας ἀλλὸ εἴδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἥλιον ὡς παρεσκευάσμην, ὡς αὐτῶς πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἁμεινὸν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ϕύμην, φάσκοντα γε ὑπὸ νοῦν αὐτὰ κεκοσμήσθαι, ἀλλὰ τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ ὡς ἐχειν ἐστὶν ὃσπερ ἔχει· ἐκάστως οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα B τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινὴ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ϕύμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθῶν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ποιεῖ δὲ λαβῶν τὰς βίβλους ὑπὲρ τάχιστα ὁδὸς τ' ἡ ἄνεγιγμασον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.
XLVII. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὀ ἑταῖρε, φῶχομην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προῆ ὁ ἀναγνωρίσκων ὀρῶ ἁνδρὰ τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον [οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον] εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὑδάτα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἀλλα πολλα καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεποιθεῖναι ὁσπερ ἄν εἰ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἀπειτα ἐπιχειρήσασα λέγειν τάς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὃν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μοι τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὁστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅστὰ ἐστὶν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυγας ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων,

D τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οία ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνέσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὅστὰ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὁ συνέχει αὐτὰ· αἰωρούμενων οὖν τῶν ὁστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐξεισαλεῖται καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι που ποιεὶ οἶχον τ’ εἴναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταῦτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεις ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὐ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνᾶς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἀλλα μυρία τοιαύτα αἰτιώμενος, Ε ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψυφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοί βέλτιον αὐ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ύπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν ἂν κελεύσωσιν· ἐπεί νη τῶν κύνα, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, πάλαι 30
Ξ contestant τὰ νεῦρα τε καὶ τὰ ὅστα ἡ περὶ Μέγαρα ἡ Βοιωτοῦ ἤ, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἴ μὴ δικαιότερον ὅμως καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπὲρειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἤπινθ' ἂν τάτη. ἀλλ' αἰτία μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα καλεῖν λίαν ἀτοποῦν· εἴ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχειν, καὶ ὅστα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἄν οἴος τ' ἢν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντα μοι, ἀληθῆ ἄν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἂ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῦ πράττων, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλή καὶ μακρά ῥαθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶον τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἰτίον τῷ ὅντι, ἂλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἰτίον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἰτίον· ο δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφώντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὠσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὠνόματι προσχρόμενοι, ὡς αἰτίον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δύνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὕρανοῦ μὲνει δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὠσπερ καρδότω πλατεία βάθρον τῶν ἁέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἶον τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθήναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὐτε ἔσητοὺς οὐτε τινὰ οἴονται δαίμονιν ἵσχυν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἤγοινται τούτου Ἀτλαντα ἂν ποτὲ ἴσχυρότερον καὶ ἀβανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπαντὰ συνέχουσα ἔξευρειν, καὶ ὡς ἄληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ἵσυνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὕδεν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχει,
μαθητής ὅτου οὖν ἦδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδή δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὐτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν

οὔτε παρ' ἄλλω μαθείν οἶός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δὲτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τής αἰτίας ξήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἐφη, ἐπιδειξίν, 65 ποιήσωμαι, ὁ Κέβης; Ἄπερφυνός μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁς βούλομαι.

XLVIII. Ἐδοξέ τοίνυν μοι, ἢ δ' ὡς, μετά ταύτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι, μή πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἦλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι· διαφθείρονται γὰρ πον ἐν όνοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἢν μὴ 5 ἐν ύδατι ἡ τινι τοιούτω σκοπώνται τὴν εἰκόνα ἐκ

Ε αὐτοῦ. τοιούτων τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοθῆναι, καὶ ἑδεισα, μή παντάπασι τὴν ψυχήν τυφλῳδεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ἐδοξέ δὴ μοι χρὴναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων 100 τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ᾿ϊσως μὲν οὖν ὃ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἐοικεὶν· οὐ γὰρ πάνιν συγχωρῶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι· 15 μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἑργοῖς. ἄλλα ὅτι ταύτη γε ὀρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὅν ἀν κρίνου ἐρρομενέστατον εἶναι, ἄ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῆ τούτῳ συμφονεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθὴ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων, ὃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δὲ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἢ λέγω· οἴμαι γὰρ σε νῦν
ου μανθάνειν. Ου μα τον Δια, εφη ο Κέβης,
ου σφοδρα.

ΓΛΚ. 'Αλλ', η δ' ός, ωδε λέγω, ουδέν και
κανόν, άλλ' άπερ αει καλ άλλοτε και εν το
παρεληπθότι λόγω ουδέν πέπαιναι λέγων.
έρχομαι γαρ δη επιχειρον σοι επιδειξασθαι
της αιτίας το είδος ο πεπραγμάτευμαι, και
ειμι πάλιν επ' εκείνα τα πολυθρύλητα και
άρχομαι απ' εκείνουν, ύποθέμενοι ειναι τι
καλόν αυτό καθ' αυτό και άγαθον και μέγα
και τάλλα πάντα: δι ει μοι δίδως τε και
συγχωρείς ειναι ταύτα, ελπίζω σοι εκ τουτων
την αιτιαν επιδειξειν και άνευρισειν, ώς
αθάνατον η ψυχή. 'Αλλα μην, εφη ο Κέβης,
ως διδούντο σοι ουκ αν φθάνοις περαινων.
Σκόπει δη, εφη, τα εξης εκείνοις, ειν σοι
ξυνδοκη όσπερ εμοι. φαίνεται γαρ μοι, ει
τι εστιν άλλο καλόν, ουδε δι' εν άλλο καλόν
einai η διότι μετέχει εκείνου του καλου και
πάντα δη ουτως λέγω. τη τοιαδε αιτία συγ-
χωρεις; Συγχωροδ, εφη. Ου τοινυν, η δ' ός,
ετι μανθανω ουδε δύναμαι τας άλλας αιτίας
τας σοφας ταυτας γιγνωσκειν. άλλ' ειν τις
μοι λέγη δι' ο τι καλόν εστιν οτιουν, η
χρώμα ευανθεις εχουν η σχήμα η άλλο οτιουν
των τοιούτων, τα μεν άλλα χαριειν εδο,
ταράττομαι γαρ εν τοις άλλοις πασι, τουτο
dε άπλως και άτέχνως και ισως ευνιθως εξω
παρ' εμαυτοι, οτι ουκ άλλο τι ποιει αυτο
καλον η εκεινου του καλου ειτε παρουσια
εἰτε κοινωνία εἰτε ὅτη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένου, οὐ γὰρ ἐτὶ τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλὰ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαντῶ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἀλλω, καὶ τοῦτον ἐξόμενος ἠγούμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀσφαλές εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅτι οὖν ἄλλω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλά. ἦ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεῖζοι μεῖζοι, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναί. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἂρ’ ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἰ τίς τινα φαλὴ ἔτερου ἔτερον τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττων τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτῷ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροι. ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἔτερον ἔτερον οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ μεῖζον ἔστω ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττων οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ ἐλάττων ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλάττων, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος, οἴμαι, μὴ τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζων τίνα φῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐλάττων ἐλάττων, ἐπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὕση τὸν μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρὸ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι. ἢ οὖν ἂν φοβοῦ ταῦτα; καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, Ἐγὼ ἐφη. Ὅνικοῦν, ὣς δ’ ὃς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τάντα τῇ αἵτιν περβάλλειν, φοβοῦ ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ
μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὖ μεγέθει; οὐ αὐτὸς γὰρ που φόβος. Πάνυ γ', ἑφη. Τί δὲ; ἐν ἔννοι προστεθέντοι τὴν πρόσθεσιν αὐτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἢν βοώς ὅτι οὐκ οὐσθα ἃ ἀλλως πως ἐκαστὸν γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχόν τῆς ἱδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτωι οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἂλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυνάδος μετά- σχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτο μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὑ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταῦτα καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφ᾽ ἂν χαίρειν, παρεῖσ ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις: σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ύποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναι οὖν. [εἴ δὲ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ύπο- θέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐφ᾽ ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναι, ἐως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαι, εἰ σοι ἄλληλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ δια- φωνεῖ.] ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὐ ὑπόθεσιν ύποθέμενος, ἦτος τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἐως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανον ἔλθοις, ἀμα δὲ Ε οὐκ ἂν φύροις ὡσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἄρχης διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἰπτε βούλοι τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν.
εκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἵσως οὖδὲ εἰς περὶ τούτων λόγος οὖδὲ φροντὶς: ἵκανοί γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκώντες ὁμοὶς δύνασθαι αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν: σὺ δέ εἴπερ εἰ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν, οἶμαι ἄν ὃς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ τε Σιμμίας ἁμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

EX. Νὴ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ὃς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατε, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἐδοξεῖν.

EX. Καί γὰρ ἡμῖν τοὺς ἀπούσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἢν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

L. ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ β ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὁμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἰσχεῖν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἱρώτα, Εἰ δὴ, ἢ δὲ ὦς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἃρ' ὦν χ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τὸτ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμία ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἄγωγε. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ἢ δὲ ὦς, ὁμολογεῖτο τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ρήμασι λέγεται. οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν, οὐ γὰρ πον πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τοῦτο τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων: οὐδ' αὐ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ο Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ
Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; Ἄλκηθή. Οὐδὲ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὁτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίαν σμικρότητα; Ἕστι ταῦτα. Οὖτως ἀρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὃν ἀμ- φοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν Σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον. καὶ ἀμα μεδιάσας, Ὅιοικα, ἐφη, καὶ ἐξυγγραφικῶς ἔρειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἔχει γε ποι ὑσ λέγω. Συνεφη. Λέγω δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος δοξαί σοι ὅπερ ἔμοι. ἐμὸι γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἐθέλειν ἀμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσ- δέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἑτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκ- χωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίη τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ Σ σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθοῦντος ἐκείνου ἀπολολέων· υπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξαμενον τὴν σμικρότητα υἱκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἑτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν, ὅσπερ ἐγὼ δεξαμενος καὶ υπομένας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὃν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμι· ἐκείνο δὲ οὐ τετὸλμηκεν μέγα ὃν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ᾽ αὐτῶς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν υἱκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γῆγνεσθαί οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ἀλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὃν ὅπερ ἦν ἀμα τουναντίων γῆγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι 103 ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασιν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, οὗτο φαίνεται μοι.
ΙΙ. Καὶ τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας— ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν υψί λεγομένων ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος τὸ μείζον γέγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἐλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὐτὴ εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἑναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἑναντίων; νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν 

Β τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἐφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἑναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἑναντίον πράγμα γέγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἑναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἑναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γὰρ, ὃ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἑχόντων τὰ ἑναντία ἑλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἑκείνων ἐπωνυμία, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἑκείνων αὐτῶν ὃν ἑφόντων ἑχει τὴν ἑπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δὲ ἑκεῖνα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν 

C ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἀμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἀρα μὴ που, ὁ Κέβης, ἐφη, καὶ σὲ τοὺς τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὃν ὃδε εἶπεν; ὁ δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἔχω· καίτοι 25 οὐ τί λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλὰ με ταράττει. Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἀρα, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἀπλῶς τούτο, μηδέποτε ἑναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἑναντίον ἑσεσθαι. Παντάπασιν, ἐφη.

ΙΙΙ. 'Ετι δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἐφη, εἰ
ἀρα συνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἡ Ἐγώγε. Ἡ Ἁρ' ὀπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ; Ἄλλ' ἔτερον τι πυρὸς τὸ δ
5 θερμὸν καὶ ἔτερον τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναι. Ἀλλὰ τόδε ἡ οἷμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα οὐσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμὸν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἐτι ἐσεσθαι ὀπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμὸν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἡ ὑπεκχωρήσεως αὐτῷ ἡ ἀπολείπεσθαι. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὐ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἡ ὑπεξίεναι ἡ ἀπολείπεσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσεως δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἐτι εἶναι ὀπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, Ε
10 λέγεις. Ἡ Ἐστιν ἀρα, ἡ δ' ὡς, περὶ ἕινα τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἄξιοσθαί τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἐστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεὶ ὀταν-περ ἦ. ἐτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς δε ἰσως ἐσται σαφέ-στερον ὁ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεὶ που δὲὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ὄνοματος τυγχάνειν, ὁπερ νῦν λέγο-μεν. ἡ οὗ; Πάνυ γε. Ἡ Ἀρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἡ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἐστι μὲν ὡς ὀπερ τὸ περιττὸν, ὁμώς δὲ δεὶ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὄνοματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεὶ, διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι, ὡστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέ-ποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶνον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει
20 δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος, ἀρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὄνοματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ
30 G
τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ οὔπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἂλλ' ὅμως οὕτω ποισ̄ πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ήμισὺς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας,

Β ὡστε οὐκ ὅν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἔστι περιττός· καὶ αὐ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τέταρτα καὶ ἄπας ὁ ἐτερος αὐ̄ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὅν ὅπερ τὸ ἀρτιον ὁμος ἐκαστος αὐτῶν ἀρτιος ἔστιν ἀεἰ· συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἕφη, 'Ο τοίων, ἕφη, βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ἄθρει. ἐστιν δὲ τὸδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἑκεῖνα τὰ ἑναντία ἀλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁσα οὐκ οντ' ἀλλήλοις ἑναντία ἔχει αἰ̄ τάναντια, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐοικε δεχομένοις ἑκεῖνη τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσίη ἑναντία ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης ἀυτῆς ἢτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ υπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φόσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὸν υπομεῖναι ἐτὶ τρία ὅντα ἀρτιὰ γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἕφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μήν, ἢ ὦ ὦσ, ἑναντίον γε ἐστὶ διὰς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκ ἀρα μόνον τὰ εἰδὴ τὰ ἑναντία οὐχ υπομένει ἐπιόντα ἀλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλ' ἀττα τὰ ἑναντία οὐχ υπομένει ἐπιόντα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἕφη, λέγεις.

ΛΙΠ. Βούλει οὖν, ἢ ὄ δ' ὦσ, ἐὰν οἰοῖ τ' ὅμεν, δ ὁμισώμεθα ὁποῖα ταύτα ἐστιν; Πάνυ γε. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἕφη, ὁ Κέβης, τάδε εἰν ἂν, ἢ ὦ τι ἂν κατάσχη μη μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδέαν αὐτὸ ἵσχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑναντίον αἰ̄ τίνος; Πῶς λέγεις; ὦ οὐσπερ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἴσθα γὰρ
δήποτον ὅτι ἂν ἢ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατὰσχῆ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισίν εἶναι ἄλλα καὶ περιττοῖς. Πάνυ γε. Ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, 10 φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἂν τούτῳ ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτε ἢ ἔλθοι. Οὐ γὰρ. Εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἢ περιττότης; Ναί. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτη ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναί. Ἡ ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἤξει. Οὐ δὲ τα. Ἀμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ ἔ τρία. Ἀμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἢ τριάς. Ναί. ὁ τοῦν ἐλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποία οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὄμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὅπως ἢ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὕσα ἐναντία 15 οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἅει αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυνάς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τοῦ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἀλλή ὁρα δῆ, εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὁ ὃν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἕφ' ὁ τι ἃν αὐτῷ ἢ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τήν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξεσθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμμηνήσκου, οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἁκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, 20 οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον τούτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἐναντίον, ὁμοιὸς δὲ τῆν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται. οὐδὲ τὸ θημολίον οὐδὲ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἴμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὦλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὐ καὶ πάντα τὰ 30 τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἐφ' ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἐπομαι.
LIV. Πάλιν δή μοι, ἐφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἄν ἔριστο ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἔκεινην, ἑκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ σε ἐροῦ με, ὁ ἄν τί [ἐν τῷ] σώματι εἰγένηται,

C θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἔκεινην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ὥ ἀν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ὥ ἄν πυρ. οὐδὲ ἄν ἔρη, ὁ ἄν σώματι τί ἐγένηται, νοσήσει, οὐκ ἔρω ὅτι ὥ ἄν νόσος, ἀλλ' ὥ ἄν πυρετός. οὐδ' ὥ ἄν ἀριθμό τί ἐγένηται, περιττός ἔσται, οὐκ ἔρω ὥ ἄν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ὥ ἄν μονάς, καὶ τάλλα ὀῦτως. ἀλλ' ὧρα, εἰ ἦδη ἴκανὸς ὀίσθ' ὡ τι Βούλομαι. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἴκανῶς, ἐφη. Ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ' ὡς, ὥ ἄν τί ἐγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὡμι ἄν ψυχή, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἄν τότο ὀῦτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ᾗ δ', ὡς. Ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ὃ τι ἄν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἄει ἰκεῖ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; Ἡκει μέντων, ἐφη. Πότερον δ' ἐστι τί ζωή ἐναντίον ἄν ὀψίν; Ἡ Εστίν, ἐφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχή τὸ ἐναντίον ὧ αὐτῆ ἐπιφέρει ἄει οὐ μή ποτὲ δέχηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὁμολόγηται; Καὶ μᾶλα σφόδρα, ἐφη ὧ Κέβης.

LV. Τί οὖν τὸ μή δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἄρτιον ἱδέαν; τὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτα ὁμομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μή δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἄν ἐμοισικόν μή δέχηται; Ἀμουσον, ἐφη, τὸ δὲ ἅδικον. Ἐἰεν. ὃ δ' ἄν θάνατον μή δέχηται.
καλοῦμεν; 'Αθάνατον, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ
οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὐ. 'Αθάνατον ἀρα ἡ
ψυχὴ; 'Αθάνατον. Εἰςεν, ἐφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ
ἀποδεδείχθαι φῶμεν; ἦ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα
γε ίκανῶς, ὦ Σωκράτες. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὦς, ὦ
Κέβης; εἰ τῶν ἀναρτίων ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ
εἰναι, ἀλλο τι τὰ τρία ἦ ἀνωλέθρᾳ ἄν ἦν; 106
Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον
ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἰναι, ὅποτε τις ἐπὶ
χῦνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγωι, ὑπεξῆι ἂν ἦ χῦν ὑσα
σῶς καὶ ἀτηκτός; οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἀπώλετο γε, οὐδὲ
αὐτὸ υπομένουσα ἔδεξατο ἄν τὴν θερμότητα.
Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. 'Ωσαύτως, οἴμαι, καὶ εἰ
tὸ ἄψυχρον ἀνωλέθρῳ ἦν, ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ
ψυχρῶν τι ἐπίοι, οὔτωτ' ἄν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδὲ
ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἄν ἀπελθὼν ψὐχῆ. Τὸν
Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁδε, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη
περὶ τοῦ ἄθανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἄθανατόν Β
καὶ ἀνωλέθρον ἐστὶν, ἄδυνατον ψῡχῆ, ὅταν
θάνατος ἐπὶ αὐτὴν ἦν, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον
μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέχεται
οὐδὲ ἔσται τεθνηκώ, ὡςπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται,
ἐφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδὲ γ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ
δὴ πῦρ ψῡχρῶν, οὐδὲ γε ἦ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης.
Ἀλλὰ τὶ κωλύει, φαίη ἂν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ
περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπίοντος τοῦ ἄρτιον,
ὡςπερ ὁμολογηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄντε
ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι C
οὐκ ἄν ἔχουμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται.
τὸ γὰρ ἄνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνωλέθρον ἐστὶν· ἐπεὶ

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ei touto omológheto hýmin, radivos an dieima-
chómeba óti epelthóntos tòu ártiòin tò periptòn
kai tà tria oìchetai ápionta: kai peri' týrois
kai thermov kai tòv ãllon ou'tos an dieima-
chómeba. hò ou'; Pánv mèn ou'n. Óukou'n kai
vòn peri' tòv ãthanatòv, ei mev hêmìn omologeitai
kai ãnovleþrov eînai, ðuxhì an eîh próds tò
áthanatòs eînai kai ãnovleþrov: ei dé me, ãllou
an dèoi logon. 'All' ou'dèn deî, èfhi, toutou
ge ènêka: ñcholì ñar an ti ãlllo ðhoràv ìh
dèchito, ei ge tò ãthanatòn ìüidion ãn ðhoràv
dèxetai.

LVII. O dé ge theós, óîmai, èfhi ð Sokrátìs, 
kai autò tò tìs ðwìs èidos kai ei ti ãlllo
ãthanatòn èstiv, parà pántwv an omologhèièn
mìdèstote àpòllusòthai. Parà pántwv mèntoi
hì ðì', èfhi, ãnovróputo' tè ge kai èti mâllou, 5
òs èg'hmai, parà theóv. 'Ostote dé tò ãthanatòv
kai ãdívaphoròv èstiv, ãlllo ti ðuxhì hì, ei
ãthanatos twnxhánei ou'sa, kai ãnovleþrov an eîh;
Pollhì ãvághkh. 'Epíwntos àra ãthanatò èpì
tòn ãnovróputon tò mèn ðvntòv, òs èoukev, autòv
àpopoîhìskèi, tò ð' ãthanatòv sóv kai ãdíváphoròv
oìchetai àpíon, ðpexkhorfhsan tòv ðthanatò. 
Fai-
netai. Pánwos mâllon àra, èfhi, ð Kébhès, 
107 ðuxhì ãthanatòv kai ãnovleþrov, kai tò ðoni
eísontai hêmìn aì ðuxhài èn 'Aïdou. Óukou'n
ègôge, ð Sokrátèv, èfhi, èçhò parà taúta
ãlllo ti légein ou'dè pè àpísteteîn tòv ðlogois.
âll' ei dé ti Sýmmìas hì tis ãlllos èxèi légein,
ευ ἔχει μὴ καταστηγῆσαι· ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὁντινά τις ἀλλον καριὼν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἢ δ' ὦς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅπη ἀπιστῶ ἓκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ὑσθένειαν ἀτιμάζουν, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ' ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταύτα τε εὐ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὃμοι ἐπισκεπτέας σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἰκανῶς διέλθητε, ὡς ἐγὼ μαί, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπικολουθήσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ξητήσετε περαιτέρω.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

I.VII. Ἀλλὰ τὸδε γ' ἔφη, ὁ ἄνδρες, δικαίων διανοηθῆναι ὅτι, εἴπερ ἢ ψυχὴ ἄθανατος, ἐπιμελείαις δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν δὲ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δοξείν ἀν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἰ τις αὐτὴς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γάρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἐρμαίον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἀμ' ἀπηλλάξθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἄθανατος φαίνεται οὖν, οὐδεμία ἂν εἰθ' αὐτῇ ἄλλῃ ἄποφυγή κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὦς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι.
ούδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐξούσα εἰς Ἡλίον ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἀν δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὅφελεῖν ἡ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὗτος, ὡς ἀρα τελευτήσαντα ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὥσπερ ζωντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἀγείν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τινα τόπουν, οὐ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἡλίον πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ὃ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε πορεύσαι. Εὐχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὅν δὲτε τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρή χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμόνων κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραίς περιόδους. ἐστὶ δὲ ἃρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Λισχύλου.
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ημμένην ἡ ἄλλ' ἀττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυχόναι ὑντα, ταύτην μὲν ἀπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνεμπόρος οὔτε ἡγεμόν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανάται ἐν πάσῃ ἐξομένῃ ἀπορίᾳ, ἐὼς ἄν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γένων- ται, δων ἐλθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρέπουσαι οἰκησιν· ἡ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξέλθοΰσα, καὶ ξυνεμπόροι καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχόνσα, ἔκκενεν τὸν αὐτὴν ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα, ἐἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τῶν τόπων, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οὐν ὑπερ οὐσος δοξάζεται ὑπ' ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰσοθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τῶν πέπεισμαι.

LVIII. Καί ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, Λέγεις, ὃ Σωκράτες; περὶ γὰρ τοῖς γῆς καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλὰ δὴ ἄκηκος, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἂ σε πείθει· ἢδεὼς οὐν ἄν ἄκοισαίμηι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὃ Σιμμία, οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη γε μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἃ γ' ἐστίν· ὃς μέντοι ἄληθή, χαλεπῶτερον μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἵσως οὐδ' ἂν οίος τε εἴην, ἁμα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἥπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὃ ἐμός, ὃ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἔξαρκεί. τὴν μέντοι ἴδεαν τῆς γῆς, οἰναν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρκει. Πέπεισμαι τοῖς, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἑγὼ, ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν οὐρανῶν περιφερῆς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν
109 μήτε ἁέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἀλλής ἀνάγκης μηδεμίας τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἰκανὴν εἶναι αὐτήν ἵσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἴσορροπίαν. ἴσορροπον γὰρ πράγμα ὁμοίον τινὸς εὖ μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδέ ἢπτον οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχουν ἀκλίνες μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν, ἡ δ' ὦς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἐφι οἱ Συμμίας. Ἐτι τοῖνυν, ἐφη, πάμμεγα τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ Βτινυ μορίῳ, ὡσπερ περὶ τέλμα μυρμηκας ἡ βατράχους, περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκούντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς εὖ πολλοῖς τοιοῦτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῦ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοίλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἴδεας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἀ ξυνερρυηκέναι τὸ τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὀμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν εὖ καθαρῷ κείσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, 35

C εὖ ὡσπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀστρα, δὴν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα εἰσώθοτων λέγειν· οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ χυρρεῖν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοίλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας εὖ τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οὔσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὡσπερ ἀν εἰ τις εὖ μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οὐστὸ τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὀρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ 45 ἑβραδυτήτα τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ
τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἁφιγμένοι μηδὲ ἐωρακῶς εἴη, ἐκδοὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρότερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὁν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοῶς εἴῃ τοῦ ἐωρακότος. ταῦτον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ημᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἰεσθαί ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέα ὤρανόν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τοῦτον ὤρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἀστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦτον, ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἴους τε ἐ εἶναι ημᾶς διεξέλθειν ἐπ' ἐσχατον τὸν ἀέα· ἐπεῖ, εἰ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἀκρα ἐλθοι ἡ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν <ἀν> ἀνακύ-φαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὅρωσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἰκανὴ εἰς ἀνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, γρῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐστὶν ο ἄληθῶς οὐρανός καὶ τὸ ἄληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἄληθῶς γῆ. ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λήθιοι καὶ ἄπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύεται οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροι εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ἢ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωσοτιοῦν ἄξια· ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὐ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολύ ἄν ἐτὶ πλέον φανεῖ διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δὲι καὶ μὴθον λέγειν, ἐ άξιον ἀκούσαι, ὁ Σιμμία, οἰα τυγχάνει τὰ ἑπὶ
τῆς γῆς ύπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἥμεις γε τούτου τοῦ μῦθου ἢδεος ἂν ἀκούσαμεν.

LIX. Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἐφη, ὁ ἐταίρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτή ἢδειν, εἰ τις ἀνωθεν θεῶτο, ὡσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὅν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὡσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ γο οἱ γραφεῖς καταχροῦνται· ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἐτί ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἡ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργὴ ἐναῖ καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὁση λευκή γήγυς ἡ χίονος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡςαύτως, καὶ ἐτί πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἡ ὁσα ἥμεις ἐωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὕτα ταῦτα τὰ κοίλα αὕτης ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἐκπλεῖα ὄντα χρώματός τι ἐδος παρέχεσθαι στῆλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικίλα, ὡστε ἐν τῇ αὕτης ἐδος συνεχεῖς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ ούσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς· καὶ αὐτὰ ἡ ὦσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἄνα τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὴν τε λειώτητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὅν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδια τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ Ἑτοιμάστα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδέν ὅ τι οὐ τοιούτων εἶναι καὶ ἐτι τούτων καλλίω. τὸ δ' αὐτιον τούτου
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εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροί καὶ οὐ κατεδησμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνως καὶ ἀλμης ὑπὸ τὸν δεύρο ξυνερρηκότων, ἢ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆς καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ξύλοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἷσχι τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμήσατο τούτοις τε ἀπασί καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργυρῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις αὐτοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὅντα πολλὰ πλήθει 111 καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὡστε αὐτὴν ἱδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεστών. ξοῦα δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαλάκτοις, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἡρᾶ, ὥσπερ ἤμεισσε περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν νῆσοις ἃς περίρρειν τὸν ἄρα πρὸς τῇ ἥπειρῳ ὄψας, καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὁ παρ᾽ ἢμῖν τὸ ὑδωρ τε καὶ θάλασσα ἐστὶν πρὸς τὴν ἤμετραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἂρα, ὁ δὲ ἢμῖν ἄρη, ἔκεινος τῶν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ βάσεις αὐτῆς κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὡστε ἐκεῖνους ἄνοσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε τῇ ἄνελλε τοὺς ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὃπει καὶ ἀκοῆ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πάσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἢμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ἢπερ ἄρη τε ὑδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθήρ ἄρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλογα τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητάς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεως τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτοὺς· καὶ τὸν γὰρ ἢλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστρά δράσθαι
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υπ' αυτῶν οία τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

LX. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν ὅπως περικέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν' τῶπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλοὺς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ὧ ἡμείς οἰκούμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὅτας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἐλαττων ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τῶπου, ἐστὶ δ' οὖς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ

D πλατυτέρους· τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συνετρήσθαι τε πολλαχθὰ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἢ πολὺ μὲν ὑδωρ ρεῖν ἢ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὦσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ αενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὕδατων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλοις ποταμοῖς, πολλοῖς δὲ ὑγροὶ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὦσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ρύθμος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ. ὅπως δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τῶπος πληροῦσθαι, ἢς ἂν ἐκάστους τὺχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιρρή γυγυμοὺν. τάντα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὦσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνούςαν ἐν τῇ γῆ· ἐστι δὲ ἅρα αὐτὴ ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσις τοιάνδε τινὰ. ἐν τὶ τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὅπως τῆς γῆς, τούτο

E ὀπερ Ὁμηρος ἔπτε, λέγων αὐτὸ τῆλε μᾶλ' ἤχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἐστι βέρεθρον.
ο καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοῖ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συμφέρουσι τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ έκ τοῦτον πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίγνονται δὲ ἐκαστοὶ τοιοῦτοι δι' οίας ἀν καὶ τῆς γῆς ἰέωσιν. ἢ δὲ αὐτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρέιν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ἰεύματα, ὅτι τοῦ πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὕτω βάσιν τὸ ὕγρον τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ο ἄρρη καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταύτον ποιεῖ· ξυνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὡσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεύστων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ἰέων τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ ξυναισχρούμενον τῷ ὕγρῳ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινοῦς τινάς ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσίον καὶ ἐξίον. ὅταν τε οὖν [Ὀρμήσαν] ὑπο- χωρήσῃ τὸ ὑδάς εἰς τὸν τόπον τῶν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς καὶ ἕκεινα τὰ δρέματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὡσπερ οἱ ἑπαντλούντες· ὅταν τε αὐτὸ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπη δεύρῳ δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροὶ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ἑτὶ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἔκαστα ἀφικνοῦμενα, εἰς οὖς ἐκάστους ὀδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω
ή ἐπηνυτλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγου· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἐνια μὲν καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἑνὶ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἐστὶ δὲ ἄ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθοῦντα, ἣ ἀπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὦσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω
Ε καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δὲ ἐστιν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ’ οὗ· ἀναντες γὰρ πρόσω ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

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Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἀλλὰ πολλὰ τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματα ἐστὶ· τυγχάνει δ’ ἀρα ὄντα ἐν τούτων τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ’ ἀττα ῥεύματα, δω τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτῳ ρέον [περὶ] κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος 'Οκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίος ρέον 'Αχέ-

113 ρων, δ’ δὲ ἐρήμων τε τόπων ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν 'Αχεροσιάδα, οἰ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαί τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινας εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακρο-

tέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκτέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσου ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς εἰσπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καίομενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ’ ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ξέουσαν ύδατος καὶ πῆλον.

Β ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιπτόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῇ] ἄλλοσε τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ’ ἐσχατὰ τῆς 'Αχεροσιάδος λίμνης.
οὐ συμμειγμένος τῷ ὑδατὶ· περιελιχθεῖς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρῳ τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὖτος δ᾿ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπονομάζοντι Πυριφλεγέθωντα, οὐ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποστάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν ὧπῃ ἄν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτον δὲ αὐτον τοῖσον ἐξάπτετε εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινὸν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δ᾿ ἔχοντα ὅλον ὅλον ὁ κυνάος, ὅν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τῇ λίμνῃ, ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα· οὗ δ᾿ ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινᾶς δυνάμεις λαβών ἐν τῷ ὑδατι, δύσ κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιπτόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίον τῷ Πυριφλεγέθωντα καὶ ἀπαντά ἐν τῇ Ἀχέρουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὕδε τὸ τούτου ὑδώρ οὐδεν ἑγείνυται, ἄλλα καὶ οὕτως κύκλῳ περιελθὼς ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Ταρταρον ἐναντίον τῷ Πυριφλεγέθωντι· ὅνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

Ι.Χ.ΙΙ. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἄφικυνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ οἱ δαίμονες ἐκαστὸν κομίζει, πρώτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιῶσαντες καὶ οἱ μῆς· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄν δόξωσι μέσος βεβιωκόται, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἀ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὁχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἂφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσι τε καὶ καθαιρομένοι τῶν τε ἁδικημάτων διέχουσι δίκαι ἀπολύονται, εἰ τίς τι ἡδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσίων τιμᾶς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν ἐκαστος· οἱ δ᾿ ἐν δόξωσι ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διά τὰ μεγέθη τῶν
άμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὡσα τοιαύτα τυχχάνει 15 ὅντα, τούτους δὲ ἢ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνονσιν. οὐ δὲ ἰάσιμα μέν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀμαρτήματα, οἴον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ’ ὀργῆς βιαίον τι πράξαντες, καὶ 20 μεταμέλουν αὐτοῖς τὸν ἀλλον βίον βιώσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένονται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐναυτὸν ἐκεί γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν 25 ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυρηφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένονται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερονσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσι τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὖς 30 ὑβρίσαν, καλέσαντες δ’ ἱκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται ἐάσαι σφάς ἐκβήναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαί, καὶ εάν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσι τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμοὺς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἄν πείσωσιν οὓς ἡδίκησαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οὐ δὲ δὴ ἢ δόξωσι διαφέροντως πρὸς τὸ ὅσιός βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων 40 τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἑλευθερούμενοι τε καὶ ἀπαλλατ- c τόμενοι ὀσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν
καθαρὰν οἰκήσιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκίζομενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἰκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ξόσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἐτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς ούτε ῥάδιον δηλώσαι ούτε ὁ χρόνος ἰκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἄλλα τούτων δὴ ἐνεκα χρῆ ὡν διεληλύθαµεν, ὁ Σιµµία, τὰν ποιεῖν, ὡστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλὸν καὶ ἡ ἐπὶς μεγάλη.

LXIII. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι δ οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ· ὅτι μέντοι τῇ ταῦτῃ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτῃ ἀττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡµῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὕσα, τούτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένω οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος· καὶ χρῆ τὰ τοιαύτα ὡσπερ ἐπάθειν ἐαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πᾶλαι μηκῶς τὸν μῷθον. ἄλλα τούτων δὴ ἐνεκα θαρρεῖν χρῆ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῆς ἄνδρα, ὥστε ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς µὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σώµα καὶ τοὺς κόσµους εἶαστε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὅντας καὶ πλέον θάπτερον ἡγησάµενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασε τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄλλα τῷ αὐτ었습니다 κόσµῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἑλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περιµένει τὴν εἰς "Ἄλιδου πορείαν, ὡς πορευοµένους ὅταν ἡ εἰµαρµένη καλὴ. ὑµεῖς µὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ
Συμμαί τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαύθις ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ ἐκαστοί πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίνη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδὸν τί μοι ὁρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον ἐναι λούσα· μενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξί παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

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²⁵ Λudenta δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Krίτων, Ἐλευ, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες· τι δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παῖδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὃ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἥμεις ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν; Ἀπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἐφη, ὁ ἴς Κρίτων, οὐδὲν κανότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελοῦμεν ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ύμῶν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἀττ ἂν ποιήτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· εάν δὲ υμῶν μέν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε, ὡσπερ κατ' ἰχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζην, οὐδὲ εάν πολλά ὁμολογή-

C  

σητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἐφη, οὐτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἂν, ἐφη, θωλήσθη, ἐανπερ γε λάβητε με καὶ μη ἐκφύγων ύμᾶς· γελάσας δὲ ἄμα ἵσυχη καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εῖπεν, Όὐ πεῖθω, ὁ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωναι, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι οὕτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνί διαλεγόμενος, καὶ διατάττων ἐκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἴεται με ἑκεῖνον εῖναι, ὃν ὀφεται ὄλγον ύστερον νεκρὸν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτη. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ παλαι
πολύν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ
φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἄλλ' οἰχήσομαι
ἀπίστων εἰς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά
μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος
ἀμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἀμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυνήσασθε
οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἐφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην
ἡ ἦν οὕτως πρὸς τοὺς δικαιστὰς ἡγγυάτο. οὕτως
μὲν γὰρ ἡ μὴ παραμενεῖν ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡ μὴ
μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυνήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνων, Ε
ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπίστων, ἵνα Κρίτων ραὸν
φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὄρον μον τὸ σῶμα ἡ καιόμενον
ἡ κατορυπτόμενον ἁγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ
πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἡ
προτίθεται Ἑωκράτη ἡ ἐκφέρει ἡ κατορύπτει.
εὖ γὰρ ἵσθι, ἡ δ' ὦς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ
καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημ-
μελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς.
ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρή καὶ φάναι τοῦτον σῶμα
θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἀν σοὶ φίλον 116
ἡ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι.

LXV. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο
εἰς οἰκήμα τι ως λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων
εἴπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν.
περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διάλεγο-
5 μενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες,
tοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξόντες, ὅση
ἡμῖν γεγονύσα εἰ, ἅτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὡσπερ
πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοῖ τῶν ἔπειτα
βίων, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἱνέχθη παρ' Β
10 αὐτῶν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ νιεῖς σμικροὶ
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

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LXV 116 B

ἡσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκείαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος δια-
λεχθεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τάς
μέν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπείναυ ἐκέλευσεν,
ἀυτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ’ ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἡ ἡγυμίας ἡ
λίου δυσμῶν. χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διετριβέν
ἐνδον. ἐλθὼν δ᾽ ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ
πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἤκεν ὁ τῶν
ἐνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ’ αὐτὸν, Ω

C Σώκρατες, ἐφι, οὐ καταγρώσομαι σοῦ ὁπερ
ἀλλων καταγρώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι
καὶ καταρώνται, ἐπειδάν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω
πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρ-
χόντων. σὲ δὲ ἔγω καὶ ἀλλως ἐγνωκα ἐν
tούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πραότατον
καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πῶς τοις δεύρο
ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ ὅτι οὐκ
ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γνωρίσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αὐτίους,
ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνος. νῦν, οἴσθα γὰρ ἄ ἡλθον
ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς βράστα

D φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαία. καὶ ἀμα δακρύσας μετα-
στρεφόμενος ἄπηει. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας
πρὸς αὐτόν. Καὶ σὺ, ἐφη, χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς
tαὐτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἀμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ἡς
αστείος, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνθρωπός. καὶ παρὰ πάντα
μοι τῶν χρόνον προσήκει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε
καὶ ἦν ἄνδρῶν λόγος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως
με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλ’ ἀγε δή, ὁ Κρίτων,
πειθόμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρ-
μακον, εἰ τέτριπται εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ
άνθρωπος. καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, ὁ Αλλ' οἶμαι, ἐφη, ἐγώγη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐτι ἦλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρεσιν καὶ οὐπω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἀμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνω ὁψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὖ μᾶλα, καὶ ἐνυγγενομένους γ' ἔνιοις ὅν ἀν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγον· ἐτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ, καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἐφη, ὁ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὕς σὺ λέγεις, οἴονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὔδὲν γὰρ οἴμαι κερδαίνειν ὀλίγον ὑστερον πιῶν 117 ἀλλο γε ἦ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γλυχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὔδενος ἐτι ἐνόντως. ἀλλ' ἰθι, ἐφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεὶ.

LXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἐνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἔστωτι, καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα διδόναι τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα 5 τετριμμένον· ίδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἀνθρωπον, Ἐπευ, ἐφη, ὁ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρη ποιεῖν; Ὁυδὲν ἀλλο, ἐφη, ἦ πιὸντα περιέναι, ἔως ἀν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γενότατι, ἐπειτα κατακείσθαι· καὶ οὔτως Β 10 αὐτὸ ποιήσει. καὶ ἀμα ὥρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει· καὶ ὁς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἰλεώς, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὔδε διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ εἰώθη εὐρηδόν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρω-
πον, Τί λέγεις, ἐφη, περὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πῶματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαι τιν.; ἐξεστιν, ὡ τι; ἤ οὐ; Ὁσοῦτον, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὡσον οἴομεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ὡ δ' ὡς: ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἐξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι: ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγώ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένουτο ταύτη. καὶ ἁμ' εἰπὼν ταύτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερὸς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπτειν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικοὶ οἷοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὡς δὲ εἴδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἄστατο ἐξώμει τὰ δάκρυα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαιον ἐμαυτὸν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνον γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἴου ἄνδρος ἔσταρον ἐστερημένος εἶν. 

δὸ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἶός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, εξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπροσθεὶς χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὡς τιναν ὑπακλάσει τῶν παρόντων, πλὴν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκείνος δὲ, Οἰα, ἐφη, ποιεῖτε, ὁ θαυμάσιοι. ἔγνῳ μέντοι ὡς ἣκιστα τούτον ἐνεκα τὰς γυναίκας ἀπετεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῦν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ ἔχρη τελευτὰν. ἀλλ' ἦσυχιαν τε ἀγιετε καὶ καρπερεῖτε. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσυχώνθημεν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. δὸ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἐφη τὰ σκέλη,
κατεκλίθη ὑππτιος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρω-
πος· καὶ ἀμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὕτως ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον διαλιπτῶν χρόνον ἔπεσκόπη τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κάπετα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δὲ ὦν ἔφη· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀὐθίς τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἔπαινὼν οὕτως ἤμιν ἔπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ὕψοιτο τε καὶ πηγνύτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἦπτετο καὶ ἐπειν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἶχήσεται. ἦδη ὦν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἱτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γὰρ, ἐπειν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθείγατο, Ὡ Κρίτων, ἐφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὁφείλομεν ἄλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπό-
δοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσῃ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἐφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπτῶν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτὸν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὁμματα ἐστησεν. ἦδον δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

Τοῦτο τέλευτη, ἦ 'Εχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταιροῦ ἦμιν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὄν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοστάτου.
CHAPTER I

57 A–59 C, cc. i. ii. Prologue. Echekrates, the Phliasian, begs for information respecting the last moments of Socrates. Phaedo assents, and, after explaining the circumstances which delayed the execution, gives a list of the friends who were present at that last meeting, where sorrow and gladness were so strangely mingled.

1, 4. αὐτός: αὐτός is used both in the question and in the answer to give authority to the ensuing narration; it is quite beside the point to read into the question ‘admiration’ and into the reply ‘pride,’ as the scholiast does.

5. τι . . ἔστιν ἄττα ἐἶπεν; by an idiom frequent in Plato the predicate in a question of this kind is singular although the subject is plural: cf. 58 C τὶ ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πρακτέντα; 93 C τὶ τις φήσει ταύτα δέντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῆν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; Gorg. 508 C σκεπτέων τὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα: the singular is less precise than the plural—‘of what character?’ so here ‘what was the subject of his discourse?’ Contrast 102 A τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταύτα λεχθέντα=’what was the course (rather than the “subject”) of your subsequent conversation?’

8. Φλιασίων: the position of Φλιασίων after πολιτῶν is to be observed: Φλιασίων is added by way of explanation to τῶν πολιτῶν, which means ‘my fellow-townsmen,’ and should be so translated: ‘no one of the citizens of Philius’ would be simply οὐδεὶς τῶν Φλιασίων. Stallbaum compares Apol. 32 B καὶ ἐνυχεύ ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή ’Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα.’ Λευκ. 70 B καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἐταίρου ’Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι. Philius, the home of Echekrates and the scene of this narration, was a small town in NE. Peloponnesse, near Sicyon: here

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apparently Phaedo rested on his return from Athens, after Socrates' death, to his native Elis. It is hardly worth while to inquire, because quite impossible to decide, what interfered with communication between Athens and Phlius at this time: certainly not, as Stallbaum suggests, the Elian War, which was over by 400 B.C., nor the Corinthian War (Hermann), which was several years later.

ἐπιχωριάζει Ἀθήνας: the idiomatic Greek pregnant use of 'place towards which,' with 'a verb of rest implying motion': cf. 61 ε ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν: 116 ἐ στᾶσ παρ' αὐτῶν: '(comes and) stays at Athens.'

10. χρόνου συχνοῦ: the gen. expresses 'time within which,' chiefly in negative sentences: it is to be connected with the Homeric gen. of 'place'—e.g. II. xvii. 372 νέφος ὀ' οὐ φαλνετο πάσης γαίης οὔτ' ὄρεων—which is itself a branch of the partitive genitive. The length of time suggested by χρόνος συχνός is relative to the point in question; here it need mean no more than a few weeks, 'for some time.'

13. εἶχεν: the subject is the implied ὁ ἀγγείλας ὅτι φάρμακον πιών ἀποθάναν.

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58 A 27. εἰκόνας: 'illos,' 'those so well known in the familiar legend.'

B 30. θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν: θεωρία is here a 'sacred embassy': θεωρός (θεωραι) was a 'spectator of games,' and the word was specially used of 'public representatives' sent to a festival: cf. Dem. 330. 20 τοὺς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς θεωροὺς εἰς τὰ Ποτία πέμψαι.


36. διόρο: 'to Athens': cf. below 69 β οἱ ἐπιχώροι, 'Athenians.'

C 38. ἀπολαβόντες: 'ἀπολ. est intercludere, intercipere, a proposito itinere exclusere': cf. Dem. de Chris. 98 νῦσω καὶ θείων καὶ πολέμου αποληφθέντος ὡστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἐπανελθεῖν οἰκάδε' (Heindorf).

CHAPTER II

4. οἱ ἄρχοντες: sc. οἱ ἐνδεκα, who superintended public executions.
8. προθυμηθήτι: 'be so kind as to': possibly the word D suggests the zealous effort to recall accurately every detail of the scene.

16. τοιούτους ἑτέρους: cf. 80 D τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τὸπον ἑτερον οὐκόμενον. τοιοῦτος is used idiomatically in Plato to avoid repeating a phrase: cf. 79 C καὶ αὐτῆ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἠλιγγᾶ ... ἀτε τοιοῦτον ἑφαπτομένη, where τοιοῦτον = πλανομένων καὶ ταραπτομένων.

19. θαυμάσια ἐπαθὼν παραγενόμενος: 'I was strangely E affected by the scene.'

21. εὐθαίμων γάρ: 'here the key-note of the dialogue is struck. Its express object is to show ὡς εἰκότως ἄνηρ τῷ ςτατο εὐθυ πείρα σια τόν θλον θαρρεί μέλλων ἀποθανείσθαι: and at the very outset we are introduced to Socrates as a living illustration of his own belief' (Archer-Hind).

23. τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων: variously explained as a gen. of the cause, or gen. of reference defining the application of the verb or adj.; cf. Crit. 43 B πολλάκις σε εὐθαίμων ἐπεισοδικεῖτο τού τρόπου, ὡς ἅδικος αὐτήν καὶ πράσω φέρεις.

ως ἀδέως ἐτελεύτα: the idiomatic use of ὡς or οἷος, to express the cause = ὡς τις οὕτως, ὡς τοιοῦτος: cf. Crit. l.c.: 89 A ἑθαήμασα αὐτοῦ πρώτον μὲν τότο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανικῶν τῶν λόγον ἀπεδέχατο: 117 C ἀπέκλαιον ... τὴν ἐμαντοῦ τύχην, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρον ἐστηρημένος εἰην. It is usually called the interrogative, but may it not be an indirect exclamatory use of ὡς, οἷος? Compare the relation of the subjoined sentences—

Direct: τις ἐστιν οὕτως; (interr.).
Indirect: ἥρομην τις εἰη οὗτος.
Direct: οἷον ἀνδρός ἐταίρον ἐστηρημένοι—(exclam.).
Indirect: ἀπέκλαιον ... οἷον ἀνδρός ... ἐστηρημένος εἰην.

25. ἀνεύθειας μοίρας: 'without a divine call' (Jowett), a reference, no doubt, to Socrates' well-known belief that throughout life he had been under the special guidance of the gods, being frequently warned against some intended action by what he calls τὸ δαιμόνιον.

27. εἷπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος: throws the utmost emphasis on the pronoun ἑκεῖνον: 'he above all men': cf. 63 C, 66 A, 67 B.

29. παρόντι πένθει: an awkward juxtaposition of datives, 59 A paralleled by Plato. 234 B τινὶ λόγῳ λαιμόδανοντι, 'to one who takes a rational view.' παρόντι is masc. and indefinite (sc.
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t

τινεῖ, as in e.g. ἔνελδότι λέγειν and τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι (supra), and the dative depends not on εἰκός but on εἰσόεινai understood.

οὕτε αὐ ἣδονή: this very rare use of οὕτε without a preceding τε or οὗτε, which is not noticed by any of the commentators, is partly due to its being separated from οἷδέν πάνυ ἐλεείνων by the clause ὥς εἰκός κτλ., partly to the fact that ἐλεος and ἣδονή form a 'pair' of emotions natural to the circumstances, which if put side by side would be expressed by οὕτε ἐλεος οὕτε (αὖ) ἣδονή.

30. ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ οὐτων: this idiom usually denotes a 'profession,' the occupation of a lifetime: cf. 84 A ἐπομένῃ τῷ λογοσμῷ καὶ ἄει ἐν τοῖς ὀψα : 68 c ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἔσθιν : Rep. 581 E ἐν τοιούτῳ τυν ἄει εἶναι μανθάνοντα, and not as here the occupation of a limited period: even Prot. 317 c καίτω πολλά γε ἓην ἐτη εἰλά ἐν τῷ τέχνῃ is not an exact parallel.

31. τοιούτου τινεῖ: referring back to ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ οὐτων: cf. note on 58 d.

32. ἀτοπόν τι... τις ἄρθησ: observe the force of τι and τις, suggesting something hard to define: Lat. quidam, nescio quis.

37. ὅτε μὲν... ἐνίσχε ἃ: the regular Attic form would be τοτε μὲν... τοτε ἃ, or ἐνίσχε μὲν... ἐνίσχε ἃ: here, in addition to the not uncommon combination of different forms in the μὲν and ἃ clauses, we have the substitution of the relative ὅτε for the demonstrative τοτε: this is common in late Greek, but extremely rare in Attic: we may compare the occasional use of the relative pronouns for the demonstrative with μὲν and ἃ in Attic: e.g. Dem. 248. 19 καὶ πόλεις Ἔλληνισας ἄσ μὲν ἄναιρων εἰς ἃς ἃς τοὺς φυγάδας κατάγων.

38. διαφερόντως: cf. 117 D.

39. Ἀπολλόδωρος: for these persons see Introd. c.

Β 50. ὃν ἃ: = παρὶν ἃ: for the omission of the preposition when a compound verb is repeated cf. 60 B τὸ σκέλος ἔξετρυφε τῇ χειρὶ, καὶ τρίσῳ ἀμα... 71 E οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν;... ἥ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι; 81 D διεξεῖναι... διελθεῖν, 104 D ἀπεργάζονται... εἰργάζοντο, 108 E ἐξορκεῖ... ἀρκεῖ.

52. Πλάτων ἃ, οἷμαι, ἴδεθειν: how are we to understand οἷμαι? Plato, if he was absent, must have known what kept him away: still, in the mouth of Phaedo, οἷμαι is dramatically appropriate, as helping the reader to forget Plato and think of Phaedo as the speaker. The mention of Plato's absence has its significance for the dialogue. Plato, while on the one hand wishing to give authority to his narrative by putting it in the mouth of an eye-witness (Phaedo), would yet seem to disclaim
personal responsibility for the literal historical accuracy of the story: there is obviously a good deal that is Plato's own thought put into the mouth of Socrates.

CHAPTER III

59 c–60 c, c. iii. On the morning after the return of the sacred vessel from Delos, the friends meet earlier than usual at the court-house near the prison. After some delay they are admitted and find Socrates relieved of his fetters and in company with his wife and child. Xanthippe, unable to control her grief, is led out; and Socrates chafing his cramped leg falls to moralising on the intimate union of pain and pleasure, which he says would have made a good subject for Aesop.

3. φοιτάν: the word commonly used of regular visits, e.g. of D children to school; cf. Ar. Eq. 1235 παῖς ὄν ἐφοίτας εἰς τίνος δίδασκαλον; so in 60 e of a haunting dream, πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνυπνον.

5. ἐν φοιτάν: the word simply marks 'coincidence.'

8. διατριβοντες: to 'pass the time,' especially in conversation, for which διατριβή is found in Apol. 37 ν ἐνεγκείν τάς ἐμάς διατριβάς καὶ τοὺς λόγους; here it = διαλεγόμενοι.

15. ἱκεν: it is worth notice how regularly this is the word E used of an 'expected arrival.'

18. περιμένειν, to 'wait for' something, to wait patiently; cf. 116 A. ἐπιμένετε, on the other hand, is to stay in the same place or position; cf. 80 C ἐπιμείκτος συνεχῶν ἐπιμένει χρόνον: Meno 93 D ἐπέμενε γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἱππῶν ὀρθὸς ἑστηκός (v. Kiddle, § 127).

20. παραγγελλών: not to Socrates, but to the prison officials; 'give orders,' commonly used of giving orders to an army. ὅπως ἂν is used here of 'purpose,' 'to the end that,' 'to the effect that'; cf. Gorg. 523 ν τούτῳ μὲν ὄν καὶ δὴ εἶπηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὃπως ἂν παύῃ: . . : Isaeus vii. 27 διεκελεύθω ὅπως ἂν, εἰ τι πάθοι πρότερον, ἐγγράφωσ᾽ με.

25. γιγνόσκεις γὰρ: does this mean 'you know her character,' or simply 'you know whom I mean'? Probably the latter, as γὰρ implies some thought not expressed—'I need only mention her name, for . .'

τὸ παιδίον: cf. Apol. 34 ν εἰσὶ μοι καὶ νιεῖς τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἥδη, δύο δὲ παιδία, and infra 116 B: τὸ παιδίον is probably the youngest son Menexenus, the eldest being Lamprocles and the second Sophroniscus (Diog. Laert.).
27. ἀνευφήμησε: ἀνάφωμε, a meaning which the word obviously has in Soph. Phil. 783 ἀπας δ᾽ ἀνευφήμησεν οἷμωγγ λέως. Jebb, in his note on this line, suggests that 'the notion is that of a cry which expresses religious awe,' εὐφήμει being a word in use at religious rites: the same use is found also in Eur. Or. 1335 ἀνευφημεῖ δόμος.

32. ἀπαγέτω: according to tradition Xanthippus was something of a shrew—cf. the amusing anecdote told in Xen. Sympos. ii. 10, where Socrates says: 'I keep Xanthippus as athletes keep a bad-tempered horse: νομίζουσιν ἦν τὸν θημα- εἰδεῖς ἵππος δύναναι κατέχειν βαδίως τοῖς γε ἄλλοις ἵπποις χρήσεσθαι.' Still ἀπαγέτω is not to be taken as said in any impatient or unkindly spirit, though it may serve to remind us how different was the Athenian attitude towards women from our own: Socrates preferred to trust his last thoughts to his friends rather than his wife. The wife of an Athenian was in no true sense his 'companion'; for a woman's eloquent protest cf. Eur. Medea 230–251.

33. τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος: sc. ἀκολούθων, pedissequi, 'personal attendants.'

34. κοπτομένην: 'beating her breast'; cf. Latin 'plangere,' and Milton's imitation: 'Nothing is here for tears, nothing to wail Or knock the breast' (Sesmon Agonistes 1721).

Β 37. ἁτοπον: a very favourite word of Plato's; Thomas Magister ἁτοπον: οὐ μόνον τὸ ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν καὶ παράδοξον.

40. τὸ ἀμα μὲν . . ἔαν δὲ τις . . : most MSS. have τῷ ἀμα μὲν, dative of 'manner' or 'cause,' 'by refusing to come together,' or 'by reason of the fact that they refuse'; the Bodleian has τὸ ἀμα μὲν, which is perhaps more idiomatic, τὸ being in loose apposition to the subject of πέφυκε, 'the fact, I mean, that they refuse.' Observe that the μὲν clause is subordinate and concessive: it does not contain a separate proposition, but, as so frequently in Greek, the μὲν and δὲ clauses taken together make one proposition: 'that, whereas (or 'although') the pair refuse to come to a man together, yet, if a man pursue . .' A very striking example of this, and one that repays analysis, is Dem. de Cor. § 179 οὐκ εἴπων μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐγραφά δέ, οὔδ᾽ ἐγραφά μὲν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ, οὔδ᾽ ἐπρέσβευσα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπέεσα δὲ τοὺς Ἡθνικοὺς . . . ; cf. too § 13 of the same speech: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ Ἡθνικοῦ μὲν δύναται διώκειν δὲ ἑμὲ, ἑμὲ δ᾽ εἰπερ ἐξελέγξειν ἐνόμιζεν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἄν ἐγράψατο: cf. 84 Α.

ἔθελεν: the lively imagination of the Greeks readily
attributes volition to inanimate objects: cf. 75 \( \alpha \) πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὅρεγεται τοῦ δ ἐστὶν ἵνα: οὕτω θ' βουλεῖται μὲν τούτο . . . εἶναι οὖν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων: ἐθέλειν is again used in 102 ν, Ε; and in 102 Ε we have ἐκείνο δ' οὗ τετόλμηκεν μέγα δὲ σμικρῶν εἶναι.

44. κορυφή: the commentators almost all pass this over without explanation, except a reference to repetitions of the same idea in later writers; e.g. Julian Or. viii. 240 ἕως ἡδων ἔν της αὐτῆς κορυφής ἔζηφθαι: Aul. Gellius Ν. Α. vi. 1 'namque idem sunt . . . dolor et voluptas: alterum enim ex altero, sicut Plato ait, verticibus inter se contrariis deligatum est ;' so too Menander, of ἀγαθῶν and κακῶν, δενδρα ὅ' ἐκ βίζης μᾶς. Prof. Geddes translates 'united at one end,' but could Plato use κορυφή so, without anything more definite? Again does not the personification in the supposed fable (πολεμοῦτα) suggest something more definite and personal for κορυφή? What of 'verticibus inter se contrariis,' Aulus Gellius' translation? This seems to suggest 'a head with two faces.'

Mr. Archer-Hind confirms this interpretation in a letter which he was kind enough to write me on the subject. He says: 'I should conceive of ἱδόν and λυπηρόν as represented in the form of two human figures with a common head and faces set Janus-wise, something like the double people of the Συμπόσιον, save that the latter were united all down the trunk. As to the word κορυφή, possibly Plato began with the vaguer sense "top," and, as the personification was developed, arrived at head in συνήψειν εἰς ταύτων αὐτῶν τὰς κορυφὰς: not but that Plato uses κορυφή for "head" without more ado, e.g. in Τίμαιου 67 Α δὴν ἡμῶν μετὰ τοῦ κορυφής τοῦ τοῦ ὁμοφαλοῦ κεῖται; 91 Ε τὰ τ' ἐμπρόσθεν καλὰ καὶ τὰς κεφαλὰς εἰς γῆν ἔλκομενα ὑπὸ ἐνεργειας ἥρεισαν προμήκεια τε καὶ παντοῖα ἓχουν τὰς κορυφὰς.']

Prof. Geddes very justly observes: 'the first words of Socrates, though seemingly casual, are, in a manner, the keynote to the whole. By a subtle and beautiful instinct both in regard to dramatic propriety and poetic suggestiveness, Plato introduces the great Thinker as just undergoing release from his chain, whereby more is suggested than meets the ear. "How closely knit are things that seem most asunder—pain and pleasure! How near is pain to pleasure, and pleasure oftentimes to pain! In the midst of pleasure we are in pain: in the midst of pain straight comes pleasure! May it not be—the heart whispers to itself—that in the midst of death's pain we may be not far from a new life's pleasure, that in the unbinding of the prison cord I may see the unbinding of my earthly chain, and I can flee like a bird away?"' Cf. Τίμαιου 81 Ε regarding death: ἡ ζωή λυθεῖσα κατὰ φῶς μεθ' ἡδονῆς 1
CHAPTER IV

60 d—61 c, cc. iv. v. *Kebes:* This reminds me that Euenos and others desire to know what led you to compose verses during your confinement in prison? *Socrates:* It was not with any thought of rivalling Euenos as a poet, but because I have been frequently warned in a dream to practise 'music.' This I always understood as an encouragement to persevere with philosophy; but in case music in the popular sense is meant, I thought it well to be on the safe side. So I took the fables of Aesop, because I knew them best, and turned them into verse. Tell this to Euenos and bid him farewell and follow me as soon as he can.

2. εὖ γ' ἐποίησας, 'I thank you for reminding me': a common idiom; cf. Eur. *Med.* 472 εὖ δ' ἐποίησας μολὼν.

4. ἐντείνας: a comparison of the various metaphorical uses of this word suggests that the metaphor is not specially that of 'stringing an instrument'—though one passage, *Prot.* 326 β εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνουτες ποιήματα, might seem to point that way—but rather 'to put in a fixed position': cf. *Men* 87 α εἰς κύκλον ἐντείνεις τρίγωνον: *Phil.* 38 E τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φώνῃ, 'to put thoughts into words'; *Plut.* *Solon* τοῦς νόμους ἐπεχειρησεν ἐντείνας εἰς ἐπος ἐξενεγεκεῖν used, as in our passage, of giving words their 'fixed place' in a metrical system, 'to put into verse.' The same idea underlies all these examples, including *Prot.* 326 β supra.

τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον: προοίμιον is the prelude to a long poem, or frequently the prelude to a religious celebra-
tion, and so 'a hymn,' as here: cf. the metaphorical use of προοιμίδαμαι, 'to say by way of preface' (præfari). The opening line of Socrates' προοιμίων is preserved by Diog. Laert.: 

Δήλῳ Ἀπολλωνί, χαίρε, καὶ Ἀρτεμί, παῖς κλεενω.

In 61 b Socrates gives as his reason for dedicating the hymn to Apollo the fact that it was his festival at the time—οὐ ἢν ἢ παροίσα θυσία. But nearly all προοιμία were to Apollo, as the god of song, and besides this Socrates seems to have felt some special dependence on Apollo: so in the Ἀρόλ. he mentions an oracle of Apollo, pronouncing him the wisest of the Greeks, and he would seem further to have associated what he calls τὸ δαίμονιον (v. note on ἄνευ θείας μοίρας supra) with Apollo, god of oracles; for, though he does not say so explicitly, his language in Ἀρόλ. 40 λ suggests it: ἢ γὰρ εἰσφυία μοι μαντική (note the word) ἢ τοῦ δαίμονίου εν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνῇ ἀεὶ ἢν καὶ πάνω ἐπὶ συμφροσύνης, εἰ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθὸς πράξεν: and again he calls it τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σήμειον. Who is ὁ θεὸς if not Apollo? I cannot do better than close with an extract from Prof. Geddes' note on this passage—'the allusions in various parts of the dialogue to the relation of Socrates to Apollo his liege lord (δεσπότης 85 λ) are both frequent and beautiful, such as the reference in 61 λ to philosophy as μεγίστη μονική, that in 85 β to himself as a servant of Apollo—singing his last strain like the dying swan, the bird of Apollo—and also the last word (118 λ) regarding the offering to the son of Apollo. All these links of connection with Apollo are worthy of observation, as pointing to an instinctive feeling in the minds of the audience silently associating the death of Socrates with the setting of the God of Day, as if that sunset was to bring with it a double darkness'—would it be fanciful to add 'as if the death of Socrates was to be followed by a new life, as sunset is followed by sunrise'?

6. Εὐήνος: of Paros, sophist and poet: we are told in Ἀρόλ. 20 β that he taught ἄρετὴ ἀνθρωπίνη καὶ πολιτικὴ at the modest fee of five minae, and a similarly disparaging allusion to him occurs in the Phaedrus: we can hardly fail to see irony in δυο ὑδὸς τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι βουλόμενος ἐποίησα τῶτα: ἢδειν γὰρ ὡς ὃν ῥάδιον εἶν.

8. ποίησας: in the technical sense of 'writing poetry.'

16. ἀφοσιούμενος: this is the original meaning of this E interesting word, 'to perform a religious duty,' 'to clear one's conscience': cf. Ἰδ. i. 199 ἀποσιοῦσας τῷ θεῷ, 'to make expiation': ἀποσιοῦσας λόγιον, Ἰд. iv. 203, 'to obey an oracle.' From this is derived, by a natural process, the subsequent
meaning of ‘doing a thing perfunctorily’: Isæus 67. 20 οὐδ’ ἄφοσιομένος ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀδυν τ’ ἀριστα παρακεναξομένος.

εἰ πολλάκις: ‘if perchance, a common phrase in Plato: so too μη πολλακίς: the idea of ‘probability’ or ‘possibility’ suggested by πολλάκις seems to come from its original meaning of ‘frequently,’ through the natural step ‘as often happens,’ and so ‘as may well be the case.’ A few lines below we have εἰ ἀρα πολλάκις, where the ἀρα seems not so much to be part of the formula, but to point back to the previous εἰ πολλάκις, ‘if, after all, by any possibility’; cf. the Latin ‘si forte, ‘si qua forte.’ Note that εἰ . . . ἐπιτάττω is virtual O.O. for εἰ . . . ἐπιτάττει, and observe how the force of εἰ here seems to hover between ‘if’ (conditional), and ‘whether’ (interrogative), i.e. ‘speculating as to whether . . .’

61 A 23. παρακελεύσθαι: observe the force of the different compounds: παρακ. ‘to exhort to do,’ ἐπικ. ‘to encourage in doing’: Xen. Cyr. vi. 3. 27 τοίς τὸ δέων ποιοῦσιν ἐπικελεύειν. διακ. has a distributive sense, ‘to encourage each his favourite’: cf. Hdt. ix. 5 διακελευσμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυναικ. τοῖς θέωσι διακ. was a proverb, though perhaps hardly so used here: cf. Cic. ad Fam. xv. 15. 3 ‘currentem, ut aunc, incitare,’ ‘to spur a willing horse.’

27. ὥς φιλοσοφιας μὲν οὐσὶς μεγίστης μονοκή: the best commentary on this is the beautiful passage in Plat. Laches 188c ὅταν . . . ἀκόλου ἀνδρός περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περὶ τινος σοφίας, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρός καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὃν λέγει, χαίρω ὑπερφυσ, θεωμένος ἁμα τῶν τῆς λέγουσα καὶ τὰ λέγομενα ὅτι πρέπονται ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀρμόττοντα ἐστι· καὶ κομιδὴ μοι δοκεῖ μονοκή ὃ τοιοῦτο εἶναι, ἁμομίαν καλλίστην ἤρμοσμένον, οὐ λόγαν οὔθε παίδεας ὀργάνα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ξῆρ ἤρμοσμένον αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν βιῶν σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα. According to Strabo, the Pythagoreans called philosophy μονοκή. In interpreting this phrase, as well as δημώδης μονοκή, we must bear in mind that μονοκή is not merely what we call music, but embraces ‘artistic and literary culture,’ and so poetry. In Greek education μονοκή is contrasted with γυμναστική, the ‘training of the mind’ with the ‘training of the body,’ so that all that is not γυμναστική is μονοκή, ‘mental training’: cf. Plato Rep. 376E τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπῶν εἰρείν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου ειρημένης; ἐστὶ δὲ πον ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστική, ἢ δ’ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.

B 39. μύθος: μύθος is ‘fiction’ or ‘fable,’ λόγος ‘narrative of fact’: cf. Gorg. 523 Λ ἀκούει ὡς, φασι, μάλα καλὸν λόγον, ὅπ δὲ μὲν ἔγνωσε μύθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον: ὡς ἀληθής γὰρ οὕτα σοι λέξω ἢ μέλλω λέγειν. Plutarch tells us that Pindar was
criticized by Corinna ὡς ἀμονοσον ὅντα καὶ μὴ ποιούντα μέθους, δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἑργον εἶναι συμμεζήκη: and further on ὅ ὁ μέθος εἶναι βουλεῖται λόγος πενήθη ἐοὶκῶς ἀλήθως. Ar. Poetica 1451 b 4 distinguishes 'history' from 'poetry,' ποιήτω διαφέρει τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγει τὸν δὲ οἷα ἃν γένοιτο.

CHAPTER V

61 c–62 c, cc. v. vi. Simmias: Euenos is not likely to take such advice as that. Socrates: Yes he is, if he is a real philosopher; not that he ought to take his own life. Κλίθες: This seems inconsistent; you first say that the philosopher will be glad to die, and then that he may not kill himself: why may he not? Socrates: I only know what I have been told. According to one account we are in custody here and may not make our escape. This is a hard saying; but there is a more obvious reason, that we are the property of the gods, who are as justly indignant if we destroy ourselves, as you would be should one of your slaves do so.

2. ἔρρωσθαι: say to him ἔρρωσο: cf. χαίρειν λέγε.

ἐὰν διώκειν ὃς τάξιστα: surely Socrates is not here, as Heindorf (omitting ὃς τάξιστα) suggests, speaking of the philosophic life as θανάτου μελετή: this would be a quite un-platonic anticipation of what is to follow. The words are not even a διαλογία (Stallb.), but bear just their natural sense and no more, 'bid him follow me as quickly as possible.'

4. οἶνον παρακελεύει: nearly all the editors print this as a C question: οἶνον is exclamatory (cf. 117 D οἶνον ποιεῖτε, ὥθανμάσιον, where the same editors inconsistently print without a question mark).

11. τοῦτον τοῦ πράγματος: sc. τῆς φιλοσοφίας, to be understood from φιλόσοφος.

12. οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτόν εἶναι: Plato is not seriously concerned with this incidental and superficial discussion of suicide: he gives his reasoning as second-hand (61 D ἐξ ἄκος ἔγα, and here οὐ φασι), and elsewhere expresses a different conclusion: e.g. Laws 873 C τι χρὴ πάσχειν... ὡς ἃν ἐάντων κτεινη... μὴπόλειν ταξάσεις δίκη μήτε περιωδίων ἀφίκτω προσπεσονόν τὐχη ἀναγκασθείς μηδὲ αἰσχρῆς τίνος ἀπόρον καὶ ἀβλου μεταλαχῶν;

14. οὕτως ἡ: ὦτως here resumes the participle καθεξ- D μενος, 'and in that attitude'; cf. 83 B ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύει οὐκ οἰομένη δὲν ἐναντιοῦται ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχή οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν: 86 E ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἡ συγχωρεῖν
αὐτοῖς, ἐάν τι δοκῶν προσάδευ, ἐάν δὲ μῆ, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδιεῖν τοῦ λόγου.

20. Φιλολάω: a distinguished Pythagorean of Croton or Tarentum: practically nothing certain is known of him, and the extant fragments attributed to him are of very doubtful authenticity. Claudianus Mamertus speaks of him as 'oprido obscure dissertans,' and perhaps οὐδέν γε σαφῶς points to this obscurity of manner, which was characteristic of the Pythagoreans as a sect.

23. φθόνος οúdeis λέγειν: an alternative form of οὗ φθόνῳ λέγειν, in the sense of 'I do not grudge the telling,' i.e. 'I shall be more than pleased to tell you.' φθόνος, besides its original meaning of 'envy,' has the derived sense of 'grudging churlishness.'

E 25. ἐκείστε: a common euphemism for 'the other world': cf. 63 E εὐελπιὲς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἰδεσθαι ἀγαθὰ: 117 C τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνεύρεθε ἐκεῖστε.

μυθολογεῖν: we have in 70 B, and again in Apol. 39 E διαμυθολογεῖν used almost as the equivalent of διαλέγεσθαι, with the connotation of 'serious conversation.' Is the dia- omitted here because of the previous διασκοπεῖν, or has the word here a special reference to the 'telling of a myth'? If so, the two words accurately describe the Phaedo: when reason and dialectic have done all they can, imagination calls in the aid of a myth.


CHAPTER VI

62 A 8. ἵως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται: this sentence has been more variously interpreted than any other in the Phaedo. The construction is complicated by the repetition of the phrase θαυμαστόν ἵως σοι φανεῖται: this repetition has no bearing on the meaning of the sentence, it is merely a conversational idiom to resume the main thread of the sentence—'it may, I say, seem strange,' cf. above 60 C έοικέω ... φανεῖται. Without this confusing phrase the sentence would run ἵως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τούτῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυχχάνει τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα, ἐστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ γίνῃ, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, τούτοις τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ὅσιοι αὐτοῖσ οὕτωσ εὖ ποιεῖν: with the sentence in this form, ὅσιον is of course parallel to βέλτιον, predicate to οὐδέποτε τυχχάνει.
VI 62 B

NOTES

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We must first of all fix the meaning of τοῦτο: this, as Stallbaum saw, is the principle μὴ θεμιτῶν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἐαυτῶν ἀποκτενών, the question 'is suicide ever justifiable'? This is obviously the point under consideration, and to give any other meaning to τοῦτο seems to me impossible, in spite of the authority of distinguished scholars who have suggested various interpretations of τοῦτο. What then is ἀπλωίν? It is interpreted for us by Plato's own words—οὐδὲποτε τηρχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τάλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἴς ...: it means 'categorical,' 'absolute,' 'not admitting of conditions or exceptions': 'it may seem strange to you that this rule (viz. the rule forbidding suicide) unlike all others is absolute.'

The rest of the sentence is clear, once we realize that the clause ends not at ἥν, but at ἐν τοιεῖν: 'ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἴς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ἥν' is quite subordinate logically, is indeed a mere preliminary to the next clause οἴς δὲ βέλτιον ... ἐν τοιεῖν, where δὲ = Lat. autem in such a sentence as 'mirabile est si pax ant bellum sit eligenda, pax autem non sine dedecore sit accipienda': what it really means is this—'you may think it strange that, in cases where death is preferable to life (granting that there are such cases), a man may not do himself a good turn ...' ὥσπερ καὶ τάλλα refers to the phrase ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἴς: i.e. 'as a rule, circumstances alter cases: is this the only exception (μένον τῶν ἄλλων),'

The whole sentence, then, should be translated—'perhaps you will be surprised if this rule unlike all others is an absolute one—if the same thing does not happen to man in this as in all other cases: that to some men, under certain circumstances (ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἴς), death is better than life, and where death is better, you may, I say, think it strange if men may not do themselves a good turn.'

This interpretation agrees in the main with that of Mr. Archer-Hind, who, however, takes ἀπλωίν differently, and makes οὐδὲποτε ... ἥν independent of the succeeding οἴς δὲ βέλτιον ...

16. ἰττω Ζεὺς: Kebes is carried away into using his native Boeotian (for Attic ἰττω): in Ar. Ach. 911 the Boeotian uses the complete Boeotian form ἰττω Δεὺς = 'Heaven knows' (lit. let Zeus know).

20. ἐν ἀπορρήτοις: 'in the mysteries,' a reference most probably to the Orphic mysteries, a system half mystical and religious, half philosophic, which taught certain doctrines as to the origin of the world and of man, and inculcated the necessity of a pure life to win happiness after death. The Orphic religion centred round the god Dionysus, and attributed its creed to the mythical poet Orpheus. This system had a great
influence on the serious thought of the Greek world in the sixth century B.C., and from it the Pythagoreans seem to have derived some of their tenets.

21. φρονρα: this was an Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine, that the body is the soul's prison: cf. Plato, Cratylus 400 b σήμα τινές φασί τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαρμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρώντι . . . δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μᾶλσα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμβί 'Ορφέα τουτο τὸ δύναμι. ὡς δίκην διδούσῃ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς δὴ ἑνεκα δίδωσιν τοῦτον δὲ περὶβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκώνα. Cicero, in the Cato Major, seems to suggest a less probable interpretation: 'vetatque Pythagorae injus-su imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere,' according to which ἐν φρονρα τωι would mean 'on a sort of sentinel duty.' Note the effect of τωι in softening the metaphor—'velut in carcere quodam.' Cf. Virg. Aen. vi. 730-734—

ignes est ollis vigor et caelestis origo seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant, terenique hebetant artus moribundaque membra. hine metuunt, cupiuntque; dolent, gaudentque; neque auras dispiciunt clausae tenebris et carcere caeco.

27. κτημάτων: this seems to suggest, like ἀποδιδότακεω above, a slightly different idea from φρονρα—that of a slave: for the word κτήμα, 'chattel,' applied to a slave cf. Enr. Med. 49 πάλαιον όκων κτήμα δεσπότης ἐμῆς. In Plato's Laws 803 e man is called a πατννον of the gods.

C

30. μὴ στημήναντός σου: μὴ because it is conditional—ei μὴ οὐ σημαίνεις.

34. πριν . . ἐπιτεύμψη: this use of πριν with subj. without ἀν, common in Homer, is found not infrequently in the dramatists, but rarely in prose authors.

CHAPTER VII

62 c-63 e, cc. vii. viii. If this be so, replies Kebes, it seems inconsistent to say that the wise man will be glad to die. For only a fool would desire to run away from wise and good masters and guardians, such as the gods are to us. To this Simmias agrees, and upbraids Socrates for being too ready to leave his friends. Well then, answers Socrates, since I am thus arraigned, I must try to defend myself before you more persuasively than I did before the jury. As he is beginning his defence he is interrupted by Kriton: the attendant, says he, has been warning me that talking is apt to hinder the operation of the poison. Never mind, replies Socrates; only let him be prepared to repeat the potion as often as may be required.
3. ἤδεισι: with ἕν ἐθέλειν.

5. θεῶν: cf. above 62 B τὸ θεῶς εἶναι: Plato, speaking popularly, uses θεός and θεῖον indifferently.

11. αὐτὸς γε αὐτοῦ οἴεται άμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι: this of course is not the usual αὐτὸς . . αὐτοῦ with the comparative, which signifies ‘more than ever’ (e.g. αὐτὸς ἄνωτος ἀναιδέστερος ἐγένετο): αὐτοῦ depends on ἐπιμελήσεσθαι: the double pronoun, αὐτὸς . . αὐτοῦ, is an example of the tendency of Greek to express both sides of a relation.

23. πραγματεία: in 64 E πραγματεία and in 99 D, 100 B 63 A πραγματέυμα are used to denote ‘serious occupation,’ ‘that to which one devotes one’s self,’ ‘business’: here it is more abstract, a quality of character: ‘insistence,’ ‘diligence.’

ἐπιβλέψας suggests a fixed, penetrating glance.

27. τι . . λέγειν: ‘there is something in what he says’: cf. the opposite οὐδὲν λέγειν, ‘to talk nonsense,’ 76 D.

30. αὐτῶν: there is some slight ms. authority for αὐτῶν, which would at first sight seem more natural: but αὐτῶν is supported by such passages as 114 E κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ἄλλα τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ and 108 C φέρεται (ἡ ψυχὴ) εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν ὀίκημα: in the former of these passages αὐτῆς would seem to be from αὐτός, ‘self,’ and in the latter αὐτῇ is apparently the ordinary 3rd person pronoun: in our present passage it is difficult to decide; perhaps αὐτῶν from αὐτός, ‘self,’ is preferable, though in that case αὐτῶν certainly seems more natural.

31. εἰς σὲ τείνειν: a metaphor from archery—‘is aiming at you.’

CHAPTER VIII

5. ἄλλοις: viz. the χθόνωι θεοί, ‘the gods of the lower world.’ Mr. Cope takes ἄλλος in the idiomatic Greek sense of ‘contrast with what is to follow,’ translating θεῶς ἄλλος . . καὶ ἄνθρωποι ‘not only gods . . but also men’: but the natural meaning here is confirmed by Λαοὺς 959 α παρὰ θεῶς ἄλλοις ἀπιέναι δύσοντα λύον, where no word contrasting with θεῶς follows.

8. παρ’ ἄνθρωπος τε: in the natural course καὶ θεῶς would follow, but the sentence is broken up by the clause καὶ τοῦτο μὲν . . . so that the καὶ is replaced by ὅτι μὲντοι.

13. οὐχ ὁμολογοι: sc. ὃς ἄν εἰ μὴ ταύτα ἡγούμην.

14. εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι: ‘that the dead have an existence’: one thesis which the dialogue proposes to prove.
17. *αὐτὸς ἔχων*: 'keeping to yourself.'

D 24. *τί .. ἄλλο .. ἦ*; very common in Plato for 'simply': it is to be distinguished from ἄλλο τι ἦ, which means 'is it not the case that .. ?'

28. *μᾶλλον* seems to have the somewhat rare sense of 'too much,' μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος.


63E-64A. After the interruption Socrates re-states the thesis which he has to defend: that the philosopher will meet death with good courage, in the confident hope that he will enjoy the greatest blessings in the other world.

E 33. *εἰ δὲ μῆ* : observe that if the verb with *εἰ* were expressed, it would be *εἰ δὲ προσφέρει*, not *εἰ δὲ μῆ προσφέρει* : *εἰ δὲ μῆ* has become a stereotyped phrase for 'otherwise.'

34. *σχεδὸν μὲν τι ἔδειν* : *τι* modifies *σχεδὸν*, the object of ἔδειν being understood—viz. 'that you would say something of the kind.'

37. *ἀποδοῖναι* : notice the force of the compound ἀπο-δοῖναι—to give something that is due or expected.

CHAPTER IX

64A-67B, cc. ix.—xi. The philosopher's whole life is nothing else than the study and practice of death; how then shall he be dismayed when that comes for which he has always been striving? This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Now the philosopher's aim is the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. But the body is for ever thwarting his endeavours: (1) by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by its weaknesses and maladies. All these hinder the free action of the soul and prevent her from gazing calmly on the truth. Accordingly so long as the soul is in union with the body, she can never attain to perfect wisdom; only death, by setting her free, enables her, if ever, to reach the truth. But the true philosopher will do all he can during life to anticipate this condition: he will withdraw his soul, so far as may be, from all communion with the body; its pleasures and pains he will scorn, its perceptions he will ignore; and so when the hour of release arrives the soul will be pure and unsullied by material taint; she will be fit to enjoy the free life of intelligence that is now before her.
1. κινδυνεύοντος γάρ: 'it may be that they . .', 'I am inclined to think that they . .': often used in Plato as almost = φαίνονται έμοι. γάρ is not to be translated; it is regularly used to introduce a statement which has been promised or anticipated in the previous sentence.

2. τοὺς ἄλλους: 'the rest of mankind.'

4. ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι: a good illustration of the difference between the present and perfect tenses: ἀποθνῄσκειν is the 'process of dying,' that is to say 'the process of emancipating the soul from the bodily passions': τεθνάναι is the state of death, the final condition of total emancipation. Cicero renders the phrase 'tota vita commentatio est mortis.'

18. γελασείοντα: γελασεῖω is 'to be inclined to laugh': B another termination with the same meaning is -δω: e.g. θανατῶ (in this same section) 'to desire death': cf. Lat. -urio, as in esurio.

13. τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν: notice this use of μὲν without a succeeding δὲ, to contrast them with the rest of mankind: he seems to refer to his own countrymen, the Thebans, and to be hinting at the proverbial stupidity of the Boeotians (cf. Βοιωτία ὅσ), here exemplified by their taking the words ἐπιτηθευόμεθαν ἀποθνῄσκειν in their literal, outward sense, being blind to their inner, spiritual signification.

15. σφάς γε: σφάς is here the indirect reflexive (sc. τοὺς παρ’ ἡμῖν), its proper use in Attic prose.

29. ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἔχ: if ἔχ is to be retained, it is perhaps best to take it as deliberative: 'is it to be,' i.e. 'are we to take it as being anything else than . .?' Cf. Ἱερ. 603 c μὴ τι ἄλλο ἔχει παρά ταύτα; Phileb. 15 D πόθεν τίς ἀρετήται; Would it not, however, be possible to explain this as the interrogative form of the common Platonic idiom, μή with subj., meaning 'perhaps it is so': e.g. ἄλλα μὴ τούτο ἀληθεῖς ἔχει, 'but perhaps this is true': put interrogatively this would be ἀρα μὴ τοῦτο ἀληθεῖς ἔχει, 'may it be that this is true?' I find after making this suggestion that Goodwin (Moods and Tenses, p. 393) quotes this passage as an example of the interrogative form of the Platonic idiom.

38. θεραπεῖας: this might almost be translated 'pampering,' or 'indulgence': cf. the Latin 'curare cutem,' which has the same connotation of 'excessive attention paid to the body,' 'indulgence.'

40. διαφερόντων: 'superior,' 'conspicuously beautiful': cf.
the adv. διαφέροντως, 'especially,' 'more than the average': it suggests 'difference' in the sense of 'superiority.'

42. καθ' οὖσον μή: μή because the proposition is universal, not applying to a particular instance: cf. below 65 A ὁ μηδὲν ἢδυ τῶν τοιούτων.

Ε 47. ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ: 'with the whole of these three chapters should be compared Timaeus 87 c–90 d. It would be an error to suppose that Plato, with all his contempt for the body, was a friend of asceticism. In the passage of the Timaeus above mentioned he says that a due balance should be maintained between soul and body: a vigorous soul ought to have a vigorous body for its vehicle. Accordingly the body should be kept in good health and condition for the sake of the soul: for no less emphatically than in the Phaedo he declares that all is to be subordinate to the free exercise of intelligence: see especially 90 a foll.' [Archer-Hind.]

65 A 53. τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις: here Socrates suggests another popular interpretation of his maxim that the philosopher practises death, viz. that a life without bodily pleasures is indeed 'a living death,' βίος ἄβλωτος, οὐκ ἄξιον ἵππα: cf. for the sentiment Soph. Ant. 1165—

τάς γὰρ ἠδονὰς
ὅταν προδώσων ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημι ἐγώ
ẑην τούτον, ἀλλ' ἐμψυχον ἡγούμαι νεκρῶν.

54. μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν: here the relative ὁ is to be supplied in a new case: μηδὲ = καὶ ὁ μή: cf. 81 b.

55. ἐγγύς τι τείνειν: the figure of speech seems to be geographical in its origin: cf. Hdt. το πρὸς Διβύθην ἄλοο οὕς τείνει, 'another mountain range stretches ... '; cf. Rep. 548 ὑ ἐγγύς τι αὐτόν Πλαύκωνος τοιούτοι τείνειν: Theaecl. 169 ἃ οὗ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκιρρωμα μᾶλλον τείνειν: 'verges close on death.'

56. αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐσι: 'which are experienced (by the soul) through the means of the body': 'which depend upon the body.'

CHAPTER X

1. φρονήσεως: we have Plato's own definition of φρόνησις in 79 c: οὗτος δὲ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν αυτήν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκείστι αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ καθάρον τί καὶ ἄξιον καὶ ἄθανατον καὶ ἄσωτος ἔχων καὶ ἦς συνιστάμενος οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἄξιον μετ' ἐκείνοις τί γίγνεται, ὅταν περὶ αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν, καὶ πέμπται τι σώματος τοῦ πλατνοῦ καὶ περὶ ἐκείνα δεῖ κατὰ ταύτα ἄσωτος ἐχεῖ ἄτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένην καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; cf.
too 66 6 and 70 6. It is attained by the use of αὐτῇ ἡ διάνοια, 65 ἔ.

3. συμπαραλαμβάνῃ: both prepositions have somewhat the same effect on the verb: συμ- 'along with,' as an ally, παρα- of 'outside assistance.'

5. ὅψις τε καὶ ἀκοή: for the uncertainty of the 'impressions B of sense' in the Platonic philosophy cf. Introd. B.

6. οἱ ποιηταὶ: Olymp. p. 23 ποιητὰς λέγει Παρμενίδην Ἐμπεδοκλέα Ἐπίχαρμον; cf. Parmenides—

Empedocles—

Δ' ἀγε, ἀθρεὶ παμπαλαμή πῃ δήλον ἐκαστον, μὴ τιν' ὅψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκοήν, μὴ τ' ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουτον, ὑπὲρ τραυματα γλώσσῃς, μὴ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅπῃ πόροι ἐστὶ νοεῖαι· γνών πίστιν ἐρυκε, νῦεδ δ' ὅ δήλον ἐκαστον.

Epicharmus—

νοῦς ὅρη καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· ταλλα κοφά καὶ τυφλά.

The same sentiment is found in Heraclitus, the author of the saying πάντα ρεῖ: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώπωσιν ὀφθαλμοῖ καὶ ὡτα βαρβάροις ψυχὰς ἐχόντων (or βορβόρων ψυχὰς ἐχόντως, 'limo animos obducentε'): and in Anaxagoras ὑπὸ ἀφαντῆτος τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οὐ δυνατὸ ἐσμὲν κρίνειν τάληθες.

θυρούσιν: a word used of what is 'often repeated,' 'is in everybody's mouth': cf. τὸ θυρούμενον, the 'common topic'—'quod in ore omnium est.' ὑμεῖς is somewhat similarly used: cf. ταῦτα δεὶ ὑμεῖς, 'to harp on the same string': Lat. "decantare."

15. λογίζεσθαι, 'the process of reasoning,' 'the exercise of C pure reason': cf. below 65 ἔ διανοεῖσθαι: they are the verbs of λόγος and διάνοια, 'reason': Lat. 'ratioeina.'

18. παραλυπτί: here, as in συμπαραλαμβάνῃ above, παρα-suggests 'intrusion of an alien element': 'intrudes to distract it': cf. 66 ὁ παραπίπτων, 65 ὁ παραπιθέμενος, and in exactly the same sense Timaeus 50 τὴν αὐτῷ παρεμφαίνων ὅψιν 'intruding upon the vision.'

19. μηδὲ τις ἡδονή: μηδὲ, not μητε, because it is not one of the series; the series is of three, (1) hearing, (2) sight, (3) pain
or pleasure: the two last make a pair, and the pair is the third of the series.

22. μὴ κοινωνοῦσα: μὴ because of ὅταν.

23. τοῦ δινότος: observe how the position of these words at the end of the sentence gives them emphasis—'that which really exists': τὸ δὲν is contrasted with τὰ φανώμενα in the Platonic philosophy, and is virtually here 'the Ideas' (v. Introd. B): it is another way of saying τῆς ἀληθείας (63 B).

D 28. δίκαιον αὐτό: for the meaning of this phrase cf. Introd. B.

φαμέν μέντοι νῆ Δία: μέντοι has not here its ordinary adversative meaning 'however,' but is used to express an emphatic affirmative: cf. 68 B ὦ τοῦλλη ἄν ἄλογα εἰή; Ἡ Πολλὴ μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, and in 73 D, 74 B, 81 D.

E 35. τῆς οὐσίας: ἀπάντων depends on this: 'the essence' or 'real nature of all things': οὐσία is defined in 78 C αὐτή ἢ οὐσία, ἢς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι, and in 92 D ἡ οὐσία, ἐχοῦσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τῆς τοῦ δ έστιν.

δ τυγχάνει ἐκαστὸν δὲν: this is the definition of οὐσία—'essence,' viz. that which each thing really is. Avoid translating it 'whatever the particular thing may be,' as though it explained ἀπάντων. τυγχάνει here, as so often, refers to something which is not 'accidental,' but rather 'the essential feature of the situation.' To illustrate this I cannot do better than quote Mr. Verrall's excellent note on Eur. Medea 608 καὶ σοὶ ἄρα ὅτι οὐσία τυγχάνω δόμοις. 'In the habitual irony of Attic speech "accidental" frequently means "essential": to say that a thing "happens to be such" may, if pronounced suitably, be merely a way of saying that the quality predicted is the most important which the thing possesses. Hence the common use of τυγχάνει ὃν for "to be in reality" or "in spite of contrary appearances."' Andr. 142 is a good example—

δεσποτῶν δ' ἐμέν ϕόβῳ
ἀνυχίαν ἄγομεν· τὸ δὲ σῶν
οἴκτῳ φέρουσα τυγχάνω.

i.e. in spite of my enforced silence I really felt compassion.
In our own passage this use of τυγχάνω appears to be a well-established Attic idiom, its original ironical suggestion being lost.

38. αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν διανοηθήναι: for αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ν. note on 74 D αὐτὸ δ' ἐστιν: διανοηθήναι is here used in its special sense of 'intellectual apprehension' (cf. note on 65 C): 'to apprehend
intellectually the essence of each object of his investigation’ (Archer-Hind).

41. ὀστὶς . . τοι: in general clauses of primary tense, the ‘universal’ relative usually has ἀν with subjunctive, but wherever the main verb is for any reason optative, the verb of the relative clause is regularly attracted into the optative: cf. the Homeric ὁς ἀπόλουσκαλ ἀλλὸς ὀστὶς τοιαύτα γε βέζοι.

51. ἀληθεία τε καὶ φρόνησις: ‘ἀληθεία is objective truth, 66 A φρόνησις the mental πάθημα which apprehends it’ (R. D. Archer-Hind).

52. ἀρ’ οὐχ οὕτως ἐστιν: a slight anacoluthon: the sentence is grammatically complete at κοινωνη, the end of the ὀστὶς clause: but owing to the length of the relative clause, the original apodosis—ἀρ’ οὖν ἐκεῖνοι ἀν τοῦτο ποιήσει καθαρώτατα—is repeated in an altered form—ἀρ’ οὐχ οὕτως ἐστιν . . ὁ τευχόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;

53. ὑπερφυὼς . . ὃς: observe the attraction of the adverb: it is idiomatic Greek for ὑπερφυές ἐστιν ὃς, cf. 99 D: so θαυμαστῶς ὃς 92 A, 96 A. Latin has the same idiom ‘mire quam,’ for ‘mirum est quam.’

CHAPTER XI

2. παριστασθαί: ‘occur,’ ‘be suggested’: for the active ἐ in the sense of ‘suggest,’ ‘put into the mind’ cf. Dem. de Cor. § 1 πρῶτον εὗχομαι . . τοῦτο παραστήσαε τοῦς θεοὺς ὑμῖν.

4. ἀττα: for τυια: ἀττα = ἀτυια.

ὡσπερ ἀτραπός τις: to understand the point of the metaphor we must realise the exact meaning of ἀτραπός: it is derived from α- (negative) and τρέω, viz. ‘that which has no turning,’ and usually signifies a ‘short cut’ (e.g. over a mountain, as opposed to a high road which follows the windings of the hill-side): cf. Hom. Od. xiv. 1 αὐτάρ ὁ ἐκ λιμένος προσέβη τρηχεῖαν ἄτραπον χάρων ἀν’ ὑλήντα δι’ ἀκριας: so in Hdt. vii. 215 and Thuc. iv. 36 it is used of the mountain track by which Hydarnes led his band over the heights above Thermopylae, when the attack by the main road, or ὀδός, failed. It is used metaphorically in Ar. Ἀνυ. 76—

νῦν οὖν δὴν τὴν νόκτα φροντίζων ὁδοῦ μίαν εὑρόν ἄτραπον δαιμονίως ὑπερφυέ:

‘he has found a track which will take him straight to his goal.’ So here, the philosopher’s ‘goal’ is the separation of the soul from the body: his regular ὀδός is ‘the abstention during life
from bodily pleasures’ (which is called ‘practising death’):
death itself is a ‘short cut’ which carries him straight to his
‘goal.’

5. ἐκφέρειν continues the metaphor of ἀπατῶσ—‘brings
us to our goal’; cf. Soph. Αἰ. 7 εὖ δέ σ’ ἐκφέρει κυνὸς Ἀκαίνης
ὡς τις εὕρων βάσις: Ὀἰδ. Κολ. 1424 ὁρᾶς τὰ τοῦτ’ οὖν ὡς ἐς ὅρθων
ἐκφέρεις μαντεύμαθα: Plato Crat. 356Δ ἦδη ποτὲ ἐγώγε, ὡ
Σῶκρατες, ἀπόρων καὶ ἑπταῦθα ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἀπερ Πρωταγόρας
λέγει.

7. μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ: sc. μετὰ τοῦ σώματος: for the use
of τοιούτος cf. above 58 D.

οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα: cf. 105D οὐκοῦν ψυχῇ τὸ ἐναντίον
ὁ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἂεὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξηται. οὐ μὴ with the 1st or 3rd
person of the subjunctive (usually aorist, but occasionally
present), and secondarily with the 1st or 3rd person of fut.
indic., is used as a strong negative in fut. time: cf. Goodwin
Moods and Tenses § 89 (smaller edition). In his larger
edition, Appendix II, Goodwin suggests a very probable theory
of its origin. He traces it through the Platonic μὴ with subj.
(cf. note on 64C), expressing ‘fear that a thing may be so,’
e.g. μὴ φαύλων ἃ (Crat. 425 B) ‘I fear it may prove to be bad’
or ‘possibly it may prove to be bad,’ back to the old Homeric
μὴ with subj. expressing ‘fear and a desire to avert the object
of fear’: Il. xvi. 128 μὴ δὴ νῆας ἔλωσι ‘may they not seize
the ships’ (as I fear they may): II. ii. 195 μὴ τι χολωσάμενος
μέξῃ κακὸν ὡς ’Αχαῖως. This use appears occasionally in the
Tragedians, with sometimes the idea of ‘fear,’ sometimes of
‘probability’ predominating: Eur. Οἰ. 776 μὴ λάβωσι σ’ αἰσχρον:
Herc. Furens 1899 ἀλλ’ αἴτα μὴ σοὶς ἔξουσίωσώμαι πέπλασ. This
form of sentence admits of two forms of negative: (1) μὴ φαύλων
ἡ may become μὴ οὐ φαύλων ἡ, i.e. ‘perhaps it is bad’ may
become ‘perhaps it is not bad,’ where the οὐ negatives what
follows μὴ, i.e. μὴ οὐ—φαύλων ἡ: (2) μὴ φαύλων ἡ may become οὐ μὴ
φαύλων ἡ, i.e. ‘it may possibly be bad’ may become ‘it cannot
possibly be bad.’ Thus οὐ μὴ and μὴ οὐ in this construction are
traced back, as they should be, to the same source: and Goodwin
also brings into line with these constructions οὐ μὴ with the
2nd person of aor. subj. or fut. indic. to express ‘prohibition.’
This is a brief indication of the lines followed by Goodwin’s
exhaustive treatment of the construction, which deserves study.

10. ἀσχολία: the opposite of σχολή: ‘distractions’: ἀσχολία
is literally ‘want of leisure,’ e.g. 66D ἀσχολίαν . . . φιλοσοφίας
is ‘want of leisure for philosophy.’

C 14. εἰδώλων: the passions are fleeting and transient, they
XII 67 B

NOTES

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have no permanence, no reality to the soul seeking after truth: cf. Thuc. 150 εἰς ἀληθῶς τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.


15. τὸ λεγόμενον: in construction this is in a loose apposition to the clause οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίζεται. Observe the force of ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὀντί in conjunction with τὸ λεγόμενον: it expresses that some common saying or proverb is seen in the light of the foregoing arguments to have a deeper truth and significance than is attached to it in common speech: 77 ἐν δεδιώκετο τὸ τῶν παιδῶν μή ἡ ἀληθῶς: Phaedr. 256 β τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ἤ ἀληθῶς ὁ 'Ολυμπιακόν: so in 80 ν εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ‘to a place we are right in calling Hades.’

17. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους: cf. Cic. de finibus i. xiii. 44 ‘Ex cupiditatibus odia discidia discordiae seditiones bella nascuntur.’

22. θεραπεία: cf. above 64 d.


43. διὰ μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη: ἐστί is originally to be supplied 67 A in this phrase—‘except in so far as is absolutely necessary’: cf. for variants of the same phrase 64 δοκεῖ δύον μὴ πολλῆ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν: 83 εἴσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι. The negative is always μὴ, as the relative is generalising.

μηδὲ ἀναπτώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως: ‘nor are infected with its nature’: for the word applied to a ‘disease,’ cf. Thuc. ii. 51 καὶ οὔτε ἑτέρος ἀφ’ ἑτέρον θεραπεία ἀναπτώμενοι ὅσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθησεν.

47. μετὰ τοιοῦτων: sc. καθαρῶν; it is best taken as masc. ‘in the company of the pure,’ cf. 63 b.

51. μὴ οὐθεμενὸν ἁ: for the explanation of this idiom cf. B note on οὐ μὴ ποτὲ κτησάμεθα 66 c.

CHAPTER XII

67 B–68 B, c. xii. So then he will meet death with a good heart who has purified his soul by withdrawing her from contact with the body and accustoming her to dwell apart by herself; for death is the consummation of her release from body. Were it not strange if the wise man shrank from that which all his life long he sought: freedom from his foe the body, and fruition of wisdom his love? Shall a man meet
death gladly in hope of reunion with some earthly love, and for the sake of his divine love shall he fear to die?

\[C\]

8. καὶ ἀλλῳ ἀνδρὶ: the point of καὶ is ‘equally with myself.’

17. ἐκλυομένην: observe the present: ‘freeing herself,’ ‘working out her own deliverance.’

ὦσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος: Cobet reads ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ . . For the repetition of the preposition both in the direct and the metaphorical phrase (where the metaphor comes first) cf. 82 Ε ὥσπερ διὰ εἰργιμοῦ διὰ τοῦτον σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα, 115 Β ὥσπερ κατ’ ἡγιὰ κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ χὴρ: Phaedr. 255Β ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρώτει εὐαν ὀρῶν λέληθη: Lep. 553Β πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῷ πόλει.

\[D\]

21. μᾶλλον καὶ μόνοι: observe this use of καὶ ‘corrigitens’ —Lat. ‘immo’ — ‘philosophers chiefly, nay philosophers alone.’

\[Ε\]

32. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληται: this sentence has two distinct protases, (a) εἰ διαβέβληται, (b) εἰ φοβοιντο, standing in different relations to the apodosis οὐ πολλὴ ἀν ἀλογία εἰς; (a) is the supposition on which the whole clause εἰ φοβοιντο . . πολλὴ ἀν ἀλογία εἰς depends, whereas (b) εἰ φοβοιντο is the immediate protasis to πολλὴ ἀν ἀλογία εἰς: ‘For if they are at variance with the body . . in that case (τοῦτον δὴ γεγενομένου) would it not be very unreasonable if they were to fear and . . ?’ There is still a third εἰ clause, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι . . ισον, but this is merely an explanatory repetition of εἰ φοβοιντο, ‘if, that is to say, they were not pleased to go . .’ For a parallel to this last cf. Αριστ. 20 οὐ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔστει τοῦτο τοῖς φυμή τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἐπιττετοίει ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ, where the εἰ clause explains οὐδὲν πράττοντο . . περιττότερον, a gen. absol. which does duty as the protasis to γέγονεν. For the structure of the whole sentence, with two independent protases, cf. 91Β ὑμείς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείδησε, σμικροὶ φροντισάντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀλήθειας πολὺ μάλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι υμῶν δοκῶ ἀλήθεις λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε.

68Α 39. ἀπηλλάχθαι: depends on ἐλπὶς ἑστὶν, ἥρων δὲ φρονήσεως being parenthetical. The perfect infinitive (as compared with τιχεῖν) expresses the final state of being completely emancipated—they trust to be able to say ἀπηλλάγμεθα.

40. ἄνθρωπίνων. ‘mere mortal or human favourites’ as contrasted with φρόνους, which is θεία παιδικά, ‘a divine love’: so in Gorg. 482Α Socrates calls philosophy his παιδικά, his
CHAPTER XIII

68 b–69 e, c. xiii. Therefore the philosopher alone is truly brave and temperate. The courage and temperance of the multitude are spurious: for they endure evils only to avoid greater evils, they forego pleasures only that they may enjoy greater pleasures; thus fear is the source of their courage, indulgence the source of their temperance. But the fount of all real virtue is wisdom: this is the only true currency; virtues that arise from balancing pleasure against pleasure and pain against pain, apart from wisdom, are worthless and slavish. Virtue is the purification of the soul; the true philosopher is he whose soul is purified and initiated into the holy mysteries of wisdom, and he it is who shall dwell with the gods in the other world. Such is the defence of Socrates.

2. ἄν ἄν ὤθης: by a not uncommon Greek idiom this relative clause, grammatically defining ἀνθρώπος, takes the place of a noun clause, e.g. τό with the infinitive: ὃν ἄν ἤθη ἀγανακτώντα ... ἐπείδη: the definition of ἀνθρώπος, takes the place of τό ἀγανακτεῖν, which is grammatically required as a definition of τοῦτο. This idiom is specially common in Thuc., as might be expected in a writer whose style is based on the 'constructio ad sensum': e.g. iv. 18 σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὕτως τάγαθα ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο, 'it is characteristic of prudent men to regard any advantage they gain as insecure, as caution suggests,' where οὕτως ... ἔθεντο is substituted for τό ... θέσθαι: vi. 14 τὸ καλῶς ἀφεί τοῦτ' εἶναι ὃς ἄν τὴν πατρίδα ὥφελήσῃ; vii. 69 νομιμώτατον εἶναι οὕτως ἄν ... δικαιώσωσιν. Hdt. i. 146 ἀνθρα-
γαθή δ' αὐτή ἀποδέδεκται . . δὲ ἂν πολλοὺς ἀποδέξῃ παίδας.
It illustrates a common tendency of Greek to follow the logic rather than the form of the sentence; cf. Cic. pro Clu. § 109 'proinde quasi non satis signi esse debuerit ab omnibus eumuisse desertum, qui se ad patronum illum contulisset.'

3. οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν: 'is after all no true philosopher': observe this pretty idiom, ἦν ἄρα, which is used to indicate that something has just been discovered to be true which has been so all along. Conversely οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν indicates that something which has been believed to be true is discovered to be untrue: cf. Hom. Od. xvi. 418-20—

'Αντίνο', ὑξών κακομήχανε, καὶ δὲ σὲ φασὺν ἐν ἀδήμω 'θάκης μεθ' ὀμῆλικας ἐμεν ἄρατον βουλὴ καὶ μίθουσι· σὺ δ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῖος ἔνσθα.

The imperfect indicates that what has just been discovered to be the case has been so all along, 'was without our knowing it': ἄρα, as usual, expresses an 'inference.'

4. του: 'presumably.'

8. τοῖς οὖτω διακείμενοι: sc. τοῖς τῷ σώματι διαβεβλημένοι, the attitude of mind described in the preceding chapter.

10. ἦν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄνομάζουσι: 'even using the word in its popular sense.'

12. ἐπτοήθαι: a poetical word, 'to be fluttered,' 'excited'; Apoll. Rhod. i. 1232 τῆς δὲ φρένας ἐπτοήθεν Κύπρις.

D 15. ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὑσυν: cf. above 59 A (note); 84 A ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ (sc. τῷ λογισμῷ) οὖσα.

23. τῷ δεδείναι καὶ δεῖ: cf. 78 B τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συμβείνω.

E 30. τὴν εὐθή σωφροσύνην: a sort of transferred epithet—'this foolishly so-called temperance,' i.e. the people who call it σωφροσύνη εὐθείας.

69 A 39. μὴ γὰρ οὖχ αὐτή ἦ: Wagner explains γὰρ by an ellipse, 'do not approve of this at once, for' . . .; but surely this is a very obscure ellipse, and does not even give the right connection of thought. γὰρ here simply introduces a reason or explanation, and there is no ellipse: 'perhaps the reason of this is that this is not' . . . For μὴ οὖν ἦ cf. note on οὖ μὴποτε κτησώμεθα 66 B.

πρὸς ἀρετήν: πρὸς here means 'in regard to,' 'in respect of,' and is not the same as in πρὸς θδονάς, πρὸς λύπας, where it rather signifies, 'in exchange for,' 'in comparison with.'
40. ἀλλαγή, 'standard of exchange.'

45. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν... ὄνομα: the participles ὄνομα B and πιπρασκόμενα are equivalent to conditional clauses, just as χωρίζομενα, the participle of the δὲ clause: the predicate is τῷ ὄντι ἃ, 'are in reality what they claim to be'; καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκαίριοτητι... φρονήσεως is best taken as explanatory of πάντα (or possibly, with very little difference to the meaning, as an expansion of the predicate τῷ ὄντι ἃ). Translate—'and all things, if they are bought and sold for this wisdom and along with it, are in reality what they claim to be, both courage and temperance and justice... whether pleasures and fears and the like be added or not.'

For the general metaphor of 'wisdom' as the only true 'standard of value' or currency cf. Eur. Fr. 546—

οὗ τοῖς νόμοσις λευκῷ ἄργυρῳ μᾶνον
καὶ χρυσός ἑστιν... ἀλλὰ κάρατη βροτοῖς
νόμοσι κεῖται πᾶσιν ἢ χρήσθαι χρέων.

Of course the metaphor is not to be pressed too closely: Plato's own terms will not bear exact analysis. Had he been content with the vague πρὸς (all virtues to be estimated πρὸς φιλόνησιν, viz. with that as their standard of value), there would have been no difficulty; but he has chosen to use the definite terms of 'buying and selling,' and this involves him in a contradiction in the phrase τοῦτο καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο: the purchaser is made to retain the φιλόνησις, although he pays it as the price for e.g. ἀνδρεία. Again we can appreciate the idea of 'selling everything for φιλόνησις,' in the sense of 'sacrificing everything for it,' but that is not in the least what Plato means by it: we cannot bring that meaning into relation with the other phrase 'buying the virtues for φιλόνησις.' This is not to accuse Plato of looseness of thought or expression, but to show the mistake of attempting to analyse literally what is only to be taken in its general spirit.

ὄνομα: this passive use of the present tense of the deponent ὄνεωμαι is rare (the perfect passive εἶσνημαι is not uncommon). Stallbaum proposes ἐσωμένα here, but the present is required to balance πιπρασκόμενα, and is supported by Xen. Eiquestr. viii. 2 ἐονεῖτο. Similar passive uses of deponent presents are not infrequent in Plato: προσχρωμένη, ἐπιφθεγγύ-μενα, μμούμενοι, βιαζόμενοι.

48. μετὰ φρονήσεως: this phrase contains the germ of the Platonic system of ethics, as developed in the Sixth Book of the Republic and elsewhere. Plato's theory of morality has
a superficial resemblance to the philosophic doctrine of utilitarianism, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' but it is elevated far above it as an ethical system by being made dependent on his metaphysical system, the theory of the Ideas, culminating in the supreme 'Idea of the Good'—αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, the origin alike of all reality (i.e. truth) and of all good (i.e. virtue). This aspect of the question is embodied in the Socratic aphorism that 'virtue is knowledge': only to the man who has knowledge of the 'supreme good' is the highest kind of virtue possible. This is admirably illustrated by Plato's definition of ἀνδρεία in Κυρ. 442 β καὶ ἀνδρείαν δῆ, οἵματι τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἔκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θύμοιδὲς διασώζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ύπό τοῦ λόγου (reason) παραγγελθέν δεινόν τε καὶ μῆ. It is this application of the knowledge attained by the human reason (λόγος) to the practical questions of morality which is more particularly signified by φρόνησις.

52. σκιαγραφία: no better account of the meaning of this word can be given than the scholiast's note on the word σκαρφασμός in Ar. Frgs 1493 σκαρφασίεις γάρ τοῦ γραφήματος ὑποτυπώσασι (adumbrare—'to sketch in outline') πρότων τοῦ γραφομένου, καὶ σκαρφάσασθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπισειρεμένως (in a careless, slovenly way) τι ποιεῖν καὶ μή κατὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀκρίβειαν, σκιαγραφεῖν. The word σκιαγραφεῖν seems to have been applied particularly to a kind of scene-painting which was intended to produce its effect at a distance, and not to be closely inspected: a modern 'impressionist' picture conveys something very like what is meant by σκιαγραφία. This use is amply illustrated by other passages, e.g. The. 208 ε ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὄστερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου ἐνώπιον οὐδὲ ἄμακρον· ἦσ'* δὲ ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν ἐφαίνετο τί μοι λέγεσθαι, Rep. 523 β τὰ πόρρωθεν φαινόμενα δήλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημένα, Crit. 107 ε σκιαγραφία δὲ ἅσαφει καὶ ἀπαθηλω χρώμεθα. Or again Ar. Metaph. ἵν. 29 (a good parallel to our passage) τὰ δὲ δόσα ἐστὶ μὲν ὅντα, πέφυκε μέντοι φαινεσθαί ἢ μή οἷα ἢ τίνι ἢ τίνι, οἰον ἡ σκιαγράφια καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἷς ὑπὲρι τὴν φαντασίαν. On a superficial view the popular virtue appears to be identical with the real philosophic virtue, but on closer examination it is seen to be something very far short of it (οὐ κατὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀκρίβειαν).

53. ἀνδραποδώδης: Professor Geddes has an illuminating note: 'an apt illustration of the force of the word may be drawn from Bion's allegory (Plut. Mor. 7 c), whereby pretenders to philosophy were likened to the suitors in the
Odyssey, who, while they professed to aspire to the hand of the queen, became content with the menial company of the slaves, who were but the handmaids of Penelope.'

55. κἀθαρας... καθαρμός: 'the process of purification... the state of being purified.' What this purification is is explained in 67 c.

58. τὰς τελετάς: almost certainly refers to the Orphic, not the Eleusinian mysteries; cf. note on ἐν ἀπορρήτοις 62 Β. The worshippers of Dionysus carried the mystic wand (θύρσος) of 'fennel' (νάρθηξ): βάκχαι are the 'true worshippers' of the god, and the hexameter line πολλοί μὲν ναρθηκόφοροι βάκχαι δὲ τε παύρων became proverbial of outward profession as contrasted with the rarer genuine enthusiasm of worship. Clement of Alexandria quotes it as a Gentile parallel to the πολλοί γὰρ εἰσὶν κλητοὶ, ὀλγοῦν δὲ ἐκλεκτοὶ of the Gospel.

60. αἰνίττεσθαι: 'to express a hidden truth in language not to be taken literally,' 'to speak in riddles'; cf. Plat. Apol. 21 Β τί ποτε αἰνίττεται ὁ θεός;

ἀμύητος: for the happiness of the initiated in the afterlife cf. the song of the 'Mystae' in Ar. Frogs 455—

μόνοις γὰρ ημῖν ἥλιος
καὶ φέγγος ἵλαρόν ἐστιν,
δοσιν μεμυθείτω εὖν
σεβή τε διήγομεν
τρόπων.

67. ὡν: must be taken as masc., partitive gen. with γενέσθαι, D 'of whose number'; in construction οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπτον is to be taken as outside the sentence, strengthening προθυμήθην οὐδὲν ἀπολείπτον ἐν τῷ βίω.

70. ὀρθὸς: 'recte'—'in a right direction,' whereas above with οἱ περιφολοσοφηκότες it means rather 're vera'—'in the true sense.'

καὶ τι ἣνύσαμεν: sc. ἡμεῖς οἱ περιφολοσοφηκότες.

73. ὡς εἰκῶτος: this is not a definition of ταῦτα, but depends rather on an idea contained in ἀπολογοῦμαι, 'this is the defence I offer of my contention that it is not without reason': the word ἀπολογοῦμαι refers back of course to 63 Α and Ε—καὶ ἀμα σοι ἀπολογία ἐσται.

CHAPTER XIV

69 e–70 c, c. xiv. All this were very well, replies Kebes, if we were sure that death did no more than release the soul
from her bodily prison. But how do we know that on quitting the body she does not vanish away like a breath? we need some strong assurance that the soul has a conscious and intelligent existence after death. True, says Socrates, and no more fitting subject of discourse could be found for one so near to death as I am.

Thus we distinctly see that the question of the immortality of the soul turns up, not as the main subject of the dialogue, but as arising out of the principal thesis.

70 A 6. [διάφθειρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύται]: with these words retained in the sentence, there is a very harsh asyndeton of these verbs and the following subjunctive οἴχηται. Schanz brackets οἴχηται...ἐτι οὐδαμοῦ ὑ, but there is a strong objection to this on the point of style. Plato would never have followed up his verb διάφθειρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύται with two participles ἀπαλλαττομένη and διασκέδασθείσα, standing in quite different relations to the main verb διάφθειρηται, and ending the sentence; whereas preceding the main verb they are quite natural. This same argument refutes the suggestion that Plato was led into repeating his main verb διάφθειρηται (contrary to grammar) by the long intervening participial clause, because these participles themselves imply that the main verb is still to come. We are driven then to regard οἴχηται...καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτι οὐδαμοῦ ὑ as the main verb, and διαφθ. καὶ ἀπολλύται as a gloss on the phrase οἴχηται διαπτομένη. Failing this, I should prefer, with Heindorf, to retain διάφθειρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύται, and put a comma after οὕματος: in that case καὶ would connect, not the participles ἀπαλλαττομένη and ἐκβαινοῦσα, but the two subjunctives διαφθειρήται and οὐδὲν ἐτι οὐδαμοῦ ὑ.

8. εὐθύς: goes closely with the participle—'in the very moment of leaving': cf. 75 B γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐωρώμεν: 75 C ἡπιστάμεθα...εὐθὺς γενόμενοι.


Β 16. παραμυθιάς: 'reassurance': cf. 83 A ἡ φιλοσοφία τίν ψυχὴν ἣρέμα παραμυθείται, 115 B ταῦτα μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθομένου ἁμα μὲν ὑμᾶς ἁμα δ' ἐμαυτῶν.

πίστεως: 'proof': cf. Isocr. 28 B ταῖς γὰρ πίστευσιν αἱ τοὺς ἄλλους λέγοντες πιθομένοι ταῖς αὐταῖς ταῦταις βουλευόμενοι χρώμεθα. Cf. use of Latin 'fides.'

ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ...καὶ των δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν: these are two distinct theses: (i.) that the soul
exists, (ii.) that it has faculties and intelligence: the latter is proved (a) directly by the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, (b) less directly though more securely by the argument which bases the immortality of the soul on its kinship with the Ideas, chaps. 48-50, which is anticipated in chaps. 25-29.

20. διαμυθολογῶμεν: equivalent to διαλεγόμεθα: cf. Apol. 39 E ὁδεῖν γὰρ κωλῦει διαμυθολόγησαι, following ἥδεως ἀν διαλεχθεῖσιν.

25. κομψοτοιός: the comic poet Enpolis is quoted as C saying μισώ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην τὸν πτωχὸν ἄδολεσχὴν, though the reference here is no doubt specially to Aristophanes, who had introduced in the Clouds a travesty of Socrates, who is represented as hung in mid-air in a basket, and made to say—ll. 226-231—

ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἦλιον.
... οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε
ἐξεύρων ὑρθὼς τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα,
ei μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα
λεπτὴν καταμίξας εἰς τὸν ὄμοιον ἄερα.
Plato deeply resented this attack, as is clear from the Apology 19 C (of Aristophanes) φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλιναρίαν φλιναροῦντα.

ἄδολεσχή: 'to prate,' 'talk garrulously,' from ἄδην, λέσχη: this word also occurs in Ar. Clouds 1463 ἐμὸν παρανοήσαντος ἄδολεςχία. Geddes remarks 'Aristophanes continued in the same attitude towards Socrates to the end, in the Birds (414 B.C.) and Frogs (405 B.C.): it would be interesting to know what were the real feelings of Aristophanes during this month of Thargelion, B.C. 399.'

CHAPTER XV

70 c-72 n, cc. xv.-xvii. Tradition says that the souls of the dead come back from Hades and live again on earth. That this belief is reasonable we may argue in the following way. All nature shows the generation of opposite from opposite; thus greater arises from less, worse from better, swifter from slower. And between each of such pairs of opposites there are two processes, one in either direction; as between greater and less are increase and decrease, and similar processes between every other pair. Therefore since life and death are such a pair of opposites, we shall expect to find two similar processes between the living and the dead. We see one such process take place before our eyes; the living pass over to the dead: if then
nature's work is not here left incomplete, there must be the other process that we do not see, and the dead pass over to the living. A yet stronger confirmation is this: did all things travel in one direction and were there no return, in the end all living things would die and remain dead, and life would be swallowed up in death. But if it be true that souls return again from the dead, they must be somewhere after their departure from the body; for certainly if they perished utterly, they could return again no more.

We have here one half of the first stage of the argument, which is complemented by the inference from reminiscence that follows. It is true, this argument of ἀναπόθοσις implies the ante-natal existence of the soul, but it is used mainly as evidence of her existence after death. Note also that it proves ὃς ἔστιν ἡ ψυχῇ ἐν "Ἠιδοῦ, not ὃς δύναμιν καὶ φύσιςιν ἔχει. (Archer-Hind.)

1. εἴτ' ἄρα: a noteworthy idiom, where what some one else says is put to the test.

3. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος: cf. Hdt. ii. 123 πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αιγύπτιοι εἰσί οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπους ψυχῆς ἀδάματός ἐστι, τὸν σώματος δὲ καταφθινόντος ἐς ἄλλο ζώον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσώφεται, ἐπεάν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαία καὶ τὰ θαλάσσαι καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὕτης ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσώθηκε· τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτὴ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχίλισι ἔτεοι. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἱ Ἑλλήνων ἑχρησαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον οἱ δὲ ἐστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωτάν ἐνυτι· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω. He appears in the last sentence to refer to the Orphic and Pythagorean sects, who believed in the immortality and transmigration of souls.

D 10. μὴ οὖσαι: i.e. εἰ μὴ ἡμῶν, 'if they had no existence.'

11. τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι: 'of the truth of this proposition,'viz. ὡς εἰσίν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ.

17. καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν: from other Platonic discussions of metempsychosis (e.g. Phaedrus 249 B) it is clear that Plato attributed immortality to the souls of beasts, and from Timaeus 77 Α that his principle extended even to vegetable life.

E 20. ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὄν τοιοῦτον τι: 'all things that have an opposite': τοιοῦτῳ τι ἐναντίον τι: cf. above 58 v note.

71 A 32. τι δὲ; 'or again,' as we should say: cf. below τι δ’ αὖ;

B 42. καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω: 'and these (αἴξησις καὶ φθίσις) are the names we give to the processes of growing on the one hand and decaying on the other.'

46. καὶ εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα: Wagner takes χρώμεθα as subj.,
and explains καύν εἰ as = καλ εἰ ἄνv, i.e. καλ ἓανv: but this surely neglects the common Platonic use of καύν εἰ for the simple καλ εἰ. The usage of καύν shows three stages: (i.) καύν with optative of the apodosis: here we often have καλ, properly belonging to εἰ, attached to ἄνv, in the form καύν ... εἰ = καλ εἰ ... ἄνv: e.g. νὸν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ, καύν ἀσέβειαν εἰ καταγιγνώσκοι, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν Dem. (= καλ εἰ καταγιγνώσκοι ... ποιεῖν ἄνv): (ii.) καύν ... εἰ, used where the verb of the apodosis is no longer one which requires ἄνv: it has now become a 'formula' = 'even if': this is the common Platonic usage, as in our passage: cf. καύν εἰ μή τω δοκεῖ, Rep. 473 a: (iii.) in later Greek it is used even without εἰ as an emphatic καλ: cf. Theocr. xxiii. 41 καύν νεκρῶ χαράσαι τὰ σὰ χείλεσσα: in its two later stages it is a colloquialism, such as are not infrequent in both Greek and Latin: cf. use of ὅστορ ὅ with an imperative, and in Latin 'ut' with an indicative: e.g. audin ut intonuit laevum?

CHAPTER XVI

2. ἔγρηγορέναι: a good instance of the use of the Greek C perfect to express a 'state' as contrasted with a 'process,' ἀνεγερέσθαι: similarly θεβάναι is the 'state of death.'

21. ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων: this will be misunderstood unless we bear in mind the precise definition of τεθνεώς given in 64 c, as the condition of the soul's existence 'apart from the body.'

29. ἄλλα ταύτη χωλή ἔσται ἡ φύσις: observe then that Ε this proof of the 'previous existence of the soul' rests on the principle of the 'uniformity of nature': had Plato rested satisfied with this proof, it would be important to point out a fundamental fallacy which vitiates it—viz. that we have no proof that the 'soul' is subject to a rule which applies to the 'material' world, the rule of 'alternating processes': Plato himself indicates that only one of the processes is clear, the other is an 'assumption' on the principle of the 'uniformity of nature' — ἡ γ' ἐτέρα σαφῆς οὐδα τυγχάνει, τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν ... οὐκ ἀνταποδώσωμεν τὴν ἕναντιαν γένεσιν; Again in ch. xxiv. when this argument is concluded, the suspicion is again suggested that these 'physical laws of nature' do not apply to the soul, in the form of the 'childish fear' (77 ε) lest perchance at the moment of separation from the body the soul is 'caught up and scattered,' by the wind.

32. ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄν εἰν γένεσις: observe that Plato has not yet proved, as this seems to suggest, that the living are born from 'the dead,' i.e. from souls which have already 'lived
and died,' but only from souls which were previously in the state called τεθνηκός, 'existence apart from the body': in substituting of τεθνεώτες for τὸ τεθνηκός Plato is perhaps unconsciously stealing a step in the argument which is not proved till the next chapter: it is not till chapter xvii. that he proves that this soul, τὸ τεθνηκός, can only be soul which has once 'lived.'

36. καὶ ταύτη: with ὡμολογεῖται, 'by this line of reasoning too.'

CHAPTER XVII

The argument of this chapter is closely connected with the preceding: its conclusion is the complement of what he has already proved. It rests, however, on a quite different scientific principle, that of the 'conservation of energy': the argument is briefly this—if 'living' arises from 'dead,' then if 'living' is not to come to an end, the stock of 'dead' must constantly be replenished, and this can only be if the 'living' constantly pass into the state of 'dead,' viz. 'existence of the soul apart from the body.' It is the principle 'ex nihilo nihil fit,' a principle which had been laid down as regards 'matter' by the early Greek philosophers: cf. Anaxagoras γιγνώσκεν χρή ὁτι πάντα (i.e. the sum total of things) οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω ἐστιν οὐδὲ πλέω: οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλέω εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἵσα ἀιεῖ: Arist. Metaph. τὸ γὰρ μηθὲν ἐκ μὴ δυντος γιγνεσθαι πάν ὅ ἐξ δυντος, σχέδων πάντων ἐστὶ κοινῶν δόγμα τῶν περὶ φύσεως. But can the soul be brought under περὶ φύσεως? Is the argument from 'material' to 'spiritual' more than an analogy? Various alternatives to Plato's conclusion might obviously be suggested: e.g. that the supply of ψυχή is infinite and inexhaustible, or that each soul is created by a creator; or again that, because it is not inexhaustible, life will some day cease to be. Plato's whole argument implies that 'soul' is in some measure 'material,' and not a mere vital principle.

3. τὰ ἑτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα: if the alternating processes did not correspond: 'if each alternating process had not its corresponding reverse process.'

6. καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτω τάλων: the metaphor is from the δίανικος δρόμος in the race-course: cf. Aesch. Ag. 344 κάψαι διαίλων θάτερον κώλου τάλων. The idea can be best illustrated by a
simple mathematical figure: \( A = \tau \ \vartheta \nu \varphi \kappa \), \( B = \tau \ \zeta \ \omega \nu \) : soul proceeds from \( A \) to \( B \), then back along the corresponding semicircle to \( A \), to replenish the stock of \( \vartheta \nu \varphi \kappa \) : were the process \( \vartheta \nu \delta \varepsilon \alpha \), a straight line from \( A \) to \( B \) with no turning back, the stock of \( A \), not being infinite and not being replenished from \( B \), would in the end be exhausted.

14. πάντ' ἀν λήρον τὸν 'Ευδ. ἀποδείξευν : lit. ‘everything would show Endymion to be mere child’s play,’ i.e. the universal state of sleep would make the story of Endymion seem nothing in comparison. Endymion was a beautiful youth, who, as he slept on Mount Latmos, in Caria, melted the heart of the goddess of the moon to love; she cast over him the spell of perpetual sleep (cf. Keats’ *Endymion*).

15. οὐδαμοῦ : Wohlrab strangely explains this as ‘genitive of price’! comparing καὶ οῦδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμὸν ἦν ἠλάξαν : but there as here it is the adverb of place—‘nowhere’: cf. the English colloquialism ‘he was nowhere,’ i.e. ‘he was not prominent’; this is admirably illustrated by Dem. de Cor. § 310 ἐν οἷς οὐδαμοῦ σὺ φανήσει γεγονός, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, οὐ τέταρτος, οὐ πέμπτος, οὐχ ἕκτος, οὐχ ὀποστοσοῦν.

19. ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα : the state of ‘Chaos,’ which Anaxagoras attributed to the universe before νοῦς came and set all things in order: cf. the words of Diogenes Laert. about Anaxagoras—πάντα χρήματα ἢν ὁμοῦ : εἶναι ὁ νοῦς ἑδίκαν αὐτὰ ἀνακόσμησε.

25. έκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων : i.e. έκ τῶν μὴ τεθνεωτῶν.

26. μὴ οὐ : the double negative is used because τὸς ἐκκαθαρίσθη, being a rhetorical question, is logically equivalent to οὐδεμία μηκανῆ.

27. καταναλώθηκαί εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι : lit. ‘being exhausted into death,’ i.e. ‘the store of existence would be exhausted and end in universal death’: observe the use of εἰς to express ‘the issue or end,’ τελευτῶν εἰς καταξάνειν εἰς φωνικίδα, ‘to cut into red rags,’ Ar. Aech. 320 : so in Latin ‘in’ with accusative: ‘denique in familiae lectum atque in privignarum funus nupsit,’ Cic. pro Clu. § 188.

35. θυσίας εἶναι : these words are followed in the mss. by καὶ τοῖς μὲν γ’ ἀγαθαῖς ἀμείνων εἶναι τοῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον, a stupid interpolation, foreign to the argument, due to a memory echo of 63 c.

**CHAPTER XVIII**

72 e–76 d, cc. xviii.–xxi. Kebes observes that another line of argument tends to show that our souls are immortal, the
theory that learning is reminiscence. If questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing that the knowledge sought exists in the mind of the respondent; as we see in the case of geometrical truths. For the satisfaction of Simmias Socrates adds the following demonstration. Reminiscence we define as recalling to mind something we formerly knew but had forgotten. For instance, a lover on seeing a lyre thinks of his beloved who used the lyre; similarly a picture of a lyre or a horse may remind us of a man, a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes, or finally a picture of Simmias may remind us of Simmias himself: so that we see reminiscence may be effected either directly or indirectly. Now if it is effected directly, that is, if the object we perceive is similar to that which it calls to our minds, we cannot fail to notice how far the resemblance is exact. For example, we affirm that there is an Idea of equality, which is called to our minds by our perception of sensibles which are equal. That this Idea is something distinct from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles may appear equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the Idea of equality no difference of opinion can exist. Now we are to observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the sensibles. And whereas (1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, (2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the Idea must have been acquired before our birth (75 c). Now this of course applies to all Ideas as well as to that of equality. Since then we have obtained this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it at birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on this ground: if a man knows a thing he can give an account of it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the Ideas: it follows then that the second alternative is true; we lose it, and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our souls certainly did not acquire this knowledge during their human life they must have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it.

The argument from ἀνάμνησις proves the existence of the soul before birth, thus supplementing ἀνταπόδοσις which is chiefly used to show her existence after death. Moreover ἀνάμνησις shows, what ἀνταπόδοσις did not, that the soul δίναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει apart from the body.

The Platonic doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, the next argument
in favour of immortality, is one of the most interesting of all his theories: it is closely bound up with his theory of Ideas (for which cf. Introd. B). The germ of the doctrine is contained in the words in 73 A ἐρωτῶμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλὸς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πάντα ἡ ἔχει: learning and teaching are, according to this doctrine, merely a process of drawing out of the mind, and making conscious, knowledge which was gained in a previous existence of intercourse with the Ideas. The most concise statements of the theory are contained in the Meno, which deals mainly with it: cf. Meno 81 c ἀτε οὖν ἡ ψυχή ἀθανάτος τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα καὶ ἐωρακύια καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἀιδώ καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τε οὐ μεμάθηκεν, ὡστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστῶν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οὔσα τε εἰναι αὐτὴν ἀνάμνη- σθηραι ἢ γε καὶ πρότερον ἡπίστατο. ἀτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦσα οὐσῆς, καὶ μεμαθηκεῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἄπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μονὸν ἀναμνησθέντα, ὥ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τάλλα πάντα ἀνευρεῖ, ἕαν τις ἄνδρειος ἢ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμης ἑρτῶν· τὸ γὰρ ἤπεον ἀρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνεις ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἔστιν; and again Phaedrus 249 c τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἡ ποτ' εἴδεν ἣμων ἡ ψυχὴ συμπεριεθέσθαι καὶ ὑπεριστρόφα μὴ νῦν εἰναι φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ δυν ὄντως.

3. ὁν σὺ εἰδώθας θαμὰ λέγειν: Plato attributes all his E doctrines to Socrates: this, like many others, was not fully developed by the historic Socrates; cf. Introd. B.

18. ἐπεί τοι: the mss. have ἐπειτα, which is retained by 73 A some editors, and made to introduce a specially striking instance of the general truth expressed in the earlier clause: cf. Latin 'cum . . . tum' (or rather 'cum . . . tum maxime'); but it is very doubtful whether ἐπειτα will bear this meaning, and Heindorf's emendation ἐπεί τοι is probably right.

19. τὰ διαγράμματα: 'mathematical diagrams': transl. by B Cic. Tusc. i. 17. 38 'descriptions.'

20. κατηγορεῖ: sc. ὁ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα: for this use of κατηγορεῖν in the sense of 'proclaim,' 'assert,' 'prove' cf. Hdt. iv. 189 καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ οὖνομα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι ἐκ Λιβυῆς ἦκεν ἡ στολὴ τῶν Παλλαδίων.

26. παθεῖν: incomparably better than the mss. μαθεῖν, which would mean 'to learn the meaning of': παθεῖν is to go through the experience of which we speak.' For the asyndeton of ἀναμνησθήναι after τοῦτο cf. 74 A τάδε προσπάσχει, ἐννοεῖν.

38. ἐννοήσῃ: we have no precise English equivalent: C 'think of,' 'have suggested to one,' 'get an idea of'; Lat. 'venit mihi in mentem.' This is the earliest suggestion of what
is so familiar in Locke's system of philosophy, the 'association of ideas.'

39. oů μη ή αυτη επιστήμη: μη because the clause is 'general.'

D 46. ἐγνωσαν: the so-called 'gnomic' aorist, where a universal truth is stated as a matter of past experience: the origin of this aorist can be best seen from such examples as Thuc. ii. 89 πολλα στρατόπεδα ἤδη ἐπεσεν ὑπ' ἐλασσόνων: Plato Critias 108 ἀθυμούντες ἄνδρες οὕπω τρόπαιον ἔστησαν. This is supported by the use of the pluperfect in the subordinate clause below 75 εἰ ὑπὸ χρόνον καὶ τοῦ μη ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέλυστο, which indicates a reference to cases in the past.

Ε 59. οὐκοιν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἱδόντα: 'the order in which these illustrations are arranged seems at first sight strange. For instead of working up from the simpler and more direct cases of association to the more complex, we have, as it were, a descending scale: it is surely more remarkable that the picture of a lyre should remind us of some particular human being than that a picture of Simmias should remind us of the living Simmias. But the explanation is simple, if we remember how Plato intends to apply his analogy. The particulars, by which we are reminded of the Ideas, stand in much the same relation to the Ideas as the painted Simmias to the real Simmias: hence by this arrangement of his examples Plato emphasises exactly the right form of the analogy. 'This is one of ten thousand proofs of the astonishing carefulness of Plato's writing' (R. D. Archer-Hind).

CHAPTER XIX

74 A 2. εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὀμοίων: as for instance the recollection of Simmias from the picture of Simmias, and in this chapter the recollection of the Idea from the particular.

6. τι ἐλλείπει: τι is accus. of extent, ἐλλείπει being intransitive.

11. παρά ταῦτα πάντα: 'above and beyond all these.'

B 15. λαβόντες αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην: ἐπιστήμη is not used in its full Platonic sense of 'scientific knowledge,' 'knowledge based on the Ideas,' for to say that we get this ἐπιστήμη from the particular objects of sense would contradict the whole of Platonic teaching on the subject: he uses it here somewhat loosely for ἐννοια, our idea or 'conception' of αὑτοῦ δ' ἔστιν: cf. 74 οτι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννοικάσε τε καὶ ἐλαθεῖς.
20. τῷ μὲν ἱσα . . τῷ δ' οὖ : most editors read τότε μὲν . . τότε δέ, making it refer to the judgment of the same individual on different occasions, and supporting this view by ἐστὶν ὅτε ἄνισὰ σοι ἑφάνῃ below, where the judgment of one person only is clearly in question: this reading τότε μὲν . . τότε δέ, though linguistically awkward after ἐνιοτε, is of course not logically inconsistent with it, as ἐνιοτε means 'in some cases,' and answers to ἐστὶν ὅτε in ἐστὶν ὅτε ἄνισὰ σοι ἑφάνῃ; But τῷ μὲν . . τῷ δέ has slightly superior mss. authority, and, while avoiding the awkwardness referred to, is logically quite adequate: the variety of men's opinions as to the equality of 'equal objects' is sufficient to point the contrast between τὰ ἱσα and αὐτὸ τὸ ἱσον.

22. αὐτά τὰ ἱσα : this remarkable plural of αὐτό τὸ ἱσον has an exact parallel in Parmen. 129 β εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτά τὰ ὁμοία τις ἀπέφαινεν ἄνιμοια γεγονόμενα ἢ τὰ ἄνιμοια ὁμοία, τέρας ἂν, ὁμιλαί, ἤν, a passage which indicates the point of using the plural αὐτά τὰ ἱσα. The idea of comparison involves two terms: A must be compared with B: to ask whether A is equal, without any B to compare it with, is nonsense: hence the plural. This is better than the explanation of Olympiodorus, who makes αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα mean 'the Idea of equality in the minds of various individuals': is not this inconsistent with σοι ἑφάνῃ?

25. ταὐτά τε τὰ ἱσα : 'these equal particulars.'

28. ὅμως αὐτοῦ : sc. ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἱσον.

30. οὖκοὖν ἢ ὁμοίοις ὄντος . . Πάννυ μὲν οὖν : it seems quite necessary to bracket this passage as an interpolation. 'In the present context the repeated definition of ἀνάμυσις is surely pointless: and worse than pointless is the reintroduction of the ὁμοίων καὶ ἄνιμων: for the reminiscence of the Idea by means of the particulars is necessarily ἄφ' ὁμοίων. . . The whole force of the argument comes from the fact that this kind of reminiscence is ἄφ' ὁμοίων, for in this case alone are we conscious of a defect in the resemblance (74 A): and our consciousness of this defect is our sole warrant for inferring that we must have known the Ideas before we perceived the particulars (74 E)' (R. D. Archer-Hind).

38. αὐτό δ' ἐστιν: 'that which the thing itself really is,' one of the most frequent Platonic phrases: it signifies the thing in question in its essential nature, separated from all those extraneous conditions involved in its material existence. It is the watchword of the Platonic theory of Ideas—the λόγος, definition, concept, essence, idea of a thing. Cf. Introd. B.

ἡ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι : this is the reading
which has by far the strongest mss. authority, and may be translated 'or does it fall short of absolute equality in respect of being similar to it?' The editors have rung the changes on ἐκείνον τὸν, ἐκείνῳ τῷ (Madvig 'does there lack anything to that quality of being like'?—very questionable Greek!), ἐκείνου τῷ μή: the last gives the best sense of all, if we are prepared to insert μή: 'or does it fall short of that absolute equality, by not being similar to it?' I feel convinced that the subject of ἔνδει must be the same as of φαίνεται (viz. equal particulars), and that ἐκείνου most certainly is αὐτὸ ὑπὸ ἑστίν ἴσον.

Ε 49. προεδεύει τὸ ἴσον: this would suggest that on the first occasion of making such a comparison, the Idea of equality springs forth from the brain like the fully-armed Athena from the head of Zeus, a conclusion which is hardly borne out by psychology. Does the child, when it first begins to compare two things which are like, consciously or unconsciously refer them to an ideal standard of equality? Is it not truer that the 'conception' of equality, or any other conception, is derived from the observation of particulars helped by memory and reasoning, and is a constant growth from the most rudimentary stage to the most developed? An interesting comparison might be drawn from this point of view between the Platonic Ideas and Kant's 'Categories,' the latter being, according to the Kantian philosophy, logically prior to experience.

75 A 57. ταύτων δὲ πάντα ταύτα λέγω: not 'I say the same of all these' (Wagner), but 'I count all these as the same thing,' as is shown by the following words ταύτων γὰρ ἑστίν. 59. ἄλλα μὲν δὴ: μὲν is here the same as μὴν: 'verum enimvero': 'but of course.'

B 63. πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἀρξασθαι: ἄρα indicates that this is an inference from what has just preceded. But is the inference a logical one? All that ἐκ γε τῶν αἰτοθεσεων δει ἐννοησαι can mean is 'the reflection ὅτι πάντα... ὀρέγεται κτλ. is suggested by our perceptions.' To translate it 'our ability to refer it to an ideal standard arises from our perceptions' of course contradicts the very point Plato is making, that the Ideas are prior to perception. Plato's conclusion does not follow logically. It is clear from Plato's argument that before we passed the judgment ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα κτλ. we must have had the idea of equality; but surely the child that sees two like things does not pass this judgment the first time it sees them, and that is the only argument that could prove Plato's inference.

65. ἐδει... εἰ ἐμέλλομεν: here of course not an unfulfilled condition in the present, but an ordinary condition in the past,
67. ὃτι προθυμεῖται: a ‘constructio ad sensum,’ giving the
deduction drawn from a reference to the ideal: so that ἀνοίσεω
is virtually equal to ἀνοίσεων ἐνθυμοῦμενον. Or possibly ὃτι προ-
θυμεῖται defines ἐκεῖα. The clause ὃτι προθυμεῖται... φαινότερα
is bracketed by Hirschig and Archer-Hind, on the grounds (i)
that it is irrelevant, (ii) that the use of προθυμεῖται is very
strange: but (i) is not a very cogent argument here: at the
worst it is superfluous: and is προθυμεῖται more strange than
ὁρέγεται just above?

CHAPTER XX

1. εἰ μὲν λαβόντες: observe that this is a purely imaginary C
condition: ‘if we were born in possession of them,’ implying
neither that we were nor were not: Plato says later on that
‘we were not born in possession of them.’

9. οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ δ ἔστι: ‘on which we set the D
seal of real existence’: ‘which we label, δ ἔστιν’: cf. Political
258 c τῇ πολιτικῇ µίαν ἱδέαν ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, where it is
repeated as ἐπισημαίνομαι.

καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν κτλ.: ‘in our dialectic dis-
cussions,’ a precise definition of the Socratic dialectic method
of question and answer.

14. ἐκάστοτε: sc. ‘in each instance,’ i.e. ‘when each of us
is born’: or possibly (with the same meaning) closely with
λαβόντες, ‘in each instance of our receiving it.’ Observe the
perfect ἐπικτῆσεμεθα: Plato as yet expresses no opinion either
in favour of or against the supposition.

εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι: this of course depends on
ἀναγκαῖον.

19. εἰ δὲ γε οἶμαι: both γε and οἶμαι indicate that Plato is Ε
approaching the supposition which he favours, by throwing
emphasis on it.

24. οἰκεῖαν: ‘one which is already ours,’ not ἄλλοτριάν,
‘derived from outside.’

27. ἐφάνη: sc. 73 c above.

αἰσθόμενον ἡ ἱδώντα: these are not alternatives:
‘perceived whether by sight or hearing or by any other sense.’

29. ὃ τοῦτο ἐπιστράτευεν: ‘with which this was associated,
whether unlike or like’: ὃ refers to ἐτερών τι... δ ἐπικτῆσεμεθα,
tοῦτο το τοῦτον in ἀπὸ τοῦτον.
CHAPTER XXI

B 7. δούναι λόγον: 'give an account of,' i.e. an accurate definition and explanation: cf. Resp. 534 β ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικόν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας (ἐκάστου depends on τῆς οὐσίας—'the essential nature of each thing'); καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ δίδοναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;

9. περὶ τούτου: sc. about the Ideas.

12. αὕτων τηνικάδε: 'to-morrow at this hour,' i.e. when Socrates is dead.

C 21. χωρίς σωμάτων: this is not quite germane to the argument; Plato as yet is only authorised to say 'apart from these particular bodies in which we have our souls.'

καὶ φρόνησιν εἴχων: Plato has made a fresh point by his theory of ἀνάμνησις, which proves the soul's previous 'intelligent existence': ἀνταπόδοσις only proved its previous 'existence.'

23. οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἐτι ὁ χρόνος: there are only three possible times at which the soul can have acquired the knowledge of Ideas: (a) since birth; (b) before birth; (c) at the moment of birth. (a) has been disproved; (c) is now suggested by Simmias, only to be shown to be absurd, as that is the moment at which we lose it: there remains only (b), and that proves the soul's previous intelligent existence.

D 24. ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποιῷ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; this Platonic theory, that we lose our knowledge of the Ideas at the moment of birth and gradually recover it during life by being reminded of them by the objects of sense, naturally suggests a comparison with Wordsworth's famous 'Ode on the Intimations of Immortality'—
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing Boy,
But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,
He sees it in his joy:
The Youth, who daily farther from the east
Must travel, still is Nature's Priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended;
At length the Man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day.

The contrast between the two conceptions is even more pronounced than their similarity. Wordsworth's idea being that we are born as it were with some faint memories of a previous blissful existence still clinging about us, which gradually grow fainter as they are obliterated by the experience of life. It would be beside the point to attempt to say which of the two contains the greater element of truth, as Wordsworth's conception is not an attempt to solve a psychological problem, but only the beautiful dream of a poet.

CHAPTER XXII

76 d–77 b, c. xxii. The outcome of the preceding argument is this: the pre-existence of our souls is inseparably bound up with the existence of Ideas and the former stands or falls with the latter. Simmias heartily assents to this and affirms his unshaken conviction that the Ideas do exist and consequently that our souls existed before our birth.

5. ἰπάρχουσαν πρότερον ... ἀναγκαίον οὕτως: Archer-E Hind brackets these words as a clumsy gloss on ἀναφέρομεν, adding a number of cogent arguments: the most decisive point against their genuineness is the use of ταῦτα = 'the objects of sense,' whereas ταῦτα in the remainder of the sentence is used three times to mean 'the Ideas.'

7. ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν: 'so surely as these Ideas exist, so surely do our souls exist even before we are born.'
9. έί δε μη ἔστι ταύτα obviously means ‘and if these Ideas do not exist.’

10. ἄλλως: ‘in vain’: ‘then our argument will have been to no purpose.’

15. εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει: Wagner entirely misunderstands this, paraphrasing ‘our argument has an admirable tendency to prove that our soul exists, in like manner, before we are born, as also the substance of which you are speaking now’: he makes εἰς καλὸν = εἰς καλὸν καρδόν, and ὤμοιος apparently to mean ὤμοιος ὄσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ‘just as much before birth as in life.’ But it is obvious that εἰς καλὸν is defined by the clause εἰς τὸ ὄμοιον εἰναι . . . , καλὸν being neuter: ὄμοιος means ‘with equal (and no more than equal) certainty,’ as is shown by τε . . . καὶ. Archer-Hind’s translation gives the sense admirably: ‘our argument has found an excellent refuge in the position that the pre-existence of our soul rests on the same assurance as the existence of the Ideas,’ i.e. the two stand or fall together (ὦμοιος).

77 A 22. ἰκανῶς ἀποδεικταί: the subject of ἀποδεικταί is not τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐναι ὃς οἶνον τε μᾶλλον, but τὸ τῆν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ἐναι καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς: ‘your argument is satisfactorily proved.’

CHAPTER XXIII

77 B–D, c. xxiii. But, continues Simmias, reminiscence only proves that our soul existed before entering into a human body: it does not prove that the soul on leaving the body may not be dissipated and perish. Kebes agrees that immortality is only half proved. Socrates replies that the other half is proved by the argument from alternation of opposites, which proved that the soul must exist after death.

B 5. διασκεδάννυται: the mss. have διασκεδάννυται, with the exception that the Bodleian ms. has διασκεδάννυται, with alternative accent and η written above the line. The mss. reading must be indicative, and Riddell defends this by Meno 77 A ἄλλος ἀπως μη οὐχ οἶος τ’ ἑσομαι: but the present indicative is not defended by an example of the fut. indic. after ἀπως μη, and in our sentence we have ἦ parallel to our verb. Perhaps the contracted form of the subj. is the best of the three possible readings: cf. the contracted optative πηγνύτο 118 A.

8. ἄλλοθεν ποθεν: the mss. reading: sc. ἄλλοθεν ἦ ἐκ τῶν ζῶντων. Archer-Hind adopts Bekker’s conj. ἄμόθεν ποθεν, but
there seems to be no evidence for the omission of γε in this combination of words: it is always in classical authors ἀμὴ γε πη, ἀμοῦ γε που, ἀμῶς γε πως, ἀμόθεν γε ποθεν.

16. εἰ μελλει τέλος ἡ ἀποδείξεις ἐξευ: ‘if our proof is to be complete’, μελλει regularly takes the present, rather than the future infinitive, in this use, where there is no reference to ‘intention in the future’ or ‘probability,’ but rather indicating ‘logical necessity.’

20. ὅν πρὸ τοῖτον ὁμολογήσαμεν: the conclusion arrived at from ἀνταπόδοσις—cf. 72 λ, end of chapter xvi.

CHAPTER XXIV

77 d—78 b, ε. xxiv. Yet, says Socrates, you and Simmias seem still to have a lurking fear lest the soul on leaving the body be scattered to the winds. Perhaps, replies Ἐκεβες, there is a child within us that still needs to be soothed; and soon there will be no man living who can soothe it. Do not despair, says Socrates; wide is Hellas and wider is the world; you must spare neither pains nor riches to find such a man, not omitting to search among yourselves.

2. διαπραγματεύσασθαι: we have already met πραγματεία D 63 λ, where see note: διαπρ. is intensive—‘to discuss or investigate thoroughly,’ ‘to thrash out’: cf. 95 ε δλῶς γὰρ δὲι περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.

4. τὸ τῶν παιδῶν: it is impossible to say with certainty whether this is cognate accus. with δεδείνας, ‘to fear what children fear,’ or is outside the construction, in a loose apposition to the following μὴ clause, as we frequently find such phrases as τὸ λεγόμενον, διὸν δατέρον, and the like: ‘lest it be as children think it is, that the soul is scattered’ (Wagner): possibly in the latter case we should rather expect μὴ, τὸ τῶν παιδῶν, ὡς ἄληθῶς...

ὡς ἄληθῶς: cf. the precisely similar use in 66 c ὡστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἄληθῶς τῷ δυτὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμᾶς ἐγγίζειν αὐτόν οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν, with note.

6. διασκεδάννυσιν: this use of the indic. after μὴ with verbs of fearing marks a nice difference from the subj.; it expresses not merely a fear, but a suggestion that the thing feared is true: φοβοῦμαι μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν, ‘I am afraid we have missed both alike.’ The difference between ‘fear’ as to a fact which cannot be prevented (indic.), and ‘fear’ of a result which may be prevented (subj.), comes out admirably in Eur. Phoen. 92-95—
8. ὡς δεδιότων: the gen. absolute is not infrequently used in reference to a person or persons who afterwards come into the sentence in a different construction: cf. δαβεβηκότος ἥδη Περικλέους ἡγελθῃ αὐτῷ ὅτι Μέγαρα ἀφέστηκε (Thuc.): Wagner wrongly explains it as agreeing with τιμῶν (sc.); the following clause μᾶλλον δὲ μή ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων clearly indicates that the first δεδιότων means ἡμῶν δεδιότων.

11. ἐν ἡμῖν: not ‘among us,’ but ‘within us.’

13. μορμολύκεαιa: explained by the lexicographer Timaeus as τὰ φοβερά τοῖς παισὶ προσωπεία: ‘bogie’ is our nearest English word. It is derived from Μορμώ, a she-monster, with whom nurses and mothers would frighten their children: cf. Theocr. xv. 40 μορμώ, δάκνει ἵπτος, ‘boh’: Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 17 φοβεσθαί τούς πελταστάς, ὀσπερ μορμόνας παιδάρια: so we have the verb μορμολύττομαι, ‘to scare.’

15. ἐξεπάσητε: Heindorf’s admirable correction of ἐξιάσηται —‘until you have charmed it out of him,’ i.e. charmed the fear of death out of the παις: this seems better than Archer-Hind’s ‘charmed him out of you,’ sc. the παις out of Kebes and Simmias: ἐπάδεων αὐτῷ surely implies that the παις ἐν ἡμῖν (to whom the dative refers) is the ‘patient,’ not the ‘disease.’ The reference is to the belief, common among the Greeks, that ‘incantations’ were effective in healing disease. For ἐξεπάδεων cf. Soph. O.C. 1192—

eἰδι χάτεροις γοναὶ κακαὶ
καὶ θυμὸς ὄξυς, ἀλλὰ νουθετούμενοι
φίλων ἐπῳδαῖς ἐξεπάδονται φύσιν,

which confirms the version above, as the subject of ἐξεπάδονται (and consequently the object of ἐξεπάδεων) is the ‘patient.’ The view of philosophy as an incantation which exercises a healing influence over the soul finds frequent expression in Plato: cf. Charmides 157 θεραπευόεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφή ἐπῳδαῖς τισί·
τὰς δὲ ἐπῳδᾶς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἴπαι τοῖς καλῶς.

78 A 23. εἰς δ’ τι ἀναγκαιότερον ἀναλίσκοντε χρήματα: most recent editors insert ἀν before ἀναγκαιότερον, and its omission in the mss. may be due to the ἀν of ἀναγκαιότερον (haplography). Mr. Arthur Sidgwick has, however (vide his excellent note on Δesch. Αγ. 620 oυκ ἐσθ’ ὅπως λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλά), established
the use of the simple optative in clauses of this kind, not as a
variant of the 'potential optative with ἀν,' but as a 'remote
deliberative optative,' and so a variant of the deliberative sub-
junctive. He has collected an array of undoubted examples
both in direct and indirect sentences: Ἀτ. Plut. 438 ποι τις
φύγων; Plat. Gorg. 492 β τί κάκιον εἶν; Aesch. P. V. 292 οὐκ
ἐστιν ὅτι μείζων μοῖραν νείματι ἢ σοι; Eur. Alc. 55 ἐστ' οὖν ὅπως
Ἀλκατείς ἐς γῆρας μόλοι; They are all interrogative sentences,
and this suggests that the old explanation, that they are
potential optatives without the ἀν (a bad explanation in itself),
is to be suspected. 'ποι φύγω would be in ordinary circum-
stances the expression; but ποι φύγω is the exclamation of
supreme terror, treating escape as in the last degree unlikely.'
The idiom is certainly rare in prose; but cf. Plat. Gorg. (above)
and Euthyd. 296 ous ἔχω πῶς ἀμφισβήτησον; also Phæado 107 Α
ως οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντων τις ἄλλων καὶ ὁ ἀναβάλλει ἢ τῶν νῦν
πάροντα.

24. μετ' ἄλληλων: none of the editors notice this somewhat
unusual use of μετά with the gen. in the sense of 'among'; in
81 Α we have μετά θεῶν διάγωσα, but there it may be translated
'along with,' 'in the company of': μετά with the dat. is used
in Homer in the sense of 'among,' e.g. Π. 1. 252 μετά τρεῖς
toισιν ἄνασσεν.

27. ὑπάρχει: ὑπάρχει has its usual meaning—'that at any
rate you can rely on our doing.' ὑπάρχει, lit. 'is there to begin
with,' used of something that can be 'taken for granted,'
'counted on.'

30. μέλει: sc. ἕδομέν μοι εἶναι: 'how can it but be?'

CHAPTER XXV

78 Β–80 Ε, cc. xxv.–xxix. The question is then, what kind
of things are liable to dissolution and what are not? and to
which class does soul belong? That which is composite and
consists of parts may doubtless be resolved again into parts;
but if we can discover something which is incomposite and
without parts we may safely affirm that this, if anything, is
indissoluble. To the class of incomposites we should assign
whatever is constant and changeless; to that of composites all
that is ever-changing. Now this is precisely what constitutes
the difference between the contents of the ideal and of the
phenomenal world respectively: the Ideas are changeless,
simple, apprehensible by pure intelligence; phenomena are
ever-changing, manifold, apprehensible by mere sensation.
Let us term the former the invisible, the latter the visible world: to which sphere shall we assign soul and body respectively? (1) the body is visible, the soul is invisible: (2) when the soul apprehends by means of the bodily senses, she deals with the ever-changing and is herself filled with confusion and uncertainty; when she apprehends by herself, she deals with the changeless, and her own reflections are constant and sure: (3) when soul and body are together, the soul is mistress, the body is servant; and to command is the function of the divine, to obey is that of the mortal. For these three reasons we decide that the affinity of soul is to the divine and changeless and indissoluble, the world of Ideas; that of body to the mortal and changeful and dissoluble, the world of phenomena. Hence we should infer that while the body quickly decays, the soul is nearly if not quite indissoluble. And as even a body that is embalmed lasts for an indefinite time, how much more enduring then should we expect the soul to be?

7. πότερον ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν; πότερον is of course the neuter adj.: 'which of the two is the soul.'

9. συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτω: συντεθέντι expresses the process, συνθέτω the resultant condition: cf. a similar pair of words 68 ν ἡ διδέναι καὶ δέει. φύσει should be taken with προσήκει, not with συνθέτω.

17. ταύτα δὲ σύνθετα: for this use of δὲ with ταύτα, where the demonstrative has already been defined, to emphasise the contrast with a previously mentioned class of things, cf. 81 β τὸ δὲ τὸις δημασὶ σκοτώδες . . τούτο δὲ εἰδισμένη μισεῖν, 80 ν and 113 θ: it is the same as the so-called 'δὲ in apodosis.'

20. ἡς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι: this is merely another way of saying οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ δ ἔστι (75 β): 'that essence which we define as being.' The relation of the two genitives, ἡς and τοῦ εἶναι, to λόγον should be carefully distinguished: ἡς is an objective genitive, the thing 'of which,' the definition is given: τοῦ εἶναι is the 'genitive of definition,' describing what the λόγος consists of. Wagner gives a version which is impossible in the context—'of the existence of which we give the proofs.'

21. καὶ ἐρωτώντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι: a repetition from the words in 75 β following οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ δ ἔστι: it marks the close association in the Platonic system between the Ideas and the dialectic method.

30. τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν; an interesting use of the partitive genitive instead of περί τῶν πολλῶν, the full form of which is τί οἷς τῶν πολλῶν; cf. Ῥερ. 459 β τί δὲ ἐπίπων οἷς καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν.
32. τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμώνυμων: ἐκείνως are obviously the E Ideas,' autōn ἐκαστὸν δ' ἔστι (D): 'named after the Ideas,' i.e. defined by attributes derived from the Ideas. The series ἦ ἰσών ἦ καλῶν ἦ . . . ὁμώνυμων is not a continuation of the previous series ἦ ἴππων ἦ ἴματῶν ἦ ἄλλων ὄντων τοιούτων, but a fresh series of 'attributes' to the former—'whether equal or beautiful or sharing any attribute of the Ideas': the substantival phrase πάντων τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμώνυμων is somewhat irregularly substituted for ἦ ὁπωσοῦν ἐκείνως ὁμώνυμων. For ὁμόνυμος cf. Sophist 234b μμήματα καὶ ὁμόνυμα τῶν ἔντων ἀπεραγώμενον ἦ γραφικῇ τέχνη: καλὸς ἵππος ἐστὶ ὁμόνυμος τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν.

33. πάν τούτων ἐκείνως: an adverbial phrase in loose apposition to the following clause: cf. the frequent τὸ λεγόμενον, and possibly τὸ τῶν παιδῶν 77 D.

34. αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς . . . κατὰ ταύτα: 'uniform in their relation either to themselves or to each other': the changeable and shifting character of the phenomena of sense was a strong point in the speculations of the early Greek physical philosophers: cf. the dictum of Heracleitus πάντα ἰχθὺ.

35. ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν: 'in a manner of speaking,' in the sense of 'almost': 'never, or hardly ever.'

40. τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ: διάνοια is the 'faculty,' 79A λογισμὸς the 'process' of reasoning: cf. note on 65c.

41. ἀείδη: a synonym of οὐχ ὀρατά: 'invisible.'

CHAPTER XXVI

1. θώμεν οὖν βούλει . . . Θώμεν, ἕφη: a good illustration of the fact that the 'deliberative' and 'jussive' subjunctives are merely interrogative and positive forms of the same 'jussive' or 'hortative' subjunctive.

4. μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα: μηδέποτε because it is a definition of a 'class of things' not an individual thing: μή is the negative of the 'mental conception,' οὗ of the 'concrete fact.'

5. ἄλλο τι ἦμων αὐτῶν: ἄλλο τι is here used for the more usual ἄλλο τι ἦ (cf. 70c) meaning 'is anything else the case than that . . . ?' 'is it not the case that . . . ?' =ἀρα οὐκ; The reply οὔδεν ἄλλο then means 'that is so.'
CHAPTER XXVII

1. πάλαι ἔλεγομεν: sc. chs. ix.–xi.

C 2. προσχρήται: προσ- signifies 'uses in addition' or 'as an ally': 'uses the assistance of.'

9. τοιούτων: the familiar Platonic usage—sc. τῶν πλανω-μένων καὶ ταρασσομένων, 'the confused and unstable objects of sense': trans. 'since such is the nature of the things she grasps': so below (v) αὕτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη = τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὡσαύτως ἐξόντων. Wagner wrongly explains it as τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεων.

D 15. καὶ ἐξῆ αὐτῆ; 'when, that is to say (καὶ), she is able to do so,' viz. αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι: there seems to be a reference to 66 B μυρίας μέν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν: ἐτι δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ δύτου θήραν. ἐρώτησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμίων καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπε-πλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς.


16. περὶ ἐκείνα: this seems to mean 'in its versata,' or possibly 'living in their company' (cf. οἱ περὶ τῶν Κύρων), but the omission of οὖσα is very difficult: the words would go more naturally with the verb ἐχεῖ—'and remains constant and unvarying in her relations to the Ideas'—but this is not the sense we require: ὡσαύτως ἐχεῖ is wanted absolutely—'remains constant.' Ast conjectures ὡςπερ ἐκείνα.

19. καλῶς καὶ ἄληθῇ λέγεις: a not infrequent combination of the two alternative phrases καλῶς λέγεις and ἄληθῇ λέγεις: cf. in Latin Ter. Ad. iv. 3. 18 'et recte et verum dicis.'

Ε 24. ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου: μέθοδος is a 'scientific method,' 'process of investigation,' 'line of argument.'

CHAPTER XXVIII

3. ἡ φύσις προστάτευ: cf. above 78 C φύσει προσήκει, 80 A φύσις being the ‘natural course of things.’

4. καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἀδ: ‘in this respect,’ ‘from this point of view too.’

7. οἷον ἄρχειν: ‘of a nature to rule’: cf. 83 D οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς’Αιδών καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι: 94 E οἷας ἀγεσθαι: 98 C.

13. τάδε ἡμῖν ἐξουσίαν: ‘this is the conclusion we arrive at.’

16. ψυχή: the mss. reading, involving a slight anacoluthon. B Instead of a definition of τάδε in the acc. and infin. (ἐναι ψυχήν), we have ψυχή and σῶμα in a sort of loose apposition to τάδε, or perhaps rather put in the nom. as subjects to ἐξουσίαν, as though τάδε had not gone before. We do not need, then, either to understand ἐξουσίαν over again, or to emend to ψυχή (Wohlrab, Archer-Hind).

17. ἀνοίγω: here in the philosophic meaning as the opposite of νοθητο—‘not the object of νοῦς, intelligence.’

20. ἢ οὐκ οὕτως ἔχει: ‘qua re hoc non ita sit’: cf. Theaet. 184 C ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἢν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ οὐκ ὀρθή: ἢ is the indirect interrogative.

CHAPTER XXIX

80 E–81 E, cc. xxix., xxx. We cannot then believe that the soul when she leaves the body is scattered and dispersed; nay, if she departs pure and untainted of the body, because she has never willingly held communion with it during life, she is freed from its follies and passions and reaches the abode of the invisible, where she dwells with the gods for ever. But if she has been the companion of the body, sharing its pleasures and desires, and thinking that alone to be real which she can apprehend by it, then she departs tainted and clogged with the material; and in fear of the viewless region, weighed down by her earthly load, she flits about the visible world. Hence it is that ghosts are seen about places of burial; they are such gross spirits as cannot rise from earth, but wander about it, until for their love of the material they once more enter a bodily form.

3. ἢ ἔγγυς τι τούτου: indicates that the conclusion of the
foregoing arguments is only one of probability, that immortality is an attribute of the soul rather than of the body.

C

8. τούτων οὐδέν: sc. διαλέγονται καὶ διαπίπτειν.

9. ἐπισκέψῃς συνάν: 'satis diu,' 'a fairly long time.'

10. δὲν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων: this is the protasis to καὶ πάνυ μάλα, i.e. πάνυ μάλα συχνόν ἐπιμεῖνε χρόνον: the μὲν, by implying contrast with another clause unexpressed, adds emphasis: 'if a man dies with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous period of life': τοιαύτη refers to the words just preceding—sc. τοιαύτη ὡστε χαριέντως ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα.

12. συμπεσόν γάρ: γάρ might almost be translated 'why!'

It confirms the previous statement by adding a still stronger case.

D

15. καὶ ἄν σαπῆ: sc. τὸ σῶμα.

17. ἦ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα: ἄρα is ironical—scilicet: 'as some people would tell us,' is the sort of suggestion of the word. What Wagner means by being translated it 'as might have been expected,' I fail to see.

18. εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἐπερον: sc. ἀεὶδῆ; cf. note on 58 d.

20. εἰς 'Αἰδοὺ ώς ἀληθῶς: 'to that which may in very truth be called Hades': cf. note on 66 c.

22. αὕτη δὲ δὴ ὡμῖν: for δὲ cf. 78 c ταῦτα δὲ σῶμετα (note).

E

29. κοινωνοῦσα: we might, perhaps, have expected κοινωνίσσα, but κοινωνοῦσα is the ptc. of ἐκοινώνει, expressing a continued course of action in the past.

33. ῥαδίως: there can be little doubt that this is an ignorant gloss: not only does it alter the meaning of τεθνάναι μελετῶσα from the philosophic meaning Plato has given it, but τεθνάναι ῥαδίως is not Greek for 'to die with equanimity'; it should be ἀποθανεῖν ῥαδίως.

81 A

43. διάγουσα: the mss. reading διάγουσα involves a violent anacoluthon from the dative ptc. ἀπηλλαγμένη, with which it should be grammatically parallel. In trying to defend the reading, we are concerned not so much to justify the nom., as to explain how it may have arisen: so that we need not resort to the suggestion that the nom. is logical (as distinct from grammatical) on the ground that ὑπάρχει αὕτη εἶναι = δύναται εἶναι. Rather, perhaps, we may say that, under the influence of the intervening ὡστε ptc. clause, Plato harks back unconsciously to the form of the principal clause οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα . . ἀπερχέται, in which ζυγὶς is the subject. Much more violent
anacolutha are to be found in Thucyd. (but then Thucydides' style is entirely one of 'logic before grammar'), and even in Plato Phaedr. 241 d we read ‘φιλήν αυτῶν ἐρεῖν . . . λέγων’ (for λέγοντα). Many editors boldly alter the word here to διαγοῦση.

CHAPTER XXX

5. ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἱδονῶν: τε does not connect Β this with ὑπ’ αὐτῶ, but anticipates the following καὶ: ‘by the body, that is to say, by the lusts and pleasures.’

7. ἀλλ’ ἦ: ‘except,’ for the simple ἦ: v. note on 76 Α; cf. 68 Β, 97 Δ.

οὖ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο: the relative can be supplied in a new case (ὁ with ἵδω, ὦ with χρῆσαίτο) without being repeated: cf. 65 Α ὦ μηδὲν ἥδυ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.


14. διελημμένην: ‘interpenetrated’: the particles of corporeal matter are regarded as ‘separating,’ ‘holding apart’ the particles of soul. For the sentiment cf. Milton Comus 460-480.


26. οὐ παρέχονται αἱ τοιαύται ψυχαὶ εἰδωλα: a very interesting example of the way in which Plato uses a popular belief (or a popular expression) to illustrate a philosophic truth: there is of course more poetry than philosophy in the idea that ghosts are souls which cannot rid themselves altogether of the corporeal. Observe the characteristic middle παρέχομαι, of something which is ‘identified’ in some way with the subject of the verb: so παρέχεσθαι πῶλυ, of ‘representing’ a city at a conference, etc.; lit. ‘to contribute for one’s own part.’

29. εἰκὸς μέντοι: μέντοι of emphatic confirmation: cf. above 65 Β.

32. τροφῆς: from meaning ‘education,’ ‘way of bringing up.’ τροφή has the meaning ‘way of life’; cf. 84 Β: Soph. El. 1183 φεῦ τῆς ἀνύμφου δυσμόρου τε σῆς τροφῆς.
CHAPTER XXXI

81 e—82 b, c. xxxi. These souls pass into the bodies of animals whose habits are likest to their former way of life; the sensual into asses, the cruel into wolves and hawks; while they that have lacked philosophy but led humane and harmless lives pass into bees and wasps and ants, or even into the human form again.

Σ 1. εἰς τοιαύτα ἡθη ὑποί’ ἄττ’ ἀν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ: τοιαύτα ἡθη = ζῷα τοιούτας ἡθεῖς χρώμενα, ‘types of animals.’ Plato now reinforces his argument, that the soul’s highest duty in life is to separate itself from the bodily element, by the Pythagorean doctrine of ‘transmigration.’ According to the degree and character of the corporeal element clinging to the soul at death will be its condition in the next stage of existence—the souls contaminated with the lowest passions will pass into the bodies of the lowest orders of the animal world. We need not understand Plato as giving his deliberate approval to this precise form of the doctrine of metempsychosis. Rather he would seem to be availing himself of a familiar philosophic doctrine to reinforce his argument: the precise destiny of the souls of the wicked is not a main point of interest in the dialogue. For the belief of Pythagoras cf. Xenophanes—

καὶ ποτέ μιν στυφελείξομὲνον σκύλακος παριόντα
φασίν ἐποικείραι καὶ τόδε φάσθαί ἐπος·
παῦσαι μηδὲ ράπτεις, ἐπεί ἄγαν ἄνερος ἐστίν
ψυχή, τὴν ἐγγὺς φθεγξαμένης ἄτων.

For other passages in Plato on metempsychosis cf. Timaeus 91 d sqq., 41 e—42 d; Rep. 618 a—620 c; Phaedrus 249 b.

5. ὑβρεῖς: used here in the special sense of ‘Inst,’ ‘outrage,’ ‘stupra.’


14. ἐκαστά: a somewhat unexpected neut. pl. for ἐκάστη, ‘each group of souls’; the neuter is perhaps used because Plato is thinking of the ‘souls’ and the ‘animals’ side by side.

κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὀμοιότητας: ‘according to the peculiar affinities of their pursuits.’ [R. D. A.-H.]

16. εἰδαμονέστατοι καὶ τοιῶν: καὶ is difficult: the natural trans. would be ‘even of these’: i.e. ‘even among those
who do not attain the supreme happiness which falls to the
lot of δια φιλοσοφηκτες εν τω βιω there are degrees of happi-
ness, the happiest being those who . . .

17. την δημοτικην και πολιτικην árētēn: ‘popular and social virtue’: δημοτικη means ‘popularly so called,’ or ‘in vogue among the δημος’ (cf. 68 c ὥν οἱ πολλοὶ ὁνομαζοναι σωφροσύνην): cf. Hdt. ii. 36 διφασίσθη τὸ γράμμασι χρέωτα, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἵππα τὰ δὲ δημοτικὰ καλέται. It is defined by the following words ἥν ἡ καλοῦν σωφροσύνην κτλ.: cf. Rep. x. 619 c ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα.

22. τοιούτον: ‘a race like themselves, social and civilised.’

24. μέλιττων: the ‘locus classicus’ on the social organisation of bees is Virgil Georg. iv. ll. 153 sqq.—
solae communes natos, consortia tecta
urbis habent, magnisque agitant sub legibus aevum,
et patriam solae et certos novere penates; . .
namque aliae victu invigilant et foedere pacto
excentur agris . .
sunt quibus ad portas cecidit custodia sorti,
inque vicem speculantur aquas et nubila caeli,
ae aut onera accipiunt venientum, aut agmine facto
ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent . .
praeterea regem non sic Aegyptus et ingens
Lydia nec populi Parthorum aut Medus Hydaspes
observant: rege incolumi mens omnibus una est:
amissu rupere fidem.

Side by side with this may be set the companion picture in Shaks. Henry V. i. 2, where the life of the hive is compared to the life of a busy community.

26. ἀνδρας μετρίων: a word common in Dem. for the ‘average,’ ‘respectable citizen.’ Prof. Geddes quotes from Wordsworth’s ‘Ode to Duty,’ to illustrate how ‘the principles of a Divine Morality, giving more value to the unconscious and self-denying affections, teach greater reverence than is accorded by Plato, for the

Glad hearts, without reproach or blot,
Who do Thy work, and know it not.’

CHAPTER XXXII

82 c, d, c. xxxii. But to the company of the gods only the true philosopher can come. For this cause he keeps himself
pure from vice, not from the worldly motives that govern the vulgar, but because he will not resist philosophy when she offers freedom and purification to his soul.

3. φιλομαθεί: Rep. 376 b τό γε φιλομαθείς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦτάν.

7. οὐ τι οἰκοφθορίαν καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι: cf. what Hor. says of the ‘sapiens,’ Sat. II. vii. 83—quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent, responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores fortis, et in se ipso totus teres atque rotundus, externi ne quid videant.

10. ἀδοξίαν μοιχηρίας: ‘the ill-repute arising from wickedness.’ For the sentiment cf. Thucid. 176 b οὐ πάνυ βίδον πείσατι ὃ ἀρα ὄχι ὃν ἐνέκει οἱ πολλοί φασί δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον τὸ δ’ οὐ, ὑνα μὴ κακός καὶ ὑνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι.

11. ἐπείτα: =τοῦτον ἑνεκεν, an emphatic summing up of the previous participles: Lat. ‘idecirce’: cf. for ἐπείτα used to emphasise a preceding participle Apol. 20 c οὐ γὰρ δήποτε σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπείτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν.

16. σώμα τι πλάττοντες: there can be little doubt that this is the proper correction of mss. σώματι πλάττοντες: not only is it nearer the mss. than σώματα, but the τι gives a contemptuous touch (or possibly it suggests ‘are concerned with what sort of body they care fashion—σώμα τι meaning ‘some particular fashion of body’). Two passages of Plato admirably illustrate this use of πλάττω—Tim. 88 c τῶν τε αὐτό σώμα ἐπιμελάσσει πλάττοντα τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνταποδοτέων κυνήγεις: Rep. 377 c καὶ πλάττεων τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖσ μῦθοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χεραῖς (of the duty of nurses with children). Ast reads σώματι πράττοντες, ‘working for the body,’ quoting Thuc. v. 76 οἱ τοῖς Δακεδαμονίοις πράττοντες; but that is not adequate justification, as πράττεω τινι is a recognised ‘political’ term, signifying ‘to scheme in the interests of a party.’

20. ἐκείνης λύσει: ἐκείνης is subjective—‘her work of rescue.’

CHAPTER XXXIII

82 d–84 b, cc. xxxiii, xxxiv. Philosophy, finding the soul a prisoner in her bodily abode, strives by persuasive admonition to set her free; telling her that she is deluded by the body
and its sensations: from such she should withdraw herself and trust to herself alone; for she alone can behold the invisible and apprehend the true. And the soul that is discreet listens to the voice of philosophy, for she sees that indulgence of bodily passions has this fatal result. Whatever awakes in us the strongest pleasure or pain, fear or desire, this we think to be most surely true. So if she share the body's pleasures and pains, she will also share its beliefs concerning truth; and being the body's close companion through life will leave it at death contaminated by its nature: therefore she will never reach her home in the invisible but must enter again into another body. For this reason the philosopher is virtuous; not from any common motive; but because, when philosophy is delivering his soul, he will not undo her work by indulging the body's appetites. So his soul has peace from its troubling and lives apart from it; and at death she returns to her divine abode, fearing not at all lest as she departs she be scattered by the winds and exist no more.

3. παραλαβοῦσα: either (i) 'finding' (Lat. excipere), or (ii) in the special sense of a master 'receiving' a pupil: cf. Apol. 18 οὗ τῶν πολλῶν έκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειδον.

4. ἀτεχνῶς: 'literally,' 'absolutely,' very often used with Σ a metaphorical word, to show that it is no mere metaphor—Lat. 're vera': cf. 90 c πάντα τὰ δυνά ἀτεχνῶς ὤσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἀνώ καὶ κάτω ὀρθέται.

5. ὤσπερ διὰ εἰργμοῦ: cf. Virg. Aen. vi. 733-34

neque auras
dispensant clausae tenebris et carceri caeco.

8. κυλινδουμένη: for the metaphor cf. the proverb in 2 Peter ii. 22 ὥσπερ μόνῳ ἐις κύλισμα βορβόρου.

τοῦ εἰργμοῦ τῆς δεινότητας καταδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἔστι: most editors take this as an example of prolepsis for ὅτι ἡ δεινότης δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἔστι: but it makes nonsense of the sentence to make δεινότης the subject of ἔστι: the subject is δεινότης, 'realising the terrible nature of this imprisonment, viz. that it (the imprisonment) arises from lust': the ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἔστι defines 'what the δεινότης consists in.'

9. ὃς ἦν μάλιστα: this has been interpreted in the most various ways, ὃς ἦν being taken by some as final, by others as ὃς τε ἦν. Mr. Archer-Hind is clearly right in taking it as 'relative,' lit. 'in the way in which': 'under circumstances in which the captive is most apt to aid in his own imprison-
ment': cf. 83 ἐκάστη ἡδονή καὶ λύπη ὦσπερ ἢλων ἔχουσα
προσηλοι αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σώμα, 'the prison of lust is just that very one of which the soul shuts the doors upon herself; for each act of indulgence is the shooting of a fresh bolt.' (R. D. A.-H.)

10. τῷ δὲ δεδέσθαι: we might perhaps have expected the partitive genitive with ξυλάφτωρ, and most editors read τοῦ against all the mss.: the dative is not without parallel: cf. Laches 645 λ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωνιᾷ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ ξυλαμβάνειν.

83 A 12. ὀὔτω: goes with ἔχουσαι, 'in this sorry plight.'

B 22. δ' ἄλλων: contrasts with αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν, and means τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων: εὖ ἄλλοις ὃν ἄλλο contrasts with αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ, 'varying under varying conditions.'

27. ὀὔτως ἀπέχεται: ὀὔτως means 'consequently,' 'in that spirit': cf. 61 b.

31. οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν . . . ὥν ἂν τις οἰκθεῖ: τοσοῦτον means practically 'so slight' (cf. Lat. 'tantum,' 'so small'): cf. Rep. 608 β μέγας δ' ἄγον, ὃ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ. Possibly here we ought to take it as getting this meaning by 'irony'—'none of the terrible evils one might imagine.' ὥν ἂν τις οἰκθεῖ is put somewhat irregularly for ὅσον ἂν . . . as though there had been no τοσοῦτον, but only οὐδὲν κακὸν ὥν ἂν τις . . . (partitive genitive).

32. οἶον ἡ νοσήσας: it is on such considerations as these that δημοτικὴ ἀρετῆ is based.

C 37. ἀμα τε ἡσθήναι . . . καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι: the real predicate is in ἡγεῖσθαι, 'is compelled, in the act of feeling some violent pleasure . . . to believe that what most strongly excites this feeling is most vivid and real': the feeling and the belief inevitably go together (ἀμα τε ἡσθήναι . . . καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι).

D 45. προσήλοι: cf. Hor. Sat. ii. 2. 77 quin corpus onustum | hesternis vitii animum quoque praegravat una | atque affigit humo dividum particular aurae.

49. ὄμοτροπος καὶ ὄμοτρόφος: 'kith and kin': for a similar play upon words cf. Laches 188 β οὐδὲν ἄνθες οὐδ' αὐτ' ἄνθες.

CHAPTER XXXIV

3. οὐχ ὅν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά φασίν: it would be natural Greek to supply with φασίν "αὐτοὺς κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείους," but that would make Plato say that the bulk of mankind misrepresent the motives of philosophers; which is not the sense required. Riddell says 'φασί is followed by κοσμίους εἶναι
understood, and this εἶναι contains the dictative force' (i.e. φασιν εἶναι = κελεύονσιν εἶναι); but this will not bear analysis. Most editors follow Stallbaum in understanding (φασι) κόσμου εἶναι, 'the reasons for which most men profess to be temperate.' But it surely meets the requirements of the sense better to understand δειν with φασι: that is, to translate it as Riddell does, but instead of giving to φασι the sense of κελεύονσι, as he does, to supply δειν, as may easily be done in so obvious a case—'not for the reasons for which most men say we ought to be temperate.'

6. τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι: this μὲν clause is entirely subordinate: taken by itself it contradicts the sense: cf. note on 60 B τὸ ἁμα μὲν . . . εὰν δὲ τις . . .

7. οὐοδῆς δὲ ἐκεῖνης αὐτὴν παραδίδοναι . . . ἐαυτὴν: none of the editors notice αὐτὴν, which is to be taken from αὐτὸς 'self,' as the subject of παραδίδοναι, not as the object of οὐοδῆς.

8. ἡγκαταδεῖν: the Greek equivalent of the Latin gerundive —'se dedere vincendam.'

9. ἀνήρυτον ἔργων πρᾶτευν: be careful not to translate 'and make her work void' (taking ἀνήρυτον as predicate): this would require ἀνήρυτον τὸ ἐργὸν ποιεῖν. It means 'engage in an endless (and unprofitable) task.'

10. μεταχειριζομένην: this reading is undoubtedly right in spite of the superior mss. evidence for μεταχειριζομένης. With the latter reading we should have to take Πηνελόπης . . . μεταχειριζομένης as genitive absolute—'as though Penelope were weaving her web in the opposite way': but this would require ὡσπερ, if not ὡσπερ Πηνελόπης τινὸς. The genitive of the mss. is no doubt due to the proximity of Πηνελόπης: μεταχειριζομένης agrees of course with αὐτὴν (τὴν ψυχήν). Πηνελόπης is possessive genitive with ἵστων: Prof. Geddes prefers to take it with ἐναντίως, quoting in support of the construction 112 κ. τοῦτον δὲ καταντικρὸ καὶ ἐναντίως ἤρων 'Ἀχέρων, where, however, τοῦτον is better taken only with καταντικρό, Plato always using the dative with ἐναντίως. The position of τινὰ again is decisive in favour of taking Πηνελόπης closely with ἵστων: 'weaving a sort of Penelope's web in the opposite way.' 'Penelope, to preserve her virtue, undid at night the work she wove by day: the soul weaves again the web of lusts which philosophy has been unravelling to set her free' (R. D. Λ.-Η.)

γαλήνην τοῦτων: sc. ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν: the genitive τοῦτων would be hard to define: is it genitive of separation, 'the tranquillity of being free from them,' or the same genitive as it would be in the opposite phrase ταραχῆ τοῦτων, a sort of
subjective genitive? At any rate γαλήνη is γαλήνη ψυχής, a state of the soul, not of the passions.

12. ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα: cf. note on 59 Α: ἐπομένη and οὖσα are subordinate to παρασκευάζουσα.

13. τὸ ἀδόξαστον: that which is not the subject of δόξα (opinion), but of ἐπιστήμη (knowledge): the distinction is fully worked out in Republic, Bk. vi.

B 16. εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον: sc. εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θείων καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον.

ἀφικομένη: the nom. is curious, as ἀπηλλάχθαι depends grammatically on δεῖν: even the earlier ptcps. παρασκευάζουσα, etc., are not strictly grammatical, as they define οὖσα, and οὖτω modifies not οἶσαι, but ξὴν, which depends on δεῖν, and so should have an accus. ptcp. agreeing with its subject: the whole construction of this sentence illustrates the wonderful flexibility of Greek.

18. οἴδεν δεῖνον μὴ φοβηθῇ: ‘there is no danger of her being afraid lest,’ an emphatic form of οὔ μή φοβηθῇ: cf. Apol. 28 Β οἴδεν δὲ δεῖνον μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ: Rep. 465 Β οἴδεν δεῖνον μὴ ποτε ἡ ἀληθὲς πόλις διεκοστήσῃ: Ar. Eccl. 650 οὔχι δεῖος μὴ σε φιλήσῃ. These phrases do not justify the explanation of the ordinary οὐ μή construction by the ‘omission of δέος’: rather the idea of ‘fear, warning, threat, danger’ (which that construction contains) is inherent in μὴ with the subjunctive, and can by the natural genius of the Greek language be made more explicit and emphatic by the insertion of δείνον or δέος: it analyses, as it were, the meaning, not the origin, of οὐ μὴ (cf. note on 66 Β).

19. δῶς μή... οὐχήται: cf. 77 Β δῶς μή... διασκεδάζωνται ἡ ψυχή: in Symposium 198 Α we have the fut. indic. φόβος οὖν ἐστιν, έαν μὴ κόσμοι ἄμεν πρὸς τὸν θεοῦ, δῶς μή καὶ αὕτης διασκεδάζοσται.

‘At first sight the concluding words of the chapter seem to imply that a soul that is pure is less likely to perish than the impure. But since this is not the case, we must understand Plato to mean that the pure soul alone is exempt from fear. The impure soul, having cast in her lot with the body, and having no conception of existence apart from it, may well suppose that corporeal life is a condition of her being; but the pure soul, who has lived apart from the body so far as she may and feels her own independent power, has no misgivings lest the company of her slave be necessary to her existence: the body may dread dissolution, but she is secure (Archer-Hind).
CHAPTER XXXV

84 c–85 d, c. xxxv. Silence ensues as Socrates ceases: but presently Simmias and Kebes are heard conversing apart. Are you discussing any doubtful matters in the argument? asks Socrates, for there must be many remaining. Simmias: There are points on which we should like further satisfaction; but we shrink from troubling you at so sad a time. Socrates. If I cannot convince you that I do not consider my present situation sad, I should find it hard indeed to persuade the rest of mankind. You think I am more foolish than the swans: for they sing sweetest just before they die; not, as men say, that they are lamenting their approaching death, but because they are Apollo's birds and know the good things that are in Hades; wherefore they sing in gladness of heart. I too am the servant of Apollo, and I depart this life no less cheerfully than they; speak then, if you have anything to ask. Simmias: I will speak: the truth of the matters we have been discussing is hard to discover, nevertheless it were faint-hearted to abandon the search. So in default of some divine word we must strive by all means to find the surest theory that human reason can furnish, as it were a raft to bear us over the sea of life. Therefore, I tell you, Socrates, that the foregoing proof does not seem to me complete.

3. πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν: 'was bent upon, or occupied with, the foregoing argument': a stronger form is ὁλος εἶναι πρὸς ταὐ: cf. Dem. de Falsa Leg. § 127 ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐκφρῶν ἦν καὶ ὁλος πρὸς τῷ λήμματι: cf. the Latin 'totus esse in aliqua re.'

ὁς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο: 'as he seemed from his appearance': cf. Xen. Cyrop. v. iv. 11 καὶ μὰ τοῖς θεοὶς σὲ ἑπαναθανασόμενος ἡμαῖρα ποτὲ φαίνῃ ἰδεῖν ὁ τοιαῖτεν ψιχὴν ἔχων. ἰδεῖν is the epexegetical infinitive, much commoner in poetry than in prose, e.g. Eur. Herc. Fnr. 1002 εἰκὼν ὡς ὑμῖν ἐφαίνετο Παλλᾶς: it corresponds to Latin ablative of the supine, 'ut visu apparebat.' Wagner calls ἰδεῖν pleonastic, and translates 'as on seeing him it seemed' (does he take ἐφαίνετο as an impersonal?): ἰδεῖν is not pleonastic, as there are more ways of judging than by appearance.

7. μῶν μή: the origin of μῶν (μὴ oν) is lost sight of: cf. μῶν οὐ, μῶν δὴ, μῶν oν, all of which imply the same thing.

9. ἀντιλαβᾶς: a metaphor from wrestling, 'grip,' 'point of attack,' or, as we should say, 'handle': cf. Thuc. vii. 65 ὅπως ἀν μῆ ἔχου ἀντιλαβῆν ἡ χείρ (the grappling-iron).
24. ὦτε γε: 'quandoquidem.'

26. διάκεμαι: not only is there no need to take this as subjunctive, or to alter it to διάκεωμαι, but the indicative is right and the subjunctive wrong. When a verb of fearing expresses a fear or uncertainty as to a thing which is a matter of fact in the present or past, the corresponding tenses of the indicative are used in the subordinate clause; cf. note on 77 D. In μὴ σοι ἄγδες Ἡ (five lines above) the subjunctive is used because the thing feared is in the future, and the unpleasantness may still be avoided by not putting the question.

29. ἀδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ: the earliest trace in Greek literature of the idea that the swan sings just before death is found in Æsch. Ag. 1444 ἢ δὲ τοι κύκνον δίκην τὸν ὑπατόν μελψασα θανάσιμων γόνω κεῖται, of the dying Cassandra. There are earlier references to its being a bird of song: Hom. Il. ii. 463 κλαγ-γηδὸν προκαθίσκων: Hesiod Shield of Her. 316 κύκνοι ἀερσιπώ-ται μεγάλ' ἐπιον. Other similar passages are Ar. Birds 769 τοιαύτες κύκνωι, τίδ τι τίδ τίδ, συμμυγή βοῦν ὄροι περοῖς κρέκοντες ιακχον Ἀπόλλω, τίδ τι τιτίγξ: Call. Hymn to Apollo 5 ὢ δὲ κύκνος ἐν ἥρα καλὸν ἀέδει: so in the Hymn to Delos the swans sing at the birth of Apollo. Aristotle supports the poets in both ideas: φῶικοι δὲ (οἱ κύκνοι), καὶ περὶ τὰς τελευτὰς μάλιστα ἀδονιν: ἀναπέτονται γὰρ καὶ εἰς τὸ πέλαγος καὶ τίνες ἦδη πλεοντες παρὰ τὴν Λιβύην περετύχων ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ πολλοῖς ἀδονι φωνῆ γοώδει, καὶ τοῦτων ἔδρων ἀποθνησκοντας ἐνιοὺς. The tradition seems to be derived from the undoubted fact that the wild swan (Cygnus Musicus) does sing; the wild swan is in modern times an inhabitant of northerly climes, and stories of the swan's song may have been conveyed to Greece by men who had travelled in more northerly regions. Macgillivray (British Birds, vol. iv. 652) says 'their cries are loud, trumpet-like, and when proceeding from a distance, clear, mellow, and resembling the sounds from a distant band of music. They are described as having a peculiarly exciting effect on the human mind, especially in desert regions, and to give rise to the most agreeable feelings. This I can well understand, having experienced the like on seeing and hearing a flock of wild swans in the Hebrides.' The melancholy sound may have suggested the tradition of the death-song, though Socrates interprets it as a song of joy at the prospect of passing into the presence of their lord and master, Apollo.

30. πλεῖστα καὶ μάλιστα: to avoid an apparent tautology, Blomfield would read καλλιστα: but μάλιστα is 'most loudly,' πλεῖστα 'most frequently.'

85 A 32. οὖπερ εἰσὶ' θεράποντες: 'the majestic form, the dazzling
whiteness, the grace of motion on the element of water, and the lofty freedom of flight in the element of air, combined with its incapacity to move with ease on the common element of earth, were features marking out this bird for high poetic associations: and a mystic symbolism would easily find in it an image of the Sun moving in resplendent majesty on the face of the heaven, and at evening and morning bathing his brightness in the baths of Ocean. It was but a step to complete its investiture as the bird of Apollo by ascribing to it the almost necessary accomplishment of the gift of song. Very similar is the fancy of Nonnus, that in the rebellion of Typhaon, Apollo disguised himself by transformation into a swan’ (Geddes).

36. ἔγδειν: the preposition suggests ‘sing with their dying breath’: cf. Polyb. xxxi. 20. 1 ἐγάδας τὸ κύκνειον.

38. ἢ τε ἄρδων καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ: chosen doubtless as the three birds connected in Attic legend with the tragic legend of the Thracian king Tereus, and the two daughters of the Attic king Pandion, Procoene and Philomela: Tereus was changed into a hoopoe, Procoene into a swallow, and Philomela into a nightingale. This protest of Plato against the current view of the nightingale’s song as one of melancholy is renewed by Coleridge in his ‘Nightingale.’

46. ὀμόδουλος . . . καὶ ιερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ: cf. note on B 60 d.

58. μὴ οὐχὶ . . . ἀλέγχειν: μὴ οὐχὶ is due to the negative idea in πάντα μαλακῶν εἶναι ἄδρός, which is another way of saying that the conduct suggested is ‘not the right conduct’: cf. 72 D τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλώθηναι εἰς τὸ τεθύκαιı; and Dem. Fals. Leg. § 123 αἱ τε πόλεις πολλαὶ καὶ χαλέπαι λαβείν μὴ οὐ χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκία.

62. ἢ μαθεῖν . . . ἢ εὑρεῖν: ‘to learn . . . or to find out for one’s self’: cf. 99 C οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλον μαθεῖν οἶδα τε ἐγενόμην; cf. too Hesiod ῾Ι. and D. 291—οὖτος μὲν πανάριστος ὁ δὲ πᾶντα νοήσῃ, ἐστιθὸς δ’ αὖ κάκεινος δ’ εὖ εἰπόνω πίθηται.

64. δισεξελεγκτάτων: ‘most irrefragable,’ ‘irrefutable.’

65. ὡσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας: cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 30. 73 ‘itaque D dubitans circumspectans haecitans multa adversa reverens tanquam in rate in mari immenso nostra vehituri oratio.’

68. λόγου θέου τυνός: ‘some divine revelation.’ This has very naturally been interpreted as an anticipation of, or at least an aspiration after, a divine revelation such as that granted to humanity in Christ, the Word of God. Olympio-
dorus implies that Christians quoted the passage in that sense—
τίς ὁ ἀσφαλέστερος καὶ ἀκινδυνότερος καὶ βεβαιότερος καὶ θεῖος
λόγος; οὐ δήποτε, ὡς φασιν, ὁ θεόθεν ἐκ τοιούτως· δοξαστικός γὰρ ὁ
γε τοιούτως· ἄλλ' ἐστιν ὁ εἰρημένος αὐτοτικός νοῦς ὁ θεὸς τῷ ὄντι
συνών, ὡς ἐν Φαίδρῳ. His own interpretation, then, is 'the
perfectly developed reason of the philosopher'; but this is not
in keeping with the spirit of the passage. The reference is
more probably to some such revelation as was supposed to be
given in the Mysteries, e.g. the Orphic: it is appropriately put
in the mouth of the Pythagorean Simmias (v. Introduction, C).

CHAPTER XXXVI

85 E–86 D, c. xxxvi. Simmias states his objection. All the
terms that have been applied to soul and body may be trans
ferred to harmony and the lyre. The harmony is invisible,
immaterial, beautiful, divine; the lyre is material, composite,
earthly, perishable. Might we not then on the same principle
maintain that the harmony must survive the destruction of the
lyre? yet we know it does not. Now suppose the doctrine to
be true, that the soul is a harmony of the body, arising from
the due proportion and temperament of its parts; will she not,
let her be ever so divine, vanish away if these bodily conditions
cease? will she not, like other harmonies, cease to be, long
before the body itself suffers dissolution?

3. ταυτή ... ἡ δῆ: 'why, in this respect, that a man
might advance this very same argument with regard to
harmony and (its relation to) the lyre and its strings.'

86 A 10. ἐπειδὰν ... κατάξῃ: this clause is subordinate to ἀνάγκη ἐτι
eιναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν, the whole depending on διοσχυριστῶ ὅτι .
The apodosis to ei διοσχυριστῶ never comes, the sentence being
interrupted by parentheses and explanations: at the end of the
chapter εἶν τὶς ἄξιοι is in fact substituted for this original
protasis.

14. οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη: this is not Simmias' own
argument, but still the argument of τις.

15. τὴν μὲν λύραν: cf. note on 84 A, and v. supra 60 B.

B 19. φαίη: depends on ei of ei διοσχυριστῶ.

24. ὑπολαμβάνομεν: we need not take the first person to refer
to the Pythagoreans, with whose doctrine of transmigration
this description of the soul as a 'harmony' is, as Archer-Hind
points out, inconsistent: it is better to take it as implying
that the theory was one commonly accepted. It is found in
Parmenides, and further developed by Zeno: cf. Diog. Laert.
γεγενήσθαι γὰρ τὴν τῶν πάντων φύσιν ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ἥπερ καὶ ψυχῆς κράμα υπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προερμένων κατὰ μηδένος τοιῶν ἐπικράτησιν. In particular it was held in the form mentioned by Plato by the later Aristoxenus, a pupil of Aristotle, and a famous writer on music, to whom Cic. refers (Tusc. i. 19) 'Aristoxenus musicus idemque philosophus ipsius corporis intentionem quandam (cf. ἄσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος), velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur.' So Lucr. iii. 98—

sensum animi certa non esse in parte locatum,
verum habitum quendam vitalem corporis esse,
harmoniam Grai quam dicunt.

25. ἐντεταμένου: cf. note on 60 D: the metaphor would seem here to be derived from 'stringing a lyre'; cf. below C οὗ ταίρ χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡ ἐπιτάθη.

40. ἐάν τις ἀξιοὶ: a slight obscurity in the argument is caused D by the fact that the difficulty arising from the ἀρμονία theory is put from opposite points of view in the two clauses εἰ τις δισχευρίζετο and εάν τις ἀξιοὶ: the contradiction between 'immortality' and the 'harmony' theory can be shown in two ways: (i) if the soul is immortal, then we have a harmony outlasting the materials that produce it, which is absurd; (ii) if the soul is a harmony, then it must like other harmonies perish before the materials (bodily elements) of which it consists, which contradicts the theory of immortality. It is a dilemma represented from either side in turn.

CHAPTER XXXVII

86 D–88 B, c. xxxvii. Socrates defers his reply to Simmias until he has heard the objection of Kebes, which the latter states as follows. I think our argument is no further on than it was: I admit that the antenatal existence of the soul has been fairly proved, but the evidence of her existence after death seems still insufficient. Not that I agree with the objection of Simmias; but all that has yet been proved is that the soul is more lasting than the body. Suppose a weaver were in the habit of making his own coats; in the course of his life he would wear out many coats; but when his time came to die, the last coat would exist after him; yet we do not deny that the weaver is more durable than the coat. Similarly the soul in the course of a man's life may wear out many bodies: that is, so fast as the body wastes, she may renew it like a garment that needs mending; but when the time of her dissolution
comes, she perishes and the body as last renewed by her exists after her. Or to grant you even more: let us suppose that she wears out many bodies, not only in the span of one life, but in many lives; and that at the separation she continues to exist in Hades; yet we have no assurance that this goes on for ever; after repeated incarnations she may gradually be wearied out, and some one of them will be her last. Therefore it is not enough to show that the soul is ever so much stronger and more lasting than the body: you must show that in her own nature she is altogether indissoluble and eternal; else our hope of immortality is but foolishness.

1. διαβλέψας: 'with a piercing glance.' Socr. had prominent eyes: cf. Theaet. 132 E προσέυκε δὲ σοι τὴν σε σμῦντηγα καὶ τὸ ἐξώ τῶν ὄμμάτων: cf. too Socr.'s words in Xen. Σύμπ. v. 5 οὕτω μὲν τούτων ἤδη οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καλλιόεσ φᾶν τῶν σῶν εἶδον. Π. ὡς δὴ; 'Οτι οἱ μὲν σοι τὸ κατ' εὐθὺ μόνον ὄρῳον, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόδαιον εἶναι: cf. too 117 B ταυρηδὸν ύποκλέψας. δια- seems to have the same meaning as in διαβλέψα (cf. Theogn. εὐ διαβάς, 'with the feet planted well apart'), and suggests wide open, staring eyes: the word διαβλέπω is so used in Ar. de insomniis 462 a, b ἐνὸς γὰρ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ πάμται διαβλέποντες, εἶν ἢ σκότος, φαίνονται εἰδώλα πολλὰ κινοῦμενα, ὥστε ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι πολλάκις φοβομένους.

2. δίκαια μέντοι: cf. note on 65 b.

4. τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; 'quin' or 'quidni respondet?'

8. ἐγγενομένου: a favourite word with χρόνος in Thuc.: εὖ-is the Latin 'inter' e.g. 'intervallum,' 'intervenio.'

10. συγχωρεῖν: parallel to ἀκούσαi (above) and dep. on χρῆναι.

προσάδειν: a musical metaphor appropriate to the subject of discussion, viz. soul as ἄρμονια: cf. 92 C οὕτως οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνῳ πᾶς εὐνύσειται; καὶ μὴν... πρέπει γε, εἰπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ εὐνύφῳ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονιας: cf. too Laws 670 ν γελοίος γὰρ ὃ γε πολὺς ὁ χλὸς ἠγούμενος ικανῶς γεγονόκει τῷ εὐαρμοστών καὶ εὐρυθύμων καὶ μή, ὡσι προσάδειν αὐτῶν καὶ βάλειν ἐν ὑμῖν γεγοναστὶ διηναγκασμένοι: 'to be in accord' (accinere), sc. τῇ ἄληθείᾳ: it practically = τὶ λέγειν.

11. οὕτως ἢδη: for this use of οὕτως = 'accordingly,' resuming the meaning of a previous clause cf. 61 ν, 83 b.

12. τὸ σὲ αὖ θράττον: with this reading we must regard ἀπιστίαν παρέχει as a gloss on θράττον: to save the words some editors read ὅ, with inferior authority of mss. For θράττω (=ταράττω) in this special sense of philosophical doubt cf.
Theaet. 187 c ὀράτει μὲ πῶς νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὡςτὶ ἐν ἀπόφημι πολλῇ ... γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τούτο τὸ τάδε.

13. λέγω δὴ: ‘well then, I will tell you’: the same δὴ that we have in the familiar καὶ δὴ of Tragedy, meaning ‘suppose’: e.g. καὶ δὴ τεβυναί: τίς με δεξεῖται πόλις; Eur. Med. 386.

14. ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι: ‘in the same position’ as it was at the end of the ἀνάμνησις discussion. The later argument derived from the soul’s attributes (as θεῖν, ἀδρατον etc.) is only one of probability, proving the soul to be πολυχρωμιώτερον τοῦ σῶματος, not ‘immortal.’

17. εἰς τὸ δὲ τὸ εἴδος: sc. ‘the human form’: cf. 76 c εἶναι 87 A ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδει.


23. ἀντιλήψει: ‘objection’: cf. 84 c ἀντιλαβάς: ἀντιλαβῇ is ‘an opening for attack,’ ‘ground of objection,’ ἀντιλήψις the ‘objection’ itself.

24. πᾶσι τούτοις: ‘in all these respects,’ sc. in being ἰσχυρότερον, πολυχρωμιώτερον etc.

32. ὁμοίως ... ὡσπερ ἂν: ‘with the same amount of reason B as a man might argue concerning . . .’: there is no need, then, to emend to ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ, as some editors do.

λέγεσθαι ταῦτα: sc. the argument that the soul is immortal because ἰσχυρὸν, πολυχρόνιον etc.

34. ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλοκεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος: not ‘that his soul has not ceased to exist,’ but ‘that ὁ ἄνθρωπος, living man, body and soul together, has not perished’: ὁ ἄνθρωπος is used in its quite ordinary sense, ‘the human being, body and soul.’ ἄνθρωπος stands in the same relation to θοιματιον as ψυχή stands
to σῶμα: this is required by the comparison, and is proved, if proof were needed, by the words τοῦ δὲ τελευταίον πρότερος (ὅ), which states as an obvious fact that the weaver perishes (i.e. ceases to be what we call ἀνθρωπος) before the last garment.

35. ἄλλα ἔστιν τοῦ σῶμος: miss. have ἔσως, but Forster’s correction is almost certainly right, as the next line shows.

C 44. τὸ δ' ἔνθετον σῷς ὑποκείμενον: this use of τὸ δὲ as a demonstrative is characteristic of Plato: it expresses a contradiction of what has gone before, and is almost the same as τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς: cf. Προτ. 37 A ἕσως αὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτί λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ ὀικτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆς, ἀπανθαδικῶς: τὸ δ' ὄντι ἔσως τοιούτων: infra 109 d, note.

D 57. ἄλλα γὰρ ἄν φαίνει: γάρ gives an explanation, here of something to be supplied with ἄλλα: fully expressed it would be ἄλλα φαίνει ἄν (ἀπόλλυσαι ἔσως τὴν ψυχήν πρότερον τοῦ υπάρχοντος), έκάστην γὰρ τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν: or, as we might express it in English, ‘but the natural conclusion (viz. that the soul outlasts the body) does not follow, because . . .”

60. εἰ γάρ ρέω: this γάρ introduces a clause explaining more fully the bearing of the previous πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν. For ρέω used of the body cf. Φιλ. 43 A τάς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περίποδες ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρητον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον.

ἔτι ᾧντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: observe that Kebes proposes two hypotheses consistent with the superior durability of the soul and yet at the same time with the supposition that it perishes at death: (i) it may be that the soul, in the course of a single human life, wears out many bodies, the body being constantly wasted and repaired by the soul; (ii) we may go farther, and admit that the soul may survive one life or many lives, entering into one body after another: yet in any particular life (our own, perhaps), it may be approaching exhaustion, and so perish even before this particular body (τὸ τελευταῖον ψφασμα) perishes.

E 66. τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἁθετείας: it is difficult to believe that this means nothing more than ‘its weakness’ (Wagner) or even ‘its inherent weakness’: may we not give it its full meaning ‘that wherein its weakness consists’ (viz. ‘that it cannot go on being repaired when the soul has left it’)?

ἐπίδεικνύοι: the optatives in this sentence are interesting and instructive: some editors insert ἄν here, others (including Archer-Hind) supply it from the preceding ἀναγκαῖον μὲντ, ἄν εἰπ: but Prof. Geddes is almost certainly right in taking it as the opt. of reported speech. He quotes Soph. Phil. 615—


\[ \text{XXXVII 88 B Notes} \]

\[ \text{εὐθέως ὑπέσχετο τὸν ἀνδρὶ Ἀχαίοις τὸνδηλάσειν ἄγων, οὗτο μὲν μάλισθά ἐκούσιοι λαβών,} \]

where the opt. is more natural in O. O. for οἷς (i.e. οἵματι) as the main verb is in a past tense: cf. Lys. xiii. § 9 λέγει (historic present) ὅτι, ἐὰν αὐτὸν ἐλησθε περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης προσβεν-τήν αὐτοκράτορα, ποιήσεις ὅστε . . . οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων τῇ πόλει εὐρήσεσθαι. The peculiarity of ἐπιδεικνύοι is that it is optative after φαίνει ἂν, by the common Greek principle of attracting into the optative any verb (subj. or indicative) depending on an optative. This attraction occurs usually in relative clauses, but here it is extended to O. O. Notice that the same explanation accounts for εἰ μὲν καὶ ἀπολλύσωτο, which is not an imaginary condition in the future, but is clearly the O. O. form of εἰ μὲν καὶ ἀπολλύσωτε, 'if it is the case that the body wastes away': it is not opt. because the protasis of ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἰη.

67. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ: with πιστεύσαντα, 'we are not yet justified in feeling confident, on the strength of this argument, that . . .' 76. αὐτῷ: sc. τὴν ψυχὴν: cf. 61 A ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὖσας 88 A μεγίστης μονακής, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος: 109 A πάμμεγά τ᾽ εἰπαί αὐτῷ (sc. τὴν γῆν). Archer-Hind ingeniously suggests that αὐτῷ is attracted into the gender of its predicate ἰσχυρῶν.

78. μὴ οὐ πονεῖν: this μὴ οὖ with inf. after a negative verb is usually confined to the so-called redundant μὴ (with such verbs as κωλύω, ἀπαρνοῦμαι): here it is extended to an infinitive with μὴ where μὴ has its full negative force, i.e. μηκετί συγχαροῖ μὴ οὐ πονεῖν = μηκετί συγχαροῖ ὡς οὐ πονεῖ. A similar extension is seen below, 88 B οὔδενι προσήκει . . . μὴ ὁμάνητως ἄρρητων.

81. τούτων δὲ τὸν θάνατον: he cannot recognise the particular death that brings the destruction of the soul, because he cannot tell how often his soul has previously been incarnate: his own body may be the last of the series. διὰλυσιν τοῦ σώματος is a definition of θάνατον, σώματος being gen. of separation, 'severance from the body': so below εὖ τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει.

85. οὔδενι προσήκει: 'no one can claim in facing death without a qualm that his confidence is not ill-grounded.'

88. εἰ δὲ μὴ: not, of course, εἰ δὲ μὴ οὗτως ἔχει, but either εἰ δὲ μὴ προσήκει . . . ἀθαρρεῖ, or εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχει ἀποδεῖξαι . . .

ἀνάγκην εἶναι: Prof. Geddes (and after him Wagner) says this depends on εἰκός ἐστι contained in προσήκει: surely it is
simpler to take it as parallel to εἰδέναι, μηδένα and ἀδόνατον εἶναι, depending on φαίη, though the series of infinitives is broken by οὐδενὶ προσήκει. The whole sentence to the end (παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυται) is to be regarded as the argument of τις (εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον, beginning of 88 a). This protasis, εἰ γάρ τις ἄνωτερον, never finds its apodosis, which can easily be supplied—‘how are we to answer him?’ or something of the kind: the actual form of the sentence has been lost sight of before the end comes, because of the involved series of clauses.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

88 c–89 c, c. xxxviii. Phaedo pauses to describe the effect of these objections upon the audience: how their confidence is shattered in the argument and in their own judgment. Echecrates sympathises, adding that the conception of soul as a harmony has always had a strong attraction for him. He desires to know how Socrates behaved. Never, replies Phaedo, did Socrates appear to greater advantage: he showed neither irritation nor dismay; he cheered and encouraged us, as a general rallies his broken forces. In illustration thereof Phaedo narrates a little by-play which passed between Socrates and himself.

Observe how this interruption in the dialogue marks a critical point in the discussion: Echecrates, Phaedo’s hearer, shares the consternation of those present (at the death-scene) at this subversion of what had seemed to be a well-grounded proof. The digression at the same time, especially in the by-play between Socrates and Phaedo, serves to keep before us the human and dramatic interest of the scene. Plato clearly regards Socrates’ cheerful behaviour as a strong reinforcement of his dialectic in favour of immortality: Socrates throughout the dialogue is the living embodiment of his belief.

6. τοῖς προειρήμενοις λόγοις: a somewhat rare dative after a verbal noun, whose verb governs the dative.

8. εἰμεν... ἦ: this variation of mood after verbs of fearing, or again in final clauses, in past time, is not infrequent, and may be put down principally to that love of variety so characteristic of the best Greek writers (cf. just above τοῖς προειρήμενοις λόγοις... εἰς τὰ ὑστερον μέλλοντα ὑπήθεσαθαι). So far as a distinction can be laid down, the opt. expresses the more remote, the subj. the more vivid fear or the more direct purpose. A series of examples will help to show how unsafe it is to lay down hard and fast rules for
so flexible a language as Greek: Thuc. iii. 22 παρανύσχον δὲ ... φρυκτοὺς πολλοὺς ... ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα τῆς φρυκτωρίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦ καὶ μὴ βοηθοῦν: Thuc. vi. 96 ἑξακοσίοις ἐξέκριναν πρότερον ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιτοπῶν εἴησαν φίλακες, καὶ ἦν εἰς ἄλλο τι δὲ ταῦτα ἐνεστῶτες παραγίγγωνται (on the analogy of this we should expect in the earlier example ... εἴῃ καὶ μὴ βοηθῶσιν, the subj. to express the more definite, concrete purpose): Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 2 δευτὴρ ἐϕαίνετο εἰναι μὴ τινα καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἐλληνας διαβολὴν σχοίνοι καὶ οἱ στρατιώται δύσνοι εἰς τὰ πράγματα ὤσιν (this again agrees with Thuc. vi. 96, not with Thuc. iii. 22). In our own passage we might make two possible distinctions between εἴμεν and ἦ: (i) that mentioned above between a more remote and a more vivid fear: (ii) εἴμεν fear of something temporary (and so naturally following the tense of the main verb): ἦ a fear concerning a general truth referring to all time. Observe that μὴ ... εἴμεν is the past form of μὴ ... ὤμεν, as is proved by ἦ: were it not for ἦ it would be tempting to take it as the past of μὴ ... ἐσμεν, 'a suspicion that we were incapable judges' (for which cf. note on διασκεδάζων 77 D, and διάκειμαι 84 E).

12. ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα: ὡς is exclamatory, 'how convincing D was the argument of Socrates which has now fallen into discredit.'

15. ἀντιλαμβάνεται: 'has a wonderful hold on me': cf. above ἀντιλαβῇ, ἀντιληψις.

22. μετήλθε: 'went after,' 'pursued': for the metaphor cf. 89 E καὶ με διαφείγοιο ὁ λόγος.

23. ἀχθόμενος: 'disconcerted.'

24. ἐβοήθει: of the process, 'came to the rescue of': ἐβοηθήσε of the result, 'was his reinforcement of the argument adequate?'

29. ἐκεῖν ὁ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος: ἐκεῖνος is thrown into the relative clause (instead of being subject of ἐκεῖν) to give it emphasis by virtue of its position: it underlines the pronoun, as it were.

32. ὡς ἡδέως: cf. note on 58 E ὡς ἀδεῶς ἐτελεύτα.

52. ὁσπέρ Ἀργείου: the story is told in Hdt. i. 82 how C the Argives, foiled in their attempts to recover Thyreatis from the Lacedaemonians, took an oath μὴ πρότερον θρέψεων κόμην Ἀργείων μηδένα μὴδὲ τάς γυναῖκας σφί χρυσοφόρησεν πρὶν ἀν Θυρέας ἀνασώσωνται. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἔθνεο νομον, οὐ γὰρ κομέοντες πρὸ τούτου ἀπὸ τούτου κομάν. For the
Greek feeling on this point cf. the use of κομάω, 'to give one's self airs,' and κομά, e.g. κομαίσι καὶ θρήνοισι (Eur. Hel. 1060).

53. ἀναμαχόμενος: 'renew the contest and conquer.'

54. πρὸς δυὸ λέγεται οὗτ' Ὁρακλῆς οἶος τε εἶναι: a proverbial expression, more fully explained in Ethyd. 297 b Ἰττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου ύμῶν, ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μή οὐ δυὸ γε φέρετε. πολύ γάρ ποῦ εἰμι φανλότερος τοῦ Ὁρακλέους, δς οὐχ οἴος τε ἢν τῇ τῇ ὑδρα διαμάχεσθαι, σοφαρτρα οὐσὶ καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνείηη, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν ἀπομνηθεῖ τοῦ λόγου, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μᾶς, καὶ καρκίνω του ἐτέρῳ πολούτῳ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀρίστερα λέγων καὶ δάκνων, τῶν Ἱδεων τῶν ἀδελφιδοῦν βοσθίν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἢκαίως ἐξομβρησεν. Compare the nearest application of the proverb in the epigram of Rufinus (Anthol. v. 93)— ὀπλαμμα πρὸς Ἐρωτα περὶ στέρνουσι λογοσιμῶν, οὐδὲ με νικήσῃ, μοῦνοι εὕν πρὸς ἐνα. θνατός δ' ἀθανάτῳ συντήσωμαι: ἢν δὲ βοσθίν Βάκχον ἔχη, τί μόνος πρὸς δι' εὖ ἑως ὑμαμαί;

58. οὖν ὂς Ὁρακλῆς: Phaedo modestly declines the part of the champion, Heracles: he will play Iolaus to Socrates' Heracles.

CHAPTER XXXIX

89 d—90 d, c. xxxix. Socrates continues: we must beware lest we become haters of arguments as some become haters of mankind. For when one has been repeatedly deceived in others, whom he believed to be good and true men, he falls sometimes into distrust and dislike of the whole human race. But this is owing to his ignorance of human nature: he does not reflect that extremes are rare, and that the very good and very bad are equally few in number. It is the same with arguments: if we have come rightly or wrongly to distrust one argument after another, we must not hastily conclude that no valid argument is to be found; it is our own want of skill that we should rather blame. We ought to take warning by those contentious disputants, who assert that there is no stable truth in anything, and fancy themselves prodigiously clever to have found this out. Yet it were sad indeed, supposing there is such a thing as truth, and that we might discover it, if, instead of laying the fault where it is really due, we quarrelled with philosophy and thus deprived ourselves of all chance of attaining truth.

D 5. ἦ λόγους μισήσας: a strict grammatical analysis might seem to require τοῦ λόγους μισεῖν after μείζον κακον τοῦτον:
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cf. above 83 B οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐπαθεῖν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ἢν τις οἶνθείτι, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας.

8. ἐνδυσαί: 'se insinuat in': the word is middle: cf. Rep. 620 c τὴν τοῦ γελοτοποιοῦ Θεραίτου (ψυχὴν) πιθήκων ἐνυδομένην.

9. ἀνευ τέχνης: a good instance of the use of τέχνη—scientific or specialist knowledge of a particular subject, here of human nature: cf. below τέχνης τῆς περὶ τάνθρωπεα. Geddes well compares Lucian's account of Timon's misanthropy (Timon ch. viii.) χρηστότης ἐπέτρεψεν αὐτὸν . . ὡς δὲ ἀληθεί λόγῳ ἀνοία καὶ εὐθεία καὶ ἄκρισια περὶ τῶν φίλων, ὁς οὐ συνεὶ κόραξ καὶ λύκως χαριζόμενος.

10. ὑγίη: the more usual Attic is ύγιᾶ: cf. however 86 Α ὀμοφυῆ.

14. ὑπὸ τούτων: 'experiences this at the hands of those . .': παθεῖν is constructed as the passive of παίειν: cf. ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ, φεύγειν ὑπὸ, ἐκπίπτειν ὑπὸ, and many other verbs.

15. ἐταιροτάτοις: cf. Gorg. 487 D τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἐταιροτάτοις: L. and S. also quote for the adjectival use of ἐταῖρος Rep. 439 D τὸ ἐπίθυμηττάκιων . . πληρότεων τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἐταῖρον, but as there it is acc. it is probably the noun: the use of the positive as adj. is far less likely than the superlative.

17. οὖδενος οὐδέν: 'in anyone,' we should say: cf. 90 c Σ ὅτι οὕτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ὑγιές οὐδὲ βέβαιον.

22. ὁσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἄν ἡγήσατο: 'he would have formed an opinion answering to the truth.'

23. χρηστοῖς καὶ πονηροῖς σφόδρα: σφόδρα goes with χρηστόσι καὶ πονηροῖσ: its position throws extra emphasis on it—'the extremes of virtue and vice are rare': taken with ἀλλούσ it would emphasise the wrong word: cf. below τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων.

31. τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων: 'the extremes at both ends.' 90 A Archer-Hind puts the case lucidly: 'The ἐσχάτα are the two opposite qualities, ἄκρα the extremes of these. Thus if we conceive λευκῶν and μέλαν to be represented by a straight line, the central portion is occupied by shades of grey: the ἐσχάτα, or parts remote from the centre, by white and black: and the ἄκρα, or ends of the line, by the highest degree of each.'

35. καὶ ἐνταῦθα: 'in the case of human wickedness too' (as well as in other ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων).

37. ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὁμοίοι: Plato does not mean to say that B arguments are 'different' from men in this respect, but only
that this is not the analogy he wishes to draw between them: he has been led into a digression by Phaedo's πώς λέγεις; 90 A.

39. ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἢ ἐπειδᾶν τις: the apodosis to ἐπειδᾶν τις, which would point the analogy, never comes in a grammatical form—'lost like a stream in the sand' (Geddes): it is resumed in another form (§ C) οἴκτρων ἄν εἰῃ τὸ πάθος, εἰ . . . μὴ ἐαντὸν τις αἵτωτο.

42. ἐνίοτε μὲν ὃν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὃν: we are not to supply ψευδῆς, nor yet ἀληθῆς: the participle in its own right means 'being true': it is the participle of ἔστι, not ἔστι.

44. οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίβαντες: 'Eristic philosophers': he would seem to be alluding specially to the 'sophists,' of whom he says in 91 A ὅπῃ μὲν ἤχει περὶ ὃν ἄν ὁ λόγος ἢ οὖ φροτιξομαι, ὅπως δὲ ἄαυτοι ἐθεντο ταύτα δόξει τοῖς παρόνσιν, τούτο προθυμοῦνται: and to whom he refers again in 101 ε as disputing not to find out the truth, but to satisfy their vanity—αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν: we are reminded of the definition of the sophist in Ar. Clouds as one 'who makes the worse appear the better argument.'

49. ἡσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρεφεται: the perplexing nature of the currents in the Euripus channel (cf. Aesch. Ag. 183 Αἰλίδος παλλρροθω τῶν) made it a proverb of instability: cf. Aesch. Ixvi. 27 πλείους τραπόμενον τροπᾶς τοῦ Εὐρίπου: Hipparch. ἀστατα καὶ ἀβέβαια Εὐρίπου τρόποιν. For ἀτέχνως cf. 82 ε.

54. ἐπετα: cf. Apol. 20 c quoted above, note on 82 c.

CHAPTER XL

90 ὁ—91 c, c xl. Let us beware then, says Socrates, lest we rashly charge our argument with being faulty, when the fault is our own. The question is of deep interest to us all, and to me especially: indeed I feel less like a philosopher than those who argue not for truth's sake but merely that their opinion may prevail; only I am more anxious to persuade myself than you. However, if my belief is true, it is well; if not, it will at least make me better company for you while I am with you. For your part, you must think more of the truth than of Socrates; and you must not accept my reasoning until you have fully tested it; lest I depart like a bee leaving my sting behind.

91 A 9. οὗ φιλοσόφως ἤχειν ἀλλὰ φιλονεικῶς: 'to be inspired not by a love of wisdom, but by a love of contention.'
13. ἀ αὐτοὶ ἔθντο: ‘the position they have themselves laid down’: their own ὑπόθεσις cf. θεμένων 93 c, ὑποθέμενος and τίθημι 100 A.

17. εἰ μὴ εἰς πάρεργον: ‘except incidentally’: this sentence is to be taken as an instance of Socrates’ playful εἰρωνεία.

23. ἦττον: ἀνδῆς ἐσομαι ὀδυρόμενος: Wagner proposes to insert μή or η before ὀδυρόμενος, failing to see that the quasi-negative ἦττον qualifies the whole phrase ἀνδῆς ἐσομαι ὀδυρό- μενος, ‘I shall be less likely to offend by lamenting.’

26. ὄλγων ὑστερον: ‘presently’: the dilemma is a quaint one: if his soul survives death, he will know that the soul is immortal: if not, he will at any rate not be any longer the victim of ἀγνοια.


34. ὁσπερ μέλιτα: probably a proverbial phrase: cf. Eupolis’ famous saying concerning Pericles—οὕτως ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις, which would seem to be a somewhat grim parody of the Greek fashion of speaking of a poet or orator as μέλιτα, and of his words as μέλι: e.g. Σοφοκλέους τοῦ μέλιτι κεχρισμένου Αρ. Φρ. 231: μέλιταν Ἡρωναν Μουσῶν ἀνθεία δρεπτομέναν Anth. vii. 13.

τὸ κέντρον: Wohlrab explains this by saying ‘Socrates stirs thoughts in the hearts of his hearers, which leave them no peace, until they attain to certainty with regard to them.’ But surely this is not the κέντρον, or what becomes of εξαπατήσας? the sting is the poison of ‘false belief,’ the ‘lie in the soul.’

CHAPTER XLI

91c-92d, a. xli. Socrates briefly re-states the objections of Simmias and Kebe: he then points out to the former that he must make his choice between the doctrine that soul is a harmony and the doctrine that learning is reminiscence. The theory of reminiscence presupposes that the soul existed before the body; but a harmony comes into existence after that which produces it; either therefore soul is not a harmony or she has had no precognition of the Ideas. Simmias admits this and declares without hesitation in favour of reminiscence, which he affirms to be a rational hypothesis, while the other is merely a plausible analogy.
The first refutation is addressed to believers in ἀνάμνησις and pre-existence of the soul; it appeals therefore only to Platonists or possibly Pythagoreans.

1. ἀλλ’ ἵτεν: ‘well, let us proceed’: cf. 78 c ἄμεν δή.

4. ὁμος καὶ θεωτερον: ὁμος, grammatically belonging to the principle verb, is often attached to the participle for emphasis: it is then virtually a stronger form of καὶτερ ο for all that it is more divine.

D 5. ἐν ἀρμονίας εἴδει οὐσα: ‘since (or ‘on the supposition that”) its existence is on the principle of a harmony’: the effect of εἴδος is much as if he had said ὡστερ ἀρμονία τις: he does not bind the word ἀρμονία down to a literal interpretation.

8. ἀλλὰ τόδε ἀδηλον παντί: from συγχρωσιν we must supply for this, φάναι.

9. πολλὰ δή .. καὶ πολλάκις: at first sight these two words would seem to refer to the two cases put by Kebes: (i.) the wearing out of many bodies during the course of a single human life: (ii.) the soul’s surviving repeated incarnations (87 D, 88 A). But the next clause καὶ η .. παῦεται shows that Socrates is only thinking of the first case, for the second case involves repeated θάνατοι, all of which except the last are not ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος.

22. ἐνδεδήναι: of course with an allusion to the body as the δεσμωτήριον ψυχῆς: cf. διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι 88 ε.

92 A 24. ὡς οὐδενι λόγο: ‘I abide by that as I do by no other argument,’ i.e. more than by any other argument.

32. συγκεισθαι: the true Attic of συνεβεβαι, and so repeating σύνθετον—‘composite .. is composed’: cf. Λεγγ. 793 B νόμων τῶν ἐν γράμμαι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἑτί τεθησομένων.

33. αὐτοῦ λέγοντος: for αὐτοῦ (Bodl. ms.) in place of σαυτοῦ cf. 78 B δεὶ ἠμᾶς ἑρεσθαὶ εἴατος: 101 D ὅν δὲ δεδώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκίαν (where it is no doubt influenced by τὸ λεγόμενον): 91 C where some ms. give ἄμα εἰατον τε καὶ ἦμᾶς ἔξπατοθήσας. For the case with ἀποδέχομαι cf. 92 Ε μῆτε ἑμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλον ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος, and still more clearly 96 Ε δος γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἑμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ..’

B 36. ταῦτα συμβαίνει λέγειν: ‘this is what your statement amounts to ..’ viz. ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἀρμονία συγκεισμένη πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι εἰς ὡς οὖν ..

41. δ ἀπεικάζεις: ‘harmony is not such as you represent it to be,’ viz. like the soul: the other reading ὃ ἀπ. would mean
'such as that to which you liken it,' viz. the soul, a condensed expression for ὄλον (ἐκεῖνοι ἐστιν) ὃ ἀπεικάσεις, which has a parallel in Rep. 349 δ τοιούτος ἀρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἶς περ ἑαυτὸς (Wagner).

48. ἑρτεῖ γάρ: the affirmative use of γάρ, frequent in C Plato: cf. Rep. 502 ἐλλὰ μὴν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ίκανός γενόμενος . . . πάντ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστοῦμεν. 'Ικανὸς γάρ, ἐφι: cf. Lat. 'enim.' In the same sense we have μέντοι 65 D.

53. ἀνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ ἐκότος τινός: 'only by a specious sort of analogy, without scientific proof.'

54. τοῖς πολλοῖς: confirms the interpretation of ὑπολαμ- D βάνομεν (56 B), as a commonly accepted belief.

57. ἀλαξόνων: 'ἀλαξόν is one who professes more than he ought, the opposite of εἴρων, one who professes less than he might: hence ἀλαξονεία is the special characteristic of the Sophists, εἴρωνεία of Socrates as their exposers' (Geddes).

61. ἐρρήθη γάρ ποι: 76 E, where the ὑπόθεσις ἀξία is given —ὁμοίως εἰναι τὴν τε ψυχήν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν ὑστάταν ἢν σον νῦν ἔλεγες. In that passage, the ὑσια spoken of is not the 'existence of the soul,' but the ' Idea ' or ' Ideas.' Accordingly the mss. reading ὀσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστίν ἡ ὑσια (which some editors retain) cannot be regarded as giving the meaning of that passage, whilst at the same time it makes nonsense of the whole sentence. Heindorf reads αὐτῆς, and gives it a very forced interpretation as possessive genitive—'so surely as that essence . . . belongs to her' (in the sense of 'being known by her'), referring to ὑπάρχονσαν πρώτερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν ὑσια (76 E). But those words are themselves probably spurious (v. note on 76 E), and the meaning given to αὐτῆς ἐστίν is very strained Greek as well as un-Platonic philosophy.

64. ἐχεισα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ δ ἐστιν: 'having the E name of essence': cf. 75 D ὁς ἐπισφραγισμέθα τὸ δ ἐστι: 78 D ἢς λόγον διδομέν τοῦ εἶναι, where we have the same genitive of definition (τοῦ).

65. ίκανῶς: 'on adequate grounds': ὅρθως—'correctly': the conclusion is correct and well grounded.

CHAPTER XLII

92 E–94 E, c. xlii. Again a harmony must conform to the conditions of the materials which produce it; consequently the completeness of the harmony is in exact proportion to the completeness with which these are brought into tune. It
follows then that there are degrees in harmony, corresponding with the conditions of the materials. But in soul there are no degrees; each soul is just as completely soul as every other. Furthermore we say some souls are virtuous, others vicious; and we define virtue to be a harmony, vice a discord of the soul. Now supposing that souls are harmonies, they are harmonies which admit of no difference in degree, since we have admitted that there are no degrees of soul. But a virtuous soul, being a harmony, has in her another harmony, while a vicious soul has a discord; therefore the virtuous soul is more of a harmony, that is, more of a soul, than the vicious. But this being contrary to our premises, we are forced to conclude that no soul is more virtuous or vicious than another; or rather that all souls, being complete harmonies, are completely virtuous: a reductio ad absurdum.

The second argument will reach those who accept neither ἀνάμνησις nor the Ideal theory, but who do accept the view that virtue is a harmonious state of the soul. It is to be observed (1) that the premiss in 93 Α πολλοῦ ἄρα δὲ ἐκ κτλ., of which a different use is made in the next chapter, here is simply brought in to show that the perfection of the harmony depends upon the tuning of the strings, etc., and consequently that as these may be more or less in tune, the harmony admits corresponding degrees of completeness: (2) the argument might seem to be complete in 93 Β, where it is allowed that, while harmony admits degrees, soul does not. But we should regard all the earlier part of the chapter as collecting the materials for the refutation which proceeds consecutively from 93 Β: moreover Plato had to guard against the rejoinder that, although harmony, as such, admits of degrees, there may yet be particular kinds of harmony, whose soul is one, which do not admit of degrees.

1. τί δέ, ἣ δ' ὅς. τοῦτο: lit. 'what do you think of the matter from the following point of view?'

93 Α 5. τί πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἀ: 'anything else besides what': any adjective in Greek which signifies comparison or difference may take παρά in place of ἣ or the comparative.

9. πολλοῦ ἄρα δὲι... κινηθήναι: a very common idiom in Plato—'it is far from'... 'it is very unlikely to,' followed by the infinitive: so we have παντὸς δέω—παντὸς δὲι τοιοῦτος εἶναι, Soph. 221 Β: sometimes δέω is personal, sometimes impersonal (δει); the infinitive is not dependent on δέω, but is a consecutive infinitive. The corresponding phrase with ὑλίγου is only used absolutely—ὑλίγου δεῖν = 'almost': cf. ὑλίγου alone in 94 Β.
12. οὐχ οὕτως ἀρµονία πέφυκεν εἶναι; 'is it not the nature of every harmony to depend on the manner in which it is harmonised?'

14. ἄν μὲν μᾶλλον ἀρµοστὴ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον: Plato obviously B has in his mind two different points of view from which a harmony may be regarded as perfect: e.g. (1) a certain combination of notes make a 'natural' harmony, as contrasted with a 'discord'; (2) the notes themselves may be more or less 'perfectly in tune,' and so the harmony be 'less perfect' (e.g. a piano or violin 'out of tune'): from these two points of view we may speak of (1) a better, (2) a more perfect harmony. It is difficult to decide which of the two is expressed by μᾶλλον, which by ἐπὶ πλέον: personally I incline to take μᾶλλον of (1), 'a better natural harmony,' ἐπὶ πλέον of (2), 'a more exact harmony.'

15. εἰπὲρ εὐδέχεται: εἰπὲρ is rather 'since' than 'if': perhaps 'admitting that this is possible' would give the nearest shade of meaning; cf. 93 E εἰπὲρ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρµοστία εἰη.

16. μᾶλλον . . καὶ πλέον: for the combination of adv. and adj. cf. Phileb. 41 E τίς μᾶλλον καὶ σφαδροτέρα ἡδονή;

19. μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας: many editors omit μᾶλλον in spite of mss. authority, but without it the phrase ἑτέραν ἑτέρας would be unnatural, referring to a comparative which is to follow. The comparison is first suggested in its most general form by μᾶλλον, and then expressed more explicitly in the terms Plato has already used ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ ἐλαττὸν καὶ ἤπτον. It is not quite to the point to compare examples of μᾶλλον used with a comparative adjective, which are plentiful enough.

21. αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν: ψυχῆν is in apposition to αὐτὸ τοῦτο: 'that which it is, viz. soul.'

26. θεμένων: cf. 91 A ἄ αὐτοι ἐθεντο. C

27. τὶ τις φήσει ταύτα δύτα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς; Prof. Geddes, Wohlrab, and Prof. Linde take ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς with δύτα, in defiance of the order of the words and of the Greek idiom by which the real predicate is so often contained in the participle: ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς undoubtedly goes with εἶναι, τὶ with δύτα: τὶ δύτα φήσει τις ταύτα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς. The idiom cannot be reproduced in English, which must say 'what are these qualities (τὶ δύτα) which exist in the soul?' If τὶ belonged to εἶναι, δύτα would be superfluous.
37. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀμολόγημα: τοῦτο is not to be taken as predicate, but as subject—'this admission amounts to'. . ., ἐστὶ is the whole predicate.

39. ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἄρμονίαν [ἄρμονίας] εἶναι: in spite of mss. authority and of the high authority of Mr. Archer-Hind, I feel convinced that ἄρμονίας is an interpolation due to a misunderstanding of the phrase: ἄρμονίαν is not the subject of εἶναι, but the predicate: 'when we admit that one soul is not more perfectly "soul" than another, we admit that one soul is not more perfectly "harmony" than another soul.' This interpretation, besides being necessitated by the argument, is surely demanded by the very next sentence—τὴν δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον . . ἄρμονίαν ὁδέαν μήτε μᾶλλον . . ἡμιοδοσία,—where ἄρμονίαν is clearly predicative. The argument then proceeds quite logically from step to step: (1) one soul is not more perfectly 'soul' than another; (2) that means that one soul is not more perfectly 'harmony' than another (since ψυχή=ἄρμονία); (3) that means that one soul is not more perfectly 'harmonised' than another; (4) that means that one soul has not a 'greater share of harmony' than another; (5) that means that one soul has not a greater share of 'virtue' than another (since 'virtue' is 'harmony')—ἐπερ ἡ ἄρετὴ ἄρμονία εἰη 93 E)—which is absurd.

52. εἶπερ ἡ μὲν κακία . . εἴη: according to the definition given in 93 c πότερον ἄρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; the optative is by attraction to the mood of the main verb, ἂν μετέχοι.

94 B 65. καὶ πάσχειν ἀν: the infinitive of ἐπαισχεῖν ἀν, 'would be in this predicament.'

I have thought it desirable to append a close translation of this difficult chapter.

'Look at it again, Simmias,' said he, 'from another point of view. Do you think it proper to a harmony, or to any other composition, to be in any other state than are the elements of which it is composed?' 'Certainly not.' 'Nor yet, I take it, to do or experience anything other than those elements do and experience?' Simmias concurred. 'Well then, it is proper to a harmony not to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to be led by them.' Again Simmias agreed. 'It is extremely improbable, then, that a harmony can undergo any contrary motion or utter a contrary sound, or in any way oppose its component parts?' 'Very unlikely indeed,' he replied. 'To proceed,' said Socrates, 'is it not the nature of every harmony to depend for its quality on the way it is
harmonised? 'I don't quite follow you,' said Simmias. 'Why,' he replied, 'if it is better harmonised and more perfectly, admitting that to be possible, will it not be a better and more perfect harmony, and if worse and less perfectly, a worse and less perfect harmony?' 'Most decidedly.' 'Now is it true of the soul, that one more than another is, in even the smallest degree, more perfectly and completely or less perfectly and completely that which it calls itself, soul?' 'Not in the smallest degree,' answered Simmias. 'Tell me then, in the name of heaven: do we say that one soul has intelligence and virtue, and is good, and another has folly and wickedness, and is bad? And is the statement true?' 'It is indeed true.' 'What then will the man who defines soul as harmony say these qualities are which exist in the soul, virtue and vice? Another kind of harmony and discord? Will he say that the one is harmonised, the good soul, and being itself a harmony, contains in itself another kind of harmony; and that the other is itself unharmonious and does not contain in itself this other harmony?' 'I cannot say,' Simmias replied; 'but it is clear that the man who gives the definition you mention would say something of the kind.' 'Well,' said Socrates, 'we have already admitted that one soul is not more or less soul than another; and this admission means that one soul is not more or more perfectly, or less or less perfectly, harmony than another: is it not so?' 'Certainly.' 'And that that which is not more or less harmony is not more or less harmonised; is that the case?' 'It is.' 'And does that which is neither more nor less harmonised partake more or less of harmony, or to the same degree?' 'To the same degree.' 'Well then, soul, since it is not, one more or less than another, that which it calls itself, soul, is not consequently (ὡς) more or less harmonised?' 'That is so.' 'And if that is true of it, it could not partake more of discord or of harmony?' 'Of course not.' 'And if that again is true of it, it could not partake, more or less one than another, of vice or virtue, since (by our definition) vice is discord and virtue harmony?' 'It could not.' 'Or rather, Simmias, to speak correctly, no soul will partake of vice, since it is a harmony: for, of course, a harmony, if it answers completely to its definition as harmony, could not partake of discord.' 'Certainly not.' 'Nor, consequently, a soul of vice, if it answers to its definition as soul?' 'What we have said proves it impossible.' 'According to this line of argument, then, we find (ἡμῶν) that all souls of all living creatures will be equally good, since they are by nature equally what they call themselves, viz. souls.' 'I agree with you, Socrates,' said he. 'Do you think our conclusion is sound,'
said he, 'or that our argument would have found itself in this predicament, if our premiss, that soul is harmony, had been correct?' 'By no means,' he replied.

CHAPTER XLIII

94 b-95 a, c. xliii. Lastly we see that the soul rules the body, often thwarting its desires and controlling its affections; whereas we saw that a harmony could not act in opposition to its constituent elements. Soul therefore cannot be a harmony.

'The last argument rests neither upon the Ideal theory nor upon the doctrine that virtue is harmony: it is simply an appeal to common sense. Aristotle's views on the subject will be found in de anima 1. iv. §§ 2-9. In the lost dialogue Eudemos he argued against harmony, (1) that harmony has an opposite, viz. ἀναρμοστία, but soul has no opposite—an obvious petitio principii; (2) that the opposite of ἀρμονία σώματος is ἀναρμοστία σώματος: the ἀναρμοστία is disease, weakness, and deformity, therefore the ἀρμονία is health, strength, and beauty; none of which is soul. See Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles p. 26.' (Archer-Hind.)

3. ἄλλωσ τε καὶ φρονίμουν: φρονίμουν, the reading of all the mss., must of course agree with ψυχήν: one is sorely tempted to read φρονίμου (sc. ἄνθρωπου), either as governed by ἄρχειν or possessive genitive with ψυχήν: we seem to require an epithet of ἄνθρωπος. τῶν ἐν ἄνθρο, πάντων is partitive genitive with ἔσθ' ὁ τι ἄλλο.

4. τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα: 'the bodily affections' or 'inclinations': τὰ κατὰ (with accus.) is 'things connected with, concerning . .' C 12. ἀρμονίαι γε οὖσαν: γε throws emphasis on to the participle—'that is to say, if it is harmony,' 'in as much as it is . .'

οἷς ἐπιτείνωτο: 'contrary to the tension, or relaxation, or vibration of the elements of which it is composed.' One of the prettiest idioms of Greek construction = ἐκείνοις ἄ ἐπιτείνωτο, ἄ being the cognate accusative, used with intransitive verbs and passives. Thus the idiomatic Greek for 'the party-strife of the city' is ἄ στασιάζει ἡ πόλις, which in the genitive (e.g.)—'as a result of the party-strife'—becomes ἄφ' ἄν στασιάζει ἡ πόλις: every page of Dem. furnishes examples. The opt. ἐπιτείνωτο is by attraction to the mood of μὴ ποτ' ἄν ἄδειν, the infin. of οὐ ποτ' ἄν ἂν: cf. note on ἐπιτείνωτο 72 d.
13. καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι οὖν πάθος πάσχοι: ἄλλο has fallen out of its proper construction after ἐναντιομένην, attracted into the cognate accusative with πάσχοι (for ἄλλω ὅτι οὖν πάθει δ' πάσχοι ἐκείνα).

14. τυγχάνει οὖσα: cf. note on 65 E.

15. οὐποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν: earlier in the sentence we had μηποτ' ἂν ζ̄δεν, μὴ being the negative of strong asseveration, 'could never possibly': here we return to the ordinary negative after a verb of saying.

25. ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις: dative after διαλεγομένη.

28. πεποίηκεν: in the technical sense of 'writing poetry,' 'has written, represented': cf. 60 D πρῶτερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. The half-serious, half-playful appeal to Homer is characteristic: so in Theaet. 152 E he traces back to Homer the doctrine πάντα ἰδεῖ: εἰπὼν γὰρ ὸκέανον τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν πάντα εἴρηκεν ἐκγονα. Ῥοης τε καὶ κυνήσεως. The quotation is from Od. xx. 17, and is appealed to for a similar purpose in Ῥοπ. 441 B τοῦ Ὀμήρου μαρτυρήσει το στῆθος δὲ πλῆξας κτλ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἰη σαφῶς ὡς ἔτερον ἔτερῳ ἐπιπλήθην πεποίηκεν Ὥμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισμένον περὶ τοῦ βελτίων τε καὶ χείρον τω ἀλογιστως ἔντοιμως.

35. ἢ καθ’ ἀρμονίαν: observe the use of κατά, 'than any'—E thing of the nature of harmony': it is contemptuous: cf. an almost exact parallel in Hdt. i. 121 ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐκεῖ πατέρα τε καὶ μητέρα εὑρήσεις οὐ κατὰ Μιθραδάτην τε τῶν βουκόλων καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ, 'of a very different kind from': Chionides, οὐ κατὰ σε, 'none of your sort': Dem. 569. 16 πολλὰ κάγαθ' ύπαίς εἰσιν εὑρηκαμένοι, οὐ κατὰ τᾶς Μειδίου λητουργίας: cf. too 108 D χαλεπώτερον μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκον τέχνην: Αγ. Φρογ. 500 εἰ δειλὸς ἐσομαι, καὶ κατὰ σε τὸ λῆμμ’ ἔχον. We have the same κατά in the use with comparatives followed by ἢ—μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα: κατά is literally 'in the class of,' 'on a level with.' Wagner misses the point, translating 'than in the manner of harmony.'

CHAPTER XLIV

95 a–e, c. xliv. Having thus disposed of the theory of harmony, Socrates proceeds to deal with the objection of Kebes, which he first recapitulates. If the philosopher is to feel any reasonable confidence that his life in Hades will be the happier for his devotion to philosophy on earth, we must prove that the soul is absolutely indestructible. It is not
enough that she is strong and godlike, nor that for ages before
our birth she enjoyed an intelligent existence. This does not
prove her immortality: the very incarnation in a human body
may be the first symptom of her coming dissolution; it matters
not whether she undergo one or many such incarnations; if we
cannot show that she is actually imperishable, our hope of a
future life is vanity.

95 A 1. τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας: some of the ancient commentators
gave a mystic interpretation to a passage which is merely a
pleasantry on the part of Socrates: Simmias, the champion
of the Ἁρμονία theory, and Kebes are both Thebans: "Ἀρμονία
(the daughter of Aphrodite, and wife of Theban Cadmus) has
been disposed of: we must now see what we can make of
Cadmus" (clearly nothing but the companion-theory of the
second Theban, Kebes).

2. ἴλεα πως, ὡς ένικε, μετρίως γέγονε, 'has proved reason-
ably gracious': ἱερως ('propitius,' 'secundus') is a word used of
deities; so below ἔλασομεθα. Mr. Archer-Hind quotes
Shilleto as giving to ἴλεα the connotation of 'bidding fare-
well': ἵλαθ, he says, is addressed to a deity in the same sense
as χαίρε to a mortal: cf. Cie. de natura deorum i. § 124
'deinde, si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla
hominum caritate teneatur, valeat: quid enim dicam, "propitius
sit"?' Cf. Theoc. xv. 143, where the lady ends her song ὑπαθ
νῦν, φιλ "Ἀδωνι, καὶ ἐς νέωτ' εὐθυμήσαις: so too Ἀπολλωνίας
Rhodius (iv. 1773) thus takes leave of his heroes ἱερ' ἄρωτων
μακάρων γένος. So here ἴλεα γέγονε may include the idea of
'we have taken leave of.'

6. θαυμαστῶς μοι ἐπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν: cf. note on 66 A
ὑπερφιώς ὃς.

B 12. καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον: λόγον put with θαυμάζωμι,
instead of being made subject of πάθω: this position gives it
emphasis to contrast with ὅ τῷ Ἁρμονίας λόγος.

14. βασκανία: cf. Lat. 'fascinum.' The malefic of the gods
was supposed to be excited by over-proud speech: Soph.
Ant. 128 Ζεὺς γὰρ μεγάλης γλώσσης κόμπους ὑπερεχοίρει: cf.
the common formula σὺν θεοῖς, σὺν θεῷ δ' εἰρήσεται, used to
avert this malefic: in Ἱερ. v. 451 A Socrates says προσκυνῶ
δ' Ἀδράστειαν (Nemesis), ὡ Γλαύκων, χάριν οὐ μέλλω λέγειν:
sio in Latin, Cat. lxvi. 71 'pace tua fari licet, Rhamnusia
virgo,' viz. Nemesis, the personification of this spirit of malefic.
The Latin 'mala lingua' represents the same idea: Virg. Ecl.
vii. 27—

aut, si ultra placitum laudarit, bacchare frontem
ingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro.
The reproof in Socrates’ mouth is of course only playful: the Platonic Socrates maintains that no evil can come from God, and especially that he is incapable of φθόνος: Phaedr. 247 A φθόνος γὰρ ἐξώ θείου χόρου ἵσταται.

16. ἔγγυς ἱόντες: a common phrase in Homer, so that Ὁμηρικῶς would seem to include both ideas, (i) in Homeric phrase: (ii) like Homer’s heroes, undauntedly: ‘let us come to close combat.’

17. εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις, ‘if there is anything after all in what you say.’

18. τὸ κεφάλαιον: the main point, summary, outline: cf. the verb κεφαλαίων, ‘to sum up,’ ‘touch the main points of.’

20. εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνήρ: ‘note that Plato once more carefully marks the proof of immortality as merely subordinate to this main thesis’ (Archer-Hind).

22. ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ: sc. ἐν βίῳ μὴ φιλοσοφή.

24. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν... οὐδὲν κωλύειν... τάντα ταῖτα μηνύειν: τὸ ἀποφαίνειν is taken up with ταῖτα, subject of μηνύειν: μηνύειν depends on κωλύειν, ‘as to the proof that... there is nothing, you say, to prevent this from indicating not immortality, but...’

30. καὶ ἂδει τε καὶ ἐπραττεν πολλὰ ἀττα: ‘and had knowledge and activity of various kinds.’

31. οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἄθανατον: we might possibly have expected ἐστί, but ἢν is probably due to the influence of the preceding and succeeding ἢν, neither of which could be anything but ἢν: all three refer to past time, the time preceding birth and the time of birth.

34. ἰόη: for this optative of reported speech without ὅτι cf. note on ἐπιδεικνύον 87 E: here the only expressed word of speaking is φῆς (present), but it is in reality a historic present, going back to the moment when Kebes spoke—hence ἰόη is possible (ἐφθασθα ὅτι ἰόη): so γίγνοιτο in 96 B ἐκ τοῦτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μυθenderit, δοξα. The same explanation may perhaps be given of εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἰῇ, four lines below: but two other accounts of εἰῃ are possible: (a) due to προσηκει φασθήσθαι, which virtually equals a potential, φασθῆται ἢν εἰκός ὁ: (β) it may be an example of the optative occasionally found in the subordinate clause of a perfectly general statement not referring to any particular time, past, present, or future: cf. ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἵππος ὑφηλίμος εἰναι ϕ ἰότο; (Plato): καὶ γὰρ ἀστερόν τὸ γ’ εῦ πρᾶσσειν, ἐπεὶ πῦθωτο, κέρδος ἐμπολα (Soph. Tr. 93).
42. πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω: Plato, without committing the artistic error of saying directly that his next proof is the most important of all, draws attention to it by this careful statement of the argument which is to be refuted: the effect is enhanced by the opening words of the next chapter—σιχνὸν χρόνον ἐπιστῶν καὶ πρὸς εαυτὸν τί ακεφάλειμος.

43. εἶ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλης: this perfectly transparent phrase would require no note, were it not for the perverse ingenuity of Wagner in creating a difficulty: he takes προσθῆς and ἀφέλης as subj. after βούλει, but in that constr. βούλει is interrogative, and the subj. in the first person: here the subj. depend on ὅμα.

CHAPTER XLV

95 Ε—97 B, c. xlv. This demands an investigation into the causes of generation and decay, on which subject Socrates proposes to relate his own experiences. In his youth he was strongly fascinated by the old physical philosophy; he inquired whether heat and cold were the universal generative forces; whether the blood were the source of intelligence, or fire, or air, or the brain. But finally he came to the conclusion that he had no aptitude for such speculations, and even lost his faith in the knowledge he before supposed himself to possess. Formerly he rested comfortably in the belief that eating and drinking were the cause of growth; nor did he shrink from saying that one man was taller than another by the head, and that ten are more than eight because of the addition of two. But now he cannot satisfy himself that the mere juxtaposition of separate units is a sufficient cause for their being two; all the less because the same result is produced by the precisely opposite process of division; nor can he even tell why one is one; but he is forced to reject the physical method as affording no real explanation of anything.

Ε 5. διαπραγματεύσασθαι: ‘to go thoroughly into’: cf. note on πραγματεύα 63 A: and 77 D.

96 A 6. τὰ γε ἐμὰ πάθη, ‘my own experiences’: it is a point impossible to decide with certainty whether this is to be taken as historically true of Socrates (Grote, followed by Prof. Geddes), or as the history of Plato's mental development put dramatically in the mouth of Socrates (Archer-Hind, following Hermann): it is undoubtedly in favour of the former view that in the Clouds of Aristoph. (423 B.C.), Socrates is satirised mainly as a speculative in physical science. It may, of course,
as Mr. Archer-Hind suggests, be merely an ideal sketch of the history of the mind in the search for truth—'the development of philosophy to the theory of Ideas.'

8. περὶ ὧν λέγεις: in spite of inferior mss. authority, this seems required by the sense—'your statement,' 'your argument': περὶ ὧν ἄν λέγῃς would have to mean, 'whatever you shall say': the ἄν may be due to the previous ὧν ἄν λέγω, and ἄν would bring along with it λέγῃς for λέγεις.

12. ὑπερήφανος: sc. σοφία.

17. ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ: B 'when hot and cold undergo a sort of fermentation,' or 'decomposition.' This doctrine was attributed by ancient writers to various philosophers of the Ionic school—Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Archelaus. The line taken in the main by the Ionic philosophers was to explain the world as derived from some single element—Thales said the primary element was 'water,' Anaximenes 'air,' and so on: Anaximander called his primary element τὸ ἀπειρον, of which pairs of opposites, such as τὸ υγρὸν and τὸ ἐξηρόν, τὸ θερμὸν and τὸ ψυχρὸν, were primary determinations. The σηπεδῶν spoken of would take place by the action of τὸ θερμὸν: cf. Ar. Μетеорολογία iv. i. 879 a 16 σημεῖο δ' ἐστὶ φθορά τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ υγρῷ οἴκειας καὶ κατὰ φύσιν θερμότητος ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίας θερμότητος: αὐτὴ δ' ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ περι-έχοντος... καὶ ξύλῳ ἐγγίζεται τοῖς σηπεμένοις διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀποκεκριμένην θερμότητα φυσικὴν οὖσαν συνιστάναι τὰ ἐκκριθέντα, a process illustrated by the formation of worms in putrefying matter, maggots in cheese, etc.

19. καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἔστιν ὁ φρονοῦμεν: cf. Empedocles 315—

αἷματος ἐν πελάγεισσι θερμαμμένη ἁμφιθροῦντος,

τῇ τε νύμηα μᾶλιστα κυκλώσκεται ἁμβρόποισιν.

αἷμα γὰρ ἁμβρόποις περικάρδιοι ἐστὶ νύμηα,

referred to without name by Lucr. iii. 43, 'et se scire animae naturam sanguinis esse,' and probably too by Virg. Georg. ii. 484 'frigidus obtusiter circum prae cordia sanguis,'

20. ἦ ὁ ἄρη ἦ τὸ πῦρ: the doctrines respectively of the Ionian philosophers Anaximenes and Heraclitus.

21. ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλος: the origin of this doctrine is attributed by Diog. Laert. to the Pythagoreans, though with doubtful authority: it was held by the physician Hippocrates: οὗτος (sc. ὁ ἐγκέφαλος) γὰρ ἦλθεν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑρῶς γενομένων ἐμμηνεύς, ἦν ὑγιαίνων τυγχάνῃ τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν αὐτῷ ὁ ἄρη παρέχεται, ἀπὶ δὲ τὴν σύνεσιν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστιν ὁ διαγγέλλων.
23. ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο: for γίγνοιτο cf. notes on 87 D, 95 D.

24. λαβοῦσας τὸ ἡρμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτα: Geddes retains the mss. κατὰ ταῦτα, which he translates 'accordingly,' comparing οὗτος in 61 D: κατὰ ταῦτα would go with ἡρμεῖν—'when it has acquired stability.' The doctrine here alluded to as to the origin of ἐπιστήμη is probably 'popular opinion,' and not that of any special philosopher or sect. It differs toto caelo from the Platonic doctrine, which regards ἐπιστήμη as fundamentally different from δόξα, in that the latter deals with the shifting phenomena of sense (γνώμαια), and so is itself shifting and unreliable, while the former deals with the immutable Ideas (τὰ ὅτα), and so is itself immutable. The difference is well brought out in the Meno (97 E): καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθείαι, ὡσον μὲν ἂν χρόνων παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα, καὶ πάντα τάγαθα ἐργάζονται: πολὺν δὲ χρόνων οὐκ ἔθελουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἄνθρώπου, ὡστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξια εἰσοῦν, ἐὼς ἂν τις αὐτὰς δόσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ . . . ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήματα γίγνονται, ἐπειτα μόνιμοι. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμωτέρον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθὴς δόξης ἑστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμην ὀρθῆς δόξης.

C 29. ἀφύης ἐλναι, ὃς οὐδὲν χρῆμα: 'the most stupid creature in the world': lit. 'stupid, as no (other) thing': we have a very close parallel in 92 Α καὶ νῦν ἔμμενῳ ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ.

33. ἀπέμαθον: 'unlearned': cf. ἀπογεγυνωσκώ—ἀπέγυνωσαν τὸ πορεύεσθαι: cf. Latin 'dediscere.'

D 38. ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται: an allusion has been seen here to the Anaxagorean doctrine of the ὄμομερη, or 'homogeneous particles,' bone being formed of small particles of bone, flesh of small particles of flesh, and so on: but in view of παντὶ δήλον it is perhaps best to take it as describing the ordinary man's view of the subject: the process described by Socrates is 'obviously' the outward manifestation of the assimilation of food. μετρίας again (five lines below) points to the same conclusion: it is an appeal to 'common-sense.'

46. ἵκανως: 'on adequate grounds': cf. 92 Ε ἵκανως καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι.

E 47. αὐτὴ τῇ κεφαλῇ: 'simply by a head': Prof. Geddes finds a reference to Π. iii. 193 μείζων μὲν κεφαλῇ Ἀγαμέμνωνος.

53. πόρρω ἐμὲ εἶναι: depends on δοκεῖ.

55. ὡς γε: Lat. 'qui' or 'quippe qui' with subjunctive.

57. ὁ προσετέθη: i.e. 'the original "one" to which the second "one" was added.'
62. αὐτή ἡ ἀρα αἰτία: an instance of the common attraction 97 A of the subject into the gender of the predicate, for τοῦτο ἡ ἀρα αἰτία αὐτῶς ἐγένετο.

63. ἡ ἕξινοδος τοῦ ... τεθημένει: 'the combination formed by (or "consisting of") their juxtaposition,' a similar genitive of definition to ἡ λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι 78 D, and τὴν ἐπιωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὦ ἐστίν 92 D.

64. οὐδὲ γε ὡς, ἐάν τις ...: this ὡς anticipates, by a natural colloquial freedom of speech, the ὡς following πείθεσθαι.

73. κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου: 'by this method B of investigation,' viz. physical speculation.

75. αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω: Prof. Geddes takes φύρω in the sense of φυρᾶται, 'to knead,' quoting Ar. Av. 462 προπεφύραται λόγος εἰς μοι, δειματτένην οὐ κωλέει: but φύρω is to 'mix up,' 'confound,' and εἰκῆ confirms this, if confirmation was needed; cf. 101 ε ἠμα οὐκ ἂν φύρουσ. Socrates is surely here only speaking with his accustomed εἰρώνεια: he had been forced to abandon the 'infallible' methods of the physicists, and resort to a 'wild jumble' of his own.

76. προσέμεια: 'accept, 'embrace': the same meaning can be expressed by τοῦτο με οὐδαμὴ προσεται—'this does not attract me' (literally—'to draw to one's self').

CHAPTER XLVI

97 B—98 B, c. xlvi. Afterwards Socrates hears a passage of Anaxagoras, wherein that philosopher declares that mind is the universal cause. His hopes are thereby raised to the highest pitch; a system which takes mind for its principle cannot, he thinks, be otherwise than teleological. Anaxagoras will surely point out that mind must order all things for the best, and he will seek no other cause why each thing is as it is, but that it is best so. He will first inform us of the shape and position of the earth and then explain how that shape and position were the best; and similarly with all other natural phenomena, assigning as the cause the best for each and all. So he read the book with eager anticipation.

1. ἐκ βιβλίου τινός: 'but once hearing a man reading from a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras, which declared ...': ἀναγι-γνώσκωντος agrees with τινός (masc.), λέγοντος probably with βιβλίου, though it may agree with τινός.

eita δο νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. Cf. Ar. Met. i. iii. 984. 8 (after speaking of the physical speculators) μετά δὲ τούτοις καὶ τάς τοιαύτας ἑρχας ὡς οὐχ ἱκανών οὐσῶν γεννήσαι τὴν τῶν ὄτων ἐφών, πάλιν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀλθείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὴν ἐχομένην ἑξήπτασαν ἀρχὴν. τοῦ γὰρ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἐχειν τὰ δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄτων ἢς ὑπ’ ὑπ’ γῆν ὑπ’ ἀλλ’ ἀλλ’ τῶν τοιοῦτων οὐδὲν ὑπ’ εἰκὸς αἰτίων εἶναι οὔτ’ ἑκέινους οἰηθήναι: οὔτ’ αὐτ’ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τῇ τύχῃ τοιούτων ἐπιτρέψει πράγμα καλῶς εἰσχεν. νοῦν δὴ τις εἰπὼν εἶναι, κάθαπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄνωσι, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν αἰτίων τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης οἷον νήφων ἔφανη παρ’ εἰκῆ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον.

8. καὶ ἐκαστὸν τιθέναι ταύτη ὅτι ἄν βελτιστά ἐξήγη: i.e. he imagined that Anaxagoras’ theory of νοῦς would be what modern philosophy calls a ‘teleological’ explanation of the universe, indicating that the universe is designed by a supreme intelligence to attain to a perfect τέλος, and that things are as they are because they fit in best with this design.

15. περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκέινου: ‘with regard to his particular object of inquiry,’ ἑκέινου referring to περὶ ἐκαστοῦ above, as περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν does in the next line.

21. κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ: ‘to my mind,’ with a playful reference to the νοῦς of Anaxagoras. This reminds us of the similar play on the phrase ‘ex animi mei sententia’ (meaning (a) ‘to the best of my knowledge,’ (b) ‘to my liking’) recorded by Cic. de Or. ii. 64. 270 ‘ridicule illud L. Nasica censori Catoni, cum ille, “ex tui animi sententia tuauxorem habes?”’ “non hercule,” inquit, “ex animi mei sententia.”

23. πλαστεῖα ἔστιν ἡ στρογγύλη: many of the Ionian speculators held that the earth was flat, e.g. Anaximenes and Thales, the latter maintaining that it floated like a piece of wood—οἱ δὲ ἐρ’ ὑδάτος κεῖσαν (φασὶ τὴν γῆν). τοῦτον γὰρ ἅρμα ἱκάστατον περιελθάμεν τῶν λόγων, ἐν φασὶν εἰπές Ἰαλήν τὸν Μιλήσιον, ὥς διὰ τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι μένουσαν ἑσπερ ξύλον ἡ τοιοῦτον ἐτεροῦν: the Pythagoreans, on the other hand, believed it to be spherical.

26. ἄμεινον ἦν: not to be confused with ἄμεινον εἶν, it would be ἦν, not ἐστι, in the O.R.: it signifies ‘has been from the beginning,’ ‘was in the beginning of things’: Wohlrab well compares the Arist. formula τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

27. ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι: observe the force of ἔπι—‘go on to show.”

36. οὗ γὰρ ἀν ποτὲ αὐτὸν ὑμην: ἃν goes with ἐπενεγκείω (inf. of ἐπενεγκοι ἀν').
sistency of the Platonic system of ‘Ideas’ with the principle here enunciated cf. Introduction B ad finem.

39. ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποδιδόντα: ‘in assigning to each phenomenon its cause and to the universe in general, I thought he would go on to explain what was best for each and what was the universal good.’

CHAPTER XLVII

98 B—99 D, c. xlvii. Bitter was his disappointment when he found that Anaxagoras did not really use mind as a cause, but accounted for phenomena by the agency of merely physical forces. Exactly similar would be the conduct of one who, after saying that Socrates acted by intelligence, should maintain that he sat there in prison because he had muscles and sinews and joints which enabled him to do so; instead of assigning the real cause, that he thought it right to submit to the judgment of the Athenian people. So far as his bones and muscles are concerned, he might have been at Megara by this time; only he thought it his duty to remain. To call such things causes is folly; although they may be termed instruments without which the cause would not produce its effect. But just this confusion of cause and instrument is made by those who suppose a vortex or some other physical force is what keeps the earth in the centre, instead of the true cause, that it is best for it to be there. About this supreme cause, the good, Socrates would gladly have learnt, could he have found a teacher: as it is he was obliged to content himself with the second best method.

1. ἀπό δὴ θαυμαστής ἐπιδός: Wagner translates this ‘starting from great hope I was sailing along, when as I went on’...: this will not do: (i) ἀπό is too familiar with ἐπιδός, in such phrases as κατὰθάλασσαι ἀπ’ ἐπιδός, to be used in this new sense of ‘starting from’: (ii) ψὐχόμενον φέρομενον can hardly mean ‘I was sailing along’; it would have to mean ‘I was off at top speed,’ which is not to the point: (iii) ἐπειδὴ can hardly bear the sense of the Latin ‘cum subito.’ The meaning is quite different—‘from what high hopes was I plunged headlong when, on going on to read, I found’... .

3. ἀνδρα: ‘a man who’: not the same as τὸν ἄνδρα.

4. [οἴδε τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτωμένων]: this must surely be an interpolation, and an unintelligent one. If retained it must be translated ‘nor assigning any real causes’: but we cannot give to αἰτίας, at this stage of the argument, the meaning ‘real
causes,’ as later on (b) he gives the name of aitia to the ‘so-
called causes’ of Anaxagoras—έτερας τοιαύτας aitiaς λέγοι, φωνάς
te kal árás kai ákous kal álla múria toiaúta aitiomenvos. It is
not till 99 a that he says ἄλλα aitia μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα καλεῖν λιαν
ἀτομον. Again both πνευ, the most unemphatic of words, and
the plural aitiaς are against this translation: aitiaς πνευς
ἐπαιτιώμενον is the very thing Plato might accuse Anaxagoras
of doing.

C 7. πεπονθέναι: a common euphemism, especially in the
orators, for ἀμαρτάνειν.

14. διαφυάς: ‘joints,’ the same thing as ἄρθρα regarded from
a different point of view, διαφυαί as breaking the continuity of
the limbs, ἄρθρα as knitting the parts of the limb together.

χωρίς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων: this use of the preposition is notable;
it is practically ‘adjectival,’ taking the place of a participle—
χωρίζοντα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων.

D 15. τὰ δὲ νεύρα: in the regular Platonic sense of ‘muscles,’
‘sinews,’ not ‘nerves.’

17. δ συνεχεὶς αὐτά: αὐτά is best perhaps taken to embrace
νεύρα, ὀστᾶ and σάρκες.

αἰωρομένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων: this, instead of gen.
absolute, might have been ὀστᾶ as the object of χαλῶντα καὶ
συνεχοντα: cf. 77 E ως δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὥ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ
ἀναπείθεω (note).

99 A 30. νὴ τὸν κύνα: cf. Apol. 22 A, Rep. iii. 399 e, Gorg. 482 b,
where it takes the fuller form μὰ τῶν κύων τῶν Ἀγαπτῶν θεῶν.
Prof. Geddies in his note on this familiar Socratic oath combats
the view, held for example by the Christian Fathers, that it
expressed Socrates’ contempt for the popular religion of the
Greeks (cf. Tertullian, ‘taceo de philosophis, Socrate contentus,
qui in contumeliam deorum quercum et hircum et canem
dejerabat’). The form of it found in Gorgias loc. cit. suggests
that it was derived from an Egyptian source: the Egyptian
god Anubis was represented with the head of a dog. In the
scholiast on Ar. Birds 521 we have recorded the decree of the
Cretan Rhadamanthys, evidently from an Egyptian source—
λέγεται (Ῥαδάμανθυς) πρῶτον οὐδένα ἐὰν ὥρκους ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ
τῶν θεῶν, ἄλλ’ ὀμνύσει κελεύσαι χήνα καὶ κύνα καὶ κριόν καὶ
tά ὁμοια. We may attribute the Socratic oath, then, rather to
true reverence than to any contempt of the gods of Greece.

33. εἰ μὴ δυκαίοτερον ὄμην: the pros and cons of escape
from prison are the subject of the Crito.

B 41. καὶ ταύτα νῦν πράττων: mss. have πράττω, which would
mean 'to say that it is because of these things that I do what I do, and at the same time that I do it by intelligence.' But there are several objections to this: (i) 'at the same time' in the translation is not in the Greek, though vital to the meaning: (ii) ταῦτα is odd, in a different sense from διὰ ταῦτα: (iii) why is πράττω substituted for ποιῶ, if ταῦτα is its direct object? (iv) most fatal of all, ἀλλὰ must introduce a verb contrasting with the last preceding principal verb, and this condition is violated by πράττω coming between. All these objections are done away with by Heindorf's neat emendation πράττον—'and that too though I act by intelligence': (i) the idiomatic καὶ ταῦτα supplies the necessary 'at the same time': (ii) καὶ ταῦτα is the familiar idiom, so that ταῦτα creates no difficulty: (iii) πράττον is used because no object is expressed: (iv) διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ becomes the principal clause immediately preceding ἀλλὰ.

43. ῥαφυμία τοῦ λόγου: 'a slip-shod way of speaking.'

τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷον τ' εἶναι: much better taken as an anacolouthon than as the indignant exclamatory infinitive. The τὸ μὴ clause becomes lost in the relative clause δ' δὴ μοι φαίνονται, and the verbal phrase (e.g. εὐθές ἕστι), so easily supplied, is not expressed.

47. ψηλαφώντες: 'groping blindly': cf. χερσὶ ψηλαφῶν Hom. Od. ix. 416 of the blinded Cyclops, and the familiar εἰ ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτῶν (τὸν θεόν) καὶ εὑροῦν (Acts xvii. 27) of the heathen 'groping after God': δ', in δ' δὴ μοι, is perhaps best taken with προσαγορεύουσι: ψηλαφ. used absolutely.

48. ἀλλοτρίῳ ὅνοματι: 'a name that does not belong to it.'

49. ὁ μὲν τις δύνη περιτεθεὶς: this explanation was given by Empedocles: cf. Arist. de caelo ii. xiii. 295 a 16 οί δ' ὡσπερ Εἰμπεδοκῆς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιθέουσαν καὶ θάττον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κολύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κύδαθοι ὕδωρ (as water stays in a cup which is whirled round rapidly). This 'vortex' theory was so familiar a one that Ar. (Clouds 379) represents Δίνος as the new god in place of Zeus: speaking of the clouds, he says:—

Στρεψ. ὁ δ' ἀναγκαζών ἔστι τίς αὐτάς, οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς, ὡστε φέρεσθαι;
Σωκρ. ἡκιστ'. ἅλλ' αἰθέριοι δίνος. Στρεψ. Δίνος; τούτι μ' ἐλευθερεῖ,
ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ὤν, ἅλλ' ἀντ' αὐτοῦ Δίνος νυνὶ βασιλεύων.

There is some doubt about the construction of ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ: most of the editors take it with δίνην (Stallb,
Wohlrab, Wagner), comparing 110 ε υτό σημεδόνος καὶ ἁλμῆς υπὸ τῶν δέθρω ξυνερρήκοτων (where v. note): there is no difficulty in υτό with the verbal noun, but two points are decidedly in favour of taking υτό with μένειν: (i) δινήν . . υτό τοῦ οὕρανου would mean 'a revolving of the earth caused by the hevens,' whereas the δινή is 'the revolution of the hevens' (cf. quotation from Aristotle and use of the word περιτιθείς): (ii) if υτό τοῦ οὕρανου is taken with δινή it leaves μένειν very abrupt: we should at least expect the idiomatic οὕτω with it—οὕτω δὴ μένειν ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν. μένειν is virtually a passive—'is kept in its place by,' cf. υτό with πίπτειν, ἀποθανεῖν, and the like.

51. ὁ δὲ ὠσπέρ καρδόπη: lit. 'others again set the air beneath it as a support, though as though it were a flat kneading-trough': cf. Arist. l.c. Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξιόδρας καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλάτος αἵτων εἶναι φασὶν τοῦ μένειν αὐτῆς' οὖ γὰρ τέμειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιπωματίσειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν ('lies like a lid on the air beneath it'). Aristophanes exercises his wit on κάρδοσος (Clouds 670 sqq.) as he had already done on δινή: being feminine, Socrates says, it should be called καρδόπη.

53. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὦς οἷῶν τε: τοῦ of course goes with κείσθαι—lit. 'the faculty of being disposed in the best possible manner in which they could be placed.'

55. δαμονίαν ισχύν ξεῖν: the subject of ξεῖν is presumably not ταῦτῃ, but αὐτᾶ of the previous clause.

56. Ἁτλάντα: as Atlas bears the weight of the physical universe on his shoulders, so we want to find an Efficient Cause capable of supporting the burden of the universe: τοῦτον is probably not neuter lor ταῦτης τῆς δινάμεως, but masculine with reference to Atlas: 'an Atlas stronger and more divine than the true Atlas.'

58. τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον: 'the good and binding,' a play on the double sense of δέον, 'right' and 'binding': cf. Cratylus 418 E ἀγαθὸν γάρ ἰδέα οὕσα τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἶναι καὶ κόλυμα φορᾶς. Mr. Archer-Hind points the bearing of this criticism: 'All this critique of Anaxagoras is a propaedeutic to the Ideal theory. The main fault of Anaxagoras is that 'the good' is not the ultimate cause in his system. Plato supplies his defects (in the Republic first, and still more in the later dialogues) (i) by making τὸ ἀγαθὸν the principle of all existence, so that each thing really exists in proportion as it is perfect; (ii) in that νοῦς, instead of being a merely external motive power, is actually the universe: causation is ultimately identity.'
CHAPTER XLVIII

99 d-100 a, c. xlviii. Since then, continues Socrates, I have been forced to abandon the investigation of physical phenomena, and fearing lest, as those who rashly take observations by gazing on the sun himself, instead of his reflection in the water, are bereft of their bodily vision, my soul should be blinded by gazing directly at phenomena, I bethought me of contemplating their images, by which I mean definitions or concepts. And yet to call these definitions images is perhaps somewhat misleading: for he that investigates definitions certainly does not contemplate an ‘image’ more than he who observes sensible objects. Anyhow this was the course I took: assuming the best definition I could form, I regard whatever agrees with that as true, and whatever does not I reject as false. I will presently explain my method more clearly.

2. ἐπιθη ἀπερηκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν: few passages in ancient literature have caused so great diversity of interpretation as this: to state and discuss at length all the interpretations would be beyond the scope of this book. The crucial point is τὰ ὄντα: is this (i) ‘realities,’ τὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα, or (ii) ‘things,’ ‘the physical world’? I think the latter: if it had been meant in the former sense, would it not have been expressed more distinctly (e.g. αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα)? cf. 97 d τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων, where τὰ ὄντα is clearly ‘the physical world.’ These ὄντα then correspond to the ἡλιος ἐκλείπων, and it is here that the difficulty arises. Mr. Archer-Hind contends (and quite correctly) that elsewhere (e.g. Rep. 516) ‘the Ideas’ are represented under the figure of the sun as seen with the naked eye, and as dazzling the intelligence that has not been led up by degrees to contemplate them: from which he argues that Plato could not possibly compare ‘the phenomena of sense’ to the sun, and the λόγοι, or ‘conceptions,’ to a reflection of the sun in water. This, I think, is to argue too much, and my own impression, from reading and re-reading this very difficult chapter, is that we are to find in it an example of the Socratic ἐλπωεία: ‘I failed,’ says Socrates, in effect, ‘to arrive at a satisfactory aitia
by the method of physical investigation, even the νοῦς theory of Anaxagoras, from which I hoped so much, proving a broken reed: but perhaps the light was too strong for my eyes: I determined to see if I could not study phenomena through some sort of "reflection" or "image."

This enables us to give a natural rendering to ἀνέπων πρός τὰ πράγματα τοὺς δυμασί, which positively must be taken of 'looking at physical phenomena with the eyes.' In an article in the Classical Review (vol. xv. p. 249), Mr. R. K. Gaye, arguing for the interpretation of τὰ ὅντα as 'realities,' 'Ideas,' lays great stress on τὰ πράγματα, to which he gives the same meaning: 'the Ideas,' he says, 'have already in this dialogue been referred to as τὰ πράγματα: αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεσέων αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα (66 d), where no stress need he laid on αὐτά, which merely correlates with αὐτῇ immediately preceding.' Strange language indeed for a Platonist! Surely αὐτά is the very last word to be disregarded in such a discussion: an impartial reading of the phrase αὐτά τὰ πράγματα in its context suggests that the phrase itself indicates that τὰ πράγματα without αὐτά would simply mean 'things,' i.e. 'phenomena.' Mr. Gaye further says: 'I do not know of any passage in which πράγματα is used definitely of particulars.' Here are two very clear cases: 98 β τῷ μὲν νῷ οὖν χρόμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα: does Mr. Gaye translate this, 'making no use of νοῦς in the arrangement of the Ideas'? Still clearer is 103 β τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλεγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίον πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γένεσθαι, νῦν δὲ δη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐναντίῳ ὦκ ἀν ποτε γένοιτο.

Further, this interpretation seems to me to give a natural point to ὅσως μὲν οὖν ὃ εἰκάζω . . οὐκ ἔοικεν. Socrates has called the λόγοι an εἰκών: an εἰκών of what? Those who take τὰ ὅντα to mean 'the Ideas' say 'an εἰκών of the Ideas': but, if so, why does he immediately tone down his metaphor, and say 'I am far from allowing that the λόγοι are more of an εἰκών than τὰ ἔργα.' According to Mr. Archer-Hind's interpretation, he has said nothing that could possibly suggest such an idea. If, on the other hand, we take τὰ ὅντα as 'physical phenomena,' then by calling λόγοι an εἰκών τῶν ὅντων, Socrates does seem distinctly to suggest that the λόγοι have less reality than the phenomena, and so naturally he proceeds immediately to correct that impression by saying that we are not to press the word εἰκών too closely—ὅσως μὲν οὖν ὃ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Finally Mr. Archer-Hind lays great stress on δεύτερος πλοῦς (v. note on 99 d): he says it implies that the πρῶτος πλοῦς, with which it contrasts, must be a 'superior method': that Socrates could not call 'physical investigation,' 'the examination of phenomena,' his πρῶτος πλοῦς, and the λόγοι a δεύτερος
πλούς: consequently the πρώτος πλούς must be the 'Ideal theory,' especially the discovery of τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δεόν. But is not δεύτερος πλούς just the sort of thing we might expect of Socrates in 'irony'? cf. the closing words of ch. xlv. ἀλλά των ἄλλων τρόπον αὐτός εἰκὴ φύσιν. Socrates' 'second best' turns out to be not so bad in the end: what is it, after all, as developed in the succeeding chapters, but the 'theory of Ideas,' that a thing is what it is by virtue of its indwelling Idea? It is this on which his final proof of the soul's immortality rests, and his audience are satisfied with it: can we believe that Plato seriously meant to call this method of proof a 'second-best,' something short of the ideal at which Socrates had once aimed?

[While my MS. was in the printers' hands, two articles by Mr. W. J. Goodrich have appeared in the Classical Review, vol. xvii. p. 384, and vol. xviii. p. 5, criticizing Mr. Gaye's article in the same spirit as my note, and adopting the same view of τὰ ἄντα σκοποῦ. H.W.]

11. εἰς τοὺς λόγους: the Socratic λόγοι are very much what E we mean by 'definitions,' or more closely still 'concepts': cf. Introd. B.

13. ὃ εἰκάζω: sc. τὸ τῷ ὃ εἰκάζω αὐτῷ.

14. οὖ... πάνυ: 'I am far from allowing.'

15. ἐν εἰκόσι: Socrates has called the λόγοι an εἰκόν of τὰ ἄντα, 'phenomena' (cf. note on ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη): he now guards against a misconception, viz. that of imagining that the λόγοι are less real than 'phenomena': phenomena themselves are, according to the Platonic doctrine, εἰκόνες of the Ideas.

16. ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις: the word ἔργον is chosen, not to suggest that phenomena are the 'effects' of the Ideas, but because ἔργον is a natural contrast to λόγος.

ἀλλ' οὖν δή: much the same as the commoner δ' οὖν: 'well, however that may be.'

CHAPTER XLIX

100 B-102 A, c. xlix. My method is nothing new, he proceeds: it starts from the Ideal theory which is familiar to us; and by means of this theory I hope to prove the soul's immortality. Starting from the assumption that there are Ideas of beautiful, and just, and great, etc., I simply affirm that all particulars possessing these qualities possess them through the Idea, whether by participation, presence, or communion, or
however you may define the connection. All other causes are
beyond my comprehension; I cling simply to my safe reply,
that the Idea of the beautiful is the cause of beauty. If you
accept this, you will never consent to say that one man is
greater or less than another by a head, but by greatness or
smallness; nor that ten are more than eight by two, but by
multitude. Similarly when one is added to one, or divided,
the cause why the two are two is not addition or division, but
the Idea of duality; all other causes you would leave to wiser
heads than yours. Again if you were forced to give an account
of your hypothesis, you would proceed to a higher generalisa-
tion, and again to another; ascending till you reached one that
was adequate: and you would beware of falling into the con-
fusions of thought, of which sham philosophers are guilty.
Here Echecrates interrupts to express his admiration of
Socrates' clear exposition.

The upshot of this chapter is that universals alone can be
known. For the present, however, these universals are in the
form of λόγοι or ὑποθέσεις, which are not objects of νοῦς proper.
When dialectic is made perfect, λόγοι will be exchanged for
ἰδέαι, ὑποθέσεις for ἀρχαί.

B 2. καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λῶγοι: cf. e.g. opening words of
ch. xxii. 76 b.

4. ἔρχομαι ... ἐπιξειρωῖν: the ptcp. is more usually future,
but ἐπιξειρωῖν has the force of a future itself, so that the present
ptcp. is more logical; cf. the common phrase ὅπερ ἦν ἔρων, 'as
I was going to say:' for the verb of 'going,' to express a
future, cf. besides the English idiom, the Latin future infinitive
passive 'datum iri.'

11. τὴν αἰτίαν ... ὡς ἀδάνατον ἡ ψυχὴ: observe how the
Greek word αἰτία covers both 'cause' and 'explanation.'

C 13. οἶκ ἄν φθάνοις περαινὼν: lit. 'you cannot be too quick
in proceeding,' i.e. 'pray proceed right away': cf. Eur. I. T.
245 χέρνισας δὲ καὶ κατάργιματα οἴκ ἄν φθάνοις ἄν εὐτρεπῆ
ποιομένη.

16. οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἀλλο: a more emphatic form of δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλο.

D 22. ἡ χρώμα εὐανθήσει ἔχον: the ptcp. explains δι' ὅ τι, 'viz.
because it has ...': cf. 102 d λῶγον δὲ τοῦτο ἐνεκα, βουλόμενος
δοξαί σοι ὅπερ ἐμοί.

26. ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ὑποσ εὐθώς: 'simply, artlessly,
it may be foolishly': ἀτέχνως is to be distinguished from
ἀτεχνῶς (= omnino).

29. εἴτε ὡς ἡ καὶ ὡς προσγενομένου: by a natural
Greek idiom the third alternative of the series, εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ..., is expressed by a different construction from the first two: Plato is saying that what makes a beautiful thing beautiful is the relation in which it stands to the ‘idea of beauty’: he does not wish to specify precisely what that relation is: it may be παρουσία, or κοινωνία, or a relation of some other sort. The mss. have προσγεγομένη, a ptp. which cannot apply to παρουσία or κοινωνία: it is not παρουσία or κοινωνία which ‘stands in a certain connection’ with the object, but αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, and our ptp. describing the relation must agree with ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ: Ueberweg’s emendation, προσγεγομένου, is almost certainly right. Mr. Archai-Hind adopts this, though he quotes in support of the suggestion to omit the ptp. altogether Plato Lains 899 Β θεῶς αὐτάς εἶναι φύσιμον, εἴτε ἐν σωμάσιν ἐνοῦσαι, ἢ ἐν ὑπνείᾳ πάντα οὐράνιον, εἴτε ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως: but it is one thing to use ὅπη καὶ ὅπως absolutely as parallel to a ptp., quite another thing to use it as parallel to a noun like παρουσία or κοινωνία. Other editors propose προσγεγομένη (but the ‘name’ is not the point; it is rather the ‘mode of relation’); Wohlrab, to keep προσγεγομένη, reads ἢ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μεθέξει εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπη δή καὶ ὅπως προσγεγομένη, thus losing a very pretty idiom, and making προσγεγομένη refer to μεθέξει, to which it applies no better than to παρουσία or κοινωνία.

30. οὐ γὰρ ἐτι τοῦτο διασχίζομαι: ἐτι is to be noticed: its use is ‘logical,’ not ‘temporal’: ‘for I do not go on to insist on that point.’

54. τὸ σμικρὸ τινὶ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι: at first sight this looks like a verbal quibble on the two uses of the dative in τῇ κεφαλῇ, (i) modal, (ii) causal; in reality Plato is clearing up a logical difficulty: he points out by a ‘reductio ad absurdum’ the danger of assigning as a cause something that can be brought out only as a consequence of another condition. The quotation in Stob. 3.1.24 belongs to 321 Β: ἐκάστον εἵνεκα τὸ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ὅσον ἐν τῷ καλῷ.

67. τῆς ἴδιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἄν μετάσχη: ἐκάστον is the possessive genitive after οὐσίας—‘the particular essence of each quality of which it participates’: ἐκάστον corresponds e.g. to διάδοσιν ἐν ὅσια τῆς δυνάς.

76. τὴν ἐναυτὸν σκιάν: an obvious figure of speech to express 'excessive caution' or 'timidity,' common to many languages: for τὸ λεγόμενον cf. note on 66 c.

77. ἐκείνου τοῦ ἄσφαλοῦ τῆς ὑποθέσεως: 'clinging to the safety of your hypothesis': the hypothesis is the same as the λόγος, a 'concept' or 'definition' (e.g. 'beauty') arrived at by observation and generalisation from particulars (cf. Intr. B § 2): or perhaps, to speak with more accuracy, the hypothesis is the 'assumption of the truth of the λόγος.'

78. [εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως εἰσαύτο: obviously εἰσαύτο is wrong, occurring in the unusual sense of 'attack' immediately after being used in its regular meaning of 'cling to': Madvig proposed ἐφώτο, which would meet this objection. But there are other grave objections to the whole passage: (i) εἰ δὲ τις . . ἐφώτο is merely a clumsy repetition of the next clause ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δεύο σε διδόναι λόγον, where the wording ἐκείνης αὐτῆς appears to me to imply a contrast with the clause immediately preceding, i.e. with 'deductions from the hypothesis.' (ii) εἰ σοι ἄλληλοι συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ does not correspond to the Platonic method: the hypothesis (v. previous note) is arrived at by generalisation from particulars: once it is formed, particulars are to be judged by reference to it, and not by comparison with each other. (iii) Mr. Archer-Hind suggests that ὀρμηθέντα should be ὀρμημένα. (iv) ἔως ἃν . . σκέψασθαι is not Greek: why ἔως ἃν? (cf. below ἔως ἐπὶ τί ἰκανόν ἐλθούν in an exactly parallel clause): L. and S. quote in support of ἔως ἃν with opt. Soph. Trach. 687 ἔως ἃν ἄρτιχριστον ἀρμόδιαμι ποι, which I find Jebb alters to ἔως νῦν; of course this point is not conclusive evidence against the genuineness of the whole sentence, as ἔως ἃν might be a 'pictorial repetition' of ἔως ἃν.

83. ὠσαύτως ἃν διδοῖς: just as we treated particulars, reducing them to a λόγος by a process of generalisation, so we now treat our hypothesis: we bring it under some higher genus, some higher generalisation.

84. ἦτε τῶν ἀνωθεν: for the meaning of ἀνωθεν, 'more general,' 'more universal,' cf. Ar. Post. Anal. i. xx. 82 a 23 λέγω δὲ ἂν μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου, κατω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος.

85. ἔως ἐπὶ τί ἰκανόν ἐλθοῖς: there is no need to find here an allusion to the final ιδέα τῶν ἄγαθοι (called in Rep. ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετη): it only means 'a generalisation which satisfies the man who impugns your first hypothesis': 'satisfactory.'

ἄμα δὲ οὐκ ἃν φύρουσ: mss. have φύρωσ: if passive, it
does not give the sense required, and the middle verb (as some editors explain it) has no authority: we want an equivalent of ὅμως τάντα κυκώντες in the next clause. Is ἀμα to be taken closely with φύσις? i.e. 'You would not confuse, by discussing together': I am inclined to think so, for ἀμα δὲ, in its usual sense of 'and at the same time,' is out of place: Socrates is not pointing out a 'further advantage' of this process, as that ἀμα δὲ would imply.

Observe the force of this precaution—in discussion you must keep quite distinct, (i) discussion of deductions from a hypothesis, (ii) discussion of the validity of the hypothesis itself: your opponent must either allow your hypothesis (i.e. allow you to assume its truth), or impugn it: in the latter case you must try to establish your hypothesis by continually higher generalisation, till you reach one that satisfies him (ἐδώ ἐπὶ τι ἴκανον ἔλθοι).

91. ὅμως δύνασθαι: a somewhat illogical repetition of the E idea of ἴκανον, due to ὅμως: 'they are quite equal to ... and still being able to satisfy themselves.'

95. νὴ Δία, ὡς Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε: the adverb goes with ἔφη: 'I am not surprised they attested.' This is the last dramatic interruption of the argument for immortality, and marks that the climax is approaching: our final proof is to rest on the 'hypothesis' just enunciated, that there are such things as αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον and the like, and that it is by participation in these essences that things possess the qualities which they do possess: from this Soc. goes on to deduce his final and convincing proof that ψυχή is immortal (cf. opening words of ch. 1.).

CHAPTER L

102 Α–103 Α, c. 1. Assuming then that Ideas exist corresponding to the hypotheses, and that by participation in them particulars possess their attributes, Socrates proceeds thus. When we say Simmias is bigger than Socrates and less than Phaedo, we are speaking loosely: in reality Simmias partakes of the Ideas of great and small; and it is greatness in him which is bigger than smallness in Socrates, and smallness in him that is less than greatness in Phaedo. For it has nothing to do with the personality of Simmias, Socrates and Phaedo, as such, that one is greater or less than another. We observe then that (1) two opposite Ideas can coexist in the same subject, although (2) such opposite Ideas cannot combine with each
other, either (3) as they exist absolutely in nature, or (4) as they are manifested in concrete particulars. And this incapacity of one opposite Idea to take upon it the nature of the other is true of all pairs of opposite Ideas as well as great and small.

Setting aside the metaphysical objections to the doctrine of Ideas of relation, which we have here in its most pronounced form, it conveniently serves Plato's purpose to show that in particulars contradictory Ideas may coexist. In 103 d we pass on to the next stage. We are here dealing with the participation by particulars in Ideas which are not essential to their nature. Greatness and smallness are not essential to a man as heat is essential to fire and cold to snow. With this chapter it is well to contrast Parmenides 150 a foll. (Archer-Hind.)

B 3. τάλλα: i.e. the phenomena of the world.

10. ἀλλὰ γὰρ: 'however,' introduces a modification or qualification of what has preceded. The point of this exceedingly difficult chapter does not seem to me to have been brought out very clearly by any of the editors: the critical words seem to me to be οὐ γάρ ποιν ἐφύκεναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων. Greatness or smallness is not part of the essential character, part of the λόγος we might say, of Simmias: it is an 'accidental' predicate (τυγχάνει ἔχων) applied in relation to some other individual: he can part with it, and yet retain his identity (cf. ἢς πεπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα καὶ ἐπὶ ὁ βίως εἰμί, ὁμοίως ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμὶ): the Idea of 'greatness' in him ὑπεκχωρεῖ on the approach of the Idea of smallness. Cf. Parmenides 129 b e μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ δύο τὰ αὔτὰ αὐτὸ τὸ δύο τὰ ἀπέφαινε ἀνώμοι γεγονόμενα ὁ τὰ ἀνώμοι δύο, τέρας ἢν, ὁμοίως ἢν εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιητὰ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαινεῖ πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἐμικυγι ἀτομον δοκεῖ εἰναι.

12. οὐτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν: τὸ ἀληθὲς is of course the subject of ἔχειν, the constr. of τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν being allowed to lapse: trans. 'as to Simmias exceeding Socr., do you admit that the truth is not exactly as expressed in the words?'

D 23. τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων: the mss. for ὑπέχων read ὑπερέχων, which would have to govern τὴν σμικρότητα: 'surpassing the smallness of the one (Socr.) by surpassing it in greatness, and lending to the other (Phaedo) by comparison a greatness exceeding his own shortness': this gives a very awkward and obscure sense, and involves the use of ὑπερέχειν with gen. and accus. in the two clauses: Madvig's conj. ὑπέχων is almost certainly right (ὑπερέχων being due to
frequent recurrence of this word in the sentence): ‘submitting his smallness to the greatness of the one (Phaedo) to be surpassed by it (epexegetic infinitive), and to the other (Socr.) presenting his own greatness, surpassing that other’s smallness.’ Here the phraseology is rather elaborate than obscure: Socrates laughingly apologises for it in the next words.

26. ἐγγαραφικῶς ἔρειν: there can be little doubt that the ἐγγαραφή meant is ‘a bond,’ ‘a legal document’: ‘it looks as if I were going to speak in the style of an indenture.’

29. οὐ μόνον αὐτό τὸ μέγεθος: not merely the Idea in the abstract, but also the ‘Idea’ as informing the particular, is incapable of admitting its opposite: this point is of vital importance when we come to the application of it to the case of ψυχή.

37. ὠσπέρ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος: the sentence is best printed with Ε only a comma after δπερ ἤν (Mr. Archer-Hind seems to take it in this way, though he prints a full stop): trans. ‘in the way that I accept and submit to smallness and, still remaining the man I am, without losing my identity am small’: it illustrates the process just described as impossible for τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος, viz. εἶναι ἐτερον ἢ δπερ ἤν: ‘τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος cannot be σμικρὸν (ἐτερον ἢ δπερ ἤν) as I can.’

45. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι: sc. ἐν τῷ προσίεναι αὐτῷ τὸ 103 A ἐναντίον.

CHAPTER LI

103 A–C, c. li. One of the company suggests that this doctrine is inconsistent with our former theory of generation from opposites (70 C foll.). Socrates replies that then we were speaking of particulars possessing the attributes of such opposites, but now we deal with the absolute opposites themselves. The former can pass from one to the other of two opposite conditions; but the opposite itself can never put on the nature of its opposite.

3. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις: sc. 70 E sqq.

6. ἀτεχνῶς αὐτη: ‘precisely this’: αὐτη is of course predicate, and is explained by ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

9. παραβάλων τὴν κεφαλὴν: ‘bending his head,’ to catch the remark, which may have been made in a low tone from diffidence.

13. ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος: πράγμα is here the ‘concrete particular’ as contrasted with αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, ‘the
abstract Idea’: this is the point that Socrates has been making in the previous chapter, that Socrates is not bigger or smaller by virtue of being Socrates, i.e. that bigness and smallness are not part of the definition, or λόγος, of Socrates, and so there is nothing to prevent Socrates from becoming ‘bigger’ or ‘smaller’ without losing his identity: hot water can become cold water, because ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ are not essential properties of water.

19. ὡν ἐνόντων: not genitive absolute: ὡν depends on ἐπωνυμίαν.

21. γένεσιν ἀλλήλων: the verbal noun of γίγνεσθαι ἀλληλα, ‘submit to becoming each the other.’


25. οὐκ αὖ, ἐφη, οὔτως ἔχω: ‘no, said he, not this time’: he had seen objections to various points earlier on, e.g. 61 ν and 87 ο sqq., but with this particular difficulty he is not in sympathy.

CHAPTER LIII

103 c-104 c, c. lii. The mutually exclusive opposites, hot and cold, are not identical with fire and snow; yet we see that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. Whence we infer that there may be an Idea which is not one of a pair of opposites, but which may exclude one of such opposites. For instance, the Idea of odd is opposite to that of even, and exclusive of it. Also the Idea of three, though not opposite to even, excludes it, because the Idea of three necessarily carries with it the Idea of odd. Similarly the Idea of even and the Idea of two exclude the Idea of odd. Thus it appears that there are (1) opposite Ideas which are mutually exclusive, (2) other Ideas, not identical with any such opposite but necessarily partaking of it, which, equally with that opposite, exclude the other opposite.

3. ἀρ’ ὅπερ χλόνα καὶ πῦρ; ‘are they the same things as snow and fire?’ We are approaching a fresh stage of the argument: ch. 50 has shown that opposite Ideas cannot admit of each other; now Socrates is to show that things of which one of a pair of opposites is an ‘essential’ attribute cannot admit the opposite of that Idea: ‘snow’ involves the Idea of ‘cold,’ and so cannot admit ‘warm,’ but must either withdraw from it or perish.

18. δ ἐστι μὲν οὐκ ἑκεῖνο, ἐχεῖ δὲ τὴν ἑκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί: here μορφή is used as a synonym of εἴδος and ἒδέα, as is proved
by 104 D ἡ ἐναντία ἑδα ἐκεῖνη τῇ μορφῇ: 'snow is not the same as "cold" (ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ἑκεῖνο) but always contains the Idea of cold.' (ἔχει τὴν ἑκεῖνον μορφήν). With ἀλλο τι we are to understand again ἀξιώσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος, 'snow must always have the predicate cold.'

26. καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν: sc. περιττὸν.

διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι: 'because it is its essential nature, never to be without oddness': for πεφυκέναι cf. 102 B οὐ γὰρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίλαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίλαν εἶναι, and opening remarks on ch. 50 (note on ἀλλά γὰρ).

34. ὁ ἡμισὺς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπὸς: 'one entire half of the series of numbers,' i.e. all the odd numbers, a common Greek idiom for τὸ ἡμισὺν (ορ τὸ ἡμισὺν μέρος) τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ: cf. Thuc. i. 2 τῆς γῆς ὁ ἀριστή, on which Classen observes 'the peculiarity, and, properly speaking, irrationality of this turn of expression may be explained in this way: the noun in the genitive should be understood in a collective sense, i.e. as if it were in the plural, but should be supplied to the adjective in a partial sense. The two expressions "the best land" (partial) and "the best of the land" (generic) are mixed up in Greek in a manner not admissible to our sense of language': cf. Thuc. i. 5 τῶν πλείστων τοῦ βλου: viii. 8 τὰς ἡμεσιας τῶν νεῶν.

37. ο ἐτερος αὖ στίχος: 'the alternate row of numbers,' B viz. the even numbers.

44. ἐοικε δεχομένοις: 'seem to admit': for the constr. cf. Hom. II. xxiii. 379 αἰεὶ γὰρ δίφρον ἐπιβησομένους ἐκτην, Pl. Prot. 361 β ἐοικε σπειδώτε, 'he seems anxious . . .'

46. ἦτοι ἀπαλλύμενα: here the ptcps., instead of following ἐοικε in the dative, somewhat ungrammatically agree with the subject, as though ἐοικε had been φαίνεται.

**CHAPTER LIII**

104 c–105 b, c. liii. Let us define these Ideas more closely. Such an Idea is not itself one of two opposite Ideas; nevertheless, into whatsoever particulars it informs it carries along with it one of these opposites; so that the particulars are called not only by the name of their own Idea, but by the name of this opposite also; nor can they admit the other opposite without ceasing to be what they are. For instance three particulars are three by participation in the ideal triad; but they are also odd, because the triad always carries with it the Idea of oddness. Consequently they can never admit the
Idea of even without ceasing to be three. Of this a number of other examples are given.

D 3. ὁ τι ἀν κατάσχεται: there is a new point made in this chapter, which might at first sight seem merely a repetition of the foregoing argument, viz. the application of the principle to concretes: Plato is now to show that 'concrete particulars (τὰ τρία), being informed (as part of their definition) by an Idea (ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἴδεα) which necessarily imports another Idea (περιττώτης), cannot admit the opposite of that imported Idea (ἡ τοῦ ἀρτιὸν ἴδεα). Observe the force of κατέχω, 'to occupy,' or in the terminology of philosophy, 'to inform': ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἴδεα κατέχει τὰ τρία in the sense of 'giving three things their quality of threeness.'

4. τὴν αὐτὸν ἴδεαν: the editors differ as to what αὐτὸν refers to: grammatically, being in the singular, it would seem natural to take it = ἐκείνου ὁ τι ἀν κατάσχεται, and so Archer-Hind takes it: but the grammatical peculiarity of αὐτὸν referring to ὁ is not so impossible, if we realise that Plato is taking a single instance as typical: indeed does not the singular ὁ τι ἀν κατάσχεται imply as much? Archer-Hind says τὴν αὐτὸν ἴδεαν is sheer nonsense, if αὐτὸν refers to ἴδεα (i.e. to ὁ, not ὁ τι), but is it altogether unnatural Greek for ἐκατόν, especially as it is to be followed by ἄλλα καὶ ἐναντίον τινός? cf. above 103 εἰ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν, where ἔκεινον can be nothing but αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος: is not τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν a close parallel to τὴν αὐτὸν ἴδεαν? On the whole it is perhaps safer to take αὐτὸν in the first way, though I should hesitate to say that the other is impossible Greek.

5. ἄλλα καὶ ἐναντίον ἄει τινός: all the mss. have αὐτῷ, though its place varies: we can only keep αὐτῷ by reading δὲι for ἄει, and ἐναντίον δὲι τινός αὐτῷ, 'it requires an opposite,' is so strange a way of expressing Plato's meaning (viz. 'that it imports the idea of some opposite') as to be impossible. Moreover, what does δὲι μοῖ τινος mean? Can it possibly mean 'I am never without this'? Does it not rather suggest 'I am without this, and must get it'? which would make it nonsense here.

9. ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον: sc. 'to objects so informed,' as are τὰ τρία by the Idea of 'three.'

E 17. ἐλεγὼν ὅρισασθαι: ἐλεγὼν, as often in Greek, used in the sense of ἐκέλευον (cf. the English 'I told you to do it'): cf. Eur. Med. 271–72 σὲ τὴν σκυθρώπῳ καὶ τὸς ἐλευθερομένην, Μήδειαν, ἐπίνον τῇ θάνατῳ γῆς ἔξω περάν: Desch. Ag. 955 Λέγω κατ' ἀνδρα, μηθ' θεόν, σέβειν ἐμε.
20. τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἂεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει: the subject is ἥ τριάς, and αὐτῷ is to be taken closely with ἐναντίον, 'for it (ἡ τριάς) always imports (ἐπιφέρει) the opposite to it' (viz. the opposite to τὸ ἀρτιόν).

24. δὲ ἂν ἐπιφέρη τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ: ἐκείνῳ goes with 105 Α ἐπιφέρῃ, not with ἐναντίον.

26. αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον: 'the importing Idea itself will never admit the opposite of the imported Idea.' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον resumes ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ.

28. ἀναμμηνήσκου: middle as in 72 ε, 'call it to mind once more.'

οὗ γὰρ χεῖρον: litotes for ἀμεινόν, as we should say 'there is no harm in hearing . . .'

30. τὸ διπλάσιον: 'a multiple of two,' in apposition with τὰ δέκα.

31. καὶ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἐναντίον: 'although not opposite to anything': καὶ has a concessive force: οὐκ, although not in the mss., is absolutely necessary to the sense, as is shown by a comparison of 104 ε ποιά οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ δύνα ὡμής οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ.

33. τὸ ἰμισον: 'numbers whose denominator is two,' in Β apposition to τὸ ἱμιόλουν οὐδὲ τάλλα τὰ τοιαύτα, just as τὸ διπλάσιον above to τὰ δέκα: ⅓, ⅓ (i.e. fractions) will not admit the idea of 'the integer' (τὸ δόλον).

CHAPTER LIV

105 B–D, c. liv. We are now enabled to advance beyond our first simple and safe hypothesis. When we are asked what by immanence makes a thing hot, we shall no longer answer heat, but fire: similarly we shall assign fever as the cause of sickness, not disease; the monad as the cause of numerical imparity, not oddness. Applying this rule, when asked what is the cause of life in the body, Kebes answers soul; for soul contains in her the principle of life which is opposite to death; whence soul can never combine with death.

We now see the significance of Plato's insistence on his point that some Ideas which are not opposites yet refuse to combine with certain opposites. Soul is not opposite to anything: but she stands in the same relation to the Idea of life as fire does to that of heat and the triad to that of oddness.

2. μὴ μοι δὲ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρῖνον: 'do not answer me in the
terms of my question, but in the manner I am going to indicate' (μμοιμένος ἐμὲ): the manner indicated is the substitution of the species for the genus, πῦρ for θερμότης, πυρετός for νόσος, μονάς for περιττότης, and so, in the analogous case to which the whole argument is directed, ψυχή for ζωή.

3. παρ' ἢν: the precise force of παρά is difficult to determine: (i) 'side by side with' (i.e. 'in addition to'); (ii) 'different from' 'going beyond,' 'superior to' (cf. use of κατά in 94 E καθ' ἀρμονίαν).

4. τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκεῖνην: cf. 100 E ἀσφαλῆς εἶναι καλ ἐμοι καὶ ὅπως ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίνεται καλὰ, 101 D τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως.

6. ὁ ἀν τὶ σώματι ἐγγέννησαι: lit. 'the body in which what is present?' an extremely neat idiom for τὶ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὗ ἐγγενομένου σώματι θερμὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα; 'what is that which, by its presence in the body, makes the body hot?' ὁ agrees with σώματι, and the form of the question is best understood by studying the answer to it, ὁ ἀν σώματι πῦρ ἐγγέννησαι θερμὸν ἔσται, 'the body in which fire is present will be warm': in the question τὶ is substituted for πῦρ. The ms. have ὁ ἀν τὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγέννησαι, which slightly complicates the construction, ὁ being masculine, either going directly with ἐγγέννησαι, or being the dative of reference, equivalent to οὗ ἀν τὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι: literally—'the man in whose body what is present, will that body be warm?' which of course is not English, but perfectly good Greek: still on the whole ἐν τῷ is better omitted. Professor Geddes retains it, but goes entirely wrong in his interpretation: he analyses the sentence thus—τὶ ἐστὶν τοῦτο, ὁ, ἀν (τοῦτο) ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγέννησαι, (τὸ σῶμα) θερμὸν ἔσται, taking ὁ as instrumental dative—'what is it, whereby the body will be hot?' and below ὁ ἀν θερμότης 'that it must be the means by which heat is produced.'

9. κομψοτέραν: cf. 101 C τὰς τουαύτας κομψειας (note): here the word is half-ironical.

13. ὁ ἀν μονᾶς: μονᾶς is of course only an example: it might equally well have been τρᾶς, or any other of the series.

19. ἡ ψυχή ἡ ἄρα ὅ τι ἀν αὐτή κατάσχει: it is important to observe that Plato here slightly alters the application of his terminology from 104 D: there κατέχω was used (v. note) of the idea 'informing' the particulars, e.g. ἡ τρᾶς κατέχει τὰ τρᾶ, 'gives them their quality of threeeness': we had then three terms—(A) τὰ τρᾶ, (B) ἡ τρᾶς, (C) περιττότης: what are our three terms now? (B) is clearly ἡ ψυχή, (C) is ζωή: (A) is not simply σῶμα, but σῶμα ζωῆ, for there is nothing in σῶμα that
involves ζωή, in the sense in which τὰ τρία involves περιπτώτης. This slight change of point of view is led up to by the examples at the beginning of this chapter, where we have (C) θερμότης, (B) τύρη, (A) σώμα θερμόν, and again (C) νόσος, (B) πυρετός, (A) σώμα νοσώδες.

Nor is this the whole difficulty: in the original formula (B) was ἡ τρίας, ‘the Idea of three’: what is ἡ ψυχή, which corresponds? The ‘soul’ which vivifies the body, and the soul which is to be proved immortal, is not ἡ ἴδεα τῆς ψυχῆς, ‘soul’ in the abstract, but the individual soul: so that the three terms of the original formula now become four: (A) σώμα (i.e. σώμα ζωή): (B) ἡ ψυχή: (B′) ἡ ἴδεα τῆς ψυχῆς: (C) ζωή. The particular soul, as well as the Idea of soul, ἐπιφέρει ζωήν εἰς δ’ τι ἀν κατάσχη, and therefore τὸ ἐναντίον ὁ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἄει οὐ μὴ ποτὲ δεξιται.

19. ἀεὶ ἦκεν ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ φέρουσα ζωήν: this may be compared with 64 c καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τὸ σώμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγέσαιν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν εἶναι. If we probe this dialectical argument of Plato’s to its depth, we shall find it to be a somewhat glaring ‘petitio principii,’ turning upon a certain looseness in the meaning of ψυχή, which has the two distinct senses of (i) ‘life,’ (ii) ‘soul,’ the latter with various shades of connotation, man’s intellectual, moral, emotional nature: cf. Soph. Ant. 359 ἡ δ’ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ τέθνηκεν. Now, adhering rigidly to this latter meaning of ψυχή, as ‘soul,’ man’s conscious intellectual, moral, and emotional nature, how are we justified in assuming as obvious that it is this which φέρει ζωήν εἰς τὸ σῶμα: if we regard it as having a concrete existence apart from the body, are we not equally justified (from the point of view of the argument) in assuming that it is σῶμα which ἦκεν φέρον ζωήν εἴπ’ τὴν ψυχὴν? All we can say of ζωή by its definition is that it is ‘the state of σῶμα and ψυχή in combination,’ just as the definition of θάνατος. Happily the interest of the Phaedo does not rest entirely upon this dialectical ‘proof of the unprovable’: modern readers of the dialogue will be more in sympathy with his deduction of the immortality of the soul from ‘mere arguments of probability,’ its kinship with the Ideas, and with all that is noble and divine in life.

CHAPTER LV

105 d–106 d, c. lv. As then that which will not admit even is uneven, so that which will not admit death, namely soul, is deathless. Now if the negation of even or of heat or of cold
necessarily implied indestructibility, then three and snow and fire would not perish at the approach of the opposite to the Idea contained in them, but would merely withdraw from it. This however is not the case: these negations do not imply indestructibility; therefore three and snow and fire can cease to exist at the approach of the opposite. But the negation of death does imply indestructibility: soul therefore, on the approach of death, not only refuses to admit it, but also refuses to perish: soul is thus not only deathless but indestructible. Indeed if the eternal principle of life could perish, then there is nothing in existence that should not perish.

Ε 4. ἀμοισον, τὸ δὲ ἀδικον: the second question is first answered directly, and then the second with τὸ δὲ, as though τὸ μὲν had preceded.

7. ἀθάνατον ἀρα ἡ ψυχή; we might at first imagine that the proof was now complete: but from the remainder of the chapter, and especially from 106 c ψυχὴ ἄν ἐκὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος, we see that ἀθάνατος has a very precise meaning, viz. τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον θάνατον, as ἀνάρτιον meant 'not admitting evenness,' ἄθερμον 'not admitting warmth.' To appreciate the distinction here made between ἀθάνατος and ἀνώλεθρος we must look back to 102 ἀλλὰ διὸν τὸ ἔτερον, ἢ φεύγει καὶ υπεκχωρεῖν, διὰν αὐτῷ προσὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ, . . . ἢ προσεκίνεις ἐκεῖνον ἀπολλεῖναι. Such things as χίων and πτέρα, on the approach of their opposites, hot and even, have two alternatives open to them, either to withdraw or perish: what they cannot do is δέχεσθαι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. Now, if δέχεσθαι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ is identical with 'perishing,' then the one alternative, perishing, is impossible to them: 106 Δ εἰ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἢν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὅπως τις εἰς χίωνα θερμῶν ἐπηγάγα, ὑπεξείς ἂν ἢ χίων οὐσία σώς καὶ ἄτικτας: they must, in that case, inevitably withdraw and be unaffected by their opposite. Now in the case of ψυχή this condition is fulfilled: the one alternative, ἀπόλλυσθαι, is precluded, because it is identical with δέχεσθαι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ viz. θάνατον: therefore soul must, at the approach of death, ὑπεξείναι σῶς οὐσία.

The difference in point of view, then, between ἀθάνατος and ἀνώλεθρος is not obscure: it is well expressed by Wytenbach τὸ ἀθάνατον hic dicitur δ ἄν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται : ἀνώλεθρον, quod superveniente contrario οὐκ ἀπόλλυται.' But is the conclusion justified? It is a very curious turn of logic by which Plato, having arrived at the conclusion that ψυχή is ἀθάνατος and wishing to prove that it is also ἀνώλεθρος, assumes, for the purpose of his proof, the very point he is proving, viz. that τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν. All that can properly be
deduced from the proposition ψυχή ἀθάνατος ἐστι, adhering to the literal meaning of ἀθάνατος as parallel to ἀνάρτιος, ἄθερμος etc., is that the soul οὐ μὴ δέξηται θάνατον, that is to say οὐκ ἔσται τεθνηκὼν (106 B). Now οὐκ ἔσται τεθνηκὼν is a perfectly legitimate deduction from ἀθάνατος ἐστι, providing we keep to its literal meaning ‘will not exist in a state of death.’ The step from ἀθάνατος to ἀνώλεθρος is unwarranted: it may have probability on its side (σχολή ἂν τι ἄλλο φθοράν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀδίκων ὃν φθορῶν δέξεται, end of ch. 55), but logically it is worthless. It is an instance, not unlike the identification of ψυχή with the vital principle (mentioned above), of the Greek tendency to be led away by words, to identify ideas with words, a tendency to which the dialectic of the sophists was peculiarly prone, and against which the Socratic method was a protest.

8. τούτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδείχθαι φῶμεν; the μὲν marks that there is a farther step in the argument still to come.

12. ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ: for ἄλλο τι ἢ, ‘is it not the case that?’ cf. note on 79 A: and for the position of τὰ τρία cf. 106 ε ἄλλο τι ψυχή ἢ . .

14. ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι: in relative and temporal clauses whose reference is ‘general,’ we sometimes find, instead of ἃν with the subjunctive (ὅσ ἃν, ὁπόταν, and so on), the simple optative, even though the main verb is in the present: in Attic it is confined to the enunciation of a γνώμη, or general maxim, the reference being, not to any special time, but to all time: cf. 95 D προσήκει γὰρ φοβείσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἶν, with examples quoted at end of note on ξένη (95 D).

16. οὐ γὰρ ἃν ἀπώλετο γε: the change from imperfect to aorist is noticeable: it seems to suggest a reference back to the time when χῶν was being discussed—‘for she would not have perished’ (which was a possible alternative open to her when we discussed the point in ch. 52, p. 103 n).

οὐδ’ αὐ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἃν τὴν θερμότητα: this is not logically an apodosis to the condition εἰ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀνώλεθρον ἢν, for it was admitted independently of that condition: literally it should be οὐδ’ ἔξην αὐτῇ δέξασθαι, but it takes the form of οὐκ ἃν ἀπώλετο.

19. ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν τι ἐπιοί: all the mss. except one have ἐπηεί, and that one has ἐποίη: but ἐπηεί, which is read by most editors, is very doubtful Greek, an unheard of attraction to the tense and mood of ἀπεσβέννυτο; cf. ἐπαγάγοι (supra).
B 30. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει . . ἄρτιον μὲν . . μὴ γίγνεσθαι: μὴ γίγνεσθαι is of course not the regular μὴ with inf. following a verb of hindering: the case put by the objector may be considered for a moment without τί κωλύει: it would then be ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ πέριττον οὖ γίγνεται ἐπίωτος τοῦ ἄρτιον, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ’ ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γέγονεν: ‘the odd does not indeed (μὲν) become even on the approach of even, but perishes and even has arisen in its place’: this whole clause is then put in dependence on τί κωλύει, ‘why may it not be the case that . . .?’ Observe that in the μὲν clause ἄρτιον is predicate to γίγνεσθαι, in the δὲ clause subject to γεγονέναι: the change of tense too, γίγνεσθαι to γεγονέναι, is significant: ‘becomes . . . has arisen.’

C 36. εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο: τοῦτο is τὸ ἀνύλεθρον εἶναι τὸ ἀνάρτιον.

D 45. σχόλη γὰρ ἂν: ‘for it is very unlikely that anything else would refuse to admit destruction, if . . .’: for the form of the sentence cf. Prot. 330 ἄλλα σχόλη μεντάν τι ἀλλο ὄσιον εἶν, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴ γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὄσιον ἑσται. This use of σχόλη is to be observed: σχόλη is literally ‘leisurely,’ ‘reluctantly’ (cf. English ‘I should not be in a hurry to do it’ with σχόλη ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσαμι): cf. Soph. Ant. 390 σχόλη ποθ’ ἥξεν δεύρ’ ἂν ἐξύσχουν ἑγὼ, with which Jebb compares Shaksp. Titus Andronicus i. 2. 301 ‘I’ll trust by leisure him that mocks me once.’

μὴ δέχοιτο: this μὴ is what some scholars call the ‘generic’ μὴ: it puts the thing in a ‘class,’ instead of stating a ‘fact’ about it: it is typical of the main distinction between μὴ and οὐ, the former expressing ‘a mental conception,’ the latter a fact: as Mr. Archer-Hind suggests, μὴ δέχοιτο = ἐν τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον, ‘would be the sort of thing to exclude death.’ Any Greek play, indeed almost any considerable passage of Greek literature, will exemplify this distinction abundantly: to take a few examples chosen at random from Soph. Philoctetes:

253. ὃς μηδὲν εἰδὸτ’ ἔσθι μ’ ὃν ἀναστορεῖς.
254. ὁ πόλλ’ ἐγὼ μοιχηθρός, ὁ πικρὸς θεώς, οὐ μηδὲ κληρῶν ὃδ’ ἐχοντος οὐκαδε μηδ’ Ἑλλάδος γῆς μηδαμοῦ διήλθε που.

(here οὐ μηδὲ is ‘quippe cuius nulla fama . . . vulgata sit’).
407. ἔξοδα γὰρ μὲν παντὸς ἀν λόγου κακοῦ γλώσσῃ θεύντα καὶ παυνυμγίαν, ἄφ’ ἂς μηδὲν ἰδίκαιον ἐς τέλος μέλλον ποιεῖν.
443. δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἰλετ’ εἰσάπαξ εἰπεῖν, ὃποι μηδεῖς ἔφη.

46. εἰ γε . . . δεῖται: ‘if the deathless is to admit destruction’: the common idiomatic use of εἰ with fut. indic. to express
el μέλλει: cf. example quoted from Ἑροτ. in last note but one, and Ar. Frogs 1460 εὔρακε νη Δή', εἰπέρ ἀναδύσει πάλιν, 'you must find something, if you are to find your way up again.'

Mr. Archer-Hind briefly summarises the argument of chs. l.–lv. as follows. 'After agreeing that the truth of immortality will be best established if we can show that it is a legitimate deduction from the theory of Ideas, we set forth thus: (1) particulars partake successively, or even simultaneously, of contrary Ideas, but the Idea itself can never admit its opposite, but at the approach thereof either withdraws or perishes: and this applies both to Ideas as existing in nature and as immanent in particulars: (2) there is a second set of Ideas, not being themselves opposites, but containing opposite Ideas: no such Idea can admit the opposite of the Idea it contains, but either withdraws or perishes; e.g. the triad contains the Idea of odd and cannot admit that of even: (3) particulars which one of this second class of Ideas informs can never admit the opposite of the contained Idea; e.g. three things can never be even: (4) if in any such instance refusal to admit the opposite necessarily involved indestructibility, we could predicate immortality of that which refused to admit it; e.g. if refusal to admit evenness involved indestructibility, three would be imperishable: but since this is not so, three may perish at the approach of evenness: (5) but in the case of soul refusal to admit the opposite of its contained Idea does involve indestructibility, since the contained Idea is life, whose opposite is death: and that which will not admit death is imperishable: soul therefore on the approach of death has not the option of perishing, but must adopt the other alternative, ὑπεκχωρεῖν. Else, if the principle of life perished, nothing could be found to resist destruction.'

CHAPTER LVI

106 d–107 b, c. lvi. Thus from the general principle that all things which refuse to admit death are indestructible we infer that soul can never perish: when death comes upon a man, his mortal part perishes, but his soul withdraws, making way for death, while she herself is saved alive. It must be then that our souls live in Hades. Kebes is now fully convinced: Simmias cannot controvert the reasoning of Socrates but still feels misgivings; whereupon Socrates encourages him to sift the matter until he is thoroughly satisfied.

3. παρὰ πάντων: this use of παρά, practically to express
the ‘agent,’ is strictly speaking ‘local,’ ‘from the side of’: cf. English ‘on all hands,’ Fr. ‘de la part de.’

11. ἀποθυγῆσει: here used in its ordinary sense, ‘perishes.’

16. παρὰ ταύτα ἄλλο: here probably παρά = ‘to contradict this’: for the uncertainty of παρά v. note on παρ’ ἦν 105 B.

19. εἰς δύνα τις ἄλλον καρπὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο: for this ‘deliberative optative’ cf. note on 78 A ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς δ’ τι ἀναγκαίωτερον ἀναλύσοιτε χρήματα.

23. οὖθ’ αὐτὸς ἔχω δὴν ἀπιστῶ ἐκ γε τῶν λεγομένων: notice the art with which the characters of Kebes and Simmias are kept up dramatically to the end: the logical and acute Kebes, who οὐ πάντες εὐθέως εἶχεν πείθεσαί, δ’ τι ἄν τις εἶπη 63 A, having found an argument in which he sees no flaw, accepts it absolutely: Simmias, who in 76 D λανθάνει ἀειτὸν οὐδεν εἰπὼν, though he cannot impugn the argument, still feels a vague unrest: he does not accept the issue of the argument whole-heartedly.


30. δῆμος ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον: a somewhat violent analogon, due (if it is what Plato wrote) to the intervening καὶ εἰ πιστὰ ὑμῖν εἰσὺν: a confusion of τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἐπισκεπτέων and αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἐπισκεπτέαι. Mr. Archer-Hind accepts Schanz’s correction ἐπισκεπτέα (equivalent of Latin ‘gerund’), against which it is difficult to argue, for if we read ἐπισκεπτέαι, and admit that Plato was led into the discord by the intervening clause, it is impossible to deny that a fortiori the copyist may have been led into the mistake similarly. The mss. all have ἐπισκεπτέαι: the choice must be a matter of taste.

31. διέλητε: ‘analyse,’ and so ‘define,’ ‘establish.’

ὡς ἐγώμαι: refers to ἀκολούθησετε, which is virtually an exhortation: ‘you must follow up your reasoning .’

33. κἂν τούτο αὔτὸ σαφές γένηται: ‘and only when this itself is quite clear’: αὔτὸ τούτο is the ‘validity’ of the ὑποθέ-

seis πρῶτα.

CHAPTER LVII

107 B–114 C, cc. lvii.–lxii. Now follows the myth setting forth the conformation of the earth and the fate of souls in the underworld. Seeing that the soul is immortal, earnest indeed
should be the care we bestow upon her training; for upon that will depend her happiness and misery for all time. The ways of Hades are many and intricate; but the soul that has studied death will find herself at home there, and guided by her attendant genius to the place of judgment will pass her appointed sojourn in the companionship of gods: but the impure will be without friend or companion. To realise what regions the soul enters after death, we must understand the true form of the earth. It is a sphere in equilibrium at the centre of the heavens: the part we inhabit is but a small cavity on its surface, filled with the coarser sediment of air which gathers in it. We have no idea that we dwell in such a hollow, but fancy we are on the surface and that our atmosphere is the true air; but could we mount to the surface, we should see how murky and impure is our dwelling compared with that bright region. We should see the earth’s surface splendid with zones of the most brilliant colours, of which ours are a faint image, glowing with flowers and trees and precious stones, all bathed in purest aether, untouched by decay; and the dwellers thereon are free from age and sickness, and the gods come to dwell among them. There are many other hollows on the earth besides ours, greater and less, having subterranean communication; but the greatest of all is called Tartaros, which is pierced right through the earth from side to side. From this all rivers issue forth, and into it they all return; and a great pulse sways up and down Tartaros, carrying with it all the air and liquid that are therein, and it replenishes now the rivers that are on one side the earth, now those on the other. All the rivers fall again into Tartaros at a lower point than they flowed out; but not lower than the centre, from which in all directions it is an ascent. Of these rivers the four greatest are Okeanos, Acheron, Pyrrophlegethon, and Styx, which flow in many tortuous windings, some beneath the earth and some on its surface. So when the souls of the departed come to judgment, they whose lives have been moderately good proceed to Acheron and dwell there till they are cleansed of any guilt that clings to them; but they whose wickedness is past cure are hurled into Tartaros, whence they come forth no more. All whose guilt is heinous but not yet beyond remedy dwell in Tartaros for a year, and then are cast forth by one of the rivers, on whose banks they meet those they have wronged. Then if they can win the pardon of these, they come forth and are purified; but if not, they return to Tartaros for another period; and this they continue to do until they have gained their pardon. But all that have lived in perfect holiness ascend to the earth’s true surface, where they dwell henceforth in bliss and purity.
3. ἐπιμελείας δῆ δεῖται: this is part of the original motive of the dialogue, to which the proof of the soul's immortality is subsidiary: for the thought cf. Apol. 30 ά πείθων υμῶν καὶ νεωτέρως καὶ πρεσβυτέρως μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς.

4. ἐν ζ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζήν: an abbreviated form for ἐν ζ ἐστώ ἐκεῖνο δ' καλοῦμεν τὸ ζήν: cf. Hom. Π. Ν. 757 'Αλεισίων ἐνθα κολώνη κέλκηται, 'where is the hill called the hill of Alisius': Piud. Νεμ. ix. 96 ἐνθ' Ἀρεάς πόρον ἀνθρωποι καλείσων.

άλλο ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός: cf. Κερ. 608 εις γὰρ οὕτως γε ἐκ παιδῶς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς τὸν πάντα ὀλίγος ποῦ τις ἂν εἴη.

8. ἔρμαιον ἃν ἂν τοῖς κακοῖς: ἔρμαιον is a 'windfall,' 'a stroke of luck' (ἀποσβόκητον κέρδος, as the schol. defines it): Hermes was the god of travellers, and so a lucky find by the roadside was attributed to him: in this capacity of luck-bringer he is called ἔρμαιον.

This view of death as ἔρμαιον τοῖς κακοῖς was held by the Epicureans, whose mouthpiece in Roman literature is Lucretius, the author of the poem 'de rerum natura,' the aim of which is to disprove the immortality of the soul. A very interesting historical appeal to this view is found in the speech of Caesar on the fate of the Catilinarian conspirators, recorded in Sallust's Catilina, ch. 51, § 20, 'de poena possum equidem dicere id quod res habet, in luctu atque miseriis mortem aerumnarum requiem non cruciat esse, eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere, ultra neque curae neque gaudio locum esse.'

D 14. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀλλο ἔχουσα εἰς "Αἰδοῦ ή ψυχή ἔρχεται: this is very much in the spirit of the scriptural άφρων, ταύτη τῇ νυκτί τὴν ψυχήν σου ἀπαύοισιν ἀπὸ σοῦ: Κ ε' ἴτοιμος, τῶν ἐσται; cf. too Gorgias 523 ε καὶ τῶν κρήτην δεὶ γνωμὸν εἴηι αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχήν αὐτῆς τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐκάστον, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιποῦτα ἐπί γῆς πάντα ἐκείνον τῶν κόσμων, ἴνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις γίνη.

15. πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς: for the meaning of τροφή cf. 81 ν (note) δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὕσης, and 84 ε καὶ τῆς ποιάτης τροφῆς οὐδέν δεινῶν μὴ φοβηθῇ ταύτα γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα . . . τροφῆ includes both ideas of (1) nurture, training; (2) the manner of life which results from this.

19. ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμονος, ὅσπερ ζώντα εἰλήκει: the phraseology here suggests the language of the Myth of Er at the end of the Republic, where Lachesis thus addresses the souls, οἷς ωνασ δαιμονίων λήκεται, ἀλλ' ύμεις δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε. There is no real con-
tradition between the two: in the *Rep.* Plato has elaborated a
myth of the ‘destinies of human souls,’ whereas here he is not
dwelling on this particular point, and so uses the more familiar
phrase: cf. Theocr. iv. 40 αἰαὶ τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονος ὦ με
λελόγχει. For the conception of the δαίμον, cf. *Rep.* 620 ν
ἐκείνην δ' ἐκάστῳ ὦ εἶλετο δαίμονα τούτον φίλακα ἐξιμπέμπεν τοῦ
βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων: Menander ἀπαντᾷ δαίμον
ἀνδρὶ συμπαραστατεὶ εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγγώς τοῦ βίου: Hor.
*Ep.* ii. ii. 187—
scit Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum,
naturae deus humanae, mortalis in unum
quodque caput, voltu mutabilis, albus et ater:
the Roman identified it mainly with the brighter side of a man’s
life: cf. ‘indulgere genio,’ ‘genialis.’

20. εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον: the effect of δὴ with τοι is very much
the same as in the English ‘no matter what place’ (added
parenthetically): cf. 108 c ἔως ἃν δὴ τινας χρόνοι γενωνται: 115 d εἰς
μακάδων δὴ τινας εἰδαμονίας: ‘to a certain place, I need not
specify what place’ is the real effect of δὴ τινα. This δὴ
is particularly common in the Herodotean ὅστις δή, ὅσος δὴ (in
Attic more usually ὅστις δῆτοτε): e.g. Hdt. i. 160 ἐκδιδόναι τῶν
Πακτύν παρεσκευάζοντο εἴπι μαθῶ δῷ δῇ: οὐ γὰρ ἔχω τούτῳ γε
εἰπεν ἄρτηκως: ‘for a fixed sum, whatever it may have been’:
100 ὃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως ...

21. οἱ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας: the form of the adv. is deter-
minded by συλλεγέντας, though it does not go with it.

διαδικασμένοις: L. and S., and the editors who notice
the word, give it the ordinary meaning of ‘submit to judgment.’
Now the ordinary meaning of διαδικάζω is ‘to settle a dispute
between two parties’ (δια-), of διαδικαζομαι ‘to have such a
dispute settled for one’s self,’ ‘to go to law against an adversary.’
This is not appropriate here, nor, on the other hand, is it likely
that the force of the preposition is in abeyance, so that the
word could be used of ‘standing a criminal trial.’ We must
take δια- in a different sense—when they have received their
various sentences’ (δια- ‘different’): this is still clearer in
113 D πρῶτον μὲν διαδικάζαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ σωσὶς βίωσαντες καὶ
οἱ μην. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἃν δῷς ὤς... ἀπολύονται... οἱ δ' ἃν δὸ
ξοσι...: and in *Rep.* 614 c δικαστας δὲ μεταξὶ τοιοῦ καθήσαν,
οὐς ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσεαν τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύσεις πορεύεσθαι τὴν
εἰς δεξίαν... τοὺς δ' ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἁριστεράν: the μὲν and δὲ
clauses here show the force of δια-.

24. τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ δὲν δέ τυχεῖν: δὲν of course is neuter: Ε
‘their appointed doom.’
26. ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνοι καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις: in Rep. 615 A Plato speaks of a χιλιέτης πορεία, since every man must be requited tenfold for his deeds, good or evil, and 100 years is taken as the extreme of human life: the Egyptians, according to Hdt. ii. 123, put the time at 3000 years, and Empedocles even goes so far as 30,000 for a murderer—

εἰτέ τις ἀμπλακίην φόνῳ φίλα γυνὰ μακράς πάσας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάληθαι, γεινόμενον παντοτικὰ διὰ χρέω εἶδα θυντῶν.

In the Phaedrus 248 E Plato says each soul must go through ten periods of 1000 years, except that of the philosopher, for whom three periods are sufficient; with this cf. Pind. Ὀλ. ii. 68 ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐστριεῖ ἐκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδικῶν ἔχειν ἵππαν, ἐτειλαν Δίως ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύχαν.

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23. ἀπλὴν οἴμων: the same proverbial saying is quoted from the lost Telephus, in slightly different forms, by various authors: our ignorance of the context makes it impossible to feel sure of the point of the remark in Aesch.: was it Virgil’s "facilis descensus Averno"?

31. διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε: ‘go wrong in any direction.’

33. ἀπὸ τῶν ὅσιν τε καὶ νομίμων: ‘from the rites of burial performed on earth’: a reference, as Olympiodorus tells us (ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τρίῳ δυν ἑν τῆς Ἕκάτης), to the offerings made monthly to the dead on the shrine of Hecate at the cross-roads, from which Plato infers by analogy that there is a τρίῳδος in Hades: so Gorgias 524 A ὅσοι ὅπω, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσωσιν ἐν τῷ λειμάνα, ἐν τῇ τρίῳδῃ ἐξ ἡς φέρετον τῷ ὄδῷ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρταρον.

36. οἷκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα: ‘is familiar with the scene,’ is at home in the καθαρὸς τόπος, inasmuch as its whole life has been devoted to cultivating ‘purity.’

37. ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἐπιστα: sc. 81 c ἡ τουταύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἠλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὅρατον τόπον φόβοι τοῦ ἀείδους τε καὶ "Αἰδοῦ, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματα τε καὶ τῶν τάφους κυλινδομένη.

38. περὶ ἐκείνο πολύν χρόνον ἐπιτημένη: the editors either pass this over without comment, or merely refer to 68 κ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπιτημήθαι: if this is in any proper sense a parallel, our phrase must stand for ἀτε περὶ ἐκείνο (sc. τὸ σώμα) πολύν χρόνον ἐπιτημένη, ‘as having all its life been excited about the body’: but in that case we should require either καὶ or ἀτε with ἐπιτημένη. If the allusion is to 81 c (quoted above) we must take ἐπιτημένη in a ‘physical sense’— ‘flutter-
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ing' or 'hovering' (possibly with the connotation of 'fear'),
a meaning not recognised by the Lexicons, but clearly required
here: περί τόν ὀρατόν τότον will then refer to περί τά μνήματα
καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδομένη.
43. πεποιηκυίαν τοιούτων: sc. ἀκάθαρτων: cf. note on 58 D. Е
48. αὐτή δὲ πλανᾶται: αὐτή is 'by herself.'
56. οὐτε δεσθε δοξάζεται: 'not so small as is supposed': cf. C
one interpretation of 83 B ὀυδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν (note).
57. ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τίνος πέπεισμαι: Wagner is certainly wrong
in taking τίνος as neuter: he quotes in support of ὑπὸ with
an impersonal noun Gorg. 526 ν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τῶν λόγων πέπει-
sμαι: but it is contrary to Greek idiom to use the ambiguous
form τίνος (without noun) as 'neuter' after a preposition
which almost invariably takes a masculine (personal) noun.
We need not inquire, since we cannot discover, who τίς is:
it is merely meant, in all probability, to give an air of
authority to the coming μύθος. (Anaximander has been sug-
gested for τίς, partly as the first philosopher to make a map
of the earth, and partly because the doctrine of Equili-
brium in 108 Е is almost exactly what Aristotle attributes to
Anaximander.)

CHAPTER LVIII

5. οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη: the point of this proverb is D
clearer than its origin—it means simply 'a difficult art': the
two most favoured explanations are (i) a reference to Glaucus
of Chios (or Samos), mentioned in Hdt. i. 25 as the inventor
of the art of soldering metal: so Diogenianus, Proverb. iv. 8
ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ραδίως κατεργαζομένων. ἀπὸ Γλαύκου Σαμίου, δὲ
πρῶτον κόλλησιν ἐφεισε σιδήρου: (ii) Glaucus, the sea-god,
the home of whose worship was the Boeotian Anthedon, was
regarded as a wizard, so that Γλαύκου τέχνη might be used of
'something requiring the insight of a wizard.'

6. ἀ γ' ἐστιν: 'what his account actually is,' γε contrasting
it with ὃς μέντοι ἀληθῆ which follows.
7. ἦ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην: cf. 94 Е ἦ καθ' ἀρμονίαν
(note).
14. πέπεισμαι ὡς . . δεῖν: an anacoluthon due to the inter-
vening clause ei ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς οὐσα.
16. περιφερῆς οὐσα: 'spherical in shape.'
19. τὴν ὦμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντη: this 109 A
Q
theory, though it reminds us of Newton's theory of gravitation, is in point of detail the exact reverse of it: according to Plato it is the absence of impulse, rather than the balance of impulses, that enables the earth to remain stationary. By ὀμοιότης τοῦ οὐρανοῦ is meant homogeneity in substance, and especially, from this point of view, in density: did the substance of the heavens vary in density, the earth would naturally be moved by pressure from the denser towards the rarer: the pressure all round is equal. Not only so, but the earth itself is ἴσορροπον, 'equipoised,' 'in equilibrium': its spherical shape and absolute balance prevent it deriving any impulse towards motion from itself: the point of ἴσορροπον is perhaps more easily grasped from its opposites: e.g. if the earth were top-heavy, it might as a result originate for itself a rotation, or again, if it were pointed at one end, a motion in the direction of the sharp end. Aristotle, de caelo ii. xiii. 295 b 11, attributes the doctrine to Anaximander: ἐσὶ δὲ τινες οὐ διὰ τὴν ὀμοιότητα φαίνει αὐτὴν μέρεν, ὡσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὁ Ἀναξιμάνδρος: μάλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἁνω ἡ κάτω ἢ εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσήκει τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἰδρυμένον, καὶ ὀμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἐσχατὰ ἔχον, ἀμα δ' ἀδύνατον εἰς τάναντια ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν. οὕστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένειν.

25. πάμμεγα τι εἶναι αὐτό: cf. 88 Α where αὐτό refers to ψυχήν (v. note, with explanation suggested by Mr. Archer-Hind: so here αὐτό may be attracted to πάμμεγά τι).

26. τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος: a good general description of the world known to the Greeks, the land lying round the Mediterranean and its arm, the Black Sea, from the straits of Gibraltar to Colchis. The former regularly appear in Greek literature as the end of the world, or at least of the known world, in that direction: Plato himself in the Timaeus (p. 24) places his mythical island of Atlantis just outside the Pillars of Heracles. The conquests of Alexander widened the outlook of the Greeks eastward as far as India, so that in Arist. de caelo ii. xiv. 9 India takes the place of Phasis in this formula: cf. Juv. x. 1 omnibus in terris quae sunt a Gadibus usque | Auroram et Gangen.

B 28. ὡσπερ περὶ τέλμα: 'dwelling about this sea as ants or frogs about a pool': the point being to show the insignificance of what the Greeks regard as 'the earth' (viz. the shores of the Mediterranean) in comparison with the size of the real earth: frogs consider their own particular pool and its surroundings the world, so do we.

32. καὶ τὰς ἱδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη: acc. of reference with παντοδαπά. παντοδαπὸς is a word which often has a suggestion
of contempt, something like our ‘miscellaneous’; e.g. ὁδὸλοι καὶ ξένιοι παντοδαποῖ, Andoc. xxii. 30: πολλὴ καὶ παντοδαπὴ ἁγνοία, Plato Soph. 228 e: ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γάρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί (?), Arist. Eth. Nic. ii. vi. 14: possibly in our passage we need not find this meaning.

33. εἰς ἀ εὐνεφρηνήκαναί: for the infinitive in a relative clause cf. 72 A ὅθεν ἔποι ἁλιὺς γίνεσθαι.

34. αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαράν: the real surface of the earth, as distinguished from these small ‘hollows’ or ‘depressions’ in the earth’s surface which we inhabit.

36. ὅν δὴ αἰθέρα ὁνομάζειν: αἰθήρ is regularly in Greek the ‘upper, purer zone above the ἄηρ.’

38. οὗ δὲ ὑποστάθηκην ταῦτα εἶναι: ‘of which these (viz. C ἐδώρ καὶ ὁμίχλην καὶ δέρα) are the sediment’: for the word ὑποστ. cf. Plut. Phoc. 3 ἔν τῇ Ῥωμιλού ὑποστάθηκη, a translation of Cic. ‘in faec Romuli.’

41. ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς: ‘up on the earth’s surface.’

ἀντερ ἄν ἐλ τις ἐν μέσῳ: we are in the same relation to dwellers on the earth’s surface as a dweller at the bottom of the sea would be to us: he would think the θάλαττα was οὐράνιος, just as we think the ἄηρ is οὐρανὸς; if he came to the surface of the sea he would make the same discovery about the ἄηρ being purer than θάλαττα which we should make about the αἰθήρ being purer than the ἄηρ, if we could get on to the earth’s real surface.

48. ἔκδύσ καὶ ἄνακύψας: these participles are subordinate to D ἐφαρκ wlan ἔλη, ‘should never have seen, by emerging and raising his head above the sea to look upon this region we dwell in, how much .’

50. τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι: the editors create a difficulty here about σφίσι following the singular ἐλ τίς: but surely παρὰ σφίσι means ‘the world of himself and his fellows’ (it is not that ἐλ τίς implies a plural, as the editors say).

54. ὡς διὰ τοῦτον οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἀστρα χωροῦντα: ‘as though this (ἄηρ) were the heavens and the stars moved across it.’ This constr. ὡς . . χωροῦντα is the so-called accus. absolute, something of a misnomer: this accus., except when impersonal (e.g. ἔγων, δέον, εἰρήμενον and the like), always is preceded by ὡς, and always stands in the same relation to the main verb, expressing the impression concerning some person or thing in the mind of the subject of the verb, an impression under which the subject acts. This relation being invariably the same, and the case being preceded by ὡς, it is
doubtful whether we ought to call it an absolute case, as that implies a case out of relation to the verb. The following example will illustrate the point—"ηξίωσαν οἱ Λακεδαίμονες τοῦ πεζοῦ ἄρχειν ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν κατὰ γῆν κρατοῦντες τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους τῷ ναυτικῷ πλείασεν ἤχύοντας: this, without the μὲν clause, is the regular type of the so-called accus. absolute, and is no more really absolute than is the αὐτοὶ μὲν nominative absolute.

55. τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦτάν: this is the reading of all mss., but most editors find a difficulty about retaining it: Heindorf suggests τὸ δ' εἶναι τοιούτων, 'but the real truth is as follows': Hermann accepts Baiter's emendation τὸ δὲ δεινότατον, while Archer-Hind omits εἶναι ταῦτάν; this last gives perfectly good sense, 'but as a matter of fact (τὸ δὲ) we are not able': Hirschig suggests τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταύτων. The reading of the mss., however, though possibly a trifle awkward, is not so difficult as to demand alteration: it merely repeats ταῦταν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι. The mis-impression of the man living at the bottom of the sea is expressed in two parts—(i) οἷοντο . . . εἰς τῆς θαλάσσης οἰκεῖαι (the illusion), (ii) διὰ δὲ βραδύττητα . . . μὴ δὲ ἕωρακὼς εἰπ. . . (the real state of the case). Our own case is similar: (i) we think we live εἶπαν αὐθῆς: (ii) in reality ὑπ' ἀσθενειας . . . οὐχ οἶνον τε εἶναι . . .: the second half is introduced by τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦταν, 'but the real fact of the matter is the same' (as in the previous imaginary case). I think the mss. reading may stand: of suggested alterations I prefer the omission of εἶναι ταῦταν (possibly a gloss to explain the point of τὸ δὲ). There is no grammatical difficulty about τὸ δὲ being used outside the constr., as it would be if we omit εἶναι ταῦταν: it is quite frequent in Plato.

Ξ 58. ἐπὶ ἀκρα ἐλθοι: sc. by climbing up to the rim (the pl. suggests the 'various points' of the rim) of the hollow, as contrasted with flying up on wings.

59. κατιδείν <ἀν> ἀνακύπτα: ἀν is required here, in spite of its repetition with οὕτως ἀν . . . κατιδείν below, and may easily have fallen out in such a position—ἈΝΑΝΑΚ: no better illustration of the meaning of ἀνακύπτω could be given than that of the fish getting its head above water: cf. Phaedrus 249c τοῦτο δὲ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἰδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθείσα θεῷ καὶ ἑπεριδοῦσα, ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψας εἰς τὸ δυτικόν ἄν.

110Α 65. ἴδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ: 'what we call earth,' 'this earth of ours,' sc. τὰ κόλλα.

71. πῆλος ἀμύχανος: ἀμύχανος might refer here either to quality or quantity (ἀμύχανός ὅσος), or possibly suggest both, 'wide wastes of clay and mud,'
72. οποὺ ἀν καλ γῆ ἢ: ‘wherever there is earth’ (as well as sea—καλ): i.e at the bottom of the sea and by the shore.

74. ἐκεῖνα δ' αὖ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν: ‘whilst the upper world again would appear to have an even greater superiority to ours’ (than ours has to the sea). The logical sequence of this long sentence has got somewhat out of joint: to balance ἐκεῖνα δ' αὖ, the μὲν clause should logically be something like this—‘our earth (ἡ ἡμέρα γὰρ ἡ γῆ), although it is marred and eaten away, is still very superior to the world beneath the sea, which is all mud and clay’: that is to say αὖ properly is not ‘on the contrary,’ but ‘still more.’

CHAPTER LIX

3. ὠσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι: ‘like balls made of twelve different-coloured pieces of leather’: the number ‘twelve’ is chosen because of the number of the ‘signs of the Zodiac’: cf. Timaeus 55c ἐπὶ δὲ οὐσὶς ξυστάσεως μᾶς πέμπτης (viz. the dodecahedron), ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατέχριστο ἐκείνο διαξωγραφώ, i.e. God used the dodecahedron as a model for the division of the heavens by signs (διαξωγραφῶν). The allusion in our passage is to the variegated surface of the earth. Cf. the description of the ball given by Aдрαστεία to the infant Ζεὺς: Ap. Rh. iii. 135—

σφαῖραιν ἑὐτρόχαλον, τῆς οὖ σὸ γε μείλιον ἄλλο χειρῶν ‘Ἡφαίστου κατακτατίσῃ θρειών’
χρύσας μὲν οἱ κύκλα τεσσάρας ἀμφὶ δὲ ἐκάστῳ διπλάδι ἄψιδος περιηγῆς εἰλισθονται.

4. χρώμασιν διειλιμμένην: ‘picked out in various colours,’ a definition of ποκλη: for the word cf. 81c ἅλλα καὶ διειλιμμένην γε οἴμαι (sc. τὴν ψυχήν) ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς: the Lat. word would be ‘distinctus’: Hor. Odes ii. v. 11 ‘jam tibi lividos distinguet Autumnns racemos purpureos varius colore.’

5. ὠσπερ δείγματα: does Plato mean by δείγματα here anything more than ‘specimens,’ the regular meaning? If not, why does he say ὠσπερ? We should rather have expected a word like μιμήματα, ‘feeble imitations.’ Can δείγματα possibly mean ‘mere indications,’ ‘suggestions’? This would make ὠσπερ easier. If not, then what Plato says is ‘that our purest colours, those viz. which the painter uses, are not more beautiful than the ordinary colours of αὔτῇ ἡ γῆ.’

6. καταχρῶνται: here only the synonym of the simple verb.
8. ἡ τούτων: τούτων by attraction for ἡ ταύτα (ἔστι).
10. τὴν δὲ ὅσῃ λευκῇ: ‘another portion, as much as is white.’
12. συγκειμένην: refers to the ‘whole surface of the earth.’
13. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταύτα τὰ κοῖλα: ‘for even these hollows of the earth (like the one we dwell in), filled as they are with water and mist, present each a colour which gleams amid the diversity of the rest, so that the earth appears one unbroken surface of varied hues’: to a spectator from above each hollow appears not as a hollow but as a patch of colour on the earth’s smooth surface.
17. συνεχές ποικίλον: not to be taken asyndeton for συνεχές καὶ ποικίλον, but either συνεχές should be taken as an adverb with ποικίλον, or else, perhaps better, ἐν τῷ εἶδος συνεχές closely together, with ποικίλον qualifying the whole phrase.
19. ἀνὰ λόγον: ‘in proportion,’ i.e. as much more beautiful than our plants as is the surface of their earth more beautiful than the surface of our κοῖλα.
24. ταύτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα: ‘the stones that we prize,’ i.e. our precious stones: cf. Phil. 62 D διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπάν ἐπι- στήμην.
29. ὁσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνως καὶ ἄλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεύρο ἐγνέρφηκότων: most of the editors have found an awkwardness in the double ὑπὸ, and various remedies have been suggested: (a) omit ὑπὸ σηπεδόνως καὶ ἄλμης as a gloss on ὑπὸ τῶν δ. ἔσων (Schanz): but it is an improbable gloss, because any explanation of ὑπὸ τῶν δ. ἔσων is unnecessary after 109 B εἰς ἀξιόπορηκέναι τὸ τῇ ὑδάρῳ καὶ τῇ ὕδη χλωρᾶν καὶ τὸν ἄερα: (b) insert τῇ after second ὑπὸ (Heindorf): (c) change second ὑπὸ to ἀπὸ (Stallbaum): (d) put comma after ἄλμης, and take ὑπὸ σηπ. καὶ ἄλμης with οἱ ἐνθάδε, and ὑπὸ τῶν δ. ἔσων with διεφθαρμένοι (Archer-Hind after Dr. Verrall): but this is surely illogical, for how could τὰ δέόρο ἐγνέρφηκότα corrupt things on the surface? If this punctuation is right, there should be a marked contrast between the two ὑπὸ clauses, instead of their being practically identical. The mss. reading may very well stand, the two ὑπὸ’s standing in a slightly different relation to διεφθαρμένοι, ‘by corruption and brine owing to the action of . . .’: cf. Symp. 216 C καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν αἰλημάτων καὶ ἕγῳ καὶ ἀλλαὶ τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν ὑπὸ τούδε τοῦ Σατύρου.

36. ἐκφανῆ: ‘on the surface.’
42. ἂς περιρρεῖν: just as with us θάλαττα περιρρεῖ νῆσους.
49. ὁψεὶ καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ φρονήσει: cf. Ῥεπ. 367 c οἶνον ὅραν B ἀκοῆς ἐστιν φρονῆν.

50. τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει: 'eodem intervallo.'

54. φήμασ: the earliest meaning of this word is 'a mysterious and significant rumour,' 'a divine intimation,' identified with κλητών, and often coupled with ἐνυπνια, οἰωνοῖ etc. (v. L. and S., 1 and 2).

55. αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν: 'visions of the gods.'

56. αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτοῦς: the pronouns are emphatic, from C αὐτός, 'self': 'face to face': αὐτοῖς is 'men,' αὐτοῖς 'gods.'

CHAPTER LX

6. τὸ χάσμα αὐτοῦς ἔλαττον ἔχειν: this is the reading of all mss., but one, the Codex Tubingensis, which has αὐτῶν: this Heindorf emends to αὐτῶν, followed by Archer-Hind. But there is no need to change αὐτοῖς: it is certainly a repetition of τοῦ δὲ, but then the infn. ἔχειν is an anacoluthon for καὶ ἔχοντας, so that the strict grammatical form of the sentence is clearly lost sight of. For the repetition in αὐτοῦς Wyttenbach compares Xen. Τυχ. 1. iii. 13 περάσομαι τῷ πάππῳ ἀγαθῶν ἵππεων κράτιστος ὡν ἵππεως συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ.

9. τοῦτοις δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν . . . συντετρήσθαι: 'and all D these are connected by subterranean channels running in all directions, some narrower and some broader': the words καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν simply state the result of συντετρήσθαι in another form. For συντετράινον cf. Dem. 977. 22 ἐπερὸν μεταλλον συντρήσαι εἰς τὰ τῶν πλησίον, 'to run a gallery into a neighbour's mine.'

13. ὠσπερ εἰς κρατήρας: it is a probable suggestion, made by Fischer, that Plato is thinking of stone basins filled by fountains. This is better, at any rate, than Gottheber's explanation of κρατήρος as the 'crater of a volcano': the subsequent mention of ρύαξ is against this, as the two would not have been alluded to separately, if they both referred to a volcano.

ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη: 'perennial streams of incredible size,' a poetical phrase quite in keeping with the spirit of the μῦδος.

19. ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους: these are the 'hollows in the E earth's surface,' alluded to as τόποι at beginning of chapter.

20. ὡς ἐν ἑκάστοις τύχῃ: 'according as the flow of water
happens to reach each of them': ὃς is Stallbaum's corr. of mss. ὁν. As ἐκάστοις is τοποῖς, ὁν must be ποταμῶν: 'those rivers whose flow happens to reach them.' But it is not to the point here to dwell on the question 'what rivers fill the τόποι,' but only 'how the τόποι are filled.'

22. ὃσπερ αἰώραν τινά ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ: 'a sort of oscillation which exists in the earth': 'est quasi reciproca agitatio duarum lanciae librae suspensae neudum quiescentium, sed invicem sursum ac deorsum fluctuantium,' Wyttenbach. The Greeks had a machine called αἰώρα, very like the modern 'swing': Olympiodorus defines αἰώρα as ἀντισταλάντωσις.

112 A 27. ὃσπερ Ὀμηρος εἶπε: the line quoted is II. viii. 14.

33. γιγνονται τοιοῦτοι δι' οἴας ἄν καὶ τῆς γῆς ρέωσι: i.e. τοιοῦτοι οία ἐστὶ καὶ η γῆ δι' ἣς ἄν ρέωσιν, 'take their character from the earth through which they flow': Aristotle (v. quotation at end of ch.) represents γιγνονται τοιούτοι by τοὺς χμοὺς καὶ τὰς χρῶσι ἔχουν τὸ ἔδώρ.

B 36. πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὔτε βασιν: possibly we can trace a slight difference between the two words—πυθμένω being 'bed' or 'bottom,' and βάσις 'support,' the former being as a rule a part of the thing mentioned, the latter something outside on which it rests—'no bed or support'—it is free to move in any direction.

41. ὃσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων: 'just as when men breathe the current of the breath is exhaled and inhaled in succession.'

C 45. [ὁρμήσαν]: omitted by best mss.

46. τὸν δὴ κάτω καλοὶμένων: both δὴ and καλοὶμενον indicate that Plato does not accept the terminology: cf. Tim. 62 ε φύσει γὰρ δὴ τις τόπους δύο εἶναι διεληφότας διὰ τὸ πᾶν ἐναρτίον, τὸν μὲν κάτω, πρὸς δι' ἵπποιν πάνθ' ὅσα τινὰ σώματος ὅγκον ἔχει, τὸν δὲ ἄνω πρὸς δὲ ἀκούσιος ἔρχεται πᾶν, οὐκ ὃρθων οὐδαμὴ νομίζειν.

47. τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πεύματα: τοῖς is in all the mss., and it is difficult to account for its interpolation, if it is an interpolation: if it is retained, it should be taken as a 'local' dative, 'it flows into (or through) the regions about the streams of the lower hemisphere,' certainly a very awkward phrase. Geddes takes it as instr., 'by means of the channels communicating with these rivers,' but what is the noun to be supplied with this instr. dative τοῖς? Wyttenbach reads τότε. On such a point it is impossible to dogmatise: it would certainly be easier without τοῖς: on the other hand τοῖς is not quite impossible.
53. εἰς οὗς ἐκάστους ὀδοποιεῖται: there is no need to alter the MSS. ἐκάστους, for the point of which cf. 111E ὅτι καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τότους πληροισθαί, ὥς ἄν ἐκάστος τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιφρον γιγνομένη: ‘to which, in each particular case, they make their way.’ ὀδοποιεῖται should probably be taken as middle—‘viam sibi faciunt’ [L. and S. say ‘passive’].

59. πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς: Plato is here in- distinctively shadowing forth a theory of gravitation: once the impulse, which, derived from αἰώρα, has pumped the water from Tartarus into e.g. the northern hemisphere, has exhausted itself, the water by the force of gravity begins to find its way down again towards the centre of the earth into Tartarus. There is, however, no apparent logical or scientific reason why the water should re-enter Tartarus below where it left it, but only lower down than the point at which it begins to descend. Plato is not concerned here to work out in detail a theory of gravity: it is a mere rough generalisation, for a further criticism of which cf. note on μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ’ οὗ (below), with plan.

60. καταντικρὺ ἡ εἰσρεῖ εἶέπεσεν: an abbreviated form of καταντικρὺ ἐκαίνου τοῦ τόπου ἡ εἰσρεῖ, so that we need not emend to ἡ or ἡ, though the latter would not be unnatural Greek: cf. Symp. 173A ὅτε τῇ πρώτῃ ταραγθία ἐνίκησεν Ἀγάθων, τῇ ὑστεραιᾳ ἡ ἡ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἐθενε. The meaning is that a river “may issue from Tartarus, e.g. on the West, and re-enter it from the East.” Aristotle (v. quotation at end of ch.) explains Plato’s meaning as follows—τὰ δὲ καταντικρὺ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οὗν εἰ μὲν ἢρξαντο κατωθεν, ἀνωθεν ἐκβάλλειν (ἐκβάλλειν = “discharge itself into Tartarus,” and so εἰσρεῖν). This is almost certainly a misrepresentation of Plato, as ἀνωθὲν and κατωθὲν would violate Plato’s law—μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ’ οὗ (v. note on these words).

65. καθέντα: καθιέναι, like ἐκβάλλειν, of a river is used as an intransitive verb: originally τὸ ὅφρ would be understood.

66. ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, πέρα δ’ οὗ: the point of Ε this will be more clearly seen by a reference to the accompanying rough plan of a section of the earth. Α’ represents Tartarus: in speaking of Tartarus Plato thinks mainly of the part of it near the centre of the earth—τῇ μὲν ἑνὶ ἤχει βασιλέαυ ὕπο χθονὸς ἐτεί βέρεθρον: but as he says it goes διαμπερεῖ δ’ δῆλη τῆς γῆς it must be represented more or less as it is in the plan—the direction of the χάσμα is not of vital importance. Β΄ is the section of an imaginary plane dividing the earth into two hemispheres: D is τὸ ἠμέτρον κοιλῶν: ΕΕ’ is a stream of ‘our
hemisphere.' The _ai_ _ω_ _pa_ pumps the water up from O, the centre of Tartarus, and our stream finds its way out at E; it must find its way back to Tartarus at E', _υποκάτω τῆς ἐκροῆς_ (v. note). This is due to gravitation: now if gravity is a force acting towards O, the centre of the earth, E' ought to be any point of Tartarus lying within the circle E F F', any point between E and G; it might re-enter Tartarus at E''. But Plato says it can descend _μὲχρι τοῦ μέσου, πέρα δ' οὖ_, i.e. it cannot cross the line B B'. This, if analysed, implies that gravitation acts not along the radii of the earth's sphere, directly on O, but perpendicularly to the plane which divides the earth into two hemispheres, the plane represented in section by B B': gravitation acting from A to B B' carries the water downwards towards B B', but a corresponding gravitation from A' to B B' prevents it from crossing the plane B B'. This again implies that the plane B B' is fixed, i.e. that there are really in the
nature of things two hemispheres. [It would be just possible to avoid this conclusion by taking μέχρι τού μέσου to mean, not a point between E and O, but a point between D', where the stream leaves the earth's surface and begins to descend, and O: i.e. that it cannot cross the plane CC'—the plane perpendicular to D'O; the objection to this is that Plato's language does not suggest that he had in his mind any such point as D', but only E.] It would be unreasonable to expect elaborate and exact scientific accuracy in a myth of this nature: the direction of gravitation is only roughly generalised.

Aristotle has a criticism of Plato's theory in the Meteorologica ii. 2 το δ' ἐν Φαίδωνι γεγραμμένον περὶ τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἀδύνατον ἔστων, λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπαντά μὲν εἰς ἀλλήλα συντετριμνα ὑπὸ γῆ, ἀρχὴ δὲ πάντων εἰς καὶ πηγῆ τῶν υδάτων διὰ καλούμενον Τάρταρος, περὶ τὸ μέσον υδάτος τι πλῆθος, ἐξ οὐ καὶ τὰ ῥέωντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ῥέωντα ἀναδίδωσι πάντα. τὴν δ' ἐπίρρυσιν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ἐκαστά τῶν ρεμάτων διὰ τὸ σαλέουν ἀεὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. οὐκ ἔχειν γὰρ ἔδραν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον εἰλείσθαι· κινοῦμενον δ' ἀνα καὶ κάτω ποιεῖν τὴν ἐπίκυρον τοῖς ρεῖμαιν. τὰ δὲ πολλαχοῦ μὲν λιμνάζειν, οἷαν καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι θάλατταν, πάντα δὲ πάλιν κύκλω περιάγειν εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν, θεῖν ἥρβαντο ἰδίω, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτόν τῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρύ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον εἰ ρεῖν ἥρβαντο κάτωθεν, ἀναβοθεῖν εἰσβάλλειν. εἶναι δὲ μέχρι τοῦ μέσου τῆς κάθεσιν· τὸ γὰρ λαυτόν πρὸς ἀναντες ἦδη πάσην εἶναι τὴν φοράν· τοὺς δὲ χυμοὺς καὶ τὰ χρῶνες ἵσχειν τὸ ὕδωρ δι' οἷαν ἄν τιχώσω ρέοντα γῆς. συμβαινει δὲ τοὺς ποταμοὺς ρεῖν οὐκ ἐπὶ ταύτων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τούτων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰς τὸ μέσον εἰσέρχοντο, ἄφ' οἴσιν εἰρέοντοι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ρευσόντας κάτωθεν ἡ ἀνάβειν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὁπότερα ἄν ρέειν χυμαίνων ὁ Τάρταρος, καίτοι τούτων συμβαίνοντος γένοιτ' ἄν τὸ λεγόμενον "ἀνω ποταμῶν", ὀπέρ ἀδύνατον. A strange criticism, as the proverb ἀνω ποταμῶν can only refer to the impossibility of rivers flowing uphill on the earth's surface: and Plato's ἄιώρα is a force strong enough to overcome gravitation, which only begins to act when the impulse of the ἄιώρα is exhausted.

67. ἀναντες γὰρ πρόσο: the mss. have πρόσ: πρόσω is Heindorf's suggestion, Hermann reading πώς: πρόσω must be taken as though it were πρόσω ρέουσι: 'for to both sets of streams the opposite half of the globe is uphill against their further progress.'

CHAPTER LXI

3. τετταρ' ἅττα ρεύματα: the four rivers are from Homer, Od. x. 511—
νὴα μὲν αὐτοῦ κέλσαι ἐπ’ Ἡκανῷ βαθῦνην,
αὐτὸς δ’ εἰς Ἀίδην λέναι δόμον εὐφῶντα:
ἔθη μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυρίφλεγέθαν τε ἱέουσιν
Κωκυτὸς θ’, δὲ δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρωφῆς.

4. ἐξωτάτω ρέον: what is ἐξωτάτω? does it mean ‘it makes the widest circle of the earth’? (i.e. nearest to the plane B B’): this seems the best interpretation.

5. [περὶ] κύκλω: the mss. περὶ is suspicious: κύκλῳ περὶ with accus. is common, but without a case περὶ adds nothing to κύκλῳ, and would more naturally be attached to ρέον—περὶπρέον κύκλῳ. Heindorf reads πέρξ, which may be right—κύκλῳ πέρξ is found elsewhere. At any rate we cannot make περὶ govern κύκλῳ.

6. τούτου δὲ καταντικρύ: i.e. it flows out of Tartarus from the side opposite to Oceanus, and flows the other way round.

113 A

7. ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ: cf. 116 C καὶ ἄλλως . . καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν . ., for the more usual ἄλλως τε καὶ.

10. τῶν πολλῶν: limits τῶν τευνηκότων—’the majority of them,’ those viz. who have not lived the philosophic life.

13. τὰς τῶν ζωῶν γενέσεις: ‘the generations of living things.’

14. τούτων κατὰ μέσον: between Oceanus and Acheron.

ἐκβάλλει: = ἐξέπεσεν of 112 D, as ἐκβολῆς = ἐκροής: L. and S. quote this passage in the sense of ‘empty, discharge itself’ (the regular meaning of ἐξῆμι, ἐκδίδωμι), which, of course, makes nonsense. Plato here adapts his compounds to the special theory of Tartarus.

17. ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ: the genitive is the primitive genitive of ‘material’ (a branch of the partitive?), like that following πλέως: cf. Ἀνθ. καὶ πείδα ζέουσα πολυπερέων Αγαρηνῶν: Phaedr. 230 B ἣ τε αὖ πηγῆ ἤει μάλα ψυχροῦ ὕδατος: Luc. Alex. 59 σκωλήκων ζέσας.

B

19. περιελιπτόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῇ]: the mss. reading τῇ γῇ should mean ‘circling round the surface of the earth,’ and if that is so, what are we to make of παρ’ ἐσχατα τῇ Ἀχερ. λίμνης? In 113 A we are told that the Ἀχερ. λίμνη is underground, and to explain τῇ γῇ here Wohlrab resorts to the improbable hypothesis that there is another Acherusian lake on the surface of the earth, connected with and bearing the same name as the under lake. Although the phraseology of 113 C D rather suggests that all the rivers come to the earth’s surface, it seems more probable that Plato, in speaking of Pyrithlegethon, thinks only of its sub-
terranian course, so that τῇ γῇ is probably an unintelligent marginal note.

21. οὗ συμμεγνύμενος τῷ ὑδατὶ: it only skirts the end of the lake.

22. κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου: τοῦ Ταρτάρου is partitive-genitive, not comparative: there is no such thing as 'lower than Tartarus': 'into a lower depth of Tartarus.'

24. οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥάκες ἀποστάσματα ἀναφυσώσιν: 'fragments of which are heaved up by lava-streams.'

25. ὅτι ἄν τύχωσι: sc. ἀναφυσώστε.

28. οἷον ὁ κυανός: whatever the substance indicated by κυανός, whether, as more usually, a metal (possibly steel), or lapis lazuli, the colour is 'dark-blue.'

29. καὶ τὴν λίμνην . . Στύγα: for the combination of Κ relative and independent clause with the same verb cf. Λαος 683 Α εἰς Δακεδάμωνα ἤν ὑμείς ὄρθως ἔφατε κατοικεῖσθαι καὶ Κρήτην ὑπὸ ἄδελφοι νόμοις. Homer and Hesiod make Στύξ not a lake, but a river.

CHAPTER LXII

3. διεδικάσαντο: cf. note on 107 D.

6. ἃ δὴ αὐτὸς ὀχύρματα ἐστιν: Archer-Hind translates 'which, it is said (δὴ), are provided for them': would it not be better to take it as in 107 Α εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, that Plato does not specify the particular vessel or conveyance?

11. οἱ δ' ἄν δὸξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν: the punishment of these Ε incurables is not for the sake of retribution, but of warning, to others: cf. Gorg. 525 ο οιδ' ἄν τὰ ἐσχατὰ ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαύτα ἀδίκημα ἀνιάτοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τά παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὕτω αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὄνηματι οὐδὲν ἄτε ἀνίατο οὐντες, ἀλλοι δὲ ὄνηματι οἱ τούτοις ὄρωντες διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὄδυνηστα καὶ φοβηρώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδειγμάτα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεί ἐν "Λιδοῦ ἐν τῷ ἰδεσμοτηρή, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφίκεσθαι θέματα καὶ νονθετήματα.

13. ἱεροσυλίας: for the special heinuousness of this offence cf. Λαος 854 Α ὁ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἀνθρώπων σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θείον κινεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν προτρέπον ιέναι, οἴστρος δὲ σὲ τὶς ἐμφύλωμεν οἱ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαδάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώπως ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενος ἀλητηριώδης.

16. τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ἰσπιεῖ: this δὲ is like
the early Greek ‘δέ in apodosis’: in Attic it is most frequent in sentences of this kind, where two classes of persons are referred to, each described by a relative clause, introduced by μέν and δέ: the δέ of the second relative clause is repeated with the demonstrative to emphasise the contrast: so in the next clause —οι δ’ αν . . τούτοις δέ . . ; cf. 78 c, 80 D.

20. καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς . . βιώσιν: μεταμέλον is used absolutely, in an adverbial relation to βιώσιν: ‘and live the rest of their days in repentance.’

114 A

22. τοιοῦτω τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ: referring to the previous ὑπ’ ὀργῆς, and so contrasted with the φόνοι ἄδικοι καὶ παράνομοι of the ἀνισα: practically ‘homicide,’ as contrasted with ‘murder.’

25. τὸ κύμα: i.e. owing to ἡ ἀλώρα.

26. κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτὸν: ‘to be borne along the stream of Cocytus.’


28. κατὰ τὴν Ἁμυνὴ τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα: in the last chapter both Cocytus and Pyrrhlegeton are made to skirt the Acherusian lake at opposite ends.

B

37. πρὶν ἀν πέσωσιν οὕς ἢδίκησαν: a clear allusion to the Athenian law which enacted that an involuntary homicide might not return from exile (ἀπευθανασίμος) till he appeased the family of the deceased: cf. Dem. 983. 13 ἄλλ’ ὄμοι ἀπάντων τοῦτων ὄροι καὶ λύσις τοῖς παθόυσι τέτακται τὸ πεισθέντας ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τοῦτ’ αὖτι τὸ δίκαιον ἐν πάσιν ἱσχύει ἄστ’ ἐάν ἔλαβεν τὸν ἄδικον φόνον καὶ σαφῶς ἐπίδειξα μὴ καθαρὸν, μετὰ ταῦτ’ αἰδεύσῃ καὶ ἀφῆ, οὐκέτ’ ἐκβαλεῖν κύριος τοῦ αὐτῶν ἑστίν.

39. πρὸς τὸ ὀσίως βιώναι: Archer-Hind finds an insuperable difficulty in the mss. reading, with which an infin. must be supplied for ὀσίως from βιώναι: Stallbaum says it stands for διαφερόντωσι βιώναι πρός τὸ ὀσίως βιώναι, quoting Philib. 61 ο ἄρα πάσαν ἡδονήν πάσα φρονήσει μεγεντεῖς τοῦ καλῶς (sc. μυγνύαι) μάλιστ’ ἃν ἐπιτυχομεν; Symp. 181 B πρός τὸ διαπράξασθαι μόνον βλέποντες, ἀμελεύσει δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μή: Εὐθ. 51 Α ἄλλα μὲν που καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τὰ σκέψι έργασι τὸ ὀρθῶς (sc. χρήσθαι) ἐπιστήμη ἑστίν ἡ ἀπεργαζομένη. But in all these cases the infin. to be supplied has already been used
in the same or the previous sentence, which puts them in a different class from our example. I should rather be inclined, instead of actually supplying βιῶνα, to say that ὁσιον (of πρὸς τὸ ὁσιόν, which we might have expected) has been drawn into the adverb by the proximity of βιῶνα: Greek is so extremely flexible, so little tied down by grammar as compared with logic, that the phrase πρὸς τὸ ὁσιός βιῶνα does not appear to me to present any difficulty whatsoever, though I quite agree with A.-H. that Stallbaum’s examples are not to the point: any page of Thuc. will furnish cases of constructions as little ‘grammatical’ as this. Of course it is impossible to refute A.-H.’s suggestion that a word like ἐχειν may have fallen out after διαφερόντως, but the gratuitous insertion of a word should be a last resort. [N.B.—Theodoret quotes this with προςκρίθαι after βιῶνα, and Clement of Alex. has προςκεκλήθαι: the latter is certainly not Plato, and the former looks like a correction of the latter.]

43. ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι: i.e. on the real, upper surface of the earth, not in one of the ‘hollows.’

45. καθηράμενοι: one of the rare direct reflexive middles, like λοιόμαι.

ἀνεν τε σωμάτων ζώσι: Plato is thinking of the ‘bodily passions’ from which the soul is liberated: it is not quite the same as the χωρὶς σωμάτων (76 c) of the soul’s praenatal condition, for these souls of the καθαρόι are not to be born again, as are those of 76 c. In the Phaedr. 246 c Plato speaks of some sort of σῶμα even for the highest existences—ἀδανατῶν τι ζῶν ἔχον μὲν ψυχῆν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα ἔμπεφυκότα.

47. ἃς οὔτε ράδιον δηλώσαι: cf. 1 Cor. ii. 9 ‘Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.’

50. τὰν ποιεῖν ὡστε . . .: the moral of the whole dialogue.

CHAPTER LXIII

114 d–115 a, c. lxiii. To insist that all these details are strictly accurate were folly; yet something like this is the fate of the soul and her habitation after death. Wherefore it is well worth while for a man to bestow all care upon his soul during this life, that she may be free from bodily passions and adorned with true virtue. And now, continues Socrates, my hour is at hand; and I will go to bathe my body for my burial.
D 6. τούτο καὶ πρέπειιν μοι δοκεῖ: with πρέπειν we are to supply διόσχυροσθαί: the following clause is different, οἰομένῳ going closely with κινεύεσθαι, 'to run the risk of holding this opinion.' Whether we are to continue the νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ to πρέπειν, or to both πρέπειν and κινεύεσθαι, or to understand οἰομένῳ as of quite general reference, is uncertain: it makes no difference to the sense. Wagner analyses it wrongly: he says it τούτο καὶ δοκεῖ μοι πρέπειν οἰομένῳ ὦτως ἔχειν καὶ ἄξιον κινεύεσθαι οἰομένῳ ὦτως ἔχειν.

8. τουαῦτα ὠσπερ ἐπάδειν ἐαυτῷ: cf. 77 E ἀλλὰ χρὴ ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἔως ἃν ἐξεπάσητε.

E 14. πλέον θάτερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι: 'do more harm than good.' Some of the editors take πλέον as neut. adj., secondary predicate with ἀπεργάζεσθαι: so Prof. Geddes, 'make bad worse.' But the phrase does not sound as if it meant that (especially θάτερον): ἀπεργ. must be taken absolutely with θάτερον, produce an evil effect,' and πλέον adverbially (even if πλέον is adjectival), it is not a secondary predicate. Another question arises as to whether θάτερον is here a euphemism for τὸ κακὸν: my own opinion is that it is helped out here by ἄλλοτρον ὦτας, which means οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεργαζόμενος. On the view of θάτερον as a euphemism, Prof. Geddes says: 'The origin of this euphemism was probably deeper than a mere feeling of politeness can explain, and is to be traced to the influence of Pythagoreanism, as first permeating Platonism, and thereby the subsequent periods of ancient literature. In a dualistic system, such as that of Pythagoras, ἔτερος came easily to be a synonym for κακὸν. The earliest traces of such an absolute use of ἕτερος are found in the Pythagorean poets: Pindar Pythian iii. 34 δαῖμον δ᾽ ἕτερος ἐσ τακὸν πρέπειαν ἐδαμάσαστο μν.: Aesch. Ag. 151 σπευδόμενα θυσίαν ἐτέραν, ἄνομον τιν', ἄδαιτον. The other Platonic passages quoted by the editors for the absolute euphemistic sense of θάτερον bear out the suggestion made above that it is helped out by the context: e.g. Euthyd. 297 D ὁ δ᾽ (sc. Ἰῶλος) αὐτῷ ἱκανῶς ἑβούλησεν. ὁ δ᾽ ἐμὸς Ἰῶλως Πατροκλῆς εἰ ἐλθον πλέον ἄν θάτερον ποιήσειεν (sc. θάτερον τοῦ ἱκανῶς βοηθήσατ). 16. τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε . . .: cf. 1 Peter iii. 3 'Whose adorning let it not be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or of putting on of apparel; but let it be the hidden man of the heart, in that which is not corruptible, even the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit.'
quent language of dying heroes of tragedy, Socrates mocks gently at his own 'fine phrase,' καλεῖ ἡ εἰμαρμένη: nothing could better suggest Socrates' entire cheerfulness in the prospect of death. The phrase itself is in keeping with the lofty thought of its context: but as applied to himself it has a suggestion of bombast, and Socrates, with his wonted εἰρωνεία, at once drops to a more homely level, ἄλλ' ὡρα τραπέσοθαι πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν.

25. οὐσάμενον πιεῖν: 'not to drink . . till I have bathed.'

CHAPTER LXIV

115 a—116 a, c. lxiv. Kriton now inquires of Socrates what are his last injunctions. Only that you will take good heed to yourselves, he replies, and put into practice the principles affirmed in our late discourse. But how are we to bury you? asks Kriton. Socrates answers with a smile, As you please, provided you can catch me. It would seem that all my words have been thrown away, and I fail to persuade you that this Socrates who now speaks to you will presently take flight to the company of the gods, and that all you will bury is his forsaken body. So, my friends, be surety for me to Kriton, not this time that I shall stay, but that I shall verily depart. But seriously such incorrect language is mischievous: say then that it is my body which you bury, and bury it as seems to you best.


6. οὐδὲν καυσότερον: the force of the comparative is practically in abeyance; we are not necessarily to understand καυσότερον δὲν ἀει λέγω: the commonest example is νεώτερον in such phrases as μηδὲν νεώτερον ποιεῖν, 'to do nothing unconstitutional,' where the comp. slightly emphasises the depreciatory sense of νέον.

ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελοῦμενοι: the real 'you,' i.e. the soul: cf. Apol. 29 ε φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡσ ἐπιτέτη γέται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;

7. καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς: apparently neuter—'to me and mine,' with reference mainly to his children, though it might well be extended to include his 'disciples,' his spiritual children: cf. the use of τὰ φιλτατα and τὰ ἐμά in Tragedy: e.g. Soph. El. 537 ἄλλ' ἄντ' ἀδελφοί δὴ τα Μενέλεω κταύων τῷ δ' οὐκ ἐμελλε τῶν δοῦσεν δίκην;

R
9. κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσῃ: 'even though you do not at
the moment agree with my argument': we might have expected
τοῖς εἰρημένοις, and Wohlrab takes it to mean 'even though
you make no promise at the moment,' but this, besides giving
a forced meaning to ὁμολογήσῃ, is not the proper contrast
required, which is surely that between 'consent to a theory'
and 'the philosophic life.'

C 13. οὔδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε: 'it will profit you nothing': for
the phrase cf. πλέον ἔχειν, πλεονεκτεῖν.

19. ὥσ ἐγὼ εἰμὶ οὕτως ὁ Σωκράτης: Prof. Geddes is clearly
wrong in taking ἐγὼ as predicate—'constitutes the being I call
I': Crito has said πῶς θάπτωμεν σε; to which Socrates replies
'Bury me as you please, if you can catch me,' and then goes
on to show that the real 'I' cannot be buried: 'the real I is
this Socrates who is conversing with you.'

D 26. εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινας εὐδαιμονίας: δὴ is not ironical (as
Wohlrab suggests): it is rather either (a) 'deictic,' 'such as
you remember I spoke of,' or (b) going closely with τινας, not
specifying the particular εὐδαιμονία, for which cf. 113 D (note).

ταυτά μοι δοκό: I see no reason for Archer-Hind's
change of μοι to μή: μή . . . ἄλλας λέγω would be natural
enough, but does not μοι δοκό . . . ἄλλας λέγειν express just
the same thing? μή δοκό seems to me illogical; it would be
in English 'I am afraid it looks as if . . .'

30. ἥ ἢν οὕτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς ἡγγανότο: Crito, along
with Plato, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, was Socrates' surety
on his trial: cf. Αρολ. 38 B Πλάτων δὲ οδε, ὥ ἀνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι,
καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδορος κελεύονται μὲ τριά-
κοντα μιῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυάσθαι.

31. ἥ μὴν παραμενεῖν . . ἥ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν: 'for my
appearance . . for my disappearance.'

E 36. ὥσ ἡ προτιθέται Σωκράτη ἡ ἐκφέρει ἡ κατορύπτει: 'that
it is Socrates that he is laying out for burial or following to
the grave or burying': the middle προτιθέται is naturally used
of the person superintending the arrangements: cf. Θυκ. ii.
34 τὰ μὲν ὡστά προτιθένται τῶν ἀπογενόμενων πρότιτα σκηνῆν
ποιήσαντες . . . ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορά ἡ κτλ.

38. τὸ μὴ καλὸς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελεῖς:
'inaccuracy of speech is not only wrong in itself, but engenders
evil in the soul.' εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο—'as far as concerns the actual
inaccuracy,' i.e. as calculated to mislead the hearer. The evil
engendered in the soul is inaccuracy of thought, e.g. thinking
the 'body,' as remaining in the form of νεκρός, is the actual
Socrates. The Socratic teaching aimed above all at definiteness and accuracy in language and thought (v. Introd. B).

42. καὶ ὑπετείχον ὑπως: this second ὑπετείχον should be taken as depending on χρη, not on φάναι.

CHAPTER LXV

116 A–117 A, c. lxv. Socrates retires to the bath, and on his return takes leave of his children and household. After a little further conversation with his friends he is warned by the servant of the Eleven that the hour of his death is at hand. The man warmly testifies to the noble character of Socrates and departs in tears. Socrates, after a few kind words concerning him, bids the poison be brought. Nay, remonstrates Kriton, the sun is yet on the mountains; many prisoners have put off drinking the hemlock till far on into the evening: there is no haste. They acted after their kind, answers Socrates; but I were false to myself, were I so covetous of the little remnant of my life: therefore bring the poison.


2. ὡς λουσώμενος: for this calm preparation for death cf. Eur. Alcestis 158—

επει γὰρ ἢσθεθ ἡμέραν τὴν κυρίαν
ἡκούσαν, ὑδασὶ ποιμαῖοι λευκὸν χρῶα
ἐλώσατ'.

5. ἀνασκοποῦντες: 'reviewing': ἁνα- as in ἀναλαμβάνω.

7. ἀτεχνώς: cf. note on 82 e.

10. δοῦ γὰρ αὐτῷ: cf. note on τὸ παιδίον 60 A. B

11. αἱ οἰκείαι γυναῖκες: 'the women of his family.' Archer-Hind says 'some suppose that this expression gave rise to the absurd fable that Socrates had two wives living at the same time; of whom the second, Myrto, daughter or grand-daughter of the famous Aristides, was the mother of his two younger children: see Diog. Laert. ii. 26.'


20. οὐ καταγωγόσωμαι σοι: 'I shall not find the same fault with you that I find with most.'

24. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ: i.e. during your imprisonment. R 2
29. ἄ ἡλθον ἄγγελλων: there is no need for Schanz’s emendation ἄγγελων: cf. Crit. 43 c ἄφιγμαι ἄγγελλων φέρων χαλεπὴν: Soph. Ant. 1172 τι δ’ αὖ τὸδ’ ἄχθος βασιλέων ἥκεις φέρων;

D 34. ὦς ἀστείος ὁ ἄνθρωπος: ‘what a charming fellow he is.’

38. μὲ ἀποδακρύει: cf. 117 ε ἀπέκλαυον ἐμαυτῶν.

40. τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος: not the gaoler, but the ‘servant’ whose business it is to prepare the poison: there is no occasion to specify the individual.

E 46. δὲν δὲν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες: τοῦτοι δὲν δὲν . . .

48. ἐτὶ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ: ‘there is still time to spare.’

117 A 54. φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος: an allusion to a familiar Greek proverb—‘stinting when the jar is empty’: cf. Hesiod Works and Days 367 μεσοῦθι φειδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ’ εὖν πυθένι φείδω, and Latin ‘sera in fundo parsimonia.’

55. ἀλλ’ θὰ, ἐφη, πιθοῦ: ‘go then and do as I ask you, and do not refuse me’: the subject of ἐφη is Socrates.

CHAPTER LXVI

117 A–118 A, cc. lxvi. lxvii. The last moments of Socrates.

B 9. καὶ οὔτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει: ‘and then the poison will act of itself.’ The editors quote medical writers for the use of ποιεῖν of medicine taking effect, Dioscorides i. 95 ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα, ‘is efficacious against poison’: Strabo 234 λούτρα κάλλιστα ποιεῖντα πρὸς νόσους: in our passage the word is chosen with reference to the preceding τι χρὴ ποιεῖν; ‘the poison will do the rest without your help’ (αὐτό). The matter-of-fact manner of the attendant who administers the poison gives to the closing scene a strong impress of historical truth: he is clearly not the same man as the friendly gaoler, and to him Socrates is no different from the ordinary criminal.

16. πρὸς τὸ ἀποστείπα τινι: this playful allusion to the Greek custom of pouring a libation to some deity before drinking reminds us of the similar scene recorded in Xen. Hell. i. iii.

56. the death of Theramenes: καὶ ἔπει γε ἀποθνῄσκετες ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ κόὼν ἐπιε, τὸ λειπόμενον ἐφασαν ἀποκοτταβίζοντα εἰτεύν αὐτὸν. Κρισί τούτ’ ἐστω τῷ καλῷ.

23. ἐπισχόμενος: ‘holding it to his lips’: cf. Apoll. Rhod. C i. 472—

it seems to suggest ‘drinking at one draught.’

36. κατέκλασε: cf. the Homeric κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ.

40. πλημμελοίεν: observe how close this is to the original use of the word, of something ‘discordant,’ ‘out of harmony.’

ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρή τελευτάν: Olymp. 171 διὶ ἐν εὐφημίᾳ Ε τελευτάν ἕξιόν όι Πυθαγόρειοι ὦς ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ θεοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, εὐφημία being the silence observed at sacrifices and other religious ceremonies.

52. τηγυντὸ: for this form cf. διασκεδασνύται 77 B.

καὶ αὐτός ἢπτετο: I think it is impossible to say with certainty whether αὐτός here is Socrates or ὁ δοῦς τὸ φάρμακον: the former is the more obvious interpretation of the word αὐτός taken by itself, but the use of αὐτῷ after γένηται, and the whole tone of the sentence ἐπείδαν... οἰχήσεται, suggests that the speaker is the prison official, in which case αὐτός must be taken as contrasted with ἐπεδείκνυτο, ‘made us feel.’

57. τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀμελομεν ἀλεξτρυόνα: a ‘cock’ was the customary offering of a person recovered from sickness to Aesculapius, the god of healing. Prof. Geddes says: ‘In ancient art the cock soon took its place as a symbol of the god of day: Plutarch (Mor. 400 c) refers to a painter who symbolised morning by a figure of Apollo with a cock upon his hand. .. From the worship of Apollo it naturally descended to that of the son of Apollo, Aesculapius, who was supposed to execute in one of its departments the restorative function of the healing God.’ On the lips of Socrates this injunction to ‘pay a cock to Aesculapius’ is very clearly an allusion to the philosopher’s view of life as a sickness of which death is the final healing. Prof. Geddes compares several passages: Aesch. fr. ὧ θάρατε Παιάν, μή μ’ ἀτιμᾶγες μολεῖ: Soph. Ajax 692 καὶ τάκ’ ἀν μ’ ἐσω πῦθοσθε, κεί νῦν δυστυχώ, σεσωσμένον: the prayer ‘Iovi Liberatori’ on the lips of Seneca and Thrasea
at death: Shaks. *Timon* v. 1 'My long sickness Of health and living now begins to mend.'

63. *καὶ ὃς*: Socrates: 'And his eyes had become fixed.'


**CHAPTER LXVII**

3. *τῶν τότε ὁν ἐπειράθημεν*: τῶν τότε with a superlative is the regular formula in such eulogies: τότε need create no difficulty, as it is looked at from the point of view not so much of Phaedo, telling his story soon after Socrates' death, as of Plato at the time of writing. Wyttenbach proposes τῶν πώποτε, but that is quite out of keeping with the studiously modest tone of ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἁν.

4. *καὶ ἄλλως*: refers to ἀπάστου, 'and in other ways ...' i.e. practically 'and besides,' or 'and in every way ...'
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